One of the jurisprudential titles applicable to artistic matters is the concept of futility (laghv). In jurisprudential texts, some artistic activities, in addition to being considered as amusement and play (lahw wa la‘b), have also been classified as futile. However, there has never been an independent and thorough discussion in jurisprudential texts regarding the legal ruling on futility. We raised this issue with Hujjat al-Islam Sayyid Alireza Hosseini, the secretary of the Islamic Jurisprudence and Law Think Tank at the Center for the Islamic-Iranian Model of Progress. He believes there is no evidence in Islamic law for the prohibition of futility. The full text of the exclusive interview by Contemporary Jurisprudence with this Qom Seminary professor is as follows:
Contemporary Jurisprudence: What is futility (laghv), and can it be applied to various forms of art?
Hosseini: In discussing terminology, one must refer to authoritative linguistic sources for lexical matters and to the works of jurists for technical definitions. Regarding futility, it is understood from linguistic texts that a futile act, or the term “futility” itself, refers to something void, ineffective, or a meaningless or purposeless act. Jurists have initially adopted this term from its linguistic meaning and explained that any act, behavior, or conduct lacking a rational purpose or goal is considered futile.
Thus, in a clear statement, futility can be defined as follows: “An act, behavior, or conduct that is purposeless, thoughtless, and devoid of any rational effect.”
As for whether there is futility in art, it must be said: In authentic art—not the kind associated with laxity or permissiveness—as of this moment, while I speak with you, I see no futile act. However, in inauthentic art that seeks to promote licentiousness and permissiveness, futility does exist.
Contemporary Jurisprudence: Is there any religious evidence indicating the prohibition or lack of preference for futility in absolute terms?
Hosseini: Evidence can be verbal or non-verbal, explicit or non-explicit. Generally, in all religious proofs, as far as we have investigated—and our investigation has been comprehensive—we have found no evidence establishing the prohibition of futility. Therefore, there is no religious proof for the prohibition of futility. I state this with certainty. Yes, an act may be forbidden due to another aspect, such as looking at a non-mahram, but from the perspective of futility itself, there is no evidence for prohibition. However, regarding the disapproval or lack of preference for futility, based on the noble verses of the Quran, the inferences of jurists, and our understanding as a humble seminary student, a discouragement and disapproval can be inferred.
Contemporary Jurisprudence: Is there any form of art that, in and of itself, is an instance of futility, or does it become futile due to accompanying factors such as the mixing of men and women, inappropriate or misleading content, or not?
Hosseini: I may have partially addressed this in the first question, but I will reiterate. I firmly believe that the art practiced in Islamic Iran, both in ancient times and since the Islamic Revolution of Iran, the art that is sublime and adheres to the standards and discipline—what I call authentic, Islamic, and ornamental art—contains no futility. However, in arts where there is a sense of laxity or permissiveness, they may be entirely futile from beginning to end.
That is one point. The second point concerns the accompanying factors of art, such as the mixing of men and women and similar issues. These require precision. In the craft of jurisprudence, you see that sometimes an act is not inherently forbidden but becomes forbidden or void due to a secondary factor, while in itself it poses no issue. Not all arts, such as cinema or theater, involve the mixing of men and women. In many arts, such factors are not even conceivable, and thus they have no inherent prohibition. Therefore, if an art is deemed forbidden, it is not because of its artistic nature but due to a secondary factor, such as the mixing of men and women. Moreover, not every form of mixing is forbidden; only mixing that involves prohibited acts is considered forbidden. However, if the mixing adheres to the standards and discipline of jurisprudence and Islamic law, we cannot deem it forbidden. In jurisprudence and the process of legal inference, we do not insist on creating a mechanism for prohibition, nor do we have a mechanism for permitting everything. We must examine what the evidence dictates. We should not speak to please or displease anyone. Our jurists operate in this manner as well.
Contemporary Jurisprudence: Does the classification of certain arts, such as music or performing arts, as futile stem from jurists and religious scholars not recognizing categories such as art, recreation, joy, and leisure?
Hosseini: Music is one matter, and ghina (a specific form of singing) is another. These must be distinguished. Sometimes we have music, sometimes ghina, and sometimes futile poetry. Each has its own ruling and subject, and because they have distinct subjects, they will also have distinct rulings.
If music falls under the category of instruments of amusement (ālāt lahw), then it is problematic. However, in such cases, it does not fall under futility but under amusement, which is a separate discussion. If music is not an instrument of amusement, it is neither amusement nor futility, as we have said that amusement is forbidden, not futility. Similarly, if ghina is forbidden, it again falls under amusement, not futility.
Another point is that it is incorrect for a jurist, as a jurist, a mujtahid, as a mujtahid, or a religious authority, as a religious authority, to delve into specific instances. For example, if someone asks a religious authority whether a trumpet is an instrument of amusement or futility, the jurist, if responding according to the proper craft of jurisprudence, should say: “This is not my expertise, and I have stated my opinion on matters of music and ghina.” They can only say: “Ghina or music associated with amusement is forbidden.” However, whether a trumpet or an organ is forbidden has no bearing on the jurist’s expertise. Even if a jurist expresses an opinion on the prohibition of a trumpet, it is merely an expert opinion and not binding.
Contemporary Jurisprudence: Is the application or non-application of the title of futility the responsibility of the jurist, the general public, or the obligated individual?
Hosseini: As I mentioned, applying rulings to specific cases or “external instances”—sometimes mistakenly referred to as “external subjects”—is not the jurist’s task. The jurist’s role is solely to issue rulings and fatwas on general jurisprudential matters, nothing more! We say this loudly, and this is not our own opinion but that of great jurisprudential scholars. The late Ayatollah Khoei explicitly wrote this in his book Fiqh al-Qadā, Mabānī Takmilat al-Minhāj. Applying rulings to specific cases is not the jurist’s task. For example, a jurist says, “Blood is impure.” Now, if someone goes to a religious authority’s house and says, “There’s something red on my sleeve; I don’t know if it’s tomato paste, cherry juice, or blood,” what does the jurist say? They say, “Don’t waste my time. What does this have to do with me? I’ve said blood is impure; go figure it out yourself.” This example clarifies that applying rulings is not the jurist’s task.
For instance, saying that a specific mobile network is forbidden—what does that have to do with a jurist? Saying Bitcoin is forbidden—what does that have to do with a jurist? Or saying billiards is forbidden? A jurist can say that permissible games must meet certain conditions, but whether a specific game like Clash of Clans or billiards fits those conditions is not the jurist’s concern; it is the responsibility of the obligated individual.
Generally, determining specific instances is the responsibility of the obligated individual. However, in cases related to courts, judicial matters, and arbitration, it is appropriate for a judge to intervene in specific details. A judge can delve into particulars, such as asking, “Where were you when this incident occurred? How old are you?” and so on. A judge intervenes in details to issue a ruling as close to justice as possible. In such matters, a ruler can intervene, though they must consult experts first, as a ruler is not an expert in everything.
Thus, to be clear, a jurist, as a jurist, cannot intervene in specific instances, details, or ambiguous cases, and these matters are the responsibility of the obligated individual. However, in judicial matters or when a religious ruler issues an opinion, they can intervene, provided they consult experts.
In fact, custom (‘urf) is divided into general custom (‘urf ‘āmm) and specific custom (‘urf khāss). In some cases, one must refer to general custom, and in others to specific custom. Referring to general custom pertains to terminology and conceptual understanding, such as understanding what futility is. What was meant by futility during the time rulings were issued, in the era of the Prophet and the Infallible Imams? This is the role of general custom.
Specific custom, however, refers to experts. When do we refer to specific custom? In applying concepts to specific instances. Sometimes, the obligated individual can determine this, but sometimes they are unsure whether something fits the concept. In such cases, they consult an expert, and the expert provides an opinion. For example, in 1982, when the issue of whether the sturgeon fish has scales was raised, the late Imam Khomeini referred to experts. The experts stated that there is a hard skin under the fins and gills of this fish. Some jurists, with great precision, also considered the general custom and said, “Check whether there are scales under the fins and gills.” Everyone looked and said, “Yes, we see it now; we thought there were no scales.” These jurists, by doing so, reconciled general and specific customs. This is very important and ensures that the matter reaches a level of certainty and knowledge beyond mere assurance.