Note: Hujjat al-Islam wa al-Muslimin Mehdi Mehrizi, a veteran professor and researcher at the Qom Islamic Seminary, has no hesitation in openly and clearly defending the minimalist approach to jurisprudence. In response to the challenges raised regarding the minimalist approach to jurisprudence, he points out that neither the proponents of the minimalist approach nor those of the maximalist approach have clearly defined the foundations and principles of their approaches, and thus, the discussions raised are generally abstract. While defending the minimalist approach to jurisprudence, he considers proponents of the maximalist approach to be keen on making jurisprudence dominant over all matters. The full text of the candid and engaging interview by Contemporary Jurisprudence with this professor and researcher of the Qom Islamic Seminary, concerning the challenges of the minimalist approach to jurisprudence, is presented for your consideration:

Contemporary Jurisprudence: What does the minimalist approach to jurisprudence entail in terms of the involvement of jurisprudence in various aspects of human life?

Mehrizi: First, it is necessary to provide a few preliminary remarks.

First Preliminary Remark: The binary division of jurisprudence into minimalist and maximalist is incorrect because there is also a middle approach that is neither minimalist nor maximalist; thus, the division is tripartite, not binary.

Second Preliminary Remark: Each of these approaches encompasses a spectrum of opinions, and it is not the case that all proponents of minimalist jurisprudence share a single view or that proponents of the maximalist approach believe in exactly the same thing. Rather, within each approach, there are differing opinions that collectively fall under the labels of minimalist, maximalist, or middle approaches.

Third Preliminary Remark: What exists in reality is maximalist jurisprudence, not minimalist jurisprudence. We do not have any books written based on the minimalist approach to jurisprudence.

Fourth Preliminary Remark: These discussions are purely theoretical. The reason for their emergence is the challenges that jurisprudence has faced. Today, humanity has reached certain rational conclusions that have led it to reject some past statements.

Fifth Preliminary Remark: None of the proponents of these three approaches have clearly and systematically articulated the principles and foundations of their approach. Therefore, the discussions surrounding them are neither abstract nor unreal because there is nothing concrete to discuss in terms of their correctness or incorrectness.

Sixth Preliminary Remark: Today, the maximalist approach to jurisprudence has veered toward extremism and seeks to make jurisprudence dominant over everything.

Contemporary Jurisprudence: What does the minimalist approach to jurisprudence entail in terms of the involvement of jurisprudence in various aspects of human life?

Mehrizi: Since the proponents of the minimalist approach to jurisprudence have not precisely articulated what they mean by this approach, we must speak on their behalf. It seems they believe that, apart from acts of worship and religious rituals, other matters have been left to human reason and experience, and the sacred legislator has not issued rulings on them. Non-worship-related matters, such as marriage, divorce, and transactions, are issues that have historically been common among all groups, from communists to Jews and Christians, and all have dealt with them in some way. Therefore, the sacred legislator has rationally left their resolution to humans.

Contemporary Jurisprudence: Does the minimalist approach to jurisprudence mean maximal reliance on reason and the practices of rational people and a reduction in reliance on textual sources? If so, given that ordinary people and non-jurists can also understand the rulings of reason and rational practices, is there any reason left for people to refer to jurists to understand the sharia?

Mehrizi: This question is somewhat biased and seeks to condemn someone. If we accept that minimalist jurisprudence has foundations and principles and that the dispute between proponents of the minimalist and maximalist approaches to jurisprudence is an intra-religious dispute, not an extra-religious one, we can no longer accuse proponents of one approach, such as the minimalist approach, of being irreligious, whereas this question seeks to accuse proponents of the minimalist approach to jurisprudence of this. This point is the key to resolving many issues. Instead of accusing others, we should say that we have one understanding of religion, and they have another, and both understandings should be respected.

Another point is that both creation (takwin) and legislation (tashri’) are in the hands of God. Therefore, it should not be imagined that the minimalist approach to jurisprudence seeks to limit the scope of God’s authority. Just as legislation is God’s creation, so is creation itself. The dispute between the minimalist and maximalist approaches to jurisprudence is about how much of legislative matters God has undertaken Himself and how much He has delegated to rational people and humans. Proponents of the maximalist approach say that God has not delegated any legislative matters to people, while proponents of the minimalist approach believe that God has delegated many matters to people. Thus, the dispute is an intra-religious one and concerns the understanding of religion. Even the implication of democracy is that God has delegated some matters to people. Furthermore, the ordinary actions of the infallibles (peace be upon them) are not reliable and do not represent the opinion of the sacred legislator. The requirement of referring to the practices of rational people to discover religious duties means relying less on textual sources, in addition to the fact that in many cases, there are no texts to refer to in the first place.

Contemporary Jurisprudence: Given that proponents of the minimalist approach to jurisprudence interpret almost all sharia matters based on rational practices and the rulings of reason, and ordinary people can also access these rulings and practices, what then is the purpose of the mission of the prophets?

Mehrizi: Religion is not equivalent to jurisprudence, nor is jurisprudence equivalent to religion. The jurists themselves say that we have 500 verses in the Quran known as the verses of rulings (ayat al-ahkam); thus, more than 6,100 verses pertain to matters other than jurisprudence. The purpose of the mission of the prophets was not solely to expound jurisprudential rulings but also to express noble ethics, provide a good role model for life, and so forth, which are reflected in those 6,100 verses. Of the 110 volumes of Bihar al-Anwar, only 25 volumes are related to jurisprudence, so three-quarters of it concerns non-jurisprudential matters that are also related to the purpose of the prophets’ mission. It must be noted that religion does not aim to teach something new; rather, innate matters are inherent in human nature, and religion has come merely to remind. This reminder is not exclusive to the discipline of jurisprudence.

Contemporary Jurisprudence: Does the minimalist approach to jurisprudence not lead to the secularization of religion?

Mehrizi: First, the secularization of jurisprudence does not lead to the secularization of religion because jurisprudence is only one part of religion. Second, suppose this approach leads to the secularization of jurisprudence—what is the harm in that? If God has delegated many religious matters to the customs of people and their reason, which is also His creation, what is the problem?

Contemporary Jurisprudence: Proponents of the minimalist approach to religion, while considering many issues outside the purview of jurisprudence, still take on roles such as marja’iyyat, which require maximal responsiveness to people’s questions. How can this contradiction be resolved?

Mehrizi: The proponents of minimalist jurisprudence, such as Mr. Mojtahed Shabestari and Mr. Soroush, have not established offices of marja’iyyat. None of the current religious authorities accept a minimalist approach to religion. However, if, hypothetically, a proponent of the minimalist approach to jurisprudence were to reach the status of a religious authority and establish an office of marja’iyyat, responding only to questions related to acts of worship and religious rituals, there would be no issue. The problem arises when someone claims marja’iyyat and also responds to people’s questions on matters beyond acts of worship.

Contemporary Jurisprudence: What has been the experience of the minimalist approach to jurisprudence in Islamic and Christian countries?

Mehrizi: Christianity has not had much jurisprudence for us to say whether it has been minimalist or maximalist; rather, it has merely addressed certain rituals and ethical issues. Among the Sunnis, there are various movements, and their differences stem from the differences in their models of governance. Among them, there are some extremist Islamist movements, and there are also intellectuals similar to our intellectuals. Thus, among the Sunnis, there are proponents of both minimalist and maximalist approaches to jurisprudence. Among Jews, it can be said that due to the extensive nature of their sharia, they practically adhere to a maximalist approach.