In 2015, Ayatollah Alidoust was perhaps the first to explicitly claim that the default ruling for artistic activities is permissibility, or even desirability. A member of the Board of Trustees of the Research Institute for Contemporary Fiqh Studies, he reiterated this statement at the first Conference on the Jurisprudence of Art and has emphasized it multiple times since. However, this assertion by the distinguished professor of advanced jurisprudence and legal theory at the Qom Seminary has met with both supporters and detractors. Ayatollah Mohammad Andaleeb Hamedani is one of those who oppose this view. The esteemed and virtuous professor of the Qom Seminary, as always with his characteristic courtesy and knowledge, has endeavored to articulate his critiques of this claim clearly and with evidence. The full text of his exclusive oral commentary, as a member of the Research Council of the Research Institute for Contemporary Fiqh Studies, is as follows:
The Principle of Permissibility in Art
In jurisprudence, we sometimes encounter a subject like sports and ask: What is the ruling on sports from a jurisprudential perspective? The definition of sports is clear—physical activities performed according to specific methods. In such cases, we may establish the principle of permissibility, and if prohibition is considered in certain instances, it is due to secondary factors. For example, we might say that intentionally causing harm to someone in a sports competition is impermissible; thus, the default ruling for sports is permissibility.
However, art appears to differ significantly from sports, a distinction that may not have been adequately considered. We cannot assert that the default ruling for artistic activities is permissibility, let alone desirability! We will address the issue of desirability later. Why is this the case? Two points must be considered together in the context of art:
First, art, in and of itself, has no external manifestation; rather, it is the specific instances that exist externally which can be considered as manifestations of art. In other words, there is no such thing in the external world that is simply called “art” without being calligraphy, poetry, oratory, or a beautiful voice. Thus, art, as an abstract concept, is not something for which we can establish a principle and then apply that principle to its instances.
Second, art has a distinctive characteristic: it is inherently tied to beauty. Fundamentally, art is the creation of beauty. We cannot hastily decide about beauty and say, for instance, that the default is permissibility. The Holy Quran explicitly states that one of Satan’s tactics is adornment and beautification—making ugly things appear beautiful and labeling them as beauty, such as the appealing label of “art,” which naturally attracts and deceives people: “And Satan made their deeds seem fair to them” (Quran 6:43).
Consequently, because of this subtle point, and since we cannot fully discern Satan’s tactics without the guidance of the Shari‘a, we must tread carefully within the boundaries of the Shari‘a, lest we mistake ugliness for beauty and rule it permissible. Therefore, we cannot say that the default for all artistic activities is permissibility unless explicitly prohibited by evidence!
Thus, establishing a principle for the concept of art is misguided. However, regarding the application of principles to specific instances of art: if an instance is explicitly prohibited by the Shari‘a, the ruling is clear; if it is subject to a qualified prohibition, the ruling is also clear; and if the instance has no prohibition at all, we apply the principle of permissibility. Therefore, for specific instances of art, the principle of permissibility applies, provided there is no evidence of prohibition.
The Desirability of Art
The second point is that some may assume that since “Indeed, Allah is Beautiful and loves beauty,” and beauty aligns with human nature, which seeks beauty, we can establish the baseline for artistic activities as desirability, and then say, “except what is proven to be forbidden or disliked by evidence.”
In response, I submit that, as mentioned earlier, art is intertwined with beauty, and beauty is one of Satan’s snares. When God stated, “Indeed, Allah is Beautiful and loves beauty,” it does not mean that the Almighty loves everyone or everything that is beautiful. It is possible that some things appear beautiful to us and we perceive them as such, yet the Lawgiver does not deem them beautiful. Of course, if there is other evidence supporting the desirability of art, it can be examined. However, it is incorrect to assume, based on this narration, that the baseline for artistic activities is desirability, as the Lawgiver accepts beauty only within the boundaries He has sanctioned, not in an absolute sense. Moreover, the earlier point remains valid: art, in and of itself, is not something that can inherently bear a religious ruling; rather, its instances, such as calligraphy, playwriting, etc., must be examined for their jurisprudential rulings. For example, we might say that the default ruling for calligraphy is desirability.
Two Types of Desirability
Second, we have two types of desirable acts, just as we have two types of disliked acts: desirability in acts of worship and desirability in non-worship acts. Desirability in acts of worship means that a reward is attached to performing the act with the intention of seeking closeness to God. However, desirability in non-worship acts, such as brushing one’s teeth or eating salt at the beginning of a meal, refers to something commendable and good, not necessarily that a reward is attached to it, even if performed without the intention of seeking closeness to God. With this in mind, even if an artistic activity is deemed desirable, it does not mean that the artist will receive a reward akin to that of performing the night prayer. Rather, it means that it is a commendable act, not desirable in the sense applicable to acts of worship.
Are Jurists Opposed to Art?
It is sometimes said that our jurists do not view art favorably, as if they assume the default for art is prohibition and are merely seeking permissibility. Then, it is objected: “The default is permissibility, not prohibition! Why do you treat art as if its default is prohibition?”
The response to this objection is clear from my earlier statements. I have explained that beauty and attraction to beauty are among the strongholds and objectives of Satan. Without the reminders of the Shari‘a, we would be greatly deceived by Satan in this regard. Therefore, if our jurists have not said that the default for art is permissibility or desirability, it is because this is a domain where Satan may exploit, and there is potential for misuse. Hence, we must proceed case by case, not simply absolve ourselves of this critical matter by saying, “The default for art is permissibility.” Once we approach it case by case, we must then examine what can be derived from the evidence. For instance, is “zafn” (dancing) inherently forbidden, or is it forbidden due to the characteristics and consequences associated with gatherings of amusement and debauchery? This requires discussion, not a blanket statement that art, as art, is permissible, though its instances may differ. Additionally, temporal and spatial conditions may influence the transformation of subjects. These points, of course, are summarized briefly, as each requires a separate discussion.