Expressing a ruling as a true statement does not eliminate the need for subject matter analysis

Hujjat al-Islam wa al-Muslimin Hujjatullah Bayat in an exclusive interview with the Center for Contemporary Jurisprudence Studies:

In interviews or meetings with the officials of the Subject Matter Analysis Center, eminent jurists and high-ranking authorities expect that the subject matter analysis of rulings will be carried out quickly and accurately by this center. Of course, it is also necessary for jurists to clarify this issue in terms of methodology, whether they accept the findings of the subject matter analysis of this center? Do they consider the center’s method for discovering topics correct?

Hujjat al-Islam wa al-Muslimin Hujjatullah Bayat has been one of the pillars and founders of the Center for the Subject Matter Analysis of Jurisprudence since the very beginning of its establishment and has been active in its various sections to this day. We spoke with the head of the Subject Matter Analysis Center about the nature, importance, and position of the subject matter analysis of jurisprudence rulings. He believes that the claim that rulings are expressed in the form of true propositions does not eliminate the need for thematic analysis. In this interview, he responded to the way in which issues are expressed by experts and other questions that were facing the thematic analysis of jurisprudential rulings. The details of the exclusive interview of Contemporary Jurisprudence with the editor of the bi-monthly journal “Thematic Analysis of Jurisprudence” are given below:

Contemporary Jurisprudence: What is the importance of jurisprudential subject matter?

 

Mr. Bayat: When we look at jurisprudential propositions and sentences that contain a jurisprudential ruling, we see that these sentences are composed of at least two components: subject matter and ruling; that is, when we say that blood is impure, water is pure, or usury is forbidden, these prohibitions, impurity, and purity that are jurisprudentially placed on usury, blood, and water must have a specific subject matter so that the ruling applies to that subject matter; therefore, ambiguity in the subject matter causes ambiguity in the ruling. If we do not know and do not recognize the subject matter, how are we going to infer and implement the ruling?

So we need subject matter in two positions: the jurist in the position of inferring the ruling, and the obligated person in the position of implementing the ruling; because he must understand the concept of the essence and the instance of the subject matter in the position of compliance. Therefore, the importance of subject matter is much greater and precedes the inference of the ruling; Because the ruling is subject to the changes with the subject, the ruling also changes. Also, if the subject is ambiguous, the ruling becomes ambiguous and will be basically undecided.

Of course, some have raised the suspicion that the jurist, in the capacity of issuing fatwa, basically has nothing to do with the subject, but rather bases the ruling on real issues, not on external issues that require subject knowledge. The answer is that first of all, the jurist cannot be completely empty of mind about the subject and issue a ruling. For example, in the case of alcohol, he must have a brief idea of ​​​​alcohol and whether it is black or white, edible or visible or traded or… . In addition, subject knowledge in our era is not limited to the prescribed topics that have been used in verses and narrations, but today we are faced with new topics that basically we cannot infer the ruling unless we know these; because the jurist has no idea about these topics; Such as cryptocurrency, forex, sperm bank, etc.; therefore, subject knowledge is the basis of jurisprudence, and as the Supreme Leader has said, subject knowledge precedes the inference of a ruling, and the ruling is subordinate to the subject; for this reason, the great jurists consider the subject as the cause of the ruling.

Contemporary Jurisprudence: Given that jurists are not experts in all subjects, how can they be sure of the correct identification of the subject?

Mr. Bayat: We have a serious discussion in jurisprudence under the title of referring to experts and specialists. Naturally, if a jurist is an expert in a subject, he can recognize the subject and infer and announce the ruling based on his perception of the subject; but given the multitude, multiplicity, diversity, and complexities of new subjects, naturally a jurist cannot be a specialist and expert in all of these. This is where he must use his expertise and knowledge in explaining the subjects. Naturally, a jurist, with the confidence he has in his individual knowledge of a subject, can gain a clear idea of ​​the dimensions of the subject through discussion and explanation of the subject by experts, and can infer and announce rulings based on the knowledge he gains about the subject.

There are very diverse and technical issues here, such as who is an expert and what characteristics should he have? What is the basis for the authority of an expert’s opinion? What should be done if a conflict occurs between experts? This is where the existence of a complex and center that can provide the jurist with a reliable opinion on that subject in a systematic manner and by utilizing the maximum capacities of experts in specialized subjects is felt. Accordingly, eminent jurist and high authorities of taqlid, in interviews or meetings they have with the officials of the subject matter center, expect that the subject matter of rulings will be analyzed by this center quickly and accurately. Of course, it is also necessary for jurists to clarify this issue in terms of methodology: do they accept the thematic findings of this center? Do they consider the center’s method for discovering topics correct? And questions like that.

Contemporary Jurisprudence: Scholars of various sciences believe that unless someone has studied and seriously studied in those sciences, they cannot properly understand the concepts and issues of those sciences. Now, can a jurist’s mere “familiarity” with a subject be considered proof of his/her image of that subject?

Mr. Bayat: If we accept that a jurist does not have the possibility and ability to specialize in some subjects in depth and completely, it is natural that the door to knowledge is closed and the jurist has no choice but to trust the expert’s opinion. However, it should be noted that the expert’s opinion does not merely create familiarity for the jurist, but rather opens up and explains the angles of the subjects, especially specialized and innovative subjects, to the jurist so that the jurist gains a clear and reassuring idea of ​​the subject by understanding the explanations and expert opinions of the experts. For example, when a jurist is faced with the specialized subject of gender reassignment or forex, the type of expert explanation becomes important. If an expert comes and explains the process and nature of Forex and gender reassignment incompletely, naturally, the jurist will not gain more than a “familiarity” with the subject, and the inference of a jurisprudential ruling will also be impaired; but if the expert accurately clarifies the various aspects of the subject for the jurist in such a way that the jurist himself is confident in discovering the subject, then this thematic knowledge will go beyond mere “familiarity” and the inference of the ruling will also occur more accurately.

Contemporary Jurisprudence: What is the position of thematic knowledge in other sciences?

Mr. Bayat: Thematic knowledge exists in all sciences; because every science needs thematic knowledge in order to reach a conclusion, issue a ruling, and form a statement about the knowledge. Every science needs thematic knowledge according to its subject, goal, and mission.  Basically, subject matter knowledge in a general sense exists in all sciences and is not specific to the science of jurisprudence.