Note: The book The Principle of Human Dignity as a Jurisprudential Rule, authored by Hujjat al-Islam wal-Muslimeen Seyyed Mohammad Ali Ayazi, was published in 2021 by Sarabi Publications in 174 pages. This work can be regarded as the first serious scholarly contribution addressing the principle of dignity as a jurisprudential rule. Its innovative subject matter, adherence to a jurisprudential approach, concise expression, avoidance of verbosity, and presentation of a novel structure for the discussion are among the book’s merits. Below is a summary of the book’s content, drawn from the Encyclopedia of Contemporary Jurisprudence:
The Principle of Human Dignity as a Jurisprudential Rule is a book by Seyyed Mohammad Ali Ayazi, an Iranian Shiite jurist and Quranic scholar. This book examines the relationship between the foundations of Shiite jurisprudence and the concept of inherent human dignity. The central question of the book is whether a principle termed “human dignity” can be derived from certain Quranic verses, such as verse 70 of Surah Al-Isra, to take precedence over other conflicting religious rulings.
The author distinguishes between two concepts of dignity: inherent dignity and contingent or potential dignity. From his perspective, the concept of inherent dignity can be inferred from Islamic religious foundations and can serve as the basis for establishing a jurisprudential principle. The book claims that, in addition to reason and the Quran, hundreds of narrations from the Infallibles elucidate inherent dignity and its related domains.
The work provides a report of the views opposing the notion of dignity as a principle and responds to them. It also asserts that establishing such a principle would make it, like the principle of justice, govern all religious rulings. This would have significant implications for jurisprudential rulings concerning women, minorities, slavery, and political and governance-related rulings. Among the book’s strengths are its concise volume, clear expression, and straightforward arguments. However, some of the author’s statements lead to a conflation of inherent dignity with incidental concepts of dignity, such as “the prohibition of insulting humans,” which could be considered a point of critique.
Brief Overview
The Principle of Human Dignity as a Jurisprudential Rule takes a jurisprudential approach to this rational principle. The author aims to: 1) clarify the concept of dignity in Quranic literature and its common usage, 2) distinguish between inherent dignity and contingent dignity, 3) prove that “human dignity” should govern religious rulings, and 4) address the objections of critics of this theory. This book is among the few works dedicated specifically to this topic and its impact on Shiite jurisprudence.
Author
The author, Seyyed Mohammad Ali Ayazi, born in 1954, is an Iranian Shiite jurist and Quranic scholar. He is a researcher in jurisprudence and Quranic studies at the Qom Seminary and a retired faculty member of the Islamic Azad University, Science and Research Branch, Tehran.
Structure
In the book’s introduction, the author defines the term “dignity” lexicographically and its technical meaning in Islamic religious texts. He then clarifies the position of the principle of dignity among other principles, such as justice. He also explains the importance of recognizing and acknowledging the existential dimensions of humanity for achieving a coherent jurisprudential system.
The main body of the work begins by examining the implications and outcomes of deriving the principle of human dignity. It demonstrates how this principle affects a jurist’s understanding and interpretation of Quranic verses and narrations, its role in applying jurisprudential principles, how it transforms rulings that violate human dignity, and how it addresses objections and questions related to issues such as “jurisprudence and human rights,” “jurisprudence and citizenship rights,” and “women’s voting rights.” In the subsequent chapter, the evidence and foundations of the principle of dignity are explored, including verses such as “And We have certainly honored the children of Adam” (Al-Isra: 70) and “Indeed, the most noble of you in the sight of Allah is the most righteous of you” (Al-Hujurat: 13). After presenting the content of these verses, the challenges in deriving the principle from them are analyzed: the inherent nature of human dignity, the principle’s primacy, the possibility of using a theological principle in deriving religious rulings, the scope of the principle of dignity, the method of determining the criterion of dignity, and examples of conflicts between the principle of dignity and jurisprudential rulings.
In the conclusion, the author proposes the establishment of a “Chapter on the Jurisprudence of Dignity.” He suggests that this chapter could compile and review jurisprudential rulings that would be subject to change based on the principle of dignity.
Methodology
The book The Principle of Human Dignity fundamentally pertains to the “foundations of jurisprudential knowledge,” making a purely jurisprudential discussion unfeasible. The author begins by analyzing the concept of “dignity,” then addresses its philosophical and theological status alongside Quranic evidence and interpretations, and finally demonstrates the impact of this principle on the science of jurisprudence and the process of deriving religious rulings. At this stage, the author engages in jurisprudential reasoning and employs the methodology of legal principles.
Claims
The author’s primary claim is that “dignity” is a principle intrinsic to humanity, derived from its essence. In the context of this work, being inherent means: 1) its actual existence within humans, 2) its universality across all humans regardless of race, religion, or other distinctions, and 3) its exclusivity to humans and not other beings. Therefore, firstly, dignity pertains to the essence of humanity as such, and the notion of acquiring dignity through effort or endeavor is not relevant. Secondly, no ruling in Islamic law can contravene the principle of human dignity. Establishing this principle necessitates a reconsideration of rulings based on gender, racial, ethnic, or even religious superiority.
In contrast, there is a view that: 1) does not consider dignity inherent to human nature but rather holds that religious evidence of dignity pertains only to humans who meet the conditions of Islam’s or a specific sect’s value system, not all humans; 2) does not regard it as a jurisprudential principle, arguing that it belongs to other domains of knowledge.
The importance of proving the “inherent nature” of dignity lies in the fact that only through this can “dignity” become a jurisprudential principle. Contingent or potential dignity lacks the capacity to establish a jurisprudential principle of dignity. If dignity were contingent or potential, it would allow for inappropriate treatment of non-Muslims, which contradicts the practice of the Infallibles (peace be upon them) (p. 74).
Arguments for Inherent and Contingent Dignity
The author argues for inherent human dignity using rational, Quranic, and narrative evidence. According to the rational argument, humans’ distinction from other beings and their nobility stem from human will, which enables humans to accept or reject divine rulings and choose between good and evil, paradise or hell. This inherent characteristic is the primary basis for human dignity. Thus, dignity is inherent to humanity. From the author’s statements, it is also inferred that “human dignity,” alongside the principles of free will and justice as fairness, is considered a philosophical or, at most, theological principle that governs religious rulings, rather than being a jurisprudential principle itself.
The Quranic argument for the principle of dignity is based on verse 70 of Surah Al-Isra. The content of this verse and others with similar themes suggests that dignity fundamentally belongs to God and has been bestowed upon humanity. The verse begins with “O children of Adam,” indicating a ruling concerning the human species as a whole, not a specific group. Furthermore, this verse does not describe a past event but identifies dignity as an inherent characteristic of humanity. Other Quranic indications of inherent human dignity include the verse on bearing the divine trust, humans as God’s vicegerents (in the sense of manifesting divine attributes), praise for human creation, and the infusion of the divine spirit. The author’s final view appears to be that, from the Quran’s perspective, the meaning and importance of dignity—alongside concepts like justice, good deeds, and beneficence—are clear to its audience, and it is referenced only to guide toward rational judgment (p. 83).
The third argument is based on narrations. Contrary to claims opposing the primacy of human dignity, the author states that hundreds of narrations from the Infallibles elucidate dignity and its domains. Although some of these narrations do not explicitly mention dignity, they encompass concepts such as human nobility and the safeguarding of human rights, including those of non-Muslims, the deceased, and even human embryos (p. 69). Moreover, many concepts now considered jurisprudential principles—such as the principles of permissibility and purity—are not explicitly labeled as principles in Shiite narrative literature.
Response to Arguments Against the Primacy of Dignity
The author concisely presents and responds to the arguments of those opposing the notion of dignity as a principle. A summary of the objections and the author’s responses is as follows:
- Conflation of Description and Prescription: Some argue that a description of reality (human nobility) cannot lead to legal or jurisprudential prescriptions (p. 103). The author responds that, given the sensitivity and importance of the issue, there is a strong connection between this existential reality and the prescriptive rulings derived from it; otherwise, its mention in the Quran would be futile.
- Lack of Connection Between Theological and Jurisprudential Principles: Even if the principle of human dignity is established, it is a theological principle, and deriving legal or jurisprudential rulings from it is not possible. The author counters by referencing various Quranic verses to show that normative jurisprudential and legal rulings can be derived from descriptive theological statements.
- Conflict with Definitive and Essential Rulings: This principle conflicts with definitive rulings such as retribution (qisas), stoning, and others. The author responds: 1) The principle of dignity only conflicts with Ash’arite interpretations of the Quran, not its explicit text. 2) A thorough examination of narrations shows that the claimed conflicts do not actually exist. 3) Many rulings assumed to be definitive and contrary to human dignity are, in essence, based on solitary or corroborated reports.
Implications of the Principle of Dignity for Jurisprudence
According to the author, accepting human dignity as a jurisprudential principle impacts the derivation of religious rulings in various ways: 1) It guides interpretive approaches. 2) It influences the application of jurisprudential rules, for instance, serving as a primary criterion in balancing and preferring rulings. The application of inherent dignity is categorical (dependent on recognizing the human species, not individual distinctions) and customary (its instances vary with time and place).
This principle can serve as the foundation for many jurisprudential principles, such as the principle of no guardianship (no one inherently has authority over another), the principle of presumed validity (human actions are presumed legally and religiously valid), the principle of presumed innocence (humans are initially free of guilt or error), and the principle of presumed purity (humans, whether Muslim or not, are presumed free of impurity).
Establishing this principle has significant implications for rulings on slavery, whether slavery was imposed on Islam—with emancipation rulings as Islam’s gradual approach to eliminating it—or considered a reality endorsed by Islam. Additionally, this principle opposes rulings based on gender discrimination or male superiority. It also negates rulings that humiliate protected religious minorities (ahl al-dhimma) or deny the citizenship rights of children born out of wedlock (pp. 141–157).
The Principle of Dignity Among Contemporary Jurists
The author cites the views of some contemporary jurists as supporting his interpretation. He notes that Morteza Motahhari’s rational argument for the primacy of justice over secondary rulings parallels the argument for the primacy of human dignity. Hossein Ali Montazeri, Seyyed Mohammad Hossein Fadlallah, and Yousef Sanei have also referenced the primacy of this principle. According to some, the principle of human dignity encompasses a set of principles that shape the worldview governing the derivation of religious rulings (p. 95).
Evaluation of the Work
The book’s concise volume, avoidance of verbosity, clear arguments, and lucid expression are among its strengths. However, as one of the first works specifically addressing this topic, it has room for improvement in several areas. For example, the structure of the content sometimes leads to repetition. Additionally, the author includes Arabic quotations in a Persian-language book, where Persian translations would have been more appropriate.
The Possibility of Bestowing Dignity
The book’s most fundamental claim is the “inherent nature of human dignity.” Proving this claim would establish it as a principle governing all jurisprudential principles and rules, as no principle or rule can contradict the inherent characteristics of its subject.
In philosophical literature, human dignity refers to inherent attributes whose negation equates to negating human identity. In legal literature, based on Articles 1 and 2 of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, human dignity refers to fundamental rights shared by all humans, regardless of differences, which cannot be revoked under any circumstances. Discussing issues such as burning corpses, providing financial aid to the needy, and insulting ideological opponents alongside topics like freedom of choice and the rejection of gender and racial discrimination indicates that, although these are distinguished from contingent dignity in some cases, the book’s foundation does not fully rest on this fundamental distinction. This lack of distinction leads to some conflation between inherent and contingent dignity. Examples such as the issue of women’s hijab, family sanctity, keeping promises, delayed beneficence, and forgiveness (pp. 133–136) under the concept of dignity suggest that it is considered equivalent to nobility or, at most, proximity to God’s presence (p. 62).
Furthermore, some of the author’s statements imply that “human dignity” is a result of divine bestowal (p. 55) or, in other words, an adornment with which humans are “embellished” (p. 61). Such a claim would render this principle non-inherent, potentially allowing other jurisprudential principles to override it. Thus, it appears that in parts of the work, there is no clear distinction between human dignity and concepts such as human sanctity, the prohibition of insult, humiliation, or disrespect.
Discussion of Narrations
Throughout the work, the importance of narrations from the Infallibles in discussing human dignity is emphasized, but no chapter thoroughly examines these narrations. One aspect that could have enriched the work is an analysis of these narrations using research methodologies—such as semantic or historical analysis—to highlight the significance of human dignity in the literature of the Infallibles.