Jurisprudence of ethics actually seeks to open a chapter in jurisprudence to examine the religious rulings of human actions. Of course, it may be a specialized field of jurisprudence, but this specialization should not make us think that we are dealing with a new science that has different norms or different goals and distinct sources.
In order to clarify the exact meaning of “Jurisprudence of Ethics” as a jurisprudential chapter, it is necessary to explain its difference with similar concepts correctly and accurately; concepts such as “Jurisprudence and Ethics” and “Ethical Jurisprudence.”The recent emergence of the creation of “moral jurisprudence” as a branch of jurisprudence has led to the lack of many writings in this field. In this special note, Hujjat al-lslam Mujtaba Rahimi, who wrote the book “From Jurisprudence and Ethics to Moral Jurisprudence” a few years ago, attempts to explain “moral jurisprudence” correctly and explain its difference from similar concepts.
As is clear from the combination of “jurisprudence and ethics”, an otherness between these two sciences has been assumed; that is, it has been thought that “ethics” is a science independent and distinct from jurisprudence, in the sense that these two sciences have different subjects, predicates, goals, sources, etc. Some of our contemporaries believe that the subject of jurisprudence is the actions of the body and the external behaviors of man, but the subject of ethics is his soul qualities such as courage and honesty, etc. In their opinion, the predicate of jurisprudential propositions is the five obligatory rules (obligatory, recommended, permissible, disliked and forbidden), and the predicate of ethical propositions is good and bad, necessary and unnecessary, right and wrong. Regarding the goals of these two sciences, they also believe that the purpose of jurisprudence is to avoid divine punishment and find excuses, but the purpose of ethics is to achieve human perfection.
Of course, before engaging in the discussion, we should remember that the concern of these lines is not to describe what has happened so far. Rather, we want to know how it should be. A scholar throughout history may have believed in the separation of the two, but our perceptions of the Book, Sunnah and reason are contrary to his beliefs.
With this explanation, we say that the aforementioned distinction between jurisprudence and ethics does not have any significant evidence from the Book, Sunnah and reason. In addition, it is inconsistent with the principles accepted by jurists as well as with their expressions. Of course, in a short note, we cannot go into detail about the aforementioned matters. Therefore, we will briefly refer to parts of what we have written in the book “From Jurisprudence and Ethics to Jurisprudence of Ethics”:
First: Famous Shi’i scholars believe in the absolute subordination of divine laws to interests and corruptions, and the so-called good and bad aspects. al-Shahid al-Awwal writes in this regard as follows:
“Since it has been proven in theology that God’s actions are caused by purposes, and it is impossible for this purpose to be bad, and it is also impossible for it to return to God Himself, it is proven that it returns to the one who is obligated. And that purpose is either to gain a benefit for the one who is obligated, or to ward off a harm from him; and each of them is either related to this world or to the Hereafter. Therefore, religious laws are not devoid of one of these.” [1]
This rule has some requirements, one of which we will discuss in the context of the discussion:
The purpose of this rule is that the benefit and harm are the cause of the ruling. Accordingly, if we can discover the benefits and harms of things with certainty, then naturally the Shari’ah ruling will come in accordance with them. Now, can you deny the benefit that exists in humility, generosity, self-respect, sacrifice, and the like? Or can you ignore the great harm of stinginess, jealousy, self-abasement, and the like? The benefit and harm of these matters are so clear and serious that denying them requires many reasons, not proof. But how is it that if fasting is harmful to our body, we rule that it is permissible or undesirable, but we cannot issue the same rulings regarding arrogance, stinginess, jealousy, self-abasement, and the like, which are much more important than many Shari’ah rulings?
In this sense, if an internal characteristic has a definite benefit for a person, adherence to it is either recommended or obligatory; therefore, we must strive and, by correcting our thoughts and behaviors that are necessary for the emergence of that characteristic, we must create our soul in it. There is also a characteristic in which there is a definite corruption for a person; here too, we must remove it from ourselves by correcting our thoughts and performing actions. We emphasize that the ruling belongs to the internal characteristic itself; as soon as we can imagine the free will of a person regarding external and internal actions, it is also easy to imagine the religious ruling for it. And it is clear that internal behaviors and characteristics are under our control; that is, we can create a moral virtue in ourselves by doing a series of things, or if we have it genetically, we can strengthen it, or we can remove a vice from ourselves or weaken it. Imagine that a person is born genetically stingy; This person must try to remove it from himself, and in doing so, he must think about both the worldly and the hereafter consequences of stinginess, and force himself to fulfill his financial obligations, which will ultimately lead to the disappearance of stinginess from his soul.
Second: There is no difference in the verses and narrations between outward and inward behaviors; that is, similar language has been used to express the ruling on these two types of actions. For instance, pay attention to the expressions included in our hadiths to express the sanctity of arrogance:
He who has an atom’s weight of arrogance in his heart will not enter Paradise [2].(The same statement has been made about the murderer, the drunkard, and the gossiper.)The one who sheds blood, the one who drinks alcohol, and the one who goes about spreading gossip will not enter Paradise [3].
Beware of arrogance and pride, for arrogance is the cloak of Allah, the Almighty and Majestic. Whoever disputes Allah’s cloak, Allah will oppose him and humiliate him on the Day of Resurrection [4].
The same statement applies to someone who does not help his believing brother. Whoever humiliates a believer while he is able to help him, Allah will humiliate him on the Day of Resurrection in front of all creation.
Three to whom Allah will not speak, nor look at them on the Day of Resurrection, nor will He purify them, and they will have a painful punishment: an old adulterer, a tyrannical king, and a poor arrogant man.(You will notice that in this narration, a language is used to condemn adultery, tyranny, and arrogance.)
- Allah does not speak to them. He will look at them on the Day of Resurrection, and He will not purify them, and for them is a painful punishment: an adulterous old man, a tyrannical king, and a poor, arrogant man. [5] (You will notice that in this narration, the same language is used to prohibit adultery, tyranny, and arrogance.)
In addition to this (i.e., using the same language to express the rules of external and internal behavior), it is one of the proofs of divine religions that the perfection and happiness of man lies in the closeness of God, in attaining His boundless mercy in Paradise, and salvation from the fire of His wrath, and the way to attain this perfection is nothing other than faith and righteous deeds, in a word, “servitude.”And again, from the verses and narrations, it can be clearly understood that servitude is achieved when the servant regulates all his voluntary behaviors in accordance with the will and will of the master, whether those behaviors are external behaviors or internal behaviors. (In the aforementioned book, we have mentioned many instances for these claims, which of course are not hidden. You can refer to it for further study).
Three: The distinction between jurisprudence and ethics is also not consistent with the statements of the jurists. Al-Shahid al-Awwal in his definition of jurisprudence writes as is follows:
Knowledge of practical Islamic rulings and their detailed evidence to achieve happiness in the afterlife.[6]
In some of his Ijazas, Shaykh al-Hurr al-Amili paid attention to worldly sovereignty in addition to hereafter happiness, and in his definition of jurisprudence he said:
“It is the knowledge of the legal rulings, which is the means to attain worldly sovereignty and happiness in the afterlife.”[7]
The fact that the science of jurisprudence is responsible for the expression of practical religious rulings and its mission is worldly sovereignty and hereafter happiness is generally accepted by Shiite jurists. Allama Hilli, in explaining the benefits of the science of jurisprudence, writes as follows:
“Its benefit: attaining happiness in the afterlife, and teaching the general public the system of livelihood in worldly benefits.” [8]
And it is clear that the happiness of the hereafter is salvation from hell and entry into paradise and attainment of higher degrees and perfections in paradise and divine satisfaction. However, I do not know how some have claimed that the goal of the science of jurisprudence is salvation from punishment and that the attainment of human perfections is the responsibility of the science of ethics?!
A very important point that lies in these phrases and actions of Shi’i jurists and that needs to be stated is that jurists define jurisprudence as “knowledge of religious rulings…” and on the other hand, they define religious ruling as “religious speech related to the actions of those who are obligated.”This means that all voluntary human actions are the subject of jurisprudence, whether they are external or internal. Throughout jurisprudence, we also see that jurists have applied religious rulings such as obligatory and forbidden, recommended and disliked for external actions such as love and hatred, hypocrisy and sincerity, arrogance and humility. (Many statements from jurists are cited in the aforementioned book). For instance, al-Sabzawari denies the prohibition of envy even if it is not expressed. [9] Sayyid Abdul A’la also considers hypocrisy to be obligatory and haraam and in this ruling, he cites consensus in addition to the Book and Sunnah. [10] The writer of the book al-Jawahir is also among the jurists who have emphasized the prohibition of ‘ujb. [11]
With this in mind, excluding ijtihad from the scope of jurisprudence is an unprincipled and unscientific act; Because the behaviors of the heart are also within the scope of jurisprudence, and the jurist, with the same mechanism that examines other branches of jurisprudence, must also examine moral propositions and state their religious rulings, how to cultivate good morals, and ways to eliminate moral vices. This is where another term comes from, called “moral jurisprudence.” Moral jurisprudence actually seeks to open a door in jurisprudence to examine the religious rulings of human actions. Of course, it may be a specialized field of jurisprudence, but this specialization should not make us think that we are dealing with a new science that has different norms or different goals and distinct sources.
Moral jurisprudence
It is like “moral jurisprudence” which means that we give a moral color to the whole jurisprudence. In other words, moral propositions are like “jurisprudential rules” that affect the whole jurisprudence. For instance, the rule of “no problem” or “no harm” is a jurisprudential rule that is the red line of all the jurisprudence’s inferences; that is, the jurisprudence should not reach a ruling that is harmful in its ijtihad. The same relationship exists between moral propositions and other branches of jurisprudence, and the jurisprudence should not issue a fatwa that is contrary to moral norms. If someone pays attention to this issue, he cannot issue a fatwa that “any sexual enjoyment except intercourse is permissible for minor girls”; it is clear that this fatwa corrupts their morals. Therefore, it is necessary for the jurist to reconsider his inferential model that he has reached this conclusion and not to issue a fatwa that violates moral and educational norms. In any case, using the ruling of internal and external actions to resolve various components of jurisprudence gives jurisprudence a moral-educational approach and brings the humanization and civilization-building capacity of Shi’i jurisprudence to the fore more than ever.
Consequently, we accept the two terms “jurisprudence of ethics” and “ethical jurisprudence” and believe that this should fundamentally happen in our jurisprudence. On the other hand, we do not accept the term “jurisprudence and ethics” because it implies a distinction and separation of the two from each other, which is contrary to our perceptions of the sacred Islamic law.
The last point is that this discussion has many points of ambiguity, and we tried to clarify them in the book “From Jurisprudence and Ethics to Moral Jurisprudence,” and we hope that it will be accepted by scholars.
[1]. Rules and benefits, vol. 1, p. 33
[2]. Al-Kafi (I-Islamiyyah), vol. 2, p. 310.
[3]. Ibid., vol. 7, p. 273.
[4]. Al-Kafi (I-Islamiyyah), vol. 8, p. 8.
[5]. The same, vol. 2, p. 311.
[6]. Thikra fi Ahkam al-Shari’ah, vol. 1, p. 40.
[7]. Bihar al-Anwar, vol. 107, p. 103.
[8]. Tahrir al-Ahkam al-Shar’iyyah ala Mathhab al-lmamiyyah (t- al-Hadith), vol. 1, p. 32.
[9]. Kifayat al-Ahkam, vol. 2, p. 752
[10]. Muhaththib al-Ahkam (by al-Sabzawari), vol. 2, p. 446
[11]. Jawahir al-Kalam in the description of the laws of Islam, vol. 2, p. 101