According to the Research Institute of Contemporary Jurisprudence, the 76th session of the “Method on Sundays” series on the topic “The Effective Role of the Holy Quran in the Method and Process of Deducing Jurisprudential Rulings” was held featuring a presentation by Professor Seyyed Mohammad-Ali Ayazi, Quran researcher and seminary and university professor, a critique by Ayatollah Mohammad Andaleeb Hamadani, professor of advanced jurisprudence (Bahth al-Kharij) and principles of jurisprudence in the Islamic Seminary of Qom, and scientific chairing by Hujjat al-Islam wal-Muslimeen Mohammad-Kazem Haqqani-Fazl, Director of the Encyclopedia of Contemporary Jurisprudence.
Hujjat al-Islam wal-Muslimeen Haqqani-Fazl, Director of the Encyclopedia of Contemporary Jurisprudence
At the opening of the session, the scientific secretary, pointing to the position of methodology in the ijtihad process, considered the subject of this meeting among the foundational and influential discussions in the discipline of jurisprudence, stating: The discussion of the relationship between the Quran and Hadith in deducing rulings is among the key issues of Contemporary Jurisprudence that can impact many jurisprudential results and the jurist’s manner of confronting religious texts.
The Director of the Encyclopedia of Contemporary Jurisprudence noted: “The Research Institute of Contemporary Jurisprudence has examined the status of the Quran in understanding the system of religious knowledge across several sessions and utilized numerous scholars and professors.”
Hujjat al-Islam wal-Muslimeen Haqqani-Fazl, pointing further to the varying approaches of Muslim thinkers in interpreting the Quran, added: “One can clearly research this issue, and from the perspective of how each intellectual spectrum views the status of the Quran, one can categorize and analyze the trends across the Islamic world.”
Professor Seyyed Mohammad-Ali Ayazi, Quran Researcher and Seminary and University Professor
Continuing, Hujjat al-Islam wal-Muslimeen Seyyed Mohammad-Ali Ayazi, raising the fundamental question “What is the true position of the Quran in the process of deducing jurisprudential rulings?”, proceeded to elucidate his view regarding the methodological precedence of the Quran over Hadith, emphasizing: “The Quran is the main and central source of legislation (tashri’) and deduction of jurisprudential rulings,” and “the Quran is the origin and Hadith exists along its length, not alongside the Quran.”
Differentiating various existing approaches in this field, he expressed his theory against the views of Quranists (Qur’aniyun), Akhbaris, the theory of collective probative force (hujjiyyat jam’iyyah) advocated by the late Mirza Mehdi Isfahani, and those who place the Quran and Hadith alongside one another, stating: “The Quran is the origin and Hadith exists along its length, not alongside it; Hadith holds an explanatory and interpretive role relative to the Quran and cannot independently serve as the source of deduction apart from the Divine Book.”
This Quran researcher, pointing to the historical trajectory of Islamic jurisprudence, stated that early jurists considered the Quran the starting point of deduction and then turned to narrations; however, gradually this trend changed, and in many cases, narrations became the starting point of deduction. In Professor Ayazi’s view of Quran-centered jurisprudence, “the Quran is the mother of legislation,” and the role of narrations is explanation, elaboration, and teaching of Quranic concepts, not establishing independent rulings alongside the Divine Book.
This seminary and university professor enumerated several fundamental principles to prove his view.
First: “Legislation” (tashri’) belongs exclusively to God, and the Prophet (s) and Imams (a) do not occupy an independent legislative capacity; rather, their role is propagation (tabligh), interpretation (tafsir), explanation (tabyin), and detailing divine rulings.
In his second premise he added: “Only in cases where the Quran itself possesses rational evidence (qarinah ‘aqliyyah) for it can one speak of restriction (takhsis), and the Imams (a) in explaining direct attention to those very rational evidences.” According to Professor Ayazi, an example of this issue was raised by Zamakhshari in interpreting the verse “And Allah is the Creator of all things” (Wa-Allahu khaliqu kulli shay’); because the general applicability (itlaq) of “all things” by dictate of reason cannot encompass the Divine Essence, and hence this case is considered a form of rational restriction.
The third foundation is paying attention to “the silences of the Quran.” Professor Ayazi believes that in cases where the Quran remains silent regarding a subject, this silence itself carries a message, and one must not fill that domain with narrations as if the Quran intended to state it. In this regard, he referred to discussions such as blood money (diyah), stating that certain details intentionally do not appear in the Quran.
The fourth axis was the critique of the Hadith-centered approach in jurisprudence. This seminary and university professor claimed that many challenging contemporary fatwas were formed not based on Quranic generalities, but upon certain narrations. Among the instances he referred to were the difference in male and female blood money, the difference in retribution between Muslims and non-Muslims, killing the apostate, depriving women of certain rights, child marriage, and restrictions related to women.
The presenter further emphasizing the necessity of Quranic centrality in the jurisprudential deduction process, stated that in a Quran-centered jurisprudential system, the jurist before all else attends to the implicational capacities (zarfiyyat-ha-ye dalali) of the Quran itself, utilizing explicit (mutaqabiqah), implicit (tadammuniyyah), and necessary (iltizamiyyah) meanings of verses, as well as required (iqtida’) and pointing (isharah) implications to extract rulings.
He specified that careful attention to types of Quranic implications enables reaching many rulings directly from the Quranic text, and as a result, in numerous cases there will be no need to consult other sources to prove a ruling.
According to Professor Ayazi, when the Quran reclaims its central position in deducing rulings, narrations will likewise assume their true place, and can be used as evidence and contextual proof for better understanding the content of verses. He added that this approach aligns with the educational and explanatory perspective of the Ahl al-Bayt (a) regarding Sharia rulings and can lead to a more precise understanding of religious teachings.
He added that the Quran contains no explicit statement regarding the difference in male and female blood money, and hence one must see what “right and justice” require under today’s conditions, enabling the revision of certain jurisprudential rulings.
The speaker, continuing with a critique of the monopolistic view of interpretive narrations, emphasized that expressing one meaning by the Imams (a) does not necessarily mean restricting the verse’s concept to that meaning. He explained that when an Imam (a) interprets a word or verse, in many cases he expresses only one of its semantic layers, and one must not assume his intention was negating other valid meanings of the verse.
The seminary and university professor, pointing to the interpretive method of the Ahl al-Bayt (a), added that the Imams (a) occasionally explained a narration or verse differently to different individuals proportionate to their conditions and capacities. According to him, numerous examples of this approach are observable in narrations quoted from Mohammad ibn Sinan and Dhurayh al-Muharibi, showing that the Imams (a) themselves did not regard presented interpretations as exclusive to one meaning.
This researcher, pointing further to certain prevalent views among commentators, critiqued the approach restricting Quranic understanding to what is reported in Hadith commentary compilations. He stated that the Holy Quran itself possesses vast semantic capacities, and if it reclaims its centrality in the process of understanding religion, new horizons of the Ahl al-Bayt’s (a) teachings will unfold, and their intended semantic system will be better understood.
Citing the theory of the late Allamah Tabataba’i in Al-Mizan fi Tafsir al-Quran, he divided interpretive narrations into “educational” (ta’limi) and “devotional” (ta’abbudi) categories, stating: “Educational narrations, if accompanied by valid proofs and evidences, can be cited in understanding verses; however, in the absence of such evidences, their probative force (hujjiyyat) will not be accepted.”
According to him, ijtihad does not mean repeating past views, and the jurist, while maintaining respect for prior jurists, must possess the possibility of critiquing and rethinking famous views (ara’ mashhurah).
The speaker, in another part of his speech, considered “the possibility of revising certain jurisprudential rulings” the third important consequence of Quranic centrality in the ijtihad process, emphasizing that direct reference to the Quran can lay the ground for re-evaluating and critiquing many prevalent jurisprudential views.
Pointing to the valuable status of Shia jurisprudential heritage, he stated that respecting prior jurists’ efforts must not mean imitating their views in the realm of ijtihad. According to him, true ijtihad dictates that the jurist, while utilizing past achievements and examining their proofs, does not consider himself bound to accept fames (shuhrats), consensuses (ijma’s), and prevalent views—especially since many raised fames and consensuses either lack roots in early jurists’ views or are documentary consensuses (ijma’ madraki) subject to critique and examination.
The presenter added: “In many instances, the formation of consensuses occurred based on one or several specific narrations, causing challenges and flaws in certain jurisprudential deductions. Hence, returning to the Quran and rereading proofs can open fresh horizons in understanding Sharia rulings.”
He further referred to the view of Grand Ayatollah Seyyed Ali Sistani in the book Ikhtilaf al-Hadith, stating that he places a portion of narrations among “inquiry narrations” (riwayat istifta’iyyah)—narrations issued in response to specific questions and conditions of audiences that are not necessarily aimed at expressing a general and comprehensive ruling. In his belief, paying attention to this approach can prove effective in re-understanding many narrative texts.
The speaker also, referring to the theory of time and space in ijtihad proposed by Imam Khomeini (r), noted that jurisprudential subjects undergo transformation over time, and the jurist must attend to contemporary custom when identifying subjects. Citing examples such as marriage and divorce, he emphasized that understanding these concepts without consulting prevailing contemporary societal custom is impossible, and one cannot merely suffice with historical perceptions of these subjects.
Hujjat al-Islam wal-Muslimeen Ayazi, in conclusion, to demonstrate the practical effects of this approach, referred to the issue of crescent sighting (ro’yat al-hilal), considering it among the ongoing challenges of Contemporary Jurisprudence. According to him, repeated disagreements regarding the beginning and end of the month of Ramadan cause confusion among believers; whereas consulting Quranic verses can offer a different perspective on this issue. The speaker specified that the Holy Quran presented crescent sighting within the framework of an ontological reality (waqi’iyyat takwiniyyah), and careful examination of concepts such as “witnessing the month” (shuhud al-shahr) can lay the groundwork for rethinking certain prevalent jurisprudential foundations and creating important transformations in this field.
Critique by Ayatollah Mohammad Andaleeb Hamadani; Professor of Advanced Jurisprudence and Principles of Jurisprudence in the Islamic Seminary of Qom
In the critique section, Ayatollah Mohammad Andaleeb Hamadani specified that regarding the principle of paying attention to the Quran and measuring narrations against Quranic criteria, he holds no fundamental disagreement with the presented remarks. He stated that in examining narrations, he follows three stages: measuring against authentic Quranic principles and definitive Sunnah, measuring against the Lawgiver’s legislative practice (sirah taqniniyyah), and measuring against the supreme objectives of legislation (ahdaf ‘aliyah-ye tashri’).
Nevertheless, he raised several fundamental questions. First, the boundary of Ayazi’s view with certain “Quranic” trends is not clear, and it must be specified precisely how this theory differs from the view of individuals who set aside narrations due to incompatibility with their own interpretation of the Quran. In this regard, he referred to the example of the late Dr. Sadeqi Tehrani.
Furthermore, Ayatollah Andaleeb Hamadani, pointing to “the silences of the Quran,” asked: “How can we place the unsaid of the Quran into conflict with the stated report, and not only place them into conflict, but prioritize the unsaid?”
The professor of advanced jurisprudence and principles of jurisprudence in the Islamic Seminary of Qom stated that if a clear criterion for identifying a narration’s opposition to the Quran is not offered, results similar to certain extremist Quranist views might emerge—views that set aside narrations even in rulings such as shortened prayer (namaz qasr).
The session’s critic also addressed one of the main presented foundations, namely negating the legislative role of narrations, stating that even if we consider legislation exclusive to God, “restriction” (takhsis) and “qualification” (taqyid) are not necessarily new legislation, but can be a form of interpretation and discovering the true intent of verses.
He specified: “Does restricting and qualifying mean legislation? No, it is stating the ruling.”
In Ayatollah Andaleeb’s belief, many jurists as well, when speaking of restricting and qualifying verses via narrations, do not intend independent legislation, but explaining the true scope of the Quranic ruling.
Another axis of critique by the professor of advanced jurisprudence and principles of jurisprudence in the Islamic Seminary of Qom was the criterion for identifying a narration’s opposition to the Quran. Referring to the jurisprudential views of Grand Ayatollah Sistani, he explained that a narration’s opposition to the Quran requires a clear framework and one cannot merely make personal interpretations the criterion.
Continuing the session, Hujjat al-Islam wal-Muslimeen Ayazi, responding to the critiques, emphasized that his intention by “Quranists” refers to those who fundamentally set aside Hadith, and his theory bears no relation to negating Hadith. He specified that figures like Allamah Tabataba’i or the late Sadeqi Tehrani are not considered Quranists in this common sense, as they made extensive use of narrations.
He also, in defense of the possibility of reinterpreting (ta’wil) certain jurisprudential apparent meanings (zawahir), stated that just as in the domain of beliefs certain verses are understood by reference to clear verses (muhkamat), in the domain of rulings as well, instances can be measured against fundamental principles such as justice, human dignity, and the right to volition. According to him, wherever the apparent meaning of a ruling conflicts with these principles, the possibility of rereading and reinterpreting it exists.
The seminary and university professor further explained that the criterion for measuring narrations is their compatibility with the principles and generalities of the Quran, citing in this regard certain transcripts of Ayatollah Sistani’s views. He specified: “Non-opposition means that it is not opposed to the principles and generalities of the Quran,” adding that in the domain of social rulings, criteria like justice and human dignity can serve as identification criteria.
The session “The Effective Role of the Holy Quran in the Method and Process of Deducing Jurisprudential Rulings” can be evaluated as one of the most explicit scientific debates regarding the relationship between the Quran and Hadith in contemporary ijtihad. Hujjat al-Islam wal-Muslimeen Ayazi, presenting the theory of “Quran-centered jurisprudence,” emphasized the methodological precedence of the Quran and the possibility of revising certain prevalent fatwas; conversely, Ayatollah Andaleeb Hamadani, while joining the principle of paying attention to the Quran, requested a more precise elucidation of the boundaries of this theory, the criterion for Hadiths’ opposition to the Quran, and the relationship between Quranic silences and narrative texts. This conversation demonstrated that the discussion of the Quran’s position in the deduction process remains one of the most important methodological disputes in Contemporary Jurisprudence.