The historical approach of jurists toward art is by no means a matter of consensus among art scholars. Some, citing strict fatwas regarding music and sculpture, view the jurists’ stance as one of opposition and skepticism toward art. Conversely, others, pointing to evidence of many jurists’ engagement in poetry and calligraphy, argue that art, in principle, is not only accepted but even encouraged by them. Amid this debate, Hassan Ejraei, a graduate of the Qom Seminary, does not seek to affirm either side of this dichotomy. Instead, he aims to explore whether jurists have approached art as individual components or as a unified whole. The full text of this insightful commentary by the researcher at the Research Institute for Contemporary Fiqh Studies is presented below:
The jurisprudential examination of art and artistic matters in the history of Islamic jurisprudence has consistently focused on five specific subjects: poetry, painting, sculpture, singing (ghinā), and music. In this regard, jurists, in both early fatwa collections and later practical treatises (risālah ‘amaliyyah), have not examined these five subjects as manifestations of a broader concept called “art” to derive and issue rulings accordingly. Instead, relying on Quranic and narrational evidence, they have independently sought to deduce the ruling for each subject. Nevertheless, by analyzing the jurists’ methodological approaches, a relatively coherent pattern can be identified. Particularly in the cases of poetry, singing, and music, jurists, rather than relying solely on the form and issuing rulings based on the essence of poetry or singing, have emphasized content and meaning as the basis for their rulings. Accordingly, the permissibility or prohibition of poetry is determined not by its mere nature as poetry but by whether its content is guiding or misleading. Similarly, at least some jurists have conditioned the prohibition of singing and music on the intent to mislead.
Despite two Quranic verses explicitly condemning poetry, poets, and their followers, there are also narrations that praise poetry alongside those that censure it: “Indeed, some poetry is wisdom.” Thus, instead of issuing a blanket prohibition on poetry based solely on the apparent meaning of Quranic verses, jurists have distinguished between form and content, deeming only misleading poetry as prohibited.
In addressing painting and sculpture, jurists have distinguished between depictions and sculptures of living beings and those of non-living entities, considering only the former as prohibited. However, Sheikh Tusi in his Tabyān commentary and Fazl ibn Hasan Tabarsi in his Majma‘ al-Bayān commentary did not deem painting or sculpture forbidden. Among later jurists, Mirza Jawad Tabrizi, in his practical treatise, refrained from issuing a prohibition on painting and sculpture, though he exercised caution and did not explicitly rule them permissible either.
The tendency to base rulings on content rather than form is evident not only in poetry but also in painting and sculpture. Alongside definitive opinions on the prohibition of painting and sculpture, some jurists have argued that their prohibition hinges not on the act itself but on intentions of veneration, servitude, or sanctification associated with them. Additionally, Sheikh Ansari considered the intent to imitate God’s creation or claim parity with God in creation as the basis for prohibiting painting and sculpture.
Although no Quranic verses explicitly condemn singing or music, five verses have been cited in interpretative narrations as evidence for their prohibition: Surah al-Hajj (22:30), Surah Luqmān (31:6), Surah al-Furqān (25:72), Surah al-Mu’minūn (23:3), and Surah al-Isrā’ (17:36). Broadly, these verses can be understood to address two main themes: prohibiting false speech and futile actions. Based on interpretative narrations, these verses have been used to deduce the prohibition of singing and music. However, some jurists, relying on Surah Luqmān (31:6) and moving beyond mere form, have conditioned the prohibition of singing and music on the intent to mislead.
All that has been briefly outlined thus far demonstrates that, while most jurists, relying on evidence prohibiting poetry, painting, sculpture, singing, and music, have leaned toward issuing fatwas of prohibition, there has always been a tendency to distinguish between form and content. This approach has persisted over time and has arguably become more prominent in the contemporary era.
In recent years, contrary to over a millennium of jurisprudential tradition, artistic matters have also been examined as a unified whole, becoming a subject of jurisprudential inquiry. Alongside discussions in fields such as political jurisprudence, communication jurisprudence, media jurisprudence, and economic jurisprudence, jurists and researchers have engaged in jurisprudential efforts in the realm of the jurisprudence of art. Topics such as “the jurisprudence of seeing, hearing, and touching in art” and “the jurisprudence of acting” have been explored.
Thus, one of the most significant shifts and developments in the jurisprudential discourse on art within the history of Islamic jurisprudence must be the transition from a fragmented view of art to recognizing it as a cohesive and integrated whole. However, this perspective is still in its early stages and has only been articulated or publicly disseminated by a limited number of jurists.
In this regard, Mohammad Eshāyeri Manfared, in his article “Analysis of the Role of Custom in Subject Identification and Instance Determination in the Jurisprudence of Art,” published in the fourth issue of Theology of Art journal, highlights the limitations of applying custom in Shia jurisprudence. He argues that there is a significant divide between absolute jurisprudence and applied jurisprudence. Accordingly, while the institution of custom lacks a robust foundation in Shia jurisprudence, in applied jurisprudence, the role of custom, particularly expert custom, must be strengthened. Based on this, Eshāyeri Manfared places the jurisprudence of art, as an applied jurisprudence, within a framework distinct from conventional or absolute jurisprudence and assigns a valuable role to custom in deriving rulings for the jurisprudence of art.
On the other hand, Mohammad Javad Fāzel Lankarāni distinguishes between individual jurisprudence and social jurisprudence, categorizing the jurisprudence of art as a subset of social jurisprudence. He raises the question of whether the criteria in individual jurisprudence are the same as those in social jurisprudence. He extends this inquiry to approaches based on the objectives of Shari‘a, asking whether such objectives can be used as a basis for derivation and ijtihād only in specific cases addressed in narrations or whether they can be applied more broadly as a general principle.
Finally, in an article titled “Intrinsic and Incidental in the Rulings of Art: A Methodological Discussion” by Sayyid Mostafa Mohaghegh Damad and Hadi Jahāngoshāy-e Abājelou, published in the seventh issue of Theology of Art journal, it is stated that in significant artistic matters, one cannot rely on solitary narrations, and such matters should align with the sensitivities of custom. However, it is emphasized that this approach does not equate to secularizing jurisprudence.
The article explicitly notes that no general rule in conventional jurisprudence addresses art as art. Thus, adopting this approach in the history of jurisprudence opens a new chapter. The authors argue that by distinguishing between intrinsic and incidental aspects, it must be determined whether a ruling of prohibition or permissibility pertains to the essence of an art or its incidental aspects. In this regard, they reference the fatwa of Fayz Kāshāni, who, alongside absolute prohibitions of music and detailed prohibitions, adopted a different approach. Relying on authentic narrations, he deemed singing permissible at wedding gatherings, as he believed narrations about music referred to its use by Umayyad and Abbasid rulers in frivolous gatherings involving the mingling of men and women. Thus, the factor of prohibition was the mingling, not singing itself.
In short, in recent years, a significant shift has occurred in the history of Islamic jurisprudence. Jurists and researchers of the jurisprudence of art, instead of addressing artistic instances individually, have considered all branches of art as a unified whole. This approach is still in its infancy and may gradually lead to the development of independent rules distinct from those of conventional jurisprudence.