It could be said that “corruption” (ifsād) is one of those concepts that appears simple but is complex. At first glance, we think we fully understand it, but when it comes to interpretation, we realize it has many facets we have overlooked. In the discipline of jurisprudence, ifsād is a well-known concept, both in criminal jurisprudence, where it is discussed as “corruption on earth” (ifsād fī al-arḍ), and in other jurisprudential domains, where it serves as a basis for invalidating or prohibiting adherence to a ruling. However, this concept has never been independently analyzed as a jurisprudential or methodological principle, which is the source of the ambiguities surrounding it. We sat down with Hojjat al-Islam wal-Muslemin Ebrahim Nikdel, a professor of advanced levels at the Mashhad Seminary, to discuss ifsād and its applications in the jurisprudence of art. While Nikdel is renowned for teaching the works of Martyr Sadr and formal and philosophical topics in jurisprudence, such as the “Algorithm of Jurisprudential Principles,” he also has a strong command of jurisprudential issues, particularly emerging topics. The full text of the exclusive interview with this faculty member of the Daneshvaran Research Institute in Mashhad is presented below:

Contemporary Fiqh: What is ifsād, and can it be applied to various forms of art?

Nikdel: Linguistically and in narrational usage, ifsād stands in contrast to ṣalāḥ (rectitude). Ṣalāḥ typically refers to a correct and proper act; otherwise, if the act does not produce a proper effect, it is deemed corrupted (fāsid). Naturally, ifsād refers to the act of ruining or performing an action that results in no proper effect on an object.

However, ifsād has a specific jurisprudential connotation used in criminal law, referring to “corruption on earth” (ifsād fī al-arḍ), which is presumably not what you mean here. The intended meaning of ifsād in this context is its prohibitive ruling (ḥurmat taklīfī). Here, ifsād means corrupting the legitimate religious or worldly affairs of people. Thus, an art that causes ifsād is one that destroys the legitimate religious or worldly affairs of people. However, ifsād fī al-arḍ refers to muḥāraba (waging war against God), which should be addressed in criminal jurisprudence.

Before delving into the discussion, it is worth noting that certain arts, such as music, sculpture, and painting, existed during the time of the Infallibles (peace be upon them) and have specific jurisprudential evidence. These arts are naturally excluded from this discussion since they have their own specific rulings. Therefore, the arts under consideration here are those that did not exist during the time of the Infallibles, and we are now examining whether the concept of ifsād applies to them.

For arts that existed during the time of the Infallibles, if specific evidence indicates their prohibition, that ruling must be followed. However, if no specific evidence exists for their prohibition, we can discuss whether the concept of ifsād applies to them.

Contemporary Fiqh: Is there any religious evidence that absolutely prohibits or deems ifsād undesirable?

Nikdel: It is appropriate to first clarify the subject. The initial question is: what is meant by prohibition? Are we seeking to establish the prohibition of the artist’s act or the actions of those responsible for permitting and promoting it, such as allowing the broadcast of a particular film or series, the installation of a specific sculpture or painting, or the holding of a certain concert? In short, are we discussing the prohibition of the artist’s act or the prohibition of the actions of the responsible authority in permitting or promoting the art?

The concepts used to determine the ruling of an artist’s act differ from those used to clarify the ruling for those who permit or promote art. For example, an art form may, in itself, be unobjectionable, but due to other factors, it may be deemed prohibited. Issues such as the mingling of men and women or non-compliance with hijab do not make the art itself inherently prohibited but render it forbidden due to these external factors. However, for those responsible for permitting or promoting art, concepts like “promoting immorality” (ishā‘at al-fuḥshā) apply, which are entirely different from the former. Thus, we must carefully determine who the subject of the prohibition is in this context: the artist or the authority responsible for permitting and promoting the art?

Some concepts, such as ifsād, do not apply solely to the artistic act itself. For instance, if an artist performs prohibited music in private, the concept of ifsād may not apply, but if they perform it publicly, ifsād may be applicable.

It seems that the concept applicable to both the artist’s act and the actions of those permitting or promoting art is ishā‘at al-fuḥshā (promoting immorality). If this concept is present, no art, in itself, would be problematic, as the essence of art does not inherently lead to promoting immorality or even ifsād. However, a piece of music, for example, may lead to ifsād or ishā‘at al-fuḥshā due to other factors, such as being exhilarating or misleading, but this does not mean that music, as an art form in itself, inherently causes ifsād or promotes immorality. Therefore, no art, in itself, constitutes ifsād.

Contemporary Fiqh: Is the inclusion of certain arts, such as music and performance arts, under the concept of ifsād a result of jurists and religious individuals not recognizing categories like art, entertainment, joy, and leisure? In other words, do you agree that if art, entertainment, and joy are considered legitimate and rational, no art, by its nature, would constitute ifsād?

Nikdel: The notion among some religious individuals that certain arts, such as music and performance arts, are not fully recognized because they reject entertainment, joy, and related matters requires, first, verification and, second, an examination of the intuitive assumptions underlying their mindset. After all, this perception stems from certain ingrained notions and does not arise without cause.

From the perspective of jurisprudence and its principles, I would argue that this question is based on a mistaken assumption. To clarify, I am speaking strictly from the viewpoint of jurisprudence and principles, not from the perspective of religious individuals. The assumption in this question seems to be that religious rulings are like ordinary laws in a rational society, influenced by political dynamics and other relationships. However, religious rulings are not like this. While we do have concepts like tazāḥum (conflict of rulings) in jurisprudence and principles, where the ruling of an act is determined in relation to other acts, if an art is prohibited under the concept of ifsād, it is due to the harm (mafsada) it entails—harm that the sacred law does not accept, not just any harm. Thus, if we prohibit it, it is for this reason, not because arts are associated with joy, entertainment, or leisure, which are secondary concepts. Arts are not prohibited due to these secondary concepts; rather, it is assumed that they are prohibited due to ifsād, which is a primary concept, making the ruling primary, not secondary. In short, this ruling is not about considering the relationship between art and entertainment, joy, or leisure; it is due to the primary concept of ifsād. Examining the relationship with secondary concepts requires a separate discussion and great precision.

Contemporary Fiqh: So, in essence, you consider the determination of ifsād to be the responsibility of the jurist?

Nikdel: No, no! The harms (mafāsid) resulting from acts vary. Not every harm is prohibited; that is, it is not the case that every act with harm is deemed prohibited in Shari‘a. Some harms are not prohibited by the sacred law, and one should merely guide people regarding them, informing them that if these harms materialize, they will bear the consequences. However, certain harms are prohibited by the sacred law. Here, juristic effort is required for the jurist to identify what is prohibited based on evidence, but applying it is not the jurist’s responsibility. Application sometimes falls to the general public, and sometimes to experts with greater and more precise knowledge of the subject. Therefore, it cannot be broadly stated that identifying instances is always the responsibility of a specific group, the general public, or the jurist. Yes, the jurist must intervene in identifying prohibited harms, but beyond that, the process is no longer their responsibility.