Note: The promotional scholarly session titled “Validity of Credit Dispositions Contrary to the Condition of Legal Act” in line with expanding new discussions in transaction jurisprudence and with the aim of rereading jurisprudential foundations of contracts and examining their relation with contemporary legal and economic developments, addressed proposing and critiquing new views in the field of legal act condition.
Dr. Esfandiar Safari in this scholarly session, by critiquing the famous view of Imami jurists, emphasized that credit dispositions contrary to the condition of a legal act cannot be valid and enforceable, because it is incompatible with rational foundations and the principle of fulfilling conditions.
He, by examining the opinions of Imam Khomeini (may his soul be sanctified) and other jurists, showed that existing theories on separating obligatory prohibition and positional invalidity need reconsideration.
In his belief, accepting the validity of such dispositions practically allows the violator to breach the contract, and this matter is not compatible with contractual justice and jurisprudential logic.
According to the information base of the Research Institute of Contemporary Jurisprudence Studies, the promotional scholarly session titled “Critical Study of the View on Validity of Credit Dispositions Contrary to the Condition of a Legal Act in Imami Jurisprudence” was held on Wednesday evening, November 5, 2025, by the efforts of the Islamic Human Sciences Research Institute of Qom University and in cooperation with the research deputy of the Faculty of Theology at Qom University and the Research Institute of Contemporary Jurisprudence Studies, with the active presence and welcome of a group of seminary and university professors and jurisprudence and law researchers.
At the beginning of the session, Hujjat al-Islam wal-Muslimeen Dr. Ali Sharifi, the scholarly secretary of the session, offering condolences for the days of the martyrdom of Lady Fatima Zahra (peace be upon her), stated that addressing credit issues in contemporary jurisprudence has a high degree and systematic examination of these discussions can help more precise explanation of rulings and responding to emerging issues. He emphasized that promotional sessions and documented critique of views provide a suitable ground for strengthening scholarly dialogue between seminary and university.
In this scholarly session, Dr. Esfandiar Safari as the presenter discussed and evaluated the famous view of Imami jurists on the validity of credit dispositions contrary to the condition of a legal act and while proposing the foundations and evidence of this theory, critiqued and analyzed it from jurisprudential and usuli perspectives.
He at the beginning of his speech, emphasizing the immense capacity of Imami jurisprudence in solving social and legal issues, said: “Our jurisprudence is an immense and boundless treasure that our nation can take pride in; but despite this valuable heritage, we need review and pathology, because some jurisprudential views that were completely applicable in their time, today in the new social and legal space need reconsideration.”
Dr. Safari in continuation, while explaining the issue, stated: “The main issue in this research is the jurisprudential ruling of dispositions contrary to the condition of a legal act; especially in cases where the committed person within the contract undertakes to perform or refrain from an action but violates its execution.”
According to him, the famous view among jurists is that although such violation is obligatory prohibited, positionally it does not cause invalidity or lack of enforceability of the second transaction. He, referring to this opinion, added: “Famous jurists believe that dispositions contrary to condition are obligatory prohibited but valid and enforceable; whereas this view from conventional and analytical perspective is not compatible with jurisprudential and legal foundations and must be reconsidered.”
The presenter in analyzing Imam Khomeini’s (may his soul be sanctified) view in this field explained that He, citing the theory of “legal addresses,” believes disposition contrary to condition has no religious prohibition and even the subject of the condition is not subject to obligation. Safari in critiquing this foundation stated that such a view is not compatible with conventional understanding of “fulfilling condition” evidence and with the intention of parties in contracts and conditions and as a result cannot be an acceptable foundation for validity of contrary disposition.
Dr. Safari in continuation added: “If we consider disposition contrary to condition valid, in fact we have allowed the violator with a unilateral action to destroy the initial contract; whereas such a right is not provable jurisprudentially and rationally for the conditioned against and this matter would be preferring without preferent.”
Dr. Safari then critiqued the usuli rule “prohibition in transactions does not indicate corruption” and clarified that this rule is not true in all cases; because in cases where the transaction causes wasting another’s right or is accompanied by explicit religious prohibition, there is correlation between prohibition and invalidity. He in this regard noted: “Religious and legal convention does not accept that the legislator considers an action prohibited on one hand and valid and credible on the other. This view disrupts rational understanding of religious rulings.”
He in continuation, referring to the view of some jurists that condition only causes obligatory ruling and does not create positional right for the conditioned for, considered this opinion insufficient and explained that accepting obligatory prohibition as the only enforcement guarantee is incompatible with jurisprudential and usuli foundations of great jurists like Muhaqqiq Na’ini and Mirza Habibullah Rashti. According to him, both reason and convention require that in case of violation of legal act condition, besides obligatory prohibition, the contrary transaction also lacks enforceability and credibility.
In continuation of the session, the scholarly critics by proposing questions and objections examined various aspects of this theory. Initially, Hujjat al-Islam wal-Muslimeen Dr. Seyed Ali Alavi Qazvini, emphasizing the necessity of updating jurisprudential view in contract analysis, said: “We cannot continue analyzing jurisprudence with past abstract approach; we must enter economic and social view into ijtihad arena so that the Islamic system does not pass beyond jurisprudence.” He, referring to some examples including unity of procedure vote on legal act condition and laws obligating registration of transactions, added that it was expected that the presented theory link with new developments in judicial procedure and legal system.
He in continuation, by proposing the discussion of “pledge as a supporting contract,” emphasized that it cannot be analyzed merely with legal view: “Pledge contract is established for wealth circulation and reducing credit risk; if we see it only with legal analysis, we distance from its economic philosophy.”
If credit and its relation with the agent’s will is not correctly explained, clear judgment cannot be made about validity or invalidity of credit dispositions. He believed that in the presented theory, separation between credit creation and created has not been well done and this very matter has caused mixing foundations in analyzing the issue. He also emphasized conceptual distinction between terms “lack of enforceability” and “invalidity” and considered more precision in using these concepts necessary.
In continuation, Dr. Mahjoub, while appreciating Dr. Safari, considered the research title very general and called for separating commercial and civil transactions. He in this field stated: “In examining dispositions contrary to legal act condition, difference between commercial and civil transactions and also between explicit and implicit conditions must be considered; because theoretical results of these two categories differ.” He also in critiquing the theory of “suspended lack of enforceability” added that attributing this state to “defect of consent” in the transaction party is doubtful and its jurisprudential foundation must be explained more precisely.
In the question and answer section, present professors including Dr. Ahmadzadeh and Dr. Mohammadi expressed their critiques and complementary points. Also one of the attendees, referring to the relation between “lack of enforceability” and “invalidity,” asked what the jurisprudential foundation of distinction between these two is and why the requirement of evidence is not considered invalidity?
Dr. Mohammadi also in summarizing his points said: “In many cases, common interpretations of the civil law go beyond the law’s text; including in article 10 which stipulates enforceability not necessity. Therefore, distinction must be made between enforceability and necessity in unnamed contracts.”
At the end of this session, the general summary was on this axis that the raised theory, while innovative, needs rereading its relation with judicial procedure developments, precise separation between jurisprudential and legal realms, and also attention to economic functions of jurisprudential institutions. The session ended with appreciation to the presenter and critics and emphasis on continuing scholarly dialogues in this field.