Note: The issue of justice has not only been raised for years and decades but for centuries in Shiite jurisprudence: at times through objections to why men and women do not have equal rights, at other times due to the unequal rights of Muslims and non-Muslims, and at yet other times because of the unequal distribution of government aid, such as subsidies, to all people. The fundamental question, however, is: What is justice? Does justice mean equality, such that these questions become meaningful, or does it refer to something else? Hujjat al-Islam wal-Muslimeen Dr. Mahdi Shajarian has, for years, made justice his primary educational and research concern. A faculty member of the Social Justice Department at the Research Institute of Islamic Sciences and Culture, he believes that no justice scholar has interpreted justice as equality. He identifies the main problem and challenge of the justice issue as its interpretation. The full text of the insightful and exclusive interview by Contemporary Jurisprudence with this justice scholar is as follows:
Contemporary Jurisprudence: What does the right to enjoy justice mean? Does it refer to God’s justice toward His servants, the just governance of the state toward the people, or the just behavior of citizens toward one another?
Shajarian: Regarding your first question, I must point out that the question refers to three types of justice:
- God’s justice toward His servants;
- The justice of the state toward citizens;
- The justice of people in their interactions with one another.
Discussions surrounding justice are interdisciplinary, with various fields exploring its different aspects. We can say that justice discussions are relevant in all three scenarios mentioned, and justice is addressed in each of them. However, different disciplines are responsible for addressing these cases.
Concerning God’s justice toward His servants, the sciences of theology and Islamic philosophy, particularly in the field of theology proper, are tasked with addressing this question. However, nowadays, when justice studies are mentioned, the focus does not typically turn to this type of justice—God’s justice. Instead, justice studies are more commonly associated with social and political sciences, which address the latter two branches: just governance of the state toward the people and the justice of people in their interactions with one another. Various disciplines, such as political philosophy, moral philosophy, and social sciences, discuss these two areas. Specifically, the science of jurisprudence also engages in both domains. Different disciplines addressing these two areas provide varied responses. Whichever of these sciences you consult, they affirm that the rights of people vis-à-vis the state and the rights of people vis-à-vis one another are indisputable.
However, in theology, there are other perspectives as well. Some deny altogether that servants have any rights vis-à-vis God Almighty, considering rights as unilateral. They view servants as solely obligated in relation to God, not entitled to rights. If any right is assumed, it is a nominal right established by God Himself: “He has prescribed mercy for Himself” (Quran 6:12), not a real or inherent right in the nature of the relationship between God and His creation. In contrast to theology and philosophy, in social sciences, political sciences, moral philosophy, and other disciplines addressing these two latter domains, there is no disagreement. All agree that people have rights vis-à-vis the state that must be respected, just as people have rights vis-à-vis one another that must be upheld. However, the scope of these rights is not limited to these two domains alone; other domains can also be outlined, such as the rights of the state vis-à-vis the people, the rights of people vis-à-vis future generations, the rights of animals, and so forth.
In the domain of people’s rights vis-à-vis the state, this relationship is not one-sided. Just as people have rights vis-à-vis the state, the state also has rights vis-à-vis the people. Similarly, some raise the rights of inanimate objects and animals vis-à-vis humans, or intergenerational rights, meaning that people in the present era must respect the rights of future generations who are not yet born.
In summary, the concept of rights and the entitlement to rights, apart from the specific theological domain where disagreement exists, is a widely agreed-upon and expansive domain addressed in various fields. The main issue here is the nature of rights and the criteria for rights, not their existence. There is no disagreement that rights exist; rather, the disagreement lies in what these rights are and what criteria determine their boundaries. If you approach this from the perspective of liberalism, prioritizing individual freedom, you interpret citizens’ rights in one way. However, if you approach it from an Islamic perspective, you interpret citizens’ rights differently.
For example, in some European societies today, sexual minorities are considered entitled to citizens’ rights. This right stems from liberal individualism, which does not consider the interests of society and family in the way Islam does. In an Islamic context, we cannot envision such extensive rights, particularly for certain sexual minorities. The concept of sexual minorities is very broad and encompasses every individual with any personal choice or gender identity they choose, recognizing it as valid. For instance, if someone claims to be heterosexual, their heterosexuality is deemed valid; if they claim to be homosexual, it is similarly recognized, and rights are granted accordingly. If they claim to be bisexual, rights are also granted.
The acronym for these gender minorities is “LGVTQPLAS,” with a “plus” (+) at the end, indicating an open-ended space. Various types of gender minorities are recognized as valid based on the two criteria I mentioned—personal choice and gender identity—and rights are envisioned for them. However, within Islamic thought, we cannot envision such an extensive scope of rights, at least for some gender minorities who are not recognized as having a different gender biologically or psychologically. For example, suppose doctors, physicians, or psychologists state that there is no disorder in an individual’s sexual, biological, or psychological state, yet the individual claims to be homosexual. Can we grant such a person rights within Islamic thought? Certainly not, because this is considered sodomy or lesbianism in Islamic thought, which is not recognized, and we cannot envision rights for them.
Therefore, the existence of rights in various schools of thought is not in doubt, but what those rights are, how they are formulated, and what their boundaries are will naturally be interpreted differently in various intellectual schools and paradigms.
Contemporary Jurisprudence: What differences are there between justice as a citizen’s right and justice as a jurisprudential rule or an Islamic theory?
Shajarian: We must first define what we mean by citizens’ rights and in what paradigm we are discussing them. Then, we should address the jurisprudential rule of justice and clarify what we mean by it. Many jurists likely do not even accept the rule of justice in the sense implied by the questioner. The rule of justice discussed in jurisprudence is a specific matter in the chapter of transactions, addressing the issue of halving. However, for some contemporary scholars, such as the late Martyr Motahhari, the rule of justice takes on a very broad meaning and can cast a shadow over all social and political rulings of Islam and our social and political jurisprudence, not being confined to a specific chapter, as was customary in the interpretations of past jurists.
Thus, we must clarify what we mean by citizens’ rights and what we mean by the jurisprudential rule of justice to answer this question.
However, a point I can briefly mention in the margin of this question, which I have also addressed in part of my research, is that we truly lack a robust engagement with justice in the conventional jurisprudence of the seminaries.
One perspective is to say that justice is exactly what is stated in the texts. If we take this view, all existing jurisprudence becomes an exposition of justice.
Another tendency is to say that justice is what is found in the texts or valid jurisprudential fatwas, particularly among scholars. This tendency exists in the seminary and is strong. This tendency represents a form of Shiite Ash’arism—not exactly Ash’arism, because it accepts the inherent goodness and evil of actions, as well as rational goodness and evil, asserting that reason recognizes the goodness of justice and the evil of oppression. Here, it diverges from the Ash’arites, who deny rational goodness and evil and, at an earlier stage, inherent goodness and evil. This intellectual difference exists between the Ash’arites and our conventional jurisprudential perspective, as we accept rational goodness and evil, believing that reason recognizes the goodness of justice and the evil of oppression, as determined by our independent reason. Up to this point, the distinction between us and the Ash’arites is clear. However, when it comes to identifying the instances of justice—and as some jurists put it, the details of justice and oppression—the question arises: How do we discover these instances?
Here, our path no longer diverges from that of the Ash’arites. Just as the Ash’arites turn to texts or other methods to identify instances of justice without relying on independent reason, we, too, turn to texts. By “we,” I mean the prevailing tendency in our jurisprudence. Yes, there are rare or marginal tendencies that differ, but the dominant tendency is as described: it assigns no role to reason in identifying instances of justice. Consequently, the scope for justice in justice-related discussions becomes very limited. In such a context, proposing the rule of justice in the way figures like Martyr Motahhari envision—where it overshadows all social and political jurisprudential discussions and sets aside any ruling that contradicts justice—is simply not feasible.
Those who advocate for the rule of justice must naturally consider it akin to the rule of negating hardship. Just as the rule of negating hardship removes a ruling whenever hardship arises, the rule of justice should have a similar property: whenever a ruling, due to temporal or spatial circumstances, leads to injustice, it should be set aside, and a just ruling should be proposed instead.
Such an approach has not been prevalent in our conventional jurisprudence, and there are only rare tendencies in jurisprudence that seek to move in this direction, particularly among some contemporary scholars who are striving to establish a foothold for this deductive approach in jurisprudence by introducing certain concepts and terms. However, I believe there is still a very long way to go before this approach is accepted and recognized by the majority of seminary scholars, and we cannot hope for it to become dominant in our jurisprudential tradition anytime soon.
Contemporary Jurisprudence: Does the right to human equality merely seek the equality of humans in rights, even if this equality results in oppression, or does it also encompass just behavior?
Shajarian: Various tendencies in justice studies consider justice studies to be studies of equality and inequality. In major justice theories, there is no valid and recognized tendency that claims justice means equality in all aspects. However, in feminist tendencies, with a specific interpretation of gender that feminists provide, they argue that not only should any inequality or dissimilarity between men and women be eliminated, but inequality between all types of genders and gender minorities should also be eradicated.
If we set aside feminist perspectives and analyze the perspective of justice scholars, to my knowledge, no one believes that justice is achieved by realizing equality in all domains, as it is evident that such an approach would itself lead to injustice. For example, if in a classroom you give all students the same grade, this is an injustice to the student who worked harder and exerted more effort. Or if in a factory or office all employees are given equal salaries despite differences in their expertise, hours of attendance, effort, and family responsibilities, this is undoubtedly an instance of injustice.
The complexity created by justice studies lies precisely at this point. Justice studies are studies of equality and inequality, not studies solely of equality. If that were the case, it would not be complex; we would simply say justice equals equality, and the issue would be resolved. But why has humanity discussed justice for hundreds and thousands of years, with points of ambiguity still remaining? Because justice studies are studies of equality and inequality. The primary focus in justice is determining the criteria through which we can discern where to act equally and where to act unequally.
Therefore, equating justice with equality is a view that justice scholars consider clearly invalid and not worth raising, except that some justice scholars believe we can attribute justice to a specific type of equality, not equality in all aspects. Let me clarify this to make the relationship between justice and equality clearer:
In essence, the Arabic root “ʿadala” (justice) is closely related to equality and has a semantic proximity to it. When two things are similar or alike, it is said: “This is the ʿidl (equivalent) of that.” Thus, it is not the case that justice has no connection to equality; rather, justice fully overlaps with certain types of equality.
To elaborate: Equality is a concept that inherently requires an object; it must always be defined in relation to something, or its precise meaning cannot be grasped. For example, if we say, “Iran has a connection,” the immediate question is: a connection with what? Because connection is a concept that requires an object. Similarly, with love or affection, we must specify where it is directed. Just as we can have hatred alongside love, we can have disconnection alongside connection. Equality is the same: when we say A and B are equal, we must ask in what respect they are equal. Is this equality in all aspects or in a specific aspect?
Equality in all aspects is very problematic. Some philosophical foundations argue that each individual has their own distinct identity and cannot be considered equal to another in all respects, as there are distinguishing characteristics between them. However, we can still rule on equality and say, for example, that Zaid and Amr are equal. But if we make such a ruling, we must immediately ask in what respect they are equal—religion, sect, height, gender, weight, etc.? The aspect of equality must be specified.
If we say justice means equality in all aspects, this is certainly an incorrect meaning, and no one subscribes to it. However, if we say justice means equality in a specific aspect, this is a valid statement. As Allameh Tabatabaei and Martyr Motahhari have suggested, justice means equality in individuals’ enjoyment of their entitlements. If we place individuals in conditions where they all receive their due rights, this is both justice and equality—equality in delivering rightful entitlements. Thus, justice reverts to equality, but to a specific type of equality, not absolute equality in all aspects. Justice means ensuring everyone enjoys their rightful entitlements.
Martyr Motahhari further explains: From this, it becomes clear that justice does not mean similarity. It is not the case that if we give everyone identical rights, we have acted justly. Rather, we must give everyone the rights they deserve, and if we do so, equality is achieved among them, but in a specific aspect, not in all aspects. Equality in what? Equality in receiving their rightful entitlements. Based on this, in an office, different salaries may be given to employees, but each receives what they deserve. Here, the amount of salaries is unequal, but everyone is equal in that they have received their rightful entitlements.
Thus, we can reduce justice to equality, but to a specific type of equality. However, reducing justice to absolute equality in all aspects is not acceptable.
Therefore, regarding whether we consider human equality rights different from justice, it must be said: If by equality we mean similarity, this is inherently oppressive and not justice, as individuals do not receive their rightful entitlements. But if by equality we mean receiving rightful entitlements, then yes, this is justice itself, and there is no difference in this regard.