Rulings concerning artistic matters are always determined with the aid of titles that apply to these matters. However, the titles of prohibition in the jurisprudence of art have never been discussed independently or comprehensively. This has led to considerable ambiguity regarding their meaning, scope, and application in the jurisprudence of art. In this regard, we spoke with Ayatollah Sayyid Mojtaba Noormofidi, President of the Institute of Contemporary Jurisprudential Studies. In addition to years of teaching advanced courses in jurisprudence (fiqh) and principles of jurisprudence (usūl) at the Qom Seminary, he has a strong interest in the jurisprudence of art, as evidenced by his membership in the Board of Trustees of the Specialized Center for Islamic Culture and Art and his participation in the Fourth Conference on the Jurisprudence of Art. This professor of advanced jurisprudence at the Qom Seminary believes that the default ruling for art is not only permissibility (ibāha) but desirability (istihbāb), and other titles must contend with this primary ruling. The full text of the exclusive interview with the member of the Board of Trustees of the Specialized Center for Islamic Culture and Art follows:
Contemporary Jurisprudence: What is the primary ruling for the production and use of artistic works?
Noormofidi: If we consider art in its broadest sense, such that it pertains to human actions and can be a subject for the science of jurisprudence—that is, if we regard it as a knowledge or skill through which a person presents their emotions, thoughts, and beliefs in a beautiful form to an audience, in a way that captivates and influences the audience through the artist’s aesthetic creation—then, not only is it permissible (mubāh) under the primary rule of permissibility for human actions, but we can also establish its desirability (istihbāb). The evidence for its desirability includes certain narrations, such as the narration: “Indeed, Allah is beautiful, loves beauty, and loves to see the effects of His blessings on His servant,” and similar narrations. These narrations can effectively prove this point. The principle that human actions are primarily permissible (ibāha), and become prohibited only if they fall under a prohibited title, stands firm. However, beyond this, the ability of a person to present a correct and sound belief in a beautiful form that influences the audience is undoubtedly desirable. Presenting a true statement in an impactful manner, guiding the audience toward the straight path, the ultimate purpose of existence, human creation, and eternal felicity, is without question desirable, and there is no dispute about it. The key is to identify and regulate those titles that could potentially alter this primary ruling. For example, which titles entail prohibition, undesirability, or dislike (karāha)?
In our sources, there are certain titles that carry the ruling of prohibition. These titles fall into several categories: sometimes, the title itself is central to the ruling, and the ruling hinges entirely on it, whether affirmatively or negatively. At other times, the ruling is tied to a specific term that has a particular significance, but this does not mean the ruling is exclusive to that term. In some cases, the title itself is not central to the ruling; rather, the ruling applies to a broader concept, and the title is merely one of its instances. In these cases, the reason for mentioning the title may be due to necessity, prevalence, or because the ruling for other instances is already clear, but it is evident that the ruling applies to the broader concept.
For example, a source states: “The Nasibi is impure, the Jew is impure, the Christian is impure, and the Zoroastrian is impure.” Although four titles are mentioned here, we are certain that the subject of the ruling of impurity is the disbeliever (kāfir), and these are all instances of that title. Thus, if a disbeliever falls under a title other than these, they would still be subject to this ruling.
Sometimes, a title is mentioned not because it is inherently central to the ruling or because it is an instance of a broader title, but because of the benefit or harm associated with it, which causes the ruling to apply. In such cases, the matter revolves around benefits and harms.
In summary, we must distinguish between these titles. There is a difference between a title that is inherently central to the ruling and one that is subject to a ruling merely because of the rationale (malāk) it entails.
In addition to these titles, there is a fourth category of titles where their application is challenging, meaning that the boundaries and scope of the title are clear, and the evidence and indications also clearly establish which ruling applies to which title or subject. Examples include lahw al-hadith or qawl al-zūr. However, the issue lies in their application, which, due to certain narrations that have applied them to other matters, becomes somewhat difficult. In such cases, the matter becomes multifaceted: there is a general title with specific instances, and it is assumed that, based on the evidence and indications, the rationale is clear. However, in a specific historical period, that rationale may have applied to a particular instance but no longer does. In such cases, the task becomes more complex and requires greater precision. For instance, we encounter numerous titles in art. Some of these titles are longstanding, while others are new. Particularly in modern art, titles have emerged that did not exist in the past. Here, distinguishing or not distinguishing between these titles and attempting to fit all current titles into the framework of titles considered in the past is highly determinative.
If we wish to propose a general title in this regard, we could say: “Anything that leads to corruption (fasād).” This title can impose restrictions on the production, dissemination, and use of artistic works. While corruption is a broad concept and may be perceived as vague due to the various ways it can be interpreted, it is clear that “preventing the means of corruption” is certainly desired by the Lawgiver (shāri‘), and the Lawgiver not only emphasizes preventing the means of corruption but also prohibits anything that promotes corruption in any way.
When we refer to the sources, we notice that they mention a limited number of titles that need to be examined. For example, one of the prohibited titles, which is certainly used in some artistic activities such as theater and cinema, is tashbīb. Tashbīb refers to someone expressing affection or love toward a non-mahram in the form of poetry. This act is inherently prohibited. However, an actor in theater or cinema may sometimes be required to engage in tashbīb. The question then arises: can we consider expressing affection or love toward a non-mahram, even if done superficially—i.e., in the context of a role played in a film or theater—as falling under this ruling? This is where the issue takes on new dimensions.
Therefore, I believe the critical task required to address this matter more effectively is the jurisprudential identification of the subject (mawḍū‘-shināsī). While subject identification is inherently important, jurisprudential subject identification takes on added significance. Its importance lies in the fact that without proper subject identification, referring to the primary ruling or making exceptions to it is impossible. This point is crucial. Sometimes, with a superficial or simplistic view of a title or subject, we may subject it to the primary ruling. However, when the subject is examined closely, it may take on a different ruling. Thus, for the primary ruling to apply to actions or objects, the subject must first be identified.
To identify the subject, the necessary tools must naturally be employed, relevant knowledge must be applied, and experts and specialists must be consulted—a process that is not easily accomplished.
Contemporary Jurisprudence: Apart from the titles mentioned in the texts, are there other new titles whose application would entail a ruling of prohibition for various forms of art?
Noormofidi: The titles mentioned in the texts are very limited, such as illustration, sculpting, music, ghinā (singing), poetry, and so forth. However, how we approach these titles and how we categorize them based on the distinctions I mentioned is very important. Some titles have inherent specificity, some are subject to a ruling because they are instances of another title, and others are not inherently central to the ruling but are subject to it due to the rationale they entail.
Regarding new titles that apply to artistic matters, it must be said that novel titles (‘anāwīn mustahdatha) are essentially novel matters (mawḍū‘āt mustahdatha). A novel matter is not inherently prohibited; rather, it must be examined in light of its alignment with the four categories of titles I mentioned.
Contemporary Jurisprudence: What is the criterion and authority for identifying prohibited titles, and who is responsible for judging these titles? The jurist, the general category of obligated individuals, or the individual obligated person?
Noormofidi: As your question indicates, we can identify three authorities: the jurist, the general custom (‘urf), or the general category of obligated individuals, and thirdly, the individual obligated person.
In general, since the Lawgiver’s address is directed to the general custom or the general populace, the identification of instances of the titles mentioned in religious directives is also the responsibility of the general populace. However, an important point to note is that sometimes the Lawgiver intervenes in defining the boundaries and scope of subjects and instances. For example, in the case of travel, which is a customary matter, the Lawgiver imposes specific conditions and boundaries and designates specific instances for it, while the general custom may have a different understanding of travel. In such cases, we cannot leave the identification of the subject to custom and determine who is considered a traveler based on custom, applying the rulings of shortened prayers (qasr) or complete prayers (itmam) accordingly. Instead, we must refer to the jurist to discern the Lawgiver’s intent from the sources.
Regarding reliance on custom, there is another discussion: should the criterion be the custom at the time the narrations were issued or the custom of the present time? This itself is an important matter. If the custom of that time is the criterion, how do we access the customary meaning of that era, and to what extent can we achieve it? This requires reflection and discussion.
In any case, we cannot categorically state that the authority for identifying instances and titles is always custom. Indeed, in some cases, the general custom is certainly the criterion, while in others, a specific custom may be the criterion. In some instances, the individual obligated person may also have a role. For example, regarding the state of tarab (ecstasy) mentioned in the context of prohibited music, there is debate about whether tarab is a criterion for the general category of obligated individuals—i.e., whether it should induce ecstasy in the general populace—or whether it depends on the individual’s state. A piece of music may induce tarab in the general category of obligated individuals but not in a specific person. Is the criterion the individual or the general category? This distinction is important and must be considered.
I believe that, overall, depending on the type of titles and sources, we can accept the authority of all three, but their roles vary depending on the case. As for determining the primary criterion for this authority, I think we cannot express a single, universal ruling.
Another point to consider is that identifying instances (masdaq-shināsī) is distinct from identifying subjects (mawḍū‘-shināsī). In my view, jurisprudential subject identification is the responsibility of the jurist. The claim that subject identification is not the jurist’s task is, in my opinion, flawed and unacceptable. However, referring subject identification to the jurist is different from saying that instance identification is the jurist’s responsibility, and the two should not be conflated.