In a well-known matter, according to the well-known principle, the fact of effect is not a condition; that is, it is not necessary to establish that a matter is effective; rather, only the “probability of effect” is at issue. If the issue were the effect itself, we could state criteria, such as evidence or the appearance of the present, etc.; but when the probability of effect is at issue and the probability is a matter of conscience and personal, and the necessity is placed around it, then talking about a quantitative criterion no longer makes sense.

Reference

One of the conditions that is commonly agreed upon for the obligation to enjoin good and forbid evil is the possibility of effect. The jurisprudential study of this condition is usually limited to stating the evidence for the requirement of this obligation or its absence, and less has been said about the dimensions of the possibility of effect. In a conversation with Ayatullah Sayyid Mujtaba Nur Mufidi, a teacher of the course of al-Fiqh al-Kharij and principles at the Qum Seminary, we discussed the dimensions of this condition, the necessity of repetition in the absence of a repulsive effect, the precise meaning of the possibility of effect, and the criteria for quantifying this condition. The head of the Center for Contemporary Jurisprudence Studies believes that, given the fatwa of jurists that the “probability of effect” is sufficient to satisfy the condition, no quantitative criterion can be listed for it. The detailed exclusive conversation of this distinguished teacher and researcher of Qum Seminary with contemporary jurisprudence is given below:

Contemporary jurisprudence: Is the possibility of effect a rational possibility in the sense that the wrongdoer will immediately cease his action upon prohibition, or does the possibility of effect even exist over time and with numerous prohibitions?

Mr. Nur Mufidi: To answer this question, we must see what effect is based on the evidence of the conditionality of enjoining good and forbidding evil for the possibility of effect? In other words, what is the nature of effect? Is a repulsive effect intended or does it also include a gradual effect? This question about the nature of effect can also be raised from another angle, namely, whether the effect also includes the postponement of sin, its reduction, or its transformation?

The rational reason for the conditional possibility of the effect can be used in a version that relies on the issue of lexicality, which is that the scope of the effect is a wide one; because if the effect occurs even with repetition, lexicality is no longer necessary and it remains subject to the arguments of enjoining the good and forbidding the evil. Of course, we do not rely solely on lexicality, but rather we acknowledge that the applications of enjoining the good include all assumptions and with the verbal restriction that is the issue of lexicality, only the assumption that we know that there is no effect is excluded; as a result, other assumptions, even if the effect is gradual, remain within the applications of obligation.

Of course, someone may say: compliance with the obligation of enjoining the good and forbidding the evil is accomplished by performing it once and after that, the obligation is nullified even if the person’s trust and end have not yet occurred, and basically, the arguments of repetition are not used. This is not correct; Because enjoining the good and forbidding the evil are the means to the realization of the good and the prevention of the evil, and until such an effect is achieved, the obligation is not nullified; but for example, if the possibility of the effect is completely eliminated with one command or prohibition, it is clear that the obligation is nullified; but if it is possible that it will have an effect if repeated, repetition becomes obligatory. The Imam (may Allah have mercy on him) has clarified in his book Tahrir al-Wasilah that in this case, repetition is obligatory.

The necessity of repetition can also be proven through rational proof of the necessity of the principle of enjoining the good; because, for example, the late Imam (may Allah have mercy on him) relies on the fact that rationally the realization of the abomination of the master must be prevented. It is clear that in this regard, there is no difference between achieving this issue with a single command or using repetition or using other methods. Of course, all of this is assuming that repetition and insistence are not corruptive and, for example, do not pose a threat to life or reputation for the one ordering or forbidding; otherwise, even if enjoining what is right and forbidding what is wrong endangers the reputation of the sinner, it is not permissible. Interestingly, in the sections on the possibility of effect in Tahrir al-Wasilah, this issue is also mentioned that if the possibility of effect on a non-public person depends on it being said to him in public, the Imam (may Allah have mercy on him) says that it is not permissible, because it is necessary to protect the reputation of a Muslim.

It is clear from the statements of the jurists that they consider the circle of influence of the command and prohibition to be broad from other angles as well. For example, they have clarified that if an order does not have a direct effect; but has a positive effect, it is still obligatory. The late Imam (may Allah have mercy on him) has stated in his writings that if an order for good does not lead to a complete cessation of evil but leads to a reduction or even postponement of sin, it is still obligatory. This means that the great scholars consider the influence to have a broader meaning. Or, for example, the jurists have stated that if a prohibition of evil causes the evil to become a lesser evil, for example, a prohibition of murder causes the person not to commit murder but to commit theft, in this case, it is still obligatory. Another example that the late Imam (may Allah have mercy on him) has given is that a prohibition against insulting the Qur’an causes the person not to do this but to insult another holy book, which is naturally less important than the Qur’an; Here, the obligation to forbid evil is fixed, but if it leads to a greater or equal sin, it is no longer permissible.

All these branches can be used from a rational reason and also from the narration “And let one of you be at the house of the physician who prescribes medicine if he sees a place for his medicine and nothing but a disease.”; because the physician acts if he knows that his action will not have an effect on completely eliminating the disease but will be effective in delaying, reducing or even turning it into a milder disease, and this is a completely rational matter. The same is true for where there is a need for repetition. The same is used from other narrational evidence; For example, the term “admonition” or “acceptance” that has been mentioned in the narrations can be considered to have levels: its full level is “admonition” and “acceptance” in a negative sense, and one of its levels is “admonition” and “acceptance”. In the matter of reducing, postponing, and transforming a sin, a kind of acceptance and admonition also applies.

However, the issue of “instructing for the good” requires great precision and delicacy, and its various aspects must be weighed so that damage does not occur through improper performance of this important divine obligation. In the branches of the condition of probability of effect in Tahrir al-Wasilah, it is stated: “If there is a possibility of effect and a possibility of difference, then it appears that there is no necessity.” Where both the possibility of effect and the possibility of effect are given in reverse, for example, it is possible that the other party will become stubborn and act worse, or even, as some scholars say, perhaps an order for the well-known where it is not the case may cause the disobedient person to utter blasphemous words and apostasy, the possibility of this matter also prevents the necessity and perhaps, in some cases, causes the prohibition of an order for the well-known. It is not intended that only one word be said or a hand be taken with an order for the well-known, but rather the issue is arrest, treatment, and effect; therefore, the best and most effective methods must be used.

Contemporary Jurisprudence: What items and matters can be listed to quantify the qualitative condition of “probability of effect”?

Mr. Nur Mufidi: This matter is not consistent with the principles of the jurists on the issue of probability of effect. Please note that in the case of a well-known act, according to the well-known principle, the fact of the effect is not a condition; that is, it is not necessary to establish that an act is effective; rather, only the “probability of the effect” is at stake. If the issue were the effect itself, we could state criteria, such as evidence or the appearance of the present, etc.; but when the possibility of the effect is at stake and the probability is a matter of conscience and personal, and the obligation is centered around it, then talking about a quantitative criterion is meaningless. The late Imam (may Allah have mercy on him) has clarified in Tahrir al-Wasilah that if the evidence is based on the lack of effect, that is, two just witnesses testify that an act has no effect on this person, the obligation is still not nullified. The reason for this is that even evidence cannot eliminate the possibility of conscience; because the criterion is the possibility of the effect, not the effect itself, and evidence is conjectural. If the criterion were effect, the evidence would prove it, but here it seems that the possibility is relevant, unless the evidence brings certainty or confidence to the person that this is also personal; because evidence is not typically reliable.

Regarding the conditionality of insistence and continuation of disobedience, the issue is completely different. There, criteria can be stated; for example, evidence of insistence is acceptable, as is evidence of abandonment and non-continuation; or some have suggested that where we doubt insistence, the emergence of a certain state is evidence; also, if the state has a certain precedent, for example, we know that there was an intention to continue and we doubt the persistence of the intention, some have said that istisahāb is current, and some believe that the emergence of a certain state of abandoning the sin precedes istisahāb. These criteria are relevant in that condition, because it can be verified and there is no question of probability there, and the issue is insistence itself; but none of these criteria are relevant regarding the probability of the effect, because in any case, a person or a conscious possibility gives effect or does not give effect; if it gives effect, no uncertain evidence or criterion can eliminate his possibility, and if the possibility does not give effect, nothing is effective in it. The only issue is the question of the absence of influence, which has no specific criteria or standard and is completely personal.

Only on the basis of those who consider the suspicion of influence necessary or accept the possibility on the condition of not suspecting the contrary, can some presumptive criteria such as evidence or the appearance of the present or the person’s own admission of the absence of influence be put forward, even if they are not informative or reassuring.