Note

Media jurisprudence, compared to other emerging jurisprudential fields, is among those for which significant research and educational steps have been taken. The existence of several advanced courses on media jurisprudence, alongside dozens of books and articles on its various topics, heralds the formation of a new chapter titled “Media Jurisprudence” among contemporary jurisprudential chapters. One of the instructors of these advanced courses is Hujjat al-Islam Mohammad Mahdi Rafipour Tehrani. Born in Tehran, he moved to Qom in 2001 after completing his preliminary studies and benefited from the advanced courses of scholars such as Ayatollahs Tabrizi, Vahid Khorasani, Haeri, and Shobeiri Zanjani. For years, he has been engaged in teaching various courses on jurisprudence, exegesis, principles, and philosophy, and for several years, he has been teaching advanced courses on media jurisprudence at the Tehran Seminary. His four-volume collection, Jurisprudential Explorations, represents part of his jurisprudential efforts. In his conversation with Contemporary Jurisprudence, he elaborated on the foundations of media jurisprudence. According to him, with the current principles of jurisprudence, which focus solely on articulating obligations and excuses, speaking of the efficiency of jurisprudence is meaningless. The full text of Contemporary Jurisprudence’s exclusive interview with this professor of advanced media jurisprudence courses is as follows:

Contemporary Jurisprudence: What is media jurisprudence, and what are its requirements?

Rafipour: Regarding the definition of media jurisprudence, some have said that media jurisprudence determines the religious and mandatory rules and regulations for the use of media. Perhaps a more comprehensive definition would be that it is a science that addresses, from a religious perspective, the behaviors related to the media domain, whether concerning producers or audiences, and derives their respective rulings based on valid evidence and accepted scholarly and jurisprudential methods. The subjects of media jurisprudence, as indicated in this definition, are broadly divided into two areas: production and consumption. We have certain topics in the realm of production, such as the use of makeup for individuals appearing in the media or the requirement that they must not lie and should convey information truthfully. There are also topics related to viewers, listeners, and readers, such as the obligation to avoid following misleading content and to steer clear of networks, channels, and satellites that present material causing doubt or instability in beliefs and rulings. These all involve rulings that media jurisprudence must address comprehensively.

The requirements of media jurisprudence, based on this definition, are defined in the two domains of production and consumption and must be derived based on valid standards and evidence, not based on personal taste or preference. The strength and religious grounding of media jurisprudence are highly important because, after all, media jurisprudence is a form of jurisprudence and must be complete in this regard. One of the requirements of media jurisprudence is that it must address emerging issues and challenging matters faced by media professionals, rather than constantly resorting to precaution, deviating from the main discussion, or leaving it unresolved. This is unacceptable. Instead, media jurisprudence must take up the new issues and challenges of media professionals, derive their rulings using jurisprudential methods, and provide them accordingly.

Contemporary Jurisprudence: In general, what are the foundations and assumptions of media jurisprudence?

Rafipour: The most important foundation of media jurisprudence is that, according to all its definitions, jurisprudence must engage with the media domain, whether it is minimal or maximal jurisprudence. There are numerous religious rulings in the media domain that must be collectively extracted, inferred, and presented in a balanced framework. Its primary assumption is that religion and Sharia can have rulings in all aspects of human life, including the media dimension, and, in general, there are rulings whose extraction is the responsibility of media jurisprudence.

Contemporary Jurisprudence: With the theory of minimal jurisprudence, is it even possible to engage with media jurisprudence?

Rafipour: In my opinion, the theory of minimal jurisprudence—as some scholars propose—does not mean that jurisprudence cannot enter various fields or specialized jurisprudential domains. Rather, it implies that the scope, quality, and extent of its engagement are more limited. Accordingly, jurisprudence must clarify its stance regarding obligatory duties and tasks in the media domain and determine the dos and don’ts of the media field. For instance, based on the theory of minimal jurisprudence, is lying forbidden? Is insulting people prohibited? Is spreading rumors and unethical matters in the media permissible? It is clear that, based on the theory of minimal jurisprudence, all these issues and similar matters can be addressed, but they remain at this level. It does not engage with what content should be produced in the media domain or what objectives and goals of Sharia in the media field need to be fulfilled. In other words, minimal jurisprudence merely articulates certain forbidden or obligatory media rulings and considers the rest as part of the “permissible zone.”

Contemporary Jurisprudence: Can the issues of media jurisprudence be resolved with the current principles of jurisprudence?

Rafipour: Yes, they can be resolved, but only partially. Naturally, we cannot claim that the existing principles are flawless, that nothing beyond them is conceivable, or that they have no shortcomings. However, this does not mean that these principles are ineffective or incapable of addressing any issues, or that their structure and content fundamentally resolve nothing. The existing principles can address and assist with some issues in specialized jurisprudential fields, including media jurisprudence. However, if we discover and extract new principles, rules, and frameworks in our jurisprudential principles, their effects will naturally be reflected in various domains, including media jurisprudence. Therefore, my answer to this question is neither a complete rejection that the existing principles are useless, nor a claim that they fully address the issues of media jurisprudence. Rather, we can resolve a significant portion of these issues with the current principles of jurisprudence, while some jurisprudential principles need to undergo transformation, change, and exploration.

Contemporary Jurisprudence: With the current jurisprudence’s approach of obligation and excuse, can appropriate and efficient responses be provided to the issues of media jurisprudence?

Rafipour: No, if you consider efficiency relevant to the domain of jurisprudence, it is clear that obligation and excuse have no connection to efficiency. Rather, this depends on our definition of the mission of jurisprudence. This matter is being discussed and examined in the philosophy of jurisprudence. In the emerging field of the philosophy of jurisprudence, thinkers and scholars are debating, and the discussion has not yet reached a conclusion. Some believe that obligation and excuse are the utmost we can achieve in the era of occultation; hence, speaking of efficiency with this definition is meaningless. If you seek an efficient media jurisprudence, you must add certain elements to your principles—for instance, introduce new rules and principles to complement these principles, limit obligation and excuse to whatstation, and establish efficiency within the principles. Only then can we achieve the appropriate and efficient response we seek. If, in the process of inference, we focus solely on the evidence and pay no attention to whether the audience is persuaded, convinced, or satisfied, and claim that these have no relation to jurisprudence, then naturally, speaking of efficiency will also be meaningless. If the existing media jurisprudence operates with the current principles of jurisprudence, talking about efficiency holds no meaning. However, whether the mission of the science of jurisprudential principles is solely to articulate obligations and excuses or whether it has another mission depends on the definition we provide for the science of jurisprudence. This matter should be examined in the philosophy of jurisprudence: what is our definition of jurisprudence, and subsequently, what principles, as preparatory rules, do we formulate and establish for the jurisprudence we have defined? Once we extract those principles and specify the goal of jurisprudence, their effects will manifest in various jurisprudential fields, such as the jurisprudence of art, media, culture, administration, and so forth.