Note: In recent decades, much has been said about minimalist and maximalist jurisprudence, but few have thoroughly examined its precise meaning and its differences from other approaches. Dr. Bilal Shakeri, a faculty member of the Akhund Khorasani Specialized Center, in an exclusive interview with Contemporary Jurisprudence, elaborated on the various definitions of minimalist and maximalist jurisprudence, as well as their foundations and implications. He believes that, contrary to common perception, there is no single, uniform definition of minimalist jurisprudence; rather, at least four definitions can be identified.

Contemporary Jurisprudence: What does minimalist jurisprudence mean? Has it been formally and explicitly defined by its proponents?

Shakeri: Based on the studies conducted and the definitions provided for minimalist and maximalist jurisprudence, we can categorize the proposed definitions into three groups.

Some have defined minimalist and maximalist jurisprudence based on the sources of evidence, others based on the subject (mukallaf), and still others based on the scope of inclusion relative to various topics.

Those who define minimalist and maximalist jurisprudence based on evidence consider minimalist jurisprudence to rely on transmitted evidence (naqli) and maximalist jurisprudence to encompass both rational and transmitted evidence (aqli and naqli). Those who base their definition on the subject consider minimalist jurisprudence to pertain to the individual and maximalist jurisprudence to address social and political issues. Those who categorize it based on the scope of inclusion relative to various topics view maximalist jurisprudence as encompassing all chapters of jurisprudence, while minimalist jurisprudence is limited to certain chapters, such as worship (ibadat).

These are the definitions that have been proposed based on different criteria for dividing jurisprudence into minimalist and maximalist. However, it seems that jurisprudence should be divided into minimalist and maximalist based on its authoritativeness (hujjiyat). In this sense, if we define authoritativeness in terms of accountability and excuse (tanjiz and ta’dhir), jurisprudence becomes minimalist and is solely concerned with ensuring that the individual avoids punishment, without addressing other aspects of their life. In contrast, maximalist jurisprudence also considers dimensions beyond punishment.

Contemporary Jurisprudence: Does the minimalist approach to jurisprudence have a singular meaning, or does it encompass a spectrum of views that all agree on rejecting the maximalist approach to jurisprudence?

Shakeri: The differences in the definitions of minimalist and maximalist jurisprudence stem from the contexts and assumptions that precede these definitions. One of these assumptions is whether religion itself is minimalist or maximalist. If religion is defined as minimalist, jurisprudence, as a part of it, will also be minimalist. Conversely, if religion is considered maximalist, jurisprudence, as a component of it, will also be maximalist.

Based on the definitions provided, it is clear that there are four approaches to dividing jurisprudence into minimalist and maximalist. Therefore, they cannot be considered to have a single meaning; rather, each has a distinct meaning that also differentiates its scope.

Contemporary Jurisprudence: Do the approaches of intellectuals such as Mohammad Mojtahed Shabestari, Mostafa Malekian, and Al-Jaberi, who prioritize matters such as ethics over jurisprudence, fall under the minimalist approach to jurisprudence?

Shakeri: The answer to this question varies depending on different interpretations. If, based on the definitions provided for minimalist jurisprudence, we consider the scope of minimalist jurisprudence to be limited in terms of subject matter, we can say that these views also fall under minimalist jurisprudence. However, if we consider ethics as a subject entirely separate from the discipline of jurisprudence and argue that ethics is fundamentally independent of jurisprudence, these views would not, in principle, fall under minimalist jurisprudence.

Therefore, to answer this question, we must clarify the relationship between jurisprudence and ethics. If we consider ethics to be a part of jurisprudence, these views would fall under minimalist jurisprudence. However, if we regard ethics as a distinct discipline from jurisprudence, these views would not be classified under minimalist jurisprudence.

Contemporary Jurisprudence: What are the most important affirmative and negative constraints of the minimalist approach to jurisprudence? What assumptions and foundations have led to the adoption of the minimalist approach to jurisprudence?

Shakeri: Theological discussions have the most significant impact on how we define minimalist and maximalist jurisprudence, particularly issues such as the comprehensiveness of religion. If our perspective on this matter aligns with that of institutions like the Academy of Islamic Sciences, which advocates a maximalist view, jurisprudence will also be maximalist. Conversely, if our view on the comprehensiveness of religion is minimalist, jurisprudence, as a part of religion, will inevitably be minimalist as well.

Another foundational factor that greatly influences this discussion is our perspective on the relationship between the servant and the master, or more precisely, the subject (mukallaf) and the lawgiver (shari’). Some have viewed the subject as solely an individual, leading them to consider jurisprudence as minimalist. In contrast, if we consider the subject to include not only individuals but also society and organizations, jurisprudence will be maximalist.

Contemporary Jurisprudence: Under a minimalist approach to jurisprudence, is it possible to envision the establishment of an Islamic government and the formulation of laws based on Islamic jurisprudence?

Shakeri: If we view jurisprudence from an individual perspective, many aspects of governance will face challenges and difficulties—not all, but many will become dysfunctional. When we consider jurisprudence as individualistic, it will have no authority to engage in matters concerning systems. Moreover, under a minimalist approach, jurisprudence is solely concerned with individual accountability and excuse (manjiz and mu’dhir), and issues related to the formation and optimal administration of governance are deemed irrelevant to jurisprudence.