Note: Hujjat al-Islam wa al-Muslimin Ibrahim Nikdel, born in 1973 in Mashhad, joined the Mashhad Islamic Seminary and studied under prominent scholars such as Ayatollahs Mahdi Morvarid, Ashrafi Shahroudi, Tabadkani, and Derayati, engaging in teaching and research on jurisprudential topics. He has long been one of the prominent instructors of advanced levels at this seminary. His book, Apparent Rulings: Nature, Processes, and General Principles, is among his notable works. In this exclusive oral note, he explores the types of sharia topics and the methods of their identification. His note is one of the most innovative discussions written on the classification of sharia topics.

Before delving into the discussion of the authority for identifying jurisprudential topics, I would like to highlight one point: in the discourse of topic identification, the terms “topic” and “object” are often treated as synonymous, whereas they are distinct. Therefore, this discussion assumes this conflation for simplicity.

I believe that the discussion of topic identification should be approached from two perspectives: one from the perspective of the jurist, who seeks to articulate sharia rulings and issue fatwas, and the other from the perspective of the followers (muqallids), who are meant to apply jurisprudence, i.e., from the perspective of the producer and the consumer.

In my view, if we approach the issue from the jurist’s perspective and examine the types of topics and objects of rulings, the response from the follower’s perspective will also become clear.

From the perspective of a jurist seeking to issue fatwas, several types of topics and objects can be envisioned:

First Type: Some topics and objects of sharia rulings are invented by the Lawgiver (God) and are not customary concepts or entities. While a customary religious concept may later emerge among the public, the original creation, with all its conditions and details, is entirely determined by the sacred Lawgiver. For example, the concept of prayer is an invented entity, unfamiliar to customary understanding, or temporary marriage, which apparently was not practiced before Islam and was introduced by the Lawgiver. For these invented sharia entities, it is the jurist’s responsibility to interpret and clarify what falls within or outside their scope. However, some aspects of these invented entities may be delegated to customary understanding, as will be discussed later, but the primary interpretation of their nature and characteristics lies with the jurist.

Second Type: Some topics and objects are borrowed from customary understanding by jurisprudence and the jurist, but the Lawgiver has modified them by adding specific conditions, restrictions, or expansions. The interpretation of these topics and objects also falls to the jurist. For instance, in customary understanding, obedience to a father is obligatory, but the Lawgiver has made certain modifications, and thus the jurist must clarify the intended meaning.

Third Type: These are topics and objects borrowed from customary understanding, but there is a possibility that the ruling at the time of the issuance of sharia laws differs slightly from contemporary customary understanding, as certain characteristics may have been adopted at that time that may not exist in today’s customary concept. For example, travel is a topic for certain sharia rulings, such as breaking the fast or shortening prayers. Travel is a customary concept, but in the past, it typically involved a distance of eight farsakhs (a sharia unit of distance) covered in a day. Today, however, with modern means of transportation, the distance covered in a day exceeds eight farsakhs. This characteristic may have been incorporated into the concept of travel, and discovering this requires ijtihad and jurisprudential expertise. Most jurists consider the daily distance to be eight farsakhs, but some, like Ayatollah Shabiri Zanjani, argue that the contemporary daily distance should be considered.

Fourth Type: These are topics or objects that are customary concepts but may have undergone changes in meaning over time. For example, certain terms may carry a positive connotation in one historical period but acquire a negative one in another due to conceptual shifts. In such cases, the jurist’s ijtihad is still required. For instance, regarding the boundaries of Mina (a location in Hajj rituals), its limits were not clearly defined in customary understanding at the time due to lack of attention to its specifics, but today Mina has expanded. Does Mina still refer to its former boundaries, or does it include the expanded area? Here, the jurist must determine its boundaries through ijtihad.

Fifth Type: These are topics where the customary understanding at the time of the Lawgiver is not the criterion, and instead, contemporary customary understanding must be considered, such as in the case of singing (ghina) or music. For these topics, one should solely refer to contemporary customary understanding, and there is no need for the jurist’s ijtihad.

Sixth Type: These are topics and objects where a customary concept is adopted, but identifying it requires specific expertise. For example, it is stated that someone for whom fasting is harmful should not fast, or someone for whom water is harmful should not perform ghusl. Harm is defined by the jurist as something that prolongs treatment or causes illness, but determining which illness is exacerbated by fasting or ablution naturally requires a specialist’s expertise. In this regard, it depends on the jurist’s view on the validity of assurance (yaqin). If the jurist considers personal assurance valid, any opinion that creates assurance is authoritative. However, if the criterion is objective assurance—i.e., assurance that rationally arises for people in general—then the specialist’s opinion, which is rationally acceptable and lacks significant opposition or is backed by evident expertise, must be relied upon. Thus, while the sixth type requires a specialist’s opinion, the jurist determines the type of validity of that opinion.

Seventh Type: These are topics and objects that were clear customary concepts both at the time of the issuance of jurisprudential evidence and today, with consistent meanings, but new instances may have emerged in the present. For example, the concept of a contract (aqd) has the same meaning in both eras, but new instances, such as insurance contracts, have appeared. Whether these new instances carry the same rulings as past instances requires the jurist’s judgment.

These seven types of topics are what came to my mind, though others might identify additional types. Some of these types may have different aspects, where identification is the jurist’s responsibility in one respect and customary understanding’s in another.

From the perspective of followers (muqallids), the ruling is that they must refer to their jurist and marja’ taqlid for each of these topics and objects. Even determining which cases require referring to the jurist’s opinion (i.e., taqlid) and which require referring to customary understanding is itself a sharia matter that necessitates taqlid.