Hujjat al-Islam wal-Muslimin Seifollah Sarami has, for several years, focused on the jurisprudence of art and, in addition to writing several articles, has conducted studies on the subject. One of the primary programs of the institute under his management (the Institute of Jurisprudence and Law at the Research Institute of Islamic Sciences and Culture) is “the Jurisprudence of Art.” On this occasion, we sat down with him to discuss the concepts that lead to the prohibition of artistic works. A member of the council of institutes at the Institute for Contemporary Jurisprudential Studies, he believes that only four concepts are claimed to render certain artistic instances forbidden, though the prohibition of these concepts themselves is a matter of dispute. The full text of the exclusive interview by the Institute for Contemporary Jurisprudential Studies with this professor and researcher of the Qom Seminary is presented below:
Contemporary Jurisprudence: In your opinion, what is the default principle regarding the jurisprudential ruling on the production and use of artistic works?
Sarami: A few years ago, I published an article titled “Revisiting the Role of Intention and Content in the Permissibility and Prohibition of Art, Particularly Regarding Ghinā” in the journal Theology of Art, Volume 2, Issue 3, Winter 2015, and in the proceedings of the first conference on the Jurisprudence of Art. There, I explained that the default principle regarding the concept of art is permissibility (ḥilliyya). This is because there is no rational or transmitted evidence indicating that art, as such—whether in its production, use, or dissemination—is subject to prohibition. Therefore, one can rely on the principle of exemption (barā’a) and conclude its permissibility.
Contemporary Jurisprudence: Which concepts lead to the ruling of prohibition or, at the very least, condemnation, disapproval, or lack of preference in the production, dissemination, or use of artistic works?
Sarami: In jurisprudential evidence, four concepts are mentioned in this regard. At first glance, one might claim that producing these four concepts as artistic forms is forbidden, and if their production is forbidden, their use and dissemination would consequently be forbidden as well. This is because, based on the relationship between the ruling and the subject, when the production of something is forbidden, it is typically and customarily so that it is not used, and thus its dissemination would also be forbidden. In cases other than these, the default principle is the permissibility we mentioned. In jurisprudential evidence, we have not found any instance where an art is encouraged. Of course, it can be inferred from the composition of poetry by the Ahl al-Bayt (peace be upon them) (if proven) or from poetry composed in their presence and hearing without their prohibition that such an act is permissible. However, establishing its recommendation or desirability requires additional evidence. Similarly, if we consider absolute beauty as the primary element of art, it may be possible to deduce from certain evidence and indications that its absolute preference or its application in certain cases is desirable, such as the embellishment of the voice in the recitation of the Holy Quran.
The four concepts mentioned, whose prohibition is subject to examination in jurisprudential sources, are: ghinā (forbidden singing), image-making (including sculpture and painting), the use of instruments of amusement (lahw), and dance. At first glance, these four concepts are exceptions to the default principle of permissibility. However, there are questions: First, what is the validity of the evidence that indicates their prohibition? Second, does this evidence fundamentally indicate prohibition or merely a lack of preference? Third, are these concepts forbidden as artistic forms per se, or are they forbidden due to their use in other prohibited contexts? For example, in the case of image-making, is image-making itself forbidden, or is it forbidden when done with specific content, such as content involving polytheism, mocking others, or promoting falsehood? I have examined this important point regarding these four concepts in the aforementioned article.
Based on my research, only ghinā, as ghinā and as an art, is forbidden. What is ghinā? It refers to singing in a specific form, the definition of which is subject to much disagreement. In any case, the sound produced by musical instruments or, for example, the sound of an animal is not called ghinā.
As for the other three concepts, it seems that they are content-based. That is, they are not forbidden as artistic forms per se but are deemed forbidden due to their application in prohibited matters. For example, the prohibition of instruments of amusement (lahw) is because they are used in the context of lahw, which is a forbidden concept. Similarly, dance is forbidden as lahw, due to the mixing of men and women, or other matters, but dance, in itself and as an art, is not forbidden. Therefore, for these three concepts, the default principle in production, use, and dissemination is permissibility.
Contemporary Jurisprudence: Are there any newly emerged concepts, aside from those mentioned in the texts, that, when applied to various forms of art, lead to the prohibition of their production, dissemination, or use?
Sarami: This question is somewhat ambiguous. If you mean by “newly emerged concepts” those concepts other than the concept of art itself that lead to prohibition, such as lahw, mixing of men and women, backbiting, mockery, slander, humiliating a believer, harassing a believer, promoting immorality, and the like, which may or may not apply to various arts, then these cannot be considered newly emerged. They existed before, though they were not discussed as arts but rather as concepts associated with art.
However, if you mean by “newly emerged concept” a newly emerged artistic concept—considering that, historically, the arts were once limited to four forms, then expanded to seven, and some have even extended them to eleven—then it must be said that all of these fall under the default principle of permissibility. As long as valid evidence for the prohibition of any of these types of art is not established, one cannot rule them as forbidden, and they remain within the default principle of permissibility.
Contemporary Jurisprudence: Is determining whether or not various forms of art fall under these forbidden or uncommon concepts the responsibility of the jurist, general custom, or individual obligated persons?
Sarami: This question is not specific to art but is general and universal. It can be raised regarding all chapters of jurisprudence and is indeed a very important question.
To clarify: We have the ruling, the subject, and the object. Each of these three can have a concept and instances. For example, in the statement “drinking wine is forbidden,” wine is the subject, drinking is the object, and prohibition is the ruling. The statement “drinking wine is forbidden” is a general proposition, but each of these has specific instances, such as a particular wine, a particular act of drinking, and a specific prohibition applied to that particular act of drinking and wine. In this general proposition, stating the ruling in a general sense is the responsibility of the Lawgiver. The subject and object in their general sense are usually delegated to custom. For example, the Lawgiver generally states, “drinking wine is forbidden,” but leaves the definition of wine and drinking to custom. However, in some cases, the Lawgiver intervenes and alters the definition. For instance, the Lawgiver says, “faqqa‘ (fermented raisin juice) is wine.” Scientifically and chemically, when raisins ferment to a certain extent, they are not wine, but they may have an intoxicating effect. Here, the Lawgiver states that this too is among the forbidden things, meaning it should be included in the prohibition of wine. Or, for example, custom may consider something as mixed water (mā’ muḍāf), but the Lawgiver intervenes and says, “No, this is specifically not mixed water but absolute water, so you can use it for ablution and purification.”
As we mentioned, each of the subject, object, and ruling has instances, and identifying these instances is primarily the responsibility of the obligated individual. However, if the obligated individual is uncertain, they can refer to custom.
The same applies to art. For example, in religious manuals, it is written that ghinā is forbidden, and then ghinā is defined customarily as such-and-such. Regarding ghinā, there is disagreement about whether its identification is the responsibility of custom or whether it is one of the cases where the Lawgiver has intervened and specified its concept.
In any case, identifying instances is, first and foremost, the responsibility of the obligated individual.