The Head of the Institute of Contemporary Jurisprudence:

I do not believe in the emerging evidence. This is a word that is fraught with ambiguity and defects. The examples you gave, such as sira and maqasid, have a return to triple or quadruple proofs. The debate on the authenticity of the new biographies is the same as it has been in the discussion of biographies for a long time. The difference in the realm of evidence has been a thing of the past, so I do not agree with the term "new evidence". The purposes or goals of the Shari'ah or the taste of the Shari’ah and al-Mutsharri’ah also go back to the book and the Sunnah. The ruling of reason is from the past.

Note: The contemporary jurisprudence certainly has new issues, but there is a question as to whether the arguments of Mr. al-Jawaheri jurisprudence are sufficient to solve its issues, or whether new arguments must be added to the inferential system of Shi’ah jurisprudence or some previous arguments should be used more? Here, some consider the existence of some presuppositions on the part of the jurists to prevent them from adhering to evidence such as established rational ways, the ruling of reason and the purposes of the Shari’ah. Ayatullah Sayyid Mujtaba Nurmufidi, however, fundamentally denies the existence of new evidence in contemporary jurisprudence. He also does not accept the point that the failure of jurists to make maximum use of the aforementioned evidence is an inappropriate premise. The head of the contemporary jurisprudence research institute believes that the same arguments that jurists often used to solve jurisprudential issues have a high capacity to solve established jurisprudential issues. The details of the conversation with this prof. of jurisprudence and principles of the Qum seminary are as follows:

Why do most of the jurists less often use new evidence such as the rational way, the discoveries of other sciences, the rule of reason, and the purposes of the Shari’ah in jurisprudence?

Prof. Nurmufidi: I do not agree with the new evidence. This is a word that is fraught with ambiguity and defects. The examples you gave, such as al-Sirah and al-Maqasid, have a return to triple or quadruple proofs. The debate on the authenticity of the new biographies is the same as it has been in the discussion of biographies for a long time. The difference in the realm of evidence has been a thing of the past, so I do not agree with the term “new evidence”. The purposes or goals of the Shari’ah or the taste of the Shari’ah and Mutsharri’ah also go back to the book and the Sunnah. The ruling of reason is from the past.

Thus, this term emerging evidence is not correct. Yes, we have emerging issues; But the evidence is the same as the previous evidence. Even in some words, the ruler and the Islamic government are introduced as a new source for jurisprudence, while it is not within these sources.

When we observe how jurists approach issues such as metaverse or a creditor and credit transactions such as finance or digital currencies, we see that instead of processing evidence such as rational ways or the purposes of Shari’ah or similar evidence, they turn to verbal evidence such as “Ahalla Allah al-Bay’” They go and finally, maybe at the end, they also mention Sirah.

Prof. Normfidi: There are two issues: paying more attention to some proofs is one issue, and creating proofs is another issue. The two should not be mixed. I agree that the main effort of jurists is focused on generalities and verbal arguments; However, it should be noted that referring to generalizations is done in two perspectives: sometimes it becomes stagnant and sometimes appropriate and appropriate uses are made.

For instance, the late lmam Khumayni adheres to these terms and generalities such as the inclusion of Ahalla Allah al-Bay’ and ofu al-Aqud and they use it. Some who do not use it do not qualify as expressions; Thus, clinging to generalizations is a good capacity to solve problems. Even expediency and secondary titles and the likes of revision of manat and abolition of character are also in many cases, verbal reasons.

There is a difference in their validity regarding intellect and rationally. But people like the author of the book al-Jawahir, in many cases, cling to rational ways; Thus, the accusation that the jurists cling to less rational ways is completely removed with a brief consideration of Jawahir al-Kalam as a symbol of the traditional books of the field.

Of course, it may not be so as a result of the inference and it is mixed with cautions; But in the inference process, this dynamic and precise inference system can be seen, and they have inferred based on these evidence.

Can the origin of the jurists’ abundant use of texts as opposed to oral evidence be attributed to the sedimentation of akhbarist thinking and stagnation of texts among them? What should be done to solve this challenge?

Prof. Nurmufidi: No, naturally, the emergence of the Akhbarists and its expansion has had an impact on the field of jurisprudence and rulings and other related sciences, and it cannot be denied; But linking this issue with it is not correct. You have to look at the reality. These are sediments and should be seen in their own way; But if there is, it is minimal. For example, references to the verses of the Qur’an are rarely seen in jurisprudential arguments, which can be caused by the sedimentation of this thinking. I would like to say that there are various factors in this lack of adherence to the verses, one of which is the existence of a rich source called hadiths, which reduces the motivation to refer to the Qur’an. In addition to the fact that from the hadiths and texts, we obtain many rules that are very helpful in deriving Shari’ah rulings.

The use of reason is also found in the words of jurists; But there is little evidence of it due to the fact that they consider only the definite rulings of reason as evidence, and apparently, apart from the issue of goodness and ugliness, there is no definite example for the ruling of reason.

Therefore, the fact that some evidence has not been referred to is due to their inherent inadequacy. On the other hand, the richness of the texts has brought this necessity. Also, the fear of some jurists from falling into rationalism and losing their heads and destroying religion can also be considered. Another issue is that our jurisprudence was individual and was far from sovereignty; Thus, the requirements that cause us to refer to other evidence are less seen. As a result, journalistic thinking has been a little involved in the stagnation of texts; But it is not all.

The psychological states of the jurists and the fears and lack of courage have brought consequences such as the same andras religion or becoming rational. Aren’t these sediments of journalism?

Professor Normfidi: It exists; But it has nothing to do with news thinking. This is due to the sanctity and piety of the jurist that he does not issue a fatwa contrary to Allah’s ruling and does not consider the issue based on his own taste, which is a reason for caution. However, this fatwa is a matter of public practice and it cannot be held easily. Of course, some are so careful that if these precautions are implemented, the social system will be disturbed. You should also pay attention to this point. Imam also paid attention to this point in his letter to Mr. Qadiri.

The influence of Akhbari on the knowledge of jurisprudence and even the principles of jurisprudence is at least a little more, because when we look at the eight purposes of sufficiency, we see that the main topics are words, which is a look at traditions. In the discussions of Hajj and Emirates, a small part is dedicated to reason and tradition, and most of it is dedicated to the authority of single news. In practical principles, the focus is on the verbal arguments that express these principles. The dominant part of balance and preferences is also dedicated to the conflict of verbal evidence. Can’t the thinness of the oral arguments in the knowledge of the principles be attributed to the thinking of akhbarist?

Professor Normfidi: I don’t think it is important what is the cause and reason, the important thing is what is the harm and what should be done? What is the effect of this discussion?

When your view of journalism is minimal, you imagine that there is no need to solve it, and therefore you will not try to solve it.

Prof. Normfidi: If the sentence is acceptable, whether it is due to the sedimentation of that thought, whether it is due to personal precautions or for sanctity and piety or other worldviews and perspectives, one should think about it anyway; But insisting on what is its origin does not seem useful.

You do not clear the assignment. Is there a problem or not? If so, what should be done? Please clarify this.

Prof. Normfidi: Your questions are biased and presupposed, while some of these presuppositions are incorrect, such as the existence of new evidence in the jurisprudence system. But in general, our inference apparatus needs to be revised. Some of the directions should be strengthened. Let’s suppose that in the field of worship, if we encounter any issues, we should go to the texts. Finally, there is also the abolition of the character or revision of Manat, which is attached. In the field of transactions, we must rely on texts, both narrative texts and Quranic texts. You can see how much the late Sheikh discusses narrative and texts in Makasab. Of course, we should place the verses of the Qur’an in the center of the circle of inference. Our jurists have also discussed the verses of Al-Ahkam. Yes, we must strengthen the argument to the verses; But it doesn’t seem right that it is only based on texts; Rather, jurists have paid attention to other evidences as well.

Can it be considered one of the few reasons why jurists use the results of other sciences in jurisprudential inferences is the idea of superiority of jurisprudence over other sciences from their point of view?

Professor Normfidi: The honor of a knowledge is either its subject or its goal. Naturally, sciences that are responsible for eternal goals have honor over other sciences. If the subject is human and it is focused on human truth and basic human needs, and it claims to accompany and show the achievement of the highest destination, then it is definitely honorable. I am speaking in general and I am not in a position to express the superiority of knowledge over each other. Considering that the subject of the divine sciences is to pay attention to human perfections, and they deal with aspects of human beings that are original, they have honor as a rule, and this is the absolute of the divine sciences.

Of course, some other sciences are also useful in jurisprudence. For example, the late Seyyed Mohammad Sadr proposed many sciences such as chemistry, physics, etc. as preliminary sciences of ijtihad. Some sciences, such as medicine, also lead the way in the thematics of jurisprudence, especially in medical jurisprudence.

But in the non-natural sciences that relate to human insight and human behavior, it should be discussed how these human sciences can be related to jurisprudence. This is no longer thematic and there is work to be done. Discovering the topic is different from thematics. Like the knowledge of economics or sociology or politics in its new form, they are the generator of many new issues that must be investigated in jurisprudence and their duty clarified in Sharia. For example, the philosophy of science is a new knowledge that may have been addressed in jurisprudence and principles; But not like this. Or methodology and research methods are useful in all sciences, even jurisprudence. These are the knowledges that are used in jurisprudence.

This article is part of the file “New Evidence in Contemporary Jurisprudence” and will be prepared and published in collaboration with Ijtihad Network.