Note: Hojjat al-Islam wal-Muslemin Mohammad Daneshfar, a professor of advanced levels at the Qom Seminary and a graduate of the Imam Muhammad Baqir (AS) Jurisprudential School in Qom, has been focusing his research on the jurisprudence of education for several years. In this exclusive article, he seeks to precisely delineate the boundaries of the jurisprudence of education in relation to other related branches and concepts.

Abstract

This work proposes a framework for defining the ideal state of the discipline of “jurisprudence of education,” considering the context of the emergence of sciences, the necessities governing them, the various methods of juristic inference in fiqh, and the role of conventionality in the formulation of sciences. Additionally, it examines the requirements of the current state of jurisprudential knowledge as it enters the field of education, with attention to two methods of inference: realist and validity-oriented approaches.

Based on the needs and objectives governing the field of the jurisprudence of education, the ideal state for delimiting this discipline involves formulating a science that directly addresses the processes of transformation from the current state to the desired state, derived from the sources of the Quran and Sunnah using a realist method of inference. In specialized sciences, merely expanding or altering the subject matter of the primary science, while preserving its methodology and unity of sources, does not negate the rational merit of considering the specialized science as a branch of the original science. If this view is not accepted and there is insistence on avoiding expansion or alteration of the subject matter of fiqh, the term “fiqh” in the title “jurisprudence of education” is used in a non-technical sense (i.e., not as the science of practical religious rulings derived from detailed evidence), akin to the usage in “fiqh al-hadith,” which refers to a deep understanding of religion. However, even in this usage, the jurisprudence of education does not differ from conventional fiqh in terms of methodology and sources. Nevertheless, given the necessities and objectives governing the jurisprudence of education, this title should not be applied to the religious rulings concerning the conduct of educators and learners (in both realist and validity-oriented methods of inference). Instead, such rulings should be considered a chapter alongside other chapters of fiqh (e.g., the Book of Fasting, the Book of Education, rather than the Jurisprudence of Fasting or the Jurisprudence of Education). However, the Book of Education, when inferred through a realist approach, serves as one of the sources for the jurisprudence of education in deducing transformation processes, unlike the Book of Education inferred through a validity-oriented approach, which lacks such capacity.

Keywords:
Jurisprudence of Education, Realist Inference, Validity-Oriented Inference, Fiqh, Education, Ethics, Moral Education.

• Introduction

  The Conventional Nature of the Formulation and Demarcation of Sciences

  The formulation and demarcation of sciences is a conventional matter determined based on criteria such as subject matter, objectives, and methodology. Since these demarcations are conventional [1], they can be evaluated based on the needs and objectives that humanity pursues in categorizing and formulating sciences. [2]

  These demarcations are typically not instantaneous but rather a gradual process influenced by factors such as intellectual developments, the advancement of tools and technologies, political and historical changes, cultural and social factors, educational institutions, and scientific exchanges between societies.

  The Context of the Emergence of Interdisciplinary Sciences and the Integration of Sciences

  The necessity of addressing new questions and resolving complex issues that a single science cannot adequately address leads to the overlapping of various fields of knowledge, which is one of the most significant contexts for the emergence of interdisciplinary sciences.

  Addressing new questions sometimes occurs through the integration of multiple sciences while preserving their fundamental components without altering or expanding their subject matter. For example, medical physics [3] is formed merely by applying a foundational science to a new field, where the principles of physics are employed to address medical issues (such as the use of radiation for cancer treatment). In this new science, physics remains the science of studying natural laws and fundamental forces, focusing on matters like matter and energy, while medical science continues to be the science of diagnosing, treating, and preventing diseases. [4]

  However, in some cases, addressing new issues may require altering or expanding the subject matter of one or both sciences, leading to the emergence of new theories and concepts that were previously absent in either science. For instance, in biotechnology [5], the sciences of biology and technology are combined, but in this new integration, biology extends beyond the study of living organisms and biological processes to include direct genetic manipulation of living organisms. [6]

  When the subject matter of a science undergoes change or expansion, as long as the methods and sources for addressing issues remain largely unchanged, it is rationally considered a branch of the original science in the classification of sciences.

  The Jurisprudence of Education

  The complexities and social and cultural changes, along with the emergence of new educational issues, confront jurisprudence with new challenges, necessitating the formulation of a new science under the title of “jurisprudence of education.”

  Considering the discussion on the integration of sciences, to precisely demarcate the jurisprudence of education, it must be determined whether combining the disciplines of jurisprudence and education [7], with their existing subjects and boundaries, is sufficient to address the questions and issues that the discipline of the jurisprudence of education is intended to resolve. Alternatively, should the boundaries of these two disciplines be altered? Or does the current discipline of education lack the qualifications to integrate with jurisprudence, requiring an independent examination of the requirements for jurisprudence to address educational issues?

  The answers to these questions depend on two factors:
  a) The definition provided for the current state and demarcation of the two disciplines.
  b) The recognition of the needs that exist to address new questions. This recognition is the primary pathway to determining the correct boundaries of disciplines and the main criterion for validating the legitimacy of sciences.

  The primary objective of this article is to elucidate the ideal state in demarcating the jurisprudence of education. To this end, the current state of the disciplines of jurisprudence and education is briefly outlined, followed by an examination of various possibilities for demarcating the jurisprudence of education, considering the needs and necessities that form the context for the emergence of this discipline, to articulate the ideal state of its demarcation.

  The Current State of the Disciplines of Jurisprudence and Education

  The Discipline of Jurisprudence

  In its linguistic sense, jurisprudence (fiqh) refers to understanding accompanied by precision and reflection. [8] In early Islam, the term “jurisprudence” was not exclusively used for a deep understanding of religious rulings but was applied to individuals who had attained profound insight into religious knowledge in general. [9] Over time, due to the necessity of distinguishing Islamic sciences, a definition was proposed by al-Shafi’i (d. 204 AH), which gained acceptance among Muslims, both Shia and Sunni. He defined jurisprudence as: “The science of practical religious rulings derived from detailed evidence.” [10]

  In this definition, jurisprudence is the science of specific practical religious rulings (whether obligatory or situational [11]). The qualification of “practical” excludes theoretical religious knowledge, such as beliefs, and descriptive sciences, such as ethics. Additionally, the qualification of being derived from detailed evidence refers to the methodology of jurisprudence, excluding knowledge obtained through revelation or esoteric means (with the term “evidence”) and the knowledge of followers regarding religious rulings (with the term “detailed”). [12]

  The subject matter of jurisprudence in this technical sense is the conduct of those bound by religious obligations, encompassing both the external and internal actions of individuals. [13]

  Shia Jurisprudence and Two Distinct Methods of Inference

  In Shia jurisprudence, there are two general methods for deducing religious rulings from the sources of the Quran and Sunnah. Although these two methods have not yet been precisely demarcated, their differences are clearly observable in the inferential approaches of jurists, to the extent that the difference between the inferential styles of Ayatollah Khoei (RA) and Ayatollah Borujerdi (RA) has become a well-known example of this distinction. Since the proposed theory in this article is partially related to these two styles of inference, a brief overview of their characteristics is provided: [14]

  Validity-Based Inference Method

  In this style of inference, known as “validity-based,” “Najaf School,” or “methodology-driven,” the primary goal is achieving certainty and excusability, rather than focusing on discovering objective reality.

  The general approach in this method relies on predefined rules that provide a disciplined framework for the jurist in the process of jurisprudential inference. A “document-centric” approach in dealing with narrations is one of the key characteristics of this style. Additionally, the rules of balancing and prioritizing narrations and resorting to practical principles, given the frequent conflicts among narrations in this style [15], hold significant importance. Reviewing the opinions of past scholars, considering the prevailing view, and the reception of the companions of the Imams have little significance, and there is no hesitation in opposing the prevailing view or even consensus (if there is a possibility of it being evidence-based). This jurisprudential approach leans toward nominalism and focuses on the literal wording of texts. In this method, deducing a system from primary inferences is challenging. Moreover, due to the mathematical precision of the jurist and the limitations imposed on the sources used for inference, the jurist often encounters conflicting texts. [16]

  This style of inference represents an internal religious paradigm [17] and lacks significant capacity to engage with human sciences. This is because, in this method, achieving rulings that regulate human life based on real benefits and harms is not the primary concern, whereas the subjects of human sciences address the structure of humanity and the laws governing it. Just as one cannot issue a ruling or make changes to a machine without considering its overall structure, the subjects of human sciences require rulings that regulate human relationships based on real benefits and harms, considering the internal and external relationships governing humanity. [18]

  Realist Inference Method

  In this style of inference, known as “realism,” “Qom School,” “content-driven,” or “evidence-based discovery,” the primary goal of the jurist is to discover the real rulings established by the Lawgiver based on actual benefits and harms, through the interconnection of evidence and the corroboration of indications.

  In this style, interpretation of narrations is conducted by considering the entirety of narrations related to the subject, as well as the historical and social context of their issuance. In the final synthesis of evidence, a document-centric approach is not adopted; rather, the document is considered one element in the inference process, and the jurist’s conclusion is based on the interconnection and corroboration of all indications to discover reality. In this school, resort to practical principles is rare, and reviewing the opinions of past scholars, the prevailing view, and the reception of the companions hold a special place, to the extent that reliance on received principles [19] is a prominent feature of Ayatollah Borujerdi’s style. In this method, opposition to the prevailing view is avoided as much as possible. The jurist in this school generally does not insist on adhering to a specific definitive reason. Based on this jurisprudential school, it is easier to arrive at a comprehensive system and subsystems through systematic inference. Due to the broad range of components involved in inference, the jurist rarely encounters conflicting texts, and exceptions are logically justified and integrated into the natural process of inference. [20]

  Any foundation that can reveal broader dimensions of the legislative system’s capacity to manage individual and social relationships aligns with this style of inference. [21]

  The Discipline of Education

  In Persian, education (tarbiyat) refers to “nurturing, teaching manners and ethics to someone, and raising a child until maturity.” [22]

  This term in Arabic may derive from two roots: “rabb” (care and guardianship) and “rabū” (growth, development, and increase). [23]

  Various definitions have been proposed for education, with the common element being the creation of gradual change. Some define education as:
  “The process of creating gradual changes in one of the existential dimensions of a person by another person to actualize potentialities through affirmative and negatory actions.” [24]

  The element of “change” in the definition of education necessitates recognizing the existing state and the ideal state, as education is responsible for the process of transformation from the existing state to the ideal state. Therefore, the various existential dimensions of the learner form the different domains of education (e.g., physical education, sexual education), with education in each domain responsible for transforming the existing state of that domain to its ideal state.

  The Difference Between Ethics and Education

  Based on this explanation, the difference between ethics and education can also be clarified. Ethics is concerned with articulating the values, traits, and voluntary actions of individuals and determining their moral goodness or badness. Education, however, examines the process of transformation, and ethics can be a domain of education (ethical education), which studies the process of internalizing values and traits in individuals. Thus, the difference between ethics and education is substantive, related to their subject matter, rather than a superficial distinction such as self-improvement (ethics) versus other-improvement (education), as some have suggested. [25]

  The Current State of the Discipline of Education

  The dominant method in educational sciences, like other Western human sciences, is the empirical method. What is currently recognized as the discipline of education is not a single science but a collection of various disciplines that study education.

  Gaston Mialaret, a French education scholar, considers educational sciences as a set of knowledge that studies the conditions, functioning, and transformation of educational states and events. [26] He categorizes educational sciences into sixteen specialized fields under three general categories:

  1. Sciences that study general and local conditions (e.g., history of education, sociology of education, educational ethnography, school demography, economics of education, educational management, comparative education).

  2. Sciences that study educational situations as they occur (e.g., educational physiology, educational psychology, social psychology of small groups, communication, teaching methods and curriculum planning, educational technology, evaluation sciences).

  3. Sciences that reflect on education and its future (e.g., philosophy of education, educational planning).

  Thus, since this discipline has not yet achieved a unified integration, it is preferable to use the term “educational sciences” rather than “the discipline of education.” [7]

  The Jurisprudence of Education

  As mentioned in the introduction, interdisciplinary sciences are formulated based on the need to address new issues that a single science cannot resolve. Therefore, to determine the ideal state of the jurisprudence of education, it is appropriate to first examine the needs and necessities that form the context for the emergence of this discipline. [27]

  With the advancement of Western human sciences and the rise of secular thought in education, coupled with societies facing the influence of Western culture and a crisis of diminishing spiritual values, the necessity of formulating a science that addresses new educational issues within the framework of jurisprudence, presents principles and methods of education (transformation processes) in accordance with Islamic principles and values, and delineates the boundaries between Islamic and secular education has become increasingly evident.

  A discipline named the jurisprudence of education, premised on the belief that Islam provides a comprehensive program for human life in its various material and spiritual dimensions, is tasked with addressing this necessity.

  The question now is whether jurisprudence, to address these issues, must integrate with another science, or are there other requirements for jurisprudence to enter the field of educational issues?

  It appears that the discipline of education, if its educational foundations (including anthropology, ontology, and epistemology) are derived from Western schools of thought and its methodology is solely empirical, cannot, in its current state, effectively integrate with jurisprudence to address the aforementioned needs and necessities. However, some of its empirical findings may be utilized in the jurisprudence of education under specific conditions.

  Regarding the discipline of jurisprudence, various approaches exist for its engagement with educational issues:

  a) The Engagement of Jurisprudence in Its Current State with Education

  In the current state of jurisprudence, which deals with the religious rulings of the conduct of those bound by obligations, engagement can occur in two ways:

  1. Engagement in Education with the Validity-Based Inference Method
     In this scenario, the jurisprudence of education is responsible for articulating the religious rulings concerning the various behaviors of the educator and the learner in all areas related to gradual transformation in the learner. In this method, since the inference of religious rulings does not aim to achieve rulings that manage human life based on real and objective relationships but focuses solely on certainty and excusability before the Lawgiver, it is not possible, even in a meta-scientific perspective, to arrive at educational processes. However, some propositions may be identified in a fragmented manner.

  2. Engagement in Education with the Realist Inference Method
     In this scenario, the jurisprudence of education is also responsible for articulating the religious rulings of the behaviors of the educator and the learner, but with the difference that, in a meta-scientific perspective, educational processes can also be inferred from these rulings and used as a source for the jurisprudence of education (which examines transformation processes). This is because, in this style of inference, the majority of the deduced rulings regarding the behaviors of the educator and the learner regulate relationships based on real benefits and harms. However, in some cases, the jurist, despite exhaustive efforts, may not achieve this goal, in which case these propositions cannot be used in a meta-scientific perspective.

  The common point in both methods is that the jurisprudence of education cannot be considered an interdisciplinary science branching from jurisprudence. Instead, it is more appropriate to use the title “Book of Education” (similar to the Book of Prayer or the Book of Fasting, not the Jurisprudence of Prayer or the Jurisprudence of Fasting) to refer to a chapter alongside other traditional chapters of jurisprudence, encompassing scattered issues related to the educator and the learner across various jurisprudential chapters, as well as some new issues in this field.

  b) The Ideal State of Jurisprudence in Engaging with Education

  Given the aforementioned necessities and needs in the field of education, it is appropriate to formulate a discipline that directly examines the processes of transformation from the existing state to the ideal state, derived from the Quran and Sunnah using the realist method.

  In the ideal state of jurisprudence’s engagement with all areas of human sciences, in addition to adopting the realist inference method, it is necessary to formulate jurisprudential principles aligned with this method. [28]

  If a discipline with these characteristics is formulated, it can be named the jurisprudence of education, even if the subject matter of jurisprudence in its current state is the conduct of those bound by obligations. As mentioned in the introduction, in interdisciplinary sciences, the previous boundaries of a discipline’s subject matter may expand or change, but as long as the methods and sources remain consistent with conventional jurisprudence, it is rationally considered a branch of the original science in the classification of sciences.

  If the notion of this discipline as a branch of jurisprudence is not accepted, the term “jurisprudence” can still be applied in a different sense, retaining its linguistic meaning of deep understanding, as seen in usages like “jurisprudence of the Quran” or “jurisprudence of hadith.” In this usage, “jurisprudence” refers to profound understanding rather than its technical meaning, although the jurisprudence of education in this sense does not differ in method or sources from conventional jurisprudence.

  Conclusion

  Based on the needs and necessities governing the discipline of the jurisprudence of education, the ideal state is the formulation of a discipline that directly examines the processes of transformation from the existing state to the ideal state, derived from the Quran and Sunnah using the realist method. Although the subject matter of jurisprudence in this discipline shifts from the conduct of those bound by obligations to the processes of transformation, given the preservation of method and unity of sources, there is rational merit in considering this discipline a branch of the original science. However, jurisprudence that solely addresses the behaviors of the educator and the learner should be regarded merely as a chapter within the traditional chapters of jurisprudence, not a branch of it. If the rulings of this chapter are deduced using the realist method, they can serve as a source for the jurisprudence of education (which focuses on transformation processes).

  References

  • Akhund Khorasani, Kifayat al-Usul, 1st ed., Al al-Bayt Institute, 1409 AH.

  • Ibn Faris, Ahmad, Mu‘jam Maqayis al-Lugha, Egypt, 1390 AH.

  • Ibn Manzur, Muhammad ibn Mukarram, Lisan al-Arab, Beirut, Dar Sader, 1414 AH.

  • A‘rafi, Alireza, Fiqh Tarbiyati, Qom, Ishraq va Irfan Institute, 1395 SH.

  • Daneshfar, Majid, “Legitimacy and Reinterpretation of the Concepts of Right, Ruling, and Property Based on It,” Level Four Thesis, August 1401 SH.

  • Dehkhoda, Ali Akbar, Dehkhoda Dictionary, Tehran, University of Tehran, 1372 SH.

  • Zuhayli, Wahba, Al-Fiqh al-Islami wa Adillatuh, Vol. 1, 1st ed., Damascus, 1401 AH.

  • Alidoust, Abu al-Qasim, Methodology of Ijtihad, Tehran, Institute for Islamic Culture and Thought, 1403 SH.

  • Ghazali, Abu Hamid, Ihya Ulum al-Din, Beirut, Dar al-Ma‘rifa for Printing and Publishing.

  • Mustafawi, Hasan, Al-Tahqiq fi Kalimat al-Qur’an al-Karim, Tehran, Translation and Publishing Institute, 1360 SH.

  • Mialaret, Gaston, The Meaning and Scope of Educational Sciences, trans. Mohammad Ali Kardan, Tehran, University of Tehran, 1375 SH.

  [1] But the notion that every science has a subject matter whose essential attributes are discussed in its issues, and thus each science is inherently distinct from others due to its subject matter, is not correct. This is because, even if this principle is accepted, its application to conventional sciences is questionable. Moreover, the classification of sciences is a rational matter, even if there is a single subject matter, as it is rational beings who designate the issues under a specific subject matter as a single science. It may even be the case that the characteristics of the subject matter are unknown, and rational beings demarcate a science based on its objectives. See: Akhund Khorasani, Kifayat al-Usul, Introduction, Discussion on the Subject Matter of Science.

  [2] This holds true for all conventional matters. In every convention, three elements—need, objective, and value—are present. The one who establishes the convention, after recognizing the real relationships between objectives and value carriers (entities capable of fulfilling objectives, such as water for thirst), establishes a convention to direct value carriers toward objectives. Thus, a convention is a tool for directing value carriers toward objectives. Therefore, those with a more comprehensive understanding of these relationships can establish better conventions and laws, and it is through these factors that the validity of conventional matters is evaluated. For further reading, see: Daneshfar, Majid, “Legitimacy and Reinterpretation of the Concepts of Right, Ruling, and Property Based on It,” Level Four Thesis, August 1401 SH.

  [3] Medical physics.

  [4] https://www.webcitation.org/6Ofsj3bRR?url=http://medicalphysics.duke.edu/medical_physics.

  [5] Biotechnology.

  [6] https://www.techtarget.com/whatis/definition/biotechnology.

  [7] The term “discipline of education” is appropriate only if the current educational sciences achieve a unified integration (in which case it would be more qualified to integrate with the discipline of jurisprudence). Otherwise, the term “educational sciences” is more suitable. In this article, both terms are used.

  [8] Mustafawi, Al-Tahqiq fi Kalimat al-Qur’an, Vol. 1, p. 123.

  [9] Ghazali, Ihya Ulum al-Din, Vol. 1, p. 55.

  [10] Zuhayli, Al-Fiqh al-Islami wa Adillatuh, Vol. 1, p. 14. For definitions by Shia scholars, see: Allama Hilli, Tahrir al-Ahkam al-Shar‘iyya ‘ala Madhhab al-Imamiyya, Vol. 1, p. 2; Shahid Awwal, Al-Qawa‘id wa al-Fawa’id, Vol. 1, p. 30; Muhaqqiq Thani, Jami‘ al-Maqasid fi Sharh al-Qawa‘id, p. 5, and others.

  [11] There is disagreement regarding situational rulings. Some, like Shaykh Ansari, do not consider situational rulings as independently establishable and view them as derived from obligatory rulings. Others accept their independent establishment with certain details, which is beyond the scope of this article. However, it seems that since situational rulings, even indirectly, pertain to the actions of those bound by obligations, they are included in the definition.

  [12] For further explanation, see: Shahid Thani, Tamhid al-Qawa‘id al-Usuliyya wa al-‘Arabiyya, pp. 33–36.

  [13] For further reading on the types of human actions and the inclusivity of the definition regarding internal actions, see: A‘rafi, Alireza, Fiqh Tarbiyati, Vol. 1, p. 44.

  [14] It is clear that the intent is to describe characteristics consistent with the nature of each style, though a jurist may not adhere to all characteristics of a single style but may generally align with one of the two styles.

  [15] Many of these conflicts arise from the method of interpretation of narrations and certain overarching assumptions, such as the manner of the Lawgiver’s legislation, which are addressed in the explanation of the Qom School’s inference method.

  [16] For a comparative table of the Qom and Najaf schools, see: Alidoust, Abu al-Qasim, Methodology of Ijtihad, p. 147.

  [17] Paradigm.

  [18] It should be noted that benefit and harm are not isolated matters but are determined based on understanding the structure governing a thing and its internal and external relationships. For example, to determine what is beneficial for the human stomach, we consider the structure governing the stomach, its role in the human body, the objectives it serves, and what enhances its efficiency. Based on this understanding of the stomach’s order and structure, we can say that consuming stones is not beneficial for the stomach. Thus, benefit refers to alignment with the governing order of a thing, and harm refers to deviation from that order. In this perspective, since all religious rulings are based on benefits and harms, it can be said (as quoted from Mirza Habibullah Rashti) that all religious rulings are, in a sense, advisory, and the five types of rulings express the requirements of the order governing humanity. For further reading: Daneshfar, Majid, “Legitimacy and Reinterpretation of the Concepts of Right, Ruling, and Property Based on It,” Level Four Thesis, August 1401 SH, p. 79.

  [19] Scholars near the era of the Minor Occultation, such as Shaykh Mufid (Muqni‘a), Salar (Marasim), Halabi (Kafi), Saduq (Hidayah and Muqni‘), and Ibn Barraj (Muhadhdhab), up to Shaykh Tusi in Nihaya, included the texts of narrations in their fatwa-based books. Shaykh Tusi, in the introduction to Mabsut, explicitly mentions this. In the books of early scholars, if the beginning of the book addresses principles of belief followed by jurisprudence, it is a fatwa-based book. Some other jurisprudential books by our scholars are deductive. Shaykh Tusi’s Khilaf is an example of this. In Ayatollah Borujerdi’s methodology, reliance on received principles (fatwa-based books of early scholars) is one of the most prominent characteristics. Thus, in cases where there may be no narration or even a conflicting narration, they would act based on received principles. For further reading, see: Muntazari, Husayn Ali, Al-Badr al-Zahir fi Salat al-Jum‘a wa al-Musafir, p. 19.

  [20] For a comparative table of the Qom and Najaf schools, see: Alidoust, Abu al-Qasim, Methodology of Ijtihad, p. 147.

  [21] The author believes that the discussion of legitimacy and ruling is one of the most significant overarching foundations addressing this matter. The author has examined these foundations in a systematic framework. Daneshfar, Majid, “Legitimacy and Reinterpretation of the Concepts of Right, Ruling, and Property Based on It,” Level Four Thesis, August 1401 SH.

  [22] Dehkhoda, Dehkhoda Dictionary, Vol. 4, p. 5776.

  [23] Ibn Faris, Mu‘jam Maqayis al-Lugha, Vol. 2, p. 483; Ibn Manzur, Lisan al-Arab, Vol. 1, pp. 401 and 304. For further reading, see: Mustafawi, Al-Tahqiq fi Kalimat al-Qur’an al-Karim, Vol. 4, p. 19.

  [24] A‘rafi, Alireza, Fiqh Tarbiyati, Vol. 1, p. 140.

  [25] A‘rafi, Alireza, Fiqh Tarbiyati, Vol. 1, p. 220. Despite acknowledging the element of change in the definition of education, he considers the primary difference between ethics and education to be limited to self-improvement versus other-improvement.

  [26] Mialaret, The Meaning and Scope of Educational Sciences, p. 22.

  [27] It may be objected that we must first define the jurisprudence of education to identify its related necessities. The response is that, in the realm of establishment, needs and necessities undoubtedly precede the formulation of a science, as the formulation of a science serves objectives that address these needs. However, in the realm of verification, we can identify the objectives served by a science through its issues. While this approach poses no issue for sciences that have reached a relative maturity, it is not effective for emerging sciences that are far from their ideal state. In such cases, the ideal state of a science must be determined causally through the necessities and needs that form the context for its emergence.

  [28] In these principles, in addition to refining foundations such as ruling and legitimacy, which directly contribute to understanding the capacity of the legislative system, the proofs mentioned in the science of principles must also be re-evaluated, and questions such as the following must be answered:

  Can the validity of indications, based on the practice of rational beings, be flexibly adjusted to the most reality-representing indication in each era?

  In cases of uncertainty, are there principles aligned with the realist method? For example, if a system is deduced from the Lawgiver’s rulings, can the most consistent ruling with that system (even if derived implicitly from the deduced system) be deemed valid in doubtful cases? (This is similar to the discussion raised by Martyr Sadr in Iqtisaduna, Vol. 1, p. 42.)