Islamic economics, like Islamic education, Islamic politics, Islamic medicine, and similar concepts, has been a subject of dispute and contention among Islamic scholars for years. Meanwhile, Islamic economics, due to its increased importance in recent years, has been more of a subject for discussion and debate. Dr. Nasser Elahi, born in 1961 in Kerman, in addition to studying at the introductory and advanced levels of jurisprudence and principles at the Qom Seminary, received his bachelor’s degree in Theoretical Economics from Mofid University, his master’s degree in Economic Sciences from the University of Tehran, his doctorate in Economic Sciences from Imam Sadiq (AS) University, and his postdoctoral fellowship in “Ethics and Economics” from the University of Notre Dame in the USA. An Associate Professor in the Department of Economics at Mofid University, he seriously accepts Islamic economics, but not in the sense that others understand it. In this exclusive interview with Contemporary Jurisprudence, he discusses the possibility of Islamic economics and his interpretation of this term.

Contemporary Jurisprudence: Some consider the existence of Islamic economics, firstly, to be contrary to the objectives of legislation, because religion came to guide humans and to explain matters that could not be understood except through divine guidance, not matters like Islamic economics which can also be understood by the intellect of rational people; secondly, given the changes in societies, people, issues, and methods of interaction among people, it is fundamentally impossible to state an economic method and creed that would be effective for over a thousand years. What is your opinion on this?

Elahi: This is a very serious question, and I also, in a way, believe that Islamic economics in the sense reflected in the question has no correct meaning or concept at all; but at the same time, I strongly believe in Islamic economics, but not in what is presented in the context of this question. I believe that Islam, as a religion that is in fact a comprehensive religion and a universal religion, and in an eternal and everlasting way, and all divine prophets also, in fact, propagated this same Islam, contains a series of objectives.

In fact, those objectives determine economic activities. Those objectives can be derived from justice, humanity, and placing human beings in economic equations. This exists among all divine laws. Of course, divine laws, according to the situation that existed in their own society, tried to carry out constrained and dynamic optimization of these objectives according to the social, economic, geographical, and local constraints that existed; because, after all, many of those social exigencies had no relation to religion. For example, the method of production through slavery has no relation to religion, but rather was one of the necessities of that society; but religion tries, by considering these conditions, to find a way to achieve those objectives which, so to speak, are among the unambiguous and eternal principles.

Therefore, if we look at religion and Sharia in this way, we find that religion is a non-temporal and non-spatial or trans-spatial and trans-temporal matter; but Sharias are realized within the framework of time and place; therefore, we must believe that the economic relations that arise are related to the objectives and constraints; meaning, Islam tries to change worldviews, and when it changes worldviews and man’s view of himself, society, nature, and God takes shape, then according to the temporal exigencies, his relations also become different. Economic relations in an Islamic society become completely different from economic relations in an atheistic society, and naturally, two types of regularities arise, and these two regularities can take shape. What we now call economics is, in fact, the laws governing the relations of economic phenomena; for example, if the money supply changes, what happens to inflation? What happens to employment? These are not religious propositions at all, nor do they fall within the expectations of religious propositions.

Of course, the final organization and arrangement that emerges in society cannot be separate and detached from religion, but rather it is definitely rooted in that religious outlook. The type of interactions takes shape according to this religious outlook, and Islam tries to guide society through so that a new organization and a new outlook emerge, and horizons change. If horizons change, then this society no longer works for those former horizons. The view we see in the Quran that those who consume riba (usury/interest) are not moderate and are in thrall to Satan, these, in fact, express a very corrupt view that existed, and Islam wants to change it so that our view of wealth is as a tool and not as a goal.

In Islam’s view, wealth should be used for human goals and to create cohesion in society. The infaq (spending in the way of God) that arises within these institutional relationships can expand the economy. In other words, in a society where riba is a dominant phenomenon, security and social capital do not take shape. Why? Because society feels that there is a group of usurers who are sucking the blood of the people, in contrast to those who, in fact, cannot provide for their own livelihoods. This dualistic society will never see security, and social capital will not be institutionalized in it, and as a result, it will not achieve growth.

But in a society where infaq exists and everyone feels that others are thinking of them, a kind of social cohesion emerges. This society, in the words of the Quran, will be a very prosperous society, and blessings from the earth and the sky will encompass it.

Therefore, Islam is by no means after institution-building, nor is it after explaining the relationships between phenomena. Islam only changes worldviews, and when worldviews change, the actors themselves try to change the institutional arrangement of society, then the rules of the game that flow in these institutions become different. We can in no way, apart from this qualitative change in society, eliminate these banks, which are the product of a capitalist society, by engineering and creating rules of the game; rather, we must try to change the function of these institutions with a series of new laws and regulations; therefore, I believe that Islamic economics is correct, but not in the sense that it emanates from within religion, but rather it arises from within the minds of actors who have come to believe in a new worldview. This meaning of Islamic economics is very different from the meaning that others state.

Contemporary Jurisprudence: Does attributing economics to a religion like Islam have a precedent among the followers of other religions?

Elahi: Yes, Christian or Jewish economics exist. Of course, I have seen less of Jewish [economics], but Christianity, especially Catholics who have conducted very extensive studies in Christian economics, tried to define an economy based on concepts derived from Christianity that would be compatible with their religious principles. In this regard, perhaps we can say they were pioneers. The Church opposed many of the changes that occurred during the Enlightenment and the Age of Enlightenment and resisted them. They believe that these institutions are not compatible with Christianity, and they have a very long history in this regard; however, they too were unable to present a Christian economy that could be implemented. Why? Because the identity of society is not a religious identity, and the hegemony of capital has encompassed it. Such a society cannot accept rules that are based on other values.

Contemporary Jurisprudence: Is the formation of a jurisprudential chapter called the jurisprudence of economics even possible, and has it occurred?

Elahi: Yes, it is possible. In any case, if our religious economic actors seek to realize the Islamic worldview, they must naturally examine the consequences of any action, what these consequences are like.

Of course, I have a fundamental problem, and that is that current jurisprudence is a jurisprudence that merely specifies obligation, meaning it is merely concerned with divine punishment or lack thereof and does not deal much with consequences; for example, what are the implications and consequences of this tax system? Are these consequences the same consequences that Islam seeks or not?

Jurisprudence must shed its skin and also pursue these consequences and see what problems this institutional form can lead to and what openings it can create.

Of course, some may object that wisdoms can never be restrictive or specific, but in any case, they can be indicative; meaning, if we see that the function of an institution in no way corresponds to the wisdoms intended by the Legislator, it becomes clear that we had a wrong understanding and did not design that institution correctly.