Note

The name of Hujjat al-Islam Mohammad Qotbi is intertwined with innovation. For years, he has initiated projects whose primary characteristic is their novelty. The former head of the Islamic Propagation Office in Isfahan once addressed the organization of playhouses; another time, he introduced new media, and today, he has turned to supporting the creativity and innovations of seminary students. The CEO of the Ashraq House of Creativity and Innovation, on the occasion of years of effort and concern in the media domain, in an exclusive interview with Contemporary Jurisprudence, discussed the foundations and assumptions of media jurisprudence—foundations and assumptions that completely change the method of deriving rulings in media jurisprudence. The head of the Art and Creative Industries Working Group at the Islamic Research Center of the Parliament believes that the general systems of media jurisprudence should be extracted from religious texts as a constitution, and then the rulings for media instances should be discovered based on the approach of non-opposition to these systems. The full text of the engaging and exclusive interview of Contemporary Jurisprudence with this seminary professor and researcher passes before your eyes:

Contemporary Jurisprudence: What is media jurisprudence, and what rulings apply to its requirements?

Qotbi: The question has various dimensions, and I will refer to it in general terms. Media jurisprudence can perhaps be viewed and defined in several ways.

One is in terms of the components of media; that is, media encompasses components such as the content published in media, media management, media production, media utilization, and media consumption. These can each be components of media, and of course, each one, in relation to itself, has its own jurisprudence; for example, the jurisprudence of media consumption is a type of obligation for individuals, meaning that as a consumer, I have religious and Sharia duties that I must consider in its jurisprudential discussions.

On the other hand, media content is another side and component of media, such as what content should be produced and with what approach. In some places, detailed jurisprudential issues arise that are quite complex and must be addressed.

Similarly, the other components of media management, media production, media utilization, and media promotion can be addressed individually, stating that each has a jurisprudential chapter that must be dealt with.

In the midst of this, the entirety of media has a jurisprudence that oversees all these components, meaning we consider media as a multifaceted phenomenon in which there are content layers, consumption layers, and culture-building layers. If we view it as a general and comprehensive chapter, naturally, we must assemble a constellation of various sides and components to address it. This depends on how we view media, after which we proceed to raise its jurisprudential chapters.

I think, for two reasons, we should not have a chapter titled media jurisprudence; instead, we should examine each of its components separately from a jurisprudential perspective. One reason is that media, throughout its history up to now, has developed great diversity and multiplicity. What we mean by media includes radio and television, people-based media, social networks, cyberspace, even educational technologies and visual arts. Given the numerous components, we should not consider media as a general matter with a common denominator, because this common denominator is so small that it is merely limited to a means of message transmission. Meanwhile, for example, the metaverse world, which is a medium, is very different from a toy, which is also a medium.

The second reason is that even now, the emergence of media instances has not ended. See, a few years ago, we did not have something called the internet, but now we do. Just in the last two or three years, we did not have artificial intelligence, but now we do. We did not have metaverse, but now we do. These continue to advance, and major developments are occurring; therefore, let us not reduce the subject to a small common denominator of message transmission or a tool for message transmission and seek to articulate its jurisprudence only from this instrumental angle.

Therefore, in my opinion, it is better to address each one separately. Of course, if we can find a conceptual umbrella as a scientific constellation that covers all components and instances and does not lead us to a minimal definition—meaning the common denominator is not small but rather a large shared concept that acts as an umbrella and covers everything—naturally, we can present it as media.

Given this point, it becomes clear that our definition of media must also change. Currently, the common definition is to say that media is a tool for message transmission; but a tool for message transmission is a very small common denominator among all these instances, and thus, it inevitably overlooks many components and sides. If we can arrive at an expansive concept in defining media, then we can say we have media jurisprudence; but at present, since we do not have such a thing, it is better to discuss each component separately and, for example, say jurisprudence of media content, jurisprudence of cinema, jurisprudence of visual arts, jurisprudence of games and toys, and so forth.

Contemporary Jurisprudence: In general, what are the foundations and assumptions of media jurisprudence?

Qotbi: The answer to this question again returns to our definition. If we consider media merely as a small common denominator meaning a tool for message transmission, the foundations for using a tool for message transmission suffice for us; but these foundations are, in truth, foundations of message transmission, not foundations of media. If we seek foundations of media, we must first consider media in that same expansive sense; then foundations of communication, foundations of awareness-raising, foundations of entertainment, foundations in the domain of education, foundations in the domain of upbringing, and all of these also enter into the discussion of its foundations. Of course, the foundations of each of these sections are also different from one another; for example, the domain of upbringing has its own specific foundations, the domain of news and information dissemination has other foundations; in news, we say freedom of news is a principle for us, but in upbringing, we say human growth is the principle; and in the domain of recreation and entertainment, we have other foundations. At present, with the new approaches that are raised in the world today, media is a tool of governance; so we must also bring in foundations of governance. Additionally, media is considered a tool in the domains of health and social affairs; so we must consider the foundations of health and social domains to be able to have a comprehensive jurisprudential reasoning regarding all of these.

Therefore, something like freedom of news is not raised as one of the foundations of media; rather, it is merely a foundation of the domain of news and information dissemination.

Contemporary Jurisprudence: With the theory of minimal jurisprudence, is it even possible to engage with media jurisprudence or not?

Qotbi: This question is very precise, and it can be answered from two angles. One is that our jurisprudential approach is abstract, which is roughly how our Guardian Council currently proceeds and says that the parliament should derive laws based on human experience and knowledge, and we merely approve them; thus, it suffices that they are not contrary to Sharia and have no definitive opposition to it.

In this approval-based model, in some respects, our work is easier; because instead of delving into religious discussions and extracting media theory, and then from this theory, deriving foundational principles, and from these foundations, extracting principles and rules. Instead of all this, we say carry out whatever the world has in the media domain, only in cases that are contrary to Sharia, we remind so that they are not performed; therefore, the minimal approach makes things very easy for governance systems, because finding cases of non-contradiction with Sharia is not very difficult either.

But if our approach in jurisprudence is foundational, meaning we want definitive agreement to occur, it makes the path and process very difficult; because we must go and extract theory and foundations and principles and rules and so forth to later reach solutions and actions; but its subsequent result is better, because we arrive at a model that we say has come from the depth of religion and has a strong religious theory behind it, and later advances us more easily.

I think there is a middle ground between these two; in such a way that we neither have a purely minimal approval-based view, meaning no definitive opposition, nor insist on a strong, deep foundational basis that has definitive agreement with the Lawgiver’s opinions. This has a middle ground, and that middle ground is that we come and extract the general systems governing the dimensions and components of media based on religious principles, but from there onward, proceed in an approval-based style; similar to what we did in the constitution. The constitution is neither purely approval-based nor completely foundational; rather, it is actually interconnected coherent systems that have strong religious and epistemological foundations, and at the same time, in some of its more executive layers, it has also proceeded with an approval-based model.

In my opinion, this model can also be found in the history of jurisprudential discussions. For example, the late Mirza-ye Na’ini in Tanbih al-Ummah has a discussion where he says, when we are in a time where we do not have direct access to the Infallible, what should we do? He uses a very beautiful term called the protective power, which is similar to what we today call the constitution. He says, for jurisprudential reasons, I cannot use the phrase “deputy in place” or “successor of the Infallible Imam”; but the constitution is a protective power, meaning it gives us safeguard against subsequent errors in legislation and in executive methods.

I think that if we proceed along this path and develop the general systems governing media—which today we refer to as the policy package for media governance—in a foundational manner, relying on profound foundations, principles, and teachings, and then declare that this is the policy package governing media, now go and identify the instances, and any instance that does not contradict this and has no conflict with it is legitimate. This can transform into a regulation, guideline, executive procedure, or logic of consumption and logic of production, and proceed forward.

These general systems do not currently exist in the constitution; rather, in it, regarding media, we have no more than 4 or 5 lines, and that too merely based on how to manage the broadcasting organization; meaning it has summarized media only in the broadcasting organization. Of course, there are some references in certain places that, for example, mass media like newspapers and publications should be this way; but in the contemporary sense where media has become very pervasive and fundamentally people-based, we have nothing in the constitution.

Therefore, it is appropriate that we come and extract the general systems through scientific exploration and based on religious teachings and knowledge, and transform it into a package like the constitution; meaning we rewrite and complete this section of the constitution in a way; then afterward, it becomes approval-based. Even now, in laws passed by the parliament, it is not merely non-contradiction with Sharia that is considered; rather, non-contradiction with the constitution must also be verified, and part of the constitution arises from that foundational and deep epistemological view. This work, although somewhat difficult, in my opinion, this middle view is closer to civilization-building and to the lofty ideals of the Islamic Revolution.

Contemporary Jurisprudence: With the current jurisprudence’s approach of obligation and excuse, can appropriate and efficient responses be provided to the issues of media jurisprudence or not?

Qotbi: I think this question is correct; because when the issues in the media arena are unlimited, then our jurisprudential apparatus should not be limited either; now, unlimited may not be the right word, but at least we should say it must be dynamic, alive, able to renew itself, and help us in accordance with the emerging issues that occur in the media arena. But this obligating and excusing view is somewhat short in stature and cannot respond to the issues of media jurisprudence. Responses to these issues must be given with the approach of Jowahiri and dynamic jurisprudence, which has been the basis for great jurists like the late Imam and the Supreme Leader.

Of course, here again, there are some points that can influence this foundation. One point is what we consider the path to reaching reality? In the jurisprudential system, sometimes our view is merely reaching valid proofs, and we consider that sufficient, in which case we need a precise jurisprudential apparatus. But sometimes we consider the path to be precaution, in which case, although its jurisprudential derivation is easier, its compliance is harder.

The outcome is that, in my opinion, neither the obligating and excusing jurisprudence is sufficient, nor an unlimited principles-based jurisprudential apparatus; rather, the middle ground is that we need a series of new jurisprudential rules. For example, although the objectives of Sharia were devised by Sunnis and due to their distance from the texts of the Ahl al-Bayt (a.s.), today it can be a good way to solve media jurisprudence issues. Another rule that I saw interspersed in the discussions of the Supreme Leader, especially in the book on music and singing, is the jurisprudential rule of the dignity of the system, meaning that an action that is not befitting the Islamic system should not be performed.

Given the social approach that jurisprudence acquired after Mirza-ye Na’ini and especially after the Islamic Revolution, we must find new jurisprudential rules appropriate to this approach. If previously there was the rule of the Muslim market, and it was merely useful for the permissibility of slaughter, today we must produce rules for other matters such as banking, urban planning and development systems, and the like.