Note: Educational jurisprudence, sometimes known as the jurisprudence of education and upbringing, and occasionally confused with ethical jurisprudence, is an emerging branch among contemporary jurisprudential disciplines. A key requirement for any jurisprudential branch is the existence of sufficient jurisprudential rules to regulate the process of deducing and discovering legal rulings, thereby excluding unsystematic and non-scholarly content from that branch. Hujjat al-Islam wal-Muslimeen Mohammad Javad Ahmadkhani, a professor of advanced levels at the Qom Seminary, in this exclusive article for Contemporary Jurisprudence, explains these rules and highlights several specific rules for educational jurisprudence.

The victory of the Islamic Revolution and the establishment of the Islamic system have doubled the responsibility of seminaries to provide theoretical support for decision-making and implementation processes in society. Alongside other academic institutions, seminaries have an active and essential role in this regard. This necessity stems from the profound transformations in human knowledge, advancements in modern sciences and technologies, and the evolution of contemporary human life, which have given rise to new issues that cannot be addressed without an Islamic approach and the expansion of the boundaries of Islamic sciences. Moreover, the Islamic system has provided an opportunity for the religious community to achieve its lofty goals, necessitating the acceleration of scholarly activities in seminaries to empower the Islamic system.

One of the domains where the Islamic system and contemporary society require the development of Islamic scientific foundations is the field of education and upbringing. In this regard, applied jurisprudence, particularly educational jurisprudence, emerges as a response to new issues and the growing demands of the religious community. Educational jurisprudence is tasked with delineating the path of servitude and the duties of obligated individuals in the process of upbringing and guiding humanity.

Jurisprudential rules have always been a focus of jurists and have been referenced throughout jurisprudential reasoning. These rules are general propositions under which specific cases can be subsumed, allowing for the derivation of their jurisprudential rulings. Unlike principles of jurisprudence, which serve as intermediaries in deducing legal rulings, jurisprudential rules themselves constitute general legal rulings applicable to their instances. The role of jurisprudential rules in applied jurisprudence, particularly educational jurisprudence, is particularly prominent. Since finding explicit evidence in the Qur’an and Sunnah for new and emerging issues in the field of upbringing is challenging, resorting to general jurisprudential rules or those specific to this domain facilitates the jurist’s task of applying new cases and deriving their legal rulings. Educational jurisprudential rules encompass a set of general rules that, in addition to outlining the duties of natural persons, are applicable in other domains and can delineate the responsibilities of legal entities, meaning they have both individual and institutional applications. This institutional applicability directly involves educational jurisprudential rules in the processes of system-building and legislation in the field of education and upbringing. These “jurisprudential rules” are not merely abstract theoretical constructs but are regarded as general legal rulings applicable to various specific cases and emerging challenges in the realm of education and upbringing. Their utility is particularly evident when addressing new educational issues for which explicit religious texts may be limited. This article will explore the concept, classifications, and key examples of these rules as discussed in foundational scholarly discourse.

Thus, educational jurisprudential rules, as part of applied jurisprudence, are critical tools for deriving rulings for emerging educational issues and developing jurisprudential foundations for Islamic human sciences. With their institutional applicability, they play a significant role in providing theoretical foundations and empowering the Islamic system in the vital domain of education and upbringing. Although some rules have existed sporadically in jurisprudential texts, their systematic collection and examination with an educational approach represent a novel effort to address the epistemological needs of contemporary humanity from a jurisprudential perspective.

The rules of educational jurisprudence can be categorized based on their scope of application or evidential basis. Based on scope, they include: general rules (applicable across all jurisprudential and educational domains, such as the rule of preserving order), specific rules of educational jurisprudence (encompassing education and upbringing), rules specific to the domain of education, and rules specific to the domain of upbringing. Based on evidential basis, they can be divided into transmitted rules (directly derived from the wording of religious evidence) and inferred rules (deduced from the collective body of evidence). Below, we briefly examine several key rules in educational jurisprudence based on their sources:

1. The Rule of Protection (Ṣiyānat) or Prevention (Wiqāya)

One of the extensive rules in educational jurisprudence, particularly in the context of raising children, is the rule of protection or prevention. This rule refers to safeguarding and preserving something from harm or damage. The concept of prevention here has a broad meaning, encompassing all types of educational actions, whether preventive, remedial, or ongoing. This rule plays a central role in family upbringing, especially in child-rearing, and many jurisprudential rulings in this domain are rooted in it.

The evidence for this rule includes both rational and textual sources. Reason independently recognizes that creating conditions for others to sin is reprehensible, while facilitating obedience is commendable and virtuous. Thus, parents’ efforts to protect their family from sins and create conditions for fulfilling obligations are considered virtuous and commendable. However, rational evidence alone only establishes desirability and continuity, not obligatory necessity.

Numerous textual sources also support this rule. The most significant Qur’anic evidence is verse 6 of Surah Al-Tahrim: ﴿O you who have believed, protect yourselves and your families from a Fire whose fuel is people and stones﴾. The address in this verse is general, encompassing parents, and the term “family” includes spouses and children. The imperative form “protect” (qū) implies obligation, and the intended meaning of protection is safeguarding oneself and one’s family from the fire of Hell (i.e., falling into sin). Thus, this verse establishes the obligatory duty of the father to protect himself, his children, and his spouse from the fire of Hell, and the obligatory duty of the mother to protect herself and her children from it.

Several narrations also confirm this rule, including one that describes a man as the “shepherd” (responsible caretaker) of his family, holding him accountable for them. Other narrations encourage believers to bequeath righteous knowledge and manners to their families to guide them toward paradise, in contrast to those who, through improper conduct, lead their families toward Hell. The Treatise on Rights also emphasizes the father’s responsibility for the proper upbringing of his child, particularly in terms of manners, guidance toward God, and assistance in obedience. This narration underscores the necessity of social, doctrinal, and devotional upbringing of children.

In summary, based on the collective evidence, particularly the verse on prevention and related narrations, parents have an obligatory duty to protect themselves and their children, and the father has an additional duty to protect his spouse, from the fire of Hell. A fundamental way to fulfill this duty is through preventive upbringing, guiding the child toward obedience to God and away from sin.

2. The Rule of Beneficial Knowledge

The rule of beneficial knowledge is another rule of educational jurisprudence, primarily related to the domains of teaching and learning. In linguistic terms, “benefit” refers to the utility or advantage that brings a person closer to their desired goal. In the Qur’an, this term is often used in contrast to harm. In technical terms, beneficial knowledge retains its linguistic meaning, and no specific technical definition has been identified for it.

Beneficial knowledge can be categorized from various perspectives, such as the nature of the knowledge, its purpose, its audience, the teacher, and the teaching method. A key point is the relative nature of the benefit of knowledge. The benefit of a particular knowledge may vary depending on the individual, time, or even the level of that knowledge. Additionally, the teaching method can influence whether a knowledge is beneficial; a knowledge that is inherently beneficial may become harmful due to an inappropriate teaching method.

In contrast to beneficial knowledge, there are non-beneficial (useless) and harmful knowledges. Non-beneficial knowledge is that which has no utility for this world or the hereafter, while harmful knowledge causes damage to the individual. The discussion primarily focuses on beneficial and non-beneficial knowledge.

The evidence for the preference of teaching and learning beneficial knowledge includes numerous narrations. Some narrations divide knowledge into two categories: knowledge of the heart (beneficial) and knowledge of the tongue (God’s proof over His servants). Another narration identifies knowledge as consisting of three things: a clear verse, a just obligation, or an established tradition, labeling anything beyond these as “superfluous” (non-beneficial, useless, or of minimal scholarly merit). These narrations highlight the importance and superiority of beneficial knowledge.

Other evidence supporting the preference for teaching and learning beneficial knowledge includes:

• The rule of cooperation in righteousness and piety: Cooperation in the path of goodness and piety is either obligatory or recommended. Since teaching beneficial knowledge is an instance of aiding in goodness, it is preferred.
• The necessity of utilizing opportunities: Human life is limited, and reason dictates that limited time should be used to achieve the greatest benefit. Beneficial knowledge is the clearest example of using time effectively and avoiding its waste.
• The virtue of the doer: Numerous narrations highlight the virtue of a benevolent teacher and guide, which supports the preference for teaching beneficial knowledge.

From this collective evidence, the principle of the preference for teaching and learning beneficial knowledge is derived. This preference implies recommendation (mustahabb), not obligation, except in cases where the Lawgiver has specifically mandated learning certain knowledge (such as essential religious doctrines).

Regarding the ruling on teaching and learning non-beneficial knowledge, evidence has been presented for its disfavor. The primary rational evidence is the waste of time and failure to achieve perfection, which constitutes a form of harm. However, this evidence only establishes disfavor (makruh), not prohibition. Some narrations may also suggest avoiding engagement with useless knowledge. Ultimately, teaching and learning non-beneficial knowledge is disfavored (makruh), meaning it involves wasting time on something without benefit. Teaching and learning harmful knowledge is undoubtedly prohibited (haram).

Given the relative nature of the benefit of knowledge and its multiplicity, prioritization in teaching and learning is essential. The practice of the Infallibles also indicates adherence to priorities, starting with the Qur’an, beliefs, and rulings. Therefore, educational institutions must, in their policymaking and planning, prioritize teaching and learning beneficial knowledge based on maximum benefit for the individual and society (both worldly and otherworldly) and avoid harmful knowledge.

3. The Rule of Teaching the Ignorant

The rule of teaching the ignorant is a rule of educational jurisprudence that is more specific than the previous rules (prevention and beneficial knowledge) and may have a more limited scope, such as being restricted to the domain of education. The term “ignorant” refers to an individual lacking knowledge or awareness.

This rule encompasses two claims: 1) the obligation to teach the ignorant mandatory religious rulings, and 2) the preference for teaching the ignorant non-mandatory religious rulings.

The evidence for the obligation to teach the ignorant mandatory religious rulings includes:

• Rational evidence: Reason recognizes the preference for assisting in the prerequisites of obedience, but this understanding alone does not reach the level of mandating teaching the ignorant.
• The verse of Nafar (Tawba: 122): This verse commands a group of believers to gain deep knowledge (tafaqquh) in religion and warn (inform and enlighten) their people. Warning cannot be achieved without teaching, so the verse implies the obligation of scholars to warn, which entails teaching. However, this obligation is limited to mandatory religious rulings, not recommended or disfavored acts or non-religious sciences. This obligation is a collective duty (wajib kifa’i).
• The verse of asking the people of remembrance (Nahl: 43 and Anbiya: 7): This verse guides believers to ask the people of remembrance (those with knowledge) when they are unaware of a mandatory matter. In cases where learning a specific knowledge is obligatory according to the Sharia, there is a rational correlation between the obligation to ask and the obligation to respond (teach).
• The verse prohibiting the concealment of knowledge: Verses that deem concealing knowledge forbidden for scholars, along with narrations emphasizing the necessity of clarification, support this obligation.

From this collective evidence, it is concluded that teaching mandatory rulings relevant to the ignorant (religious obligations they encounter) is a collective obligation for those with knowledge, provided the ignorant person has the capacity to learn and is at risk of neglecting those rulings.

Regarding the preference for teaching the ignorant non-mandatory rulings (recommended or disfavored acts), the aforementioned evidence does not independently establish such a ruling. However, some narrations generally condemn neglecting knowledge that does not harm through ignorance, or emphasize the inclination of the righteous to beneficial knowledge, or include supplications seeking refuge from non-beneficial knowledge. These may support the preference (recommendation) for teaching non-mandatory knowledge, though establishing obligation from them is challenging.

Conclusion

The jurisprudential rules related to education and upbringing provide a robust framework for developing educational philosophies and practices deeply rooted in a religious-ethical worldview. These rules offer mechanisms for prioritizing educational content, defining the ethical responsibilities of educators and learners, and addressing contemporary challenges in a manner consistent with foundational values. These principles emphasize not only cognitive development but also the moral, spiritual, and social well-being of individuals and society. Further exploration and systematic application of these rules are essential for constructing comprehensive and coherent models of faith-based education that can effectively navigate the complexities of the modern world while remaining faithful to fundamental ethical imperatives. The ongoing development and refinement of these “rules” represent a critical intellectual endeavor for scholars in both jurisprudence and education.