Note: The jurisprudence of education, from the moment it was introduced as a branch of jurisprudence, has been accompanied by numerous ambiguities: How does it differ from the jurisprudence of ethics? How does it differ from the discipline of education? Does education refer to formal schooling, or does it encompass the general upbringing of individuals? In addition to these questions, this branch of jurisprudence naturally carries certain foundations and presuppositions that influence the derivation of its rulings. Hujjat al-Islam wa al-Muslimin Mohammad Omoumi, who, after years of studying under scholars such as the late Ayatollah Naseri, established the Dar al-Huda Jurisprudential School in Qom with a focus on the jurisprudence of ethics and education, in this exclusive interview, elaborated on these presuppositions. He first precisely clarified the meaning of the jurisprudence of education and distinguished it from ijtihadi education. The full text of the exclusive interview by Contemporary Jurisprudence with this professor of advanced jurisprudence and principles at the Qom Islamic Seminary follows:
Contemporary Jurisprudence: What is meant by the jurisprudence of education? Does it involve examining educational propositions, or is it an educational approach to the entirety of religion? In the latter case, can it be considered a branch of jurisprudence?
Omoumi: In defining the jurisprudence of education, as well as the jurisprudence of ethics, we have two major and fundamental approaches. While other approaches may also exist, these two are the most fundamental.
The first meaning of the jurisprudence of education is that we aim to derive jurisprudential rulings for educational topics. We compile a list of questions related to education and, using the familiar and prevalent method in jurisprudential rulings—referred to as Jawahiri jurisprudence—derive the jurisprudential rulings for these educational topics. The outcome of this process will be a set of the five types of obligatory rulings (wajib, haram, mustahab, makruh, mubah). Whether situational rulings (ahkam wadh’iyyah) are also included requires separate discussion.
The second meaning is that we approach all educational matters, which are not necessarily limited to the five obligatory rulings, from a religious perspective using an ijtihadi method. The result of such a scholarly effort will not necessarily be jurisprudential propositions. We may discuss methods, challenges, or stages of education, but this is done through an ijtihadi approach, meaning it has its own specific logic of derivation. This logic or ijtihadi method, based on principles, requires a discipline akin to the principles of jurisprudence, which could be called “principles of the jurisprudence of education.” This discipline shares many commonalities with the conventional principles of jurisprudence, especially in matters of terminology, but also has differences in certain aspects. Currently, we do not have a formalized discipline called the principles of the jurisprudence of education, just as the jurisprudence of education itself, despite efforts made, has not yet been fully developed into a comprehensive and formalized collection and is still in its early stages.
Thus, in the jurisprudence of education, two meanings have been examined. The first meaning involves deriving jurisprudential rulings for educational topics, while the second involves an ijtihadi approach to the matter of education across its various dimensions, where the jurisprudential aspect is only one part of this broader framework. To avoid terminological ambiguity, the first meaning can be termed the “jurisprudence of education,” while the second can be referred to as “ijtihadi education.”
As for whether the jurisprudence of education can be considered a branch of jurisprudence, in my opinion, if the first meaning is intended, yes, it can be a branch of jurisprudence, treated as one of the applied jurisprudential fields, such as the jurisprudence of banking or the jurisprudence of the stock market. However, it must be noted that determining what constitutes an educational topic is a broad discussion. What criteria do we use to classify a matter as educational? Especially if we want to distinguish between the domains of ethics and education, there will be challenges and discussions. We need to arrive at criteria that allow us to separate educational topics from other topics and proceed to derive their jurisprudential rulings.
Contemporary Jurisprudence: What are the most important foundations and presuppositions of the jurisprudence of education that influence the derivation of rulings related to this branch of jurisprudence?
Omoumi: As the question implies, here the jurisprudence of education refers to deriving jurisprudential rulings for educational topics, meaning the outcome is rulings of the conventional jurisprudential type, specifically the five obligatory rulings. If we accept this, first, the general foundations for engaging in the science of jurisprudence apply here as well, from the broadest foundations—such as accepting the existence of God, the issue of prophethood, and the validity of the Quran and Sunnah—to the validity of the evidence discussed in the principles of jurisprudence. All of these remain fully applicable.
In addition to these, several other points can be raised as presuppositions for the jurisprudence of education:
One point concerns the scope of religion and jurisprudence in relation to aspects of life. The assumption of the jurisprudence of education is that religion has statements and rulings regarding education—whether self-education or the education of others. In other words, the presupposition is that if we accept an act as falling within the realm of voluntary acts, it will necessarily carry one of the five obligatory rulings; thus, education will also be subject to such rulings.
Another presupposition is that the element of choice is involved in education. The previous presupposition was a major premise, stating that all voluntary aspects of human life are covered by jurisprudence, and jurisprudence has rulings for them. This presupposition serves as a minor premise, stating that education is a voluntary matter; more precisely, choice is also involved in the matter of education. This must also be considered a presupposition. By accepting these premises, using the Jawahiri jurisprudential method or the ijtihadi approach, we can turn to the evidence and derive rulings for educational topics.
Contemporary Jurisprudence: What differences do various philosophical and theological perspectives on human beings cause in the rulings of the jurisprudence of education?
Omoumi: It seems that the most significant impact of philosophical and theological perspectives lies in the scope of what is considered voluntary. Depending on the perspectives on human beings and their education, what falls within the realm of choice and what lies outside it can influence our derivations. If something is outside the realm of choice and also lacks voluntary prerequisites—meaning it is both involuntary and has no voluntary preliminaries—it will naturally not have a jurisprudential ruling, as jurisprudence addresses the rulings of voluntary acts.
However, if, from a philosophical or theological perspective, something is voluntary or, though involuntary, has voluntary prerequisites, it can fall within the scope of jurisprudential issues, and if it has an educational aspect, it can be included in the jurisprudence of education. This is how I believe philosophical and theological perspectives influence the jurisprudence of education.
Contemporary Jurisprudence: What theological foundations and presuppositions must be accepted for the necessity of an educational approach in deriving and expressing jurisprudential propositions?
Omoumi: The question seems somewhat ambiguous; that is, an educational approach in deriving and expressing jurisprudential propositions appears unclear. If the intent is to consider educational matters as a governing principle or an overarching framework for derivation, serving as a criterion for evaluating evidence, or to resolve conflicts by relying on educational matters or reconciling them customarily, this is not a well-defined or systematic matter and is thus ambiguous. What is meant by an educational approach? Our view is that the overall outcome of religion in all its dimensions—whether doctrinal, cognitive, ethical, or behavioral—is the education of human beings and their attainment of the highest levels of perfection and happiness. However, establishing a criterion to evaluate evidence during derivation does not seem well-defined.
Contemporary Jurisprudence: Can it be said that the prevailing presupposition among jurists for deriving sharia rulings has been solely “security from divine punishment,” and for this reason, they have paid less attention to the educational implications of jurisprudential propositions?
Omoumi: This question, like the previous one, is somewhat ambiguous. What is meant by educational implications? Do we have a derived matter from religion as an educational matter that serves as a criterion for the validity of our derivation? No, we do not have anything well-defined or systematic in this regard. Yes, the jurists’ perspective is about security from divine punishment and having a valid justification before God, and this itself is an educational point. If a person lives their life in a way that, in all their voluntary acts—whether external or internal—they have a valid justification before God, this itself educates the person, fosters the spirit of servitude, and promotes submission and devotion to God, which is among the highest levels of human perfection. Beyond this, I do not have a clear understanding of the question.