Introduction: “Jurisprudential Ethics” is the title of a discipline whose very existence—or lack thereof—and the suitability of such a title for this discipline (assuming it exists) remain disputed. Is this discipline a grand falsehood or a new truth? Some interpret the word “jurisprudence” in its technical sense, but this is not the intended meaning in such a title. This group objects that disrupting terminology will lead to misunderstandings and is therefore incorrect. Some have authored books like Jurisprudential Education, examining the jurisprudential rulings on certain educational acts. In our view, this effort does not constitute a new discipline but rather an adaptation to fresh and overlooked issues within an old science. Others have discussed ethical topics, such as obsession, in practical treatises and stated their religious rulings. We do not deny the benefits of these efforts, but our discussion is of a different nature; therefore, we must explain the title “Jurisprudential Ethics.”

Definition of Jurisprudential Ethics

To define the term “Jurisprudential Ethics,” we must first examine its two components: “jurisprudence” and “ethics.”

Definition of Jurisprudence

The term “jurisprudence” has a different meaning in the history of science and is associated with the jurisprudence of rulings. The technical definition of “jurisprudence” is: “Linguistically, it means knowledge, and technically, it is knowledge of secondary religious rulings derived from their detailed evidence” (Siyuri) or “Knowledge of practical religious rulings acquired from their detailed evidence” (author of Ma‘alim). This is a modern meaning, and in religious sources—Quran and narrations—jurisprudence does not appear in this technical sense; it is a term coined by jurists.

The meaning we intend in the title “Jurisprudential Ethics,” while not aligned with this technical definition, has deep roots and frequent usage in religious sources. In these sources, “jurisprudence” has a general meaning and is not limited to knowledge of rulings. Rather, a “jurist” is defined as a religious thinker or someone who deeply understands religion, not merely one who deduces rulings. The characteristics of a jurist in these sources are not solely academic but also pertain to specific behaviors, emotions, and dispositions, with narrations speaking of their freedom and insight.

Here are a few examples from narrations to clarify that “jurisprudence” in narrations conveys a broader meaning than the technical one:

1. From Abu Abdillah (peace be upon him), who said: Amir al-Mu’minin (peace be upon him) said: “Shall I inform you of the true jurist? The true jurist is one who does not make people despair of God’s mercy, nor make them feel secure from God’s punishment, nor grant them license in God’s disobedience, nor abandon the Quran in favor of something else…”

In this hadith, there is no reference to knowledge of rulings; rather, it highlights abilities to bring balance to people in religious matters. These include recognizing the state of the audience, identifying moderation in every issue, and deducing from religious sources what is useful for guiding the audience to moderation. Of course, part of these abilities may involve deep understanding of religious rulings. Additionally, the individual’s relationship with the Quran determines their status as a jurist; thus, a jurist is one who has intimacy with the Quran.

2. From Abu Ja‘far (peace be upon him), when asked about an issue and he responded, the man said: “The jurists do not say this.” He replied: “Woe to you! Have you ever seen a true jurist? The true jurist is one who is ascetic in this world, desirous of the Hereafter, and adheres to the Sunnah of the Prophet.”

This narration also does not refer to knowledge of rulings but to deep understanding. Accordingly, such a person prioritizes the Hereafter over the world and understands that the loser is one who clings to this fleeting world. The narration indicates that a jurist, after redirecting emotions, also knows the method and adheres to the Prophet’s Sunnah.

3. In the noble verse of Nafar—which is claimed to be the basis for seminaries responding to its call—careful attention is needed. It seems that in this verse, the jurist is not limited to a scholar of rulings. The verse states: “It is not for the believers to go forth all together. Why should not a group from each section of them go forth to become learned in the religion and to warn their people when they return to them, so that they may beware?” [At-Tawbah 9:122]. This means believers do not all depart; some remain to perform two tasks: first, to gain deep understanding in religion, and second, to warn people upon returning. Nafar in Arabic means migration or departure. The object of deep understanding is religion, not rulings. Of course, a significant part of religion consists of rulings, but religion is not limited to them. For example, there are over 500 verses on ethics, which are considered ethical verses. We also have numerous narrations on ethics, not much fewer than those on rulings. Another point is that warning (indhar) means verbal intimidation to instill fear. Does stating rulings create warning? Even if it does, this is not typical. New insights perform this function, not merely stating rulings and commands.

In conclusion, the definition of a jurist in religious sources differs from the jurists’ technical term. The meaning of “jurisprudence” in religious sources is far broader and deeper than its technical meaning. Of course, we always view a jurist as a scholar of rulings, but religion encompasses more than rulings, and we must consider all aspects. Thus, we need a space where deep understanding is applied to the ethical teachings of religion as well. The background of many of our behaviors is that some religious matters—namely rulings—require precision and subtlety, while others do not and are completely clear and evident. Even if not stated explicitly, this is the intellectual background of many that needs correction.

Have we ever considered whether ethical foundations can also be deduced from religious sources? Has a book titled Foundations of Islamic Ethical Thought ever been written? Examine Mi‘raj al-Sa‘adah and Jami‘ al-Sa‘adat. These two books are filled with ethical verses and narrations. However, it is useful to look at the introductions of such books. Has anything been said about the foundations for using religious sources to extract ethical rulings?

Even with minimal study, one can conclude that all these contents are based on Greek and Aristotelian ethical foundations. The Naraqis, adhering to those foundations, merely adorned the contents with verses and narrations. With all due respect to the Naraqis, it seems as though religious sources have nothing to say on ethical foundations and only assist in methods and solutions. In fact, the methods and approaches are also expressed according to those Aristotelian foundations and merely decorated with verses and narrations. Even the verses and narrations are not explained in detail and are often merely cited.

Of course, instances of the deep understanding we intend have existed in history, though very limited. For example, some discussions by Ibn Tawus and Shahid Thani in parts of Miskin al-Fu’ad. Ethics has typically been indebted to philosophy and mysticism, and these two sciences have provided abundant contributions to the science of ethics, to which we pay respect. However, the discussion is that there is another source that may contain abundant similar content, namely religious sources—the Quran and narrations. For instance, Bayazid Bastami had a shaykh named Abu Ali Sindi. Bayazid is known for his ecstatic utterances (shathiyat), meaning statements made in ecstasy that do not align with principles and standards. This individual has a statement that seems to identify the root of ecstatic utterances: “My master Abu Ali Sindi taught me the subtleties of monotheism, and I taught him al-hamd and qul huwa Allah.” This means Abu Ali Sindi was a recent convert and spoke of the subtleties of monotheism, so he expressed these subtleties from sources other than Islam. Sindh is a region in India; this individual was Indian and influenced by Indian mystical culture.

Consequently, we see that some of Bayazid’s ecstatic utterances appear exactly in the Upanishads. In fact, the source of these utterances is there, and they were formed in that context. Observe that such individuals were willing to draw from anywhere; religious sources were merely one source alongside others, though throughout history, they received the least attention, and we seek to pursue this very objective.

Another example: We have a narration on the stages of spiritual wayfaring with ten chains of transmission mentioned. Those familiar with jurisprudential matters know that few religious rulings have ten chains. Nevertheless, as far as searched, this narration is not referenced in any ethical-mystical book, and no commentary exists on this important narration. There are many such examples. Of course, this is surprising and clarifies that religious sources were not considered an independent source with abundant content for these authors.

Note that the contents of these religious sources must also be subjected to precise deep understanding, and we must interrogate them to make them speak—meaning we have questions and seek answers from these sources that we can attribute to God and the Infallibles (peace be upon them).

In reality, we face a new domain of knowledge where we must explore the principles and methodology of discussion in this new science. Another problem in this field is that the sources of this science have not been collected and organized.

Definition of Ethics

Primarily in the writings of Muslim ethics researchers, ethics consists of examining virtues and vices. Of course, it seems that behavior and the criteria for evaluating behavior have also been discussed. However, the focus of Western moral philosophers is more on the criteria for behavioral value.

The discussion of ethical criteria in the West is known as moral philosophy, meaning the examination of fundamental ethical questions with a rational approach. In ethical research and moral philosophy in the West, four types of discussions occur. We quote this (with additions) from the introduction by Mr. Malekian to the book A Glance at Moral Philosophy in the 20th Century (Darwall, Gibbard, and Railton, pp. 9–13):

1. Descriptive Ethics: In this type, we describe the morals of a group or individual. For example, discussing the morals of South American indigenous peoples. But the question is: Are such discussions sociological or psychological, and what do they have to do with theoretical, philosophical, and general discussions? The answer is that after these descriptive discussions, they reach a general analysis and broad conclusions. Work in descriptive ethics begins with empirical and case studies and then proceeds to philosophical discussions.

2. Normative Ethics: This set of ethical discussions has a more applicational aspect and forms in contrast to conceptual discussions in metaethics.

   a. What do we value? What is good and what is bad? What is a human duty and what is not? What are the oughts and ought-nots? When we seek answers to these questions from rational thought, it becomes normative ethics, part of moral philosophy studies.

   b. Examining the priority and posteriority of the above discussions. For example, whether duties take precedence or values.

   c. Discussion of the meaning and purpose of life. “Why live?” is an ethical question.

   d. Do we have natural rights, or are rights conventional and positivist? This is an important discussion in legal science and also enters ethics.

   e. Applied ethics. When general contents and rules are applied to specific cases, applied ethics emerges, such as medical ethics or engineering ethics. Or rules conflict, and we do not know which to apply, or we have difficulty applying a rule. The volume of discussions here is much greater than previous ones.

3. Metaethics: Metaethics is a conceptual discussion, also called analytical ethics. In the West, various philosophies existed in philosophical discussions, leading to the need for an index and error-corrector to better address these issues. Thus, they turned to conceptual discussions and analytical philosophy. Similar dialogue arose in ethics and became known as metaethics. Three categories of discussions in metaethics:

   a. Conceptual examination of ethical concepts and propositions.

   b. Analysis of ethical propositions: Examining their status and how they connect.

   c. Ethical epistemology, such as deriving oughts from ises.

4. Moral Psychology: Moral psychology is a set of philosophical and sometimes empirical discussions concerning psychological and mental matters that humans deal with as ethical agents or judges. The main ones include: the issue of free will and determinism, human self-love and egoism, psychological egoism, psychological hedonism….

These are all that have developed in the West and are discussed. But when we speak of ethics, we mean more, such as discussing etiquettes. If we examine these etiquettes in terms of ethical values, this discussion is also ethical. Even obligations and prohibitions can be measured with these values. In fact, prohibitions and obligations are strict measures that religion has set to protect other ethical values.

For example, ethical education also requires scientific discussions because creating ethical foundations and values in others needs scientific matters. We must note that the best control factor is internal, while order and external factors rely on law, branding, and flogging. We discuss ethical education in ethics, just as we examine political education in political science.

Additionally, ethical foundations are considered, and we discuss them in ethics. Ontological, epistemological, and anthropological foundations are examined. These discussions must be addressed somewhere. But due to their direct connection to our discussion and our concern for examining them, we discuss them within the science of ethics itself, as the ontologist or anthropologist may not share our perspective and concern.

Definition of Jurisprudential Ethics

Now, if we pose these same fundamental ethical questions to revelatory sources and examine them using jurisprudential methods, we arrive at Jurisprudential Ethics. In such terms, philosophy, mysticism, or jurisprudence refers to a different approach, not a different science. For example, mysticism’s subject is absolute existence, but in Al-Futuhat al-Makkiyya, a mystical book, everything is discussed, even earthly minerals. Are all these discussions tangential and off-topic? No. What distinguishes mysticism from philosophy is that mysticism examines all these areas with intuitive tools different from rational ones. The questions are the same, but the response tools differ.

We posit a protective domain for religion and accept that within this domain, religion answers our questions. On the other hand, questions arise in moral philosophy. We want to obtain answers to these questions from religion in the area where our questions intersect with this protective domain. This is the meaning and definition of Jurisprudential Ethics.

Necessity of Jurisprudential Ethics

In a period of Shi‘ite history, Jurisprudential Ethics was not deemed necessary. Examining this involves referring to catalogs of lost Shi‘ite books—such as those by Ibn Nadim, Shaykh Tusi, and Najashi—and concluding from the book titles that in the early period and during the Imams’ presence (peace be upon them), attention was paid to Jurisprudential Ethics. For example, Ibn Abi Rafi‘ and his sons collected the sermons of Amir al-Mu’minin (peace be upon him), which included ethics. After that, little from Imam Hasan and Imam Husayn (peace be upon them) has reached us. Then, among the companions of Imam Sajjad (peace be upon him), we encounter Abu Hamzah Thumali, who had a book titled Kitab al-Zuhd. In these periods, the common title for ethical books was Kitab al-Zuhd. This title gradually appears in the books of the Imams’ companions (peace be upon them), and those with books on beliefs or rulings also had a book on ethics titled Kitab al-Zuhd.

In the later Imams’ period, collections like the thirty books of Husayn ibn Sa‘id Ahwazi included Kitab al-Zuhd. This trend continued after the Occultation. After the Occultation, the jurisprudence of rulings continued its growth, becoming deeper and more complex. But in Jurisprudential Ethics, we do not see such development, especially after the era of Khwajah Nasir al-Din Tusi, where this stagnation is evident. It seems that at one point, scholars concluded that ethical issues were resolved.

Apparently, this sense of resolution stemmed from Iran inheriting two strong ethical cultures: Iranian and Greek. Our great scholars—including Khwajah Tusi, who wrote three ethical books: Akhlaq Nasiri, Akhlaq Muhtashami, and Awsaf al-Ashraf—drew ethical discussions entirely from Greek philosophy to the extent that Akhlaq Nasiri is said to be a translation rather than an original work. Or Awsaf al-Ashraf is a synthesis of philosophical precision, mystical subtlety, and Quranic and narrational allusions. Khwajah Tusi’s skill in synthesis is very strong. The result is the perception that the issue is resolved, and no jurisprudential work is done in ethics. Of course, Sayyid Ibn Tawus in Muhasabat al-Nafs and Shahid Thani in Miskin al-Fu’ad made efforts in this area. However, these efforts are very limited, and no comprehensive and extensive work has been done. Now the question is: Do we really need Jurisprudential Ethics?

Source: House of Young Ethics Researchers.