Introduction: Hujjat al-Islam wal-Muslimin Ahmad Ali Yousefi is considered one of the pioneers of economic jurisprudence and Islamic economics in the religious seminaries. For over 30 years, he has been teaching and researching Islamic economics. In a conversation with Rahnama, he analyzes the various dimensions of Islamic economics. According to this faculty member of the Islamic Culture and Thought Research Institute, the nature of institutions like banks is based on money creation, which is definitively forbidden (haram); therefore, such institutions should fundamentally not exist in the Islamic economic system. The full text of this conversation follows for your review:

Attention to applied and modern jurisprudences (fiqh mudaf) has increased in recent years. Economic jurisprudence, as one of the applied jurisprudences, is the subject of our discussion and interview. Please explain the position and importance of economic jurisprudence.

I thank you and your team for opening this door to inform the seminarians. First, I would like to mention a necessity that is not specific to economic jurisprudence and is perhaps also a necessity for political, social, and other applied jurisprudences. It was relayed to me that a few years ago, the honorable Ayatollah Makarem stated that subject-matter identification (mawdu’-shinasi) is more than seventy percent influential for exercising ijtihad on new topics, and the other thirty percent is dependent on literature, biography of narrators (rijal), logic, science of hadith transmission (dirayah), and the other introductory sciences for ijtihad. One of the important matters in the fields of applied jurisprudence is the correct understanding of the new, economic subject, so that the jurist can then derive its ruling. Regarding subjects in the jurisprudential establishment, we can have subject-matter identification on three levels. I will explain with an example. One level is to present an economic subject to the jurist without considering 4-5 components, such as not paying attention to the philosophy of its creation in people’s economic lives, without attention to its historical changes in nature, without attention to the various functions this phenomenon has had in people’s lives throughout history and how its functions were constantly changing, expanding, and contracting, and without attention to its various current functions. But another time, we consider the subject with these factors in mind; that is, we introduce its philosophy of creation, its essential explanation, and its various social, political, and current functions with these components and deliver it to the jurist and the jurisprudential establishment. Certainly, the rulings derived from the first type of subject-matter identification will differ from the rulings derived from the second type.

One of the important matters in the fields of applied jurisprudence is the correct understanding of the new, economic subject, so that the jurist can then derive its ruling.

Is the second one the same as the requirements of time and place, conditions, and developments?

No, it even includes the course of changes in the nature and function of this phenomenon.

For example, this matter of money that I mentioned. What is the real nature of money? In the years 1994-1995, we were writing the book The Nature of Money and its Jurisprudential-Economic Strategies. There, with a historical perspective, we suggested that the officials of the central bank and the country’s monetary officials should pursue tools for the ease of money transfer as soon as possible. The purchasing power of money is the reality of money. Sometimes, over the course of a month, someone involved in financial communications moves billions and billions without touching a banknote or a coin. It is a number, a figure that goes from my account to your account and from your account to another’s. What is happening? The reality of money is its purchasing power. If we do not consider those components I mentioned, the derived rulings will be different. We have another level of subject-matter identification that is much more important than the other two. We bring this economic phenomenon and identify and analyze it within the Islamic economic system. The first question that arises for the jurist of applied jurisprudence and the specialist is: does this phenomenon fundamentally have a place within the Islamic economic system or not? Let me clarify with an example. We raised the issue of money creation with the honorable Ayatollah Makarem Shirazi last year. We explained the dimensions of money creation in summary. I used an example for him, I said, “Imagine I bring one hundred million of the blessed Imam’s share to you, and you say to deposit it into a current account. The bank, in a process over several months, turns this into five hundred million. Who owns that four hundred million?” I said, according to the fatwas of the honorable gentlemen, the bank defines that current account as a loan (qard). When it becomes a loan, the bank in fact owns this one hundred million, and the borrower, which is the bank, owns all the profits resulting from the one hundred million. He said, “This is not possible, this is oppression (zulm), this is harm (idrar), it is unjust consumption of property (akl al-mal bil-batil). Submit a request for a fatwa, and I will issue one.” A few of us researchers drafted a two-page text and sent it to him, and he said that money creation is gambling, unjust consumption of property, and harm. After a few months, Imam Sadiq (AS) University invited me to speak on the jurisprudential-economic analysis of Ayatollah Makarem Shirazi’s fatwa. I asked the professors at the session a question: when money creation is forbidden, an unjust consumption of property, and a cause of harm, can a bank have a banking nature without creating money? They all unanimously said no. Place these two propositions side by side, what conclusion can we draw? A bank has no banking nature without money creation. Money creation is also harm and unjust consumption of property. Therefore, a bank, with such a phenomenon, has no place in the structure of the Islamic economic system. Why should the jurisprudential establishment spend thousands of hours each year to jurisprudentially analyze the prescriptive and declaratory rulings for the various relationships within this phenomenon called a bank, given this nature? The third level of subject-matter identification frees the jurist. Does this phenomenon have a place within the Islamic economic system, such that the jurisprudential establishment should dedicate thousands of hours to the issues within this phenomenon, or not?

The first question that the third level of subject-matter identification creates for the jurisprudential establishment is this: does this phenomenon, from a jurisprudential and Islamic standards perspective, have a place within the Islamic economic system or not? If we say no, it must go, and we have no right to take thousands of hours from the jurists to answer the questions within this phenomenon. If it has a place within this system, then we must say, let’s bring its issues into our jurisprudential establishment to analyze them.

At the third level, does it erase the problem statement, or in other words, does it not accept this subject?

It erases it or establishes it. It tells the jurisprudential establishment: spend your time on this matter or don’t. A bank with such a nature has no place within the Islamic economic system. It leads the jurist to the conclusion that we must seek a new monetary system for the Islamic economic system. The first question that the third level of subject-matter identification creates for the jurisprudential establishment is this: does this phenomenon, from a jurisprudential and Islamic standards perspective, have a place within the Islamic economic system or not? If we say no, it must go, and we have no right to take thousands of hours from the jurists to answer the questions within this phenomenon. If it has a place within this system, then we must say, let’s bring its issues into our jurisprudential establishment to analyze them. Another discussion that is necessary to raise is the discussion of the jurisprudence of a system (fiqh-e nizam), which is very prevalent in the seminary now. Sometimes when we analyze what the gentlemen mean, we see they mean a systematic jurisprudence (nizam-e fiqh), not the jurisprudence of a system. A systematic jurisprudence means our jurisprudence is system-based. So what? Not that it’s useless, but it has its effects. But is this the jurisprudence of a system? The fact that our jurisprudence is system-based is not the jurisprudence of a system. Another perception that some have of the jurisprudence of a system is that our jurisprudence can derive and extract the rulings for the behaviors and relationships of individuals with governing institutions and the rulings for governing institutions with each other. For example, tax is a relationship between the people and the government, between real and legal entities and the government. Behavior and relationships related to the system. Some say when our jurisprudential establishment derives their rulings, it becomes the jurisprudence of a system. I do not accept these two or three perceptions as the jurisprudence of a system. We have a responsive, passive, issue-reciting, and system-accepting jurisprudence, and we have a demanding jurisprudence as opposed to a responsive one, an active one as opposed to a passive one, a designer one as opposed to a problem-oriented one, and a system-building one as opposed to a system-accepting one. So, sometimes jurisprudence answers all the questions that come to the jurisprudential establishment. Should we do this? Must the jurisprudential establishment be responsive to every question it faces? This is our question: there are thousands of issues within the banking structure that, if this banking system with its nature is not legitimate, why should we answer them?

Merely being responsive is not an art; therefore, it is not an art to have various behaviors and relationships created based on secular and disbelieving ideologies poured into our jurisprudential pouch for us to be responsive. Our jurisprudence must be a demanding jurisprudence. Our jurisprudence must be able to design social, economic, and political systems and make demands of the world.

Why should an economic system be designed within the framework of secular thoughts based on the will of Satan, and then within this system, various behaviors and relationships be jurisprudentially analyzed? You must seek an economic system and structures based on monotheism (Tawhid).

Therefore, in applied jurisprudences, the difference between a demanding and a responsive jurisprudence becomes clear. The difference between a system-building and a system-accepting jurisprudence becomes clear. Right now, we accept the entire body of the capitalist system, and our jurisprudential establishment performs jurisprudential analysis within this body. We must, in economic jurisprudence, clarify the difference between a designer and a problem-oriented jurisprudence, the difference between an active and a passive jurisprudence must become clear. It was early 2019, and two months before that, a discussion of mine was published on the Ijtihad website, and then in Ofoq-e Howzeh, I had about a two-hour interview with them, and they transcribed it. After a while, when everything was ready and about to be printed, Mr. Fazel Lankarani’s discussions came up. In two or three issues, they published Mr. Fazel’s discussions that Islam has no such thing, what does it mean it has no system? Does it mean it’s not legitimate? Not rational? Or not possible? How is it that we, with our jurisprudence, accept and analyze secular thoughts based on polytheism and idolatry? If we say it is not legitimate, how do we jurisprudentially analyze and approve them? After all, we are familiar with a set of Islamic teachings. If we design a system and you analyze jurisprudential behaviors and relationships within this system, is that problematic? Must it necessarily come from somewhere else? If it’s not legitimate, that’s not a correct statement. Is theirs legitimate but ours is not? If you say it is not rational, then by an even stronger reason, how do you jurisprudentially analyze, review, and reject or approve the systems they design?

How do you bring the capitalist system from beginning to end, from A to Z, and jurisprudentially analyze the parts that are relationships and behaviors? If we design a system from beginning to end, from monotheism to jurisprudential and ethical rulings, and deliver it to your jurisprudential establishment, it is both possible and legitimate. Economic jurisprudence can do this. Therefore, the discussion of the necessity of economic jurisprudence is completely clear for the seminary with these points I have made.

Please also provide an explanation about the structure of economic jurisprudence. What is the relationship of this jurisprudence with the 52 chapters of fiqh? Does it become a separate chapter or a collection of several books?

In reality, we have three main axes in economic jurisprudence. That is, a student of economic jurisprudence must be proficient in these three axes: 1- Conventional world economics to the extent that it is effective for subject-matter identification. 2- Islamic economics. 3- The chapters of the jurisprudence of transactions (fiqh al-mu’amalat). These three sciences—of course, there are some other sciences, but these three are the main axes. Now, those first two sciences are mostly for subject-matter identification, and this third part is for understanding Islamic rulings. Of course, the discussion of philosophy and theology (kalam) is also necessary for an essential understanding of economic phenomena.

A student of economic jurisprudence must be proficient in these three axes: 1- Conventional world economics to the extent that it is effective for subject-matter identification. 2- Islamic economics. 3- The chapters of the jurisprudence of transactions. These three sciences—of course, there are some other sciences, but these three are the main axes.

Another topic is about the steps to reach applied jurisprudences. In the past, hadith collections were first formed, hadiths were issued from the Infallibles (AS), and then these were categorized, and based on those chapters, fiqh took shape. Now, when our jurist in general jurisprudence wants to issue a fatwa, Wasa’il al-Shi’a is at his disposal and has made his job easier. Two of the famous professors of general jurisprudence said that one reason professors do not go into new jurisprudences is because the work is harder and requires more effort. At first glance, seminarians imagine that general jurisprudence is harder than applied jurisprudences, while the case is completely the opposite. One of the professors said that seventy percent of the work in general jurisprudence has been done, the hadiths are categorized, the opinions of the jurists are mentioned…

Why should our perspective be one of difficulty and ease? This is jihad in the way of God; it is the greater jihad. It is an academic jihad. It is duty-based. Our duty today is to enter this valley and revive jurisprudence and the seminary. When the honorable professors, the فاضل (learned) seminarians, recognize their duty and fundamentally feel a sense of duty, we will have an output. The gentlemen have seen the works from our first educational cohorts. They were the teachers of these gentlemen, but now they see that their influence in jurisprudence in relation to the governing institutions has become a hundred times greater than their own. They started to think, if we are to study for a few years and be this influential in the system, what does difficulty and ease mean? It is our duty. This is important for the revival of the seminary. The seminary must be on the line of solving the problems and issues of the system. Our jurisprudential establishment is strong in terms of power and the foundations of derivation.

The work that has been done, for example, in general and traditional jurisprudence, and these hadith collections have been written and theorized—is it necessary for us to follow the same path in economic jurisprudence? For example, should we first collect books of economic hadiths and categorize them based on today’s needs?

We use the same hadith and jurisprudential collections. But you can be sure that in another decade, more or less, we will have a Fiqh of Banking, a Fiqh of Money, a Fiqh of Cooperatives, and a Fiqh of Taxation. We will have a Fiqh of the State in various sections.

Right now, al-Lum’ah has various chapters; in economic jurisprudence, too, various chapters will be opened, and seminarians will have to study those introductory discussions of ijtihad and general jurisprudence more concisely, and the superfluous parts of jurisprudence and its principles should be removed. We must write a Principles of Economic Jurisprudence for economic jurisprudence, and the graduates of the first cohorts of our institute are also thinking that we must write a Principles of Economic Jurisprudence for economic jurisprudence. Of course, economic jurisprudence in the seminary is, praise be to God, a pioneer because people were pursuing it, like Mr. Mirmoezzi and Mousavian and others… who had and have a really serious commitment to the traditional jurisprudence of the seminary. Praise be to God, it is progressing well. Meaning, we do not see a deficiency in traditional jurisprudence. In fact, a kind of precise dynamism is hidden in our traditional jurisprudence.

You can be sure that in another decade, more or less, we will have a Fiqh of Banking, a Fiqh of Money, a Fiqh of Cooperatives, and a Fiqh of Taxation. We will have a Fiqh of the State in various sections.

Some have recently said that Islam does not have an economic system.

This is a responsive, passive, problem-oriented, and system-accepting jurisprudence. My question to these gentlemen is this: when we speak of the custom of the world’s rational people (‘urf ‘uqala’ al-‘alam) in jurisprudence, are we only talking about the capitalist system? Are they the only rational people? In jurisprudence, when we say the custom of the world’s rational people, it includes the capitalist system, idolaters, Jews, Christians, socialists, and all of these. Now, how is it that you have taken up a sword against the socialists and brought the world’s rational people into the framework of the capitalist system? Catch him on this point, and his whole argument is hot air.

Some professors say to come to modern jurisprudences after Kifayah. Some say to attend advanced dars-e kharij for at least two years, and some professors say one must attend ten years of general dars-e kharij in jurisprudence and its principles and then specialize in economic and political trends, economic and political jurisprudence, and the jurisprudence of media and family. What is your honorable opinion?

First, I believe this level, up to the end of Kifayah and Makasib, must be completed, but with a shortened duration and optimized education. We can really teach these same subjects to seminarians with acceptable educational resources in half this time or a little more. Some superfluous material must be cut. Second, I believe that studying dars-e kharij for two or three years is the best opportunity to enter this field. We have experimented with it, and it has really worked. After all, since this field has discussions that require individuals to have an acceptable familiarity with jurisprudence and its principles.

Source: Rahnama-ye Pazhouhesh, Issues 35-36.