Note: Hujjat al-Islam wal-Muslimeen Qadirali Shams, born in 1965 in Isfahan and a graduate of the Qom Islamic Seminary, began teaching advanced lessons (Dars-e Kharij) on the Jurisprudence of Ethics in 2016, the results of which were published in three volumes titled Fiqh al-Akhlaq. Subsequently, he turned his attention to the Jurisprudence of Education and began discussing its topics in his advanced lessons. His simultaneous teaching of the Jurisprudence of Education and the Jurisprudence of Ethics makes him one of the most qualified individuals to discuss the Jurisprudence of Education and its differences from related fields such as the Jurisprudence of Ethics. He considers the relationship between the Jurisprudence of Ethics and the Jurisprudence of Education to be one of general and specific correlation from a certain perspective (‘umum wa khusus min wajh). The recipient of the Islamic Republic of Iran’s Book of the Year Award also mentions Fiqh Akbar (Greater Jurisprudence) in this context, explaining its meaning and its relationship to conventional jurisprudence. The detailed and insightful text of Contemporary Jurisprudence‘s exclusive interview with this professor of advanced lessons on the Jurisprudence of Education at the Qom Islamic Seminary is as follows:
Contemporary Jurisprudence: What is meant by the Jurisprudence of Education? Does it refer to the examination of educational propositions, or does it pertain to an educational approach to the entirety of religion? In the latter case, can it be considered a distinct jurisprudential chapter?
Shams: One of the topics recently introduced in Islamic seminaries and added to the list of applied jurisprudential fields is the Jurisprudence of Education. By the grace of God, since 2016, we have examined the rulings of ethical topics such as pride, envy, lying, and the like from a jurisprudential perspective. This work, which had not been explored in such depth and detail before, has been published by the Office of Contemporary Jurisprudence.
After discussing the Jurisprudence of Ethics, it was suggested that we begin working on the Jurisprudence of Education. Significant discussions have already taken place in this field, including the works of His Eminence Ayatollah A’rafi. We aim to continue this path. Although the Jurisprudence of Education is a new topic under this title, some of its issues have been addressed in traditional jurisprudential discussions, such as custody or religious education, albeit briefly and sporadically. For example, the author of Urwah al-Wuthqa mentions an issue regarding religious education toward the end of the discussion on judgment (qada). Compiling and systematizing these discussions allows for a comprehensive perspective on this topic, gradually establishing its place in jurisprudential fatwas.
The term fiqh (jurisprudence) in its linguistic sense means absolute understanding and is used in this sense in verses and narrations. However, in technical terminology, it refers to “the science of secondary rulings derived through reasoning and based on evidence.” Thus, fiqh means understanding the secondary and practical rulings of religion through reasoning.
Recently, the term Fiqh Akbar (Greater Jurisprudence) has emerged, referring to all Islamic and religious sciences that a person understands through reasoning and ijtihad. For example, what is Islam’s stance on economic issues? To what extent is Islam compatible with capitalism or Marxism? What is Islam’s approach to solving problems like inflation? These topics do not fall under fiqh in its technical sense, but when discussing Islam’s perspective on such matters, they are sometimes referred to as Fiqh Akbar, meaning the aim is to understand religion’s stance on various issues. This term has not yet become widely established, and fiqh typically retains its primary meaning.
The term tarbiyyah (education) derives from the root rabw, meaning growth, development, or increase. The term riba (usury) is also derived from this root because it involves an increase over the initial capital.
In the terminology of psychology and educational sciences, definitions of tarbiyyah have been provided that are not unrelated to its linguistic meaning. Plato is quoted as defining education as “training the child’s primary nature toward virtue through the acquisition of appropriate habits.” Training here means habituation—habituating the primary, innate nature (as opposed to the acquired secondary nature) to a virtue. However, this habituation is not direct; rather, it involves enabling the child to develop a habit that leads to being characterized by a virtue. The problem with this definition is that education is not exclusive to children or to altering their primary nature. While education has the greatest impact on children, it is not limited to them.
Another issue is that education is not solely about creating a habit in an individual that leads to virtue. For instance, parents can contribute to fostering the virtue of patience through proper nutrition, which is also part of education. Hence, some Western thinkers have defined education as: “Proper education is that which assists the individual in fulfilling their general and specific duties in peace and war in an appropriate and skillful manner.” The term “assists” is a good and comprehensive expression.
In summary, our intended meaning of tarbiyyah encompasses all these aspects: it applies to both children and others, achieved through teaching and other methods whereby the individual voluntarily chooses the path of righteousness, as well as situations where the educator imposes actions on the learner. It also makes no difference whether the goal is to eliminate a vice or cultivate a virtue in the learner. All actions that lead to removing a deficiency or creating a perfection in the learner are considered education. As some scholars have put it, education is about moving the learner from potential to actuality, transforming a latent capacity for perfection into an actualized one. Education encompasses the series of behaviors and actions that result in removing a deficiency or creating a perfection in the learner. This perfection includes virtues discussed in the science of ethics, such as learning mathematics, which is also a form of education. Thus, education refers to proper education.
With this explanation, teaching (ta‘lim) is included in education, and teaching is a part of the educational process, although sometimes the two are distinguished, with teaching placed alongside nurturing. Therefore, education is defined as “the series of actions performed by the educator to remove a deficiency or create a perfection in the learner.”
Consequently, the Jurisprudence of Education refers to “deriving secondary rulings related to educational behaviors and actions from evidence.” For example, the jurisprudential ruling on the principle of education or the jurisprudential ruling on educational methods, such as physical or psychological discipline.
However, understanding Islam’s perspective on educational issues—such as whether Islam offers specific educational methods, whether Western methods are endorsed by Islam, or whether they lead to outcomes desirable in Islam—falls under Islamic Education, which is akin to Fiqh Akbar.
To clarify the distinction, consider a child with a behavioral issue. Determining whether physical discipline is a correct method from Islam’s perspective pertains to the science of Islamic Education. In contrast, in the Jurisprudence of Education, we seek to determine the jurisprudential ruling on physical discipline as an educational method. At times, the jurisprudential ruling may draw on the educational effects of this method as discussed in the science of education. [1] These two fields are interconnected: a jurist of education may use insights from the science of education, and a scholar of Islamic Education may propose methods based on the Jurisprudence of Education. Thus, one examines the jurisprudential ruling, while the other addresses efficacy and impact. [2]
We noted that in the Jurisprudence of Education, the jurisprudential ruling on the principle of education and its methods is examined based on evidence and jurisprudential sources. Educational actions refer to actions that influence the growth and perfection of others through our actions, in contrast to the science of education. A scholar of education, such as a psychologist or religious educator, is not concerned with the jurisprudential ruling of an action but rather seeks it from the jurist. They focus on analyzing and identifying the roots of an undesirable behavior or trait in the learner, examining its causes, effects, and methods to eliminate it, focusing on the efficacy of these methods. As mentioned, these two fields sometimes interact. A religious educator may rely on the jurist for prescribing methods, just as the jurist is not indifferent to the opinions of the educational scholar and considers the effects of a method when issuing a ruling.
Contemporary Jurisprudence: What is the difference between the Jurisprudence of Education and similar jurisprudential fields, such as the Jurisprudence of Ethics, Educational Jurisprudence, and the Jurisprudence of Teaching and Education?
Shams: The term Jurisprudence of Ethics is a relatively new term introduced in the discourse of our jurists, and it may still be unfamiliar to many. Sometimes, the Jurisprudence of Education is understood in a broader sense, encompassing anything related to the reformation of the self, whether one’s own or others’. In this sense, the Jurisprudence of Ethics falls under the Jurisprudence of Education.
However, the common understanding of tarbiyyah (education) is that it involves fostering growth and perfection in another person, as education pertains to reforming others. Thus, the Jurisprudence of Education deals with educational actions performed by an individual to reform another, whereas the Jurisprudence of Ethics addresses matters related to ourselves, including both moral vices and virtues and the actions arising from these traits. Therefore, some matters are exclusive to the Jurisprudence of Education, such as physical education, though from an ethical perspective, it may be considered a form of kindness to a child, linking it to ethics. Other matters are exclusive to the Jurisprudence of Ethics, such as self-conceit (‘ujb).
Of course, an educator also considers self-conceit as a moral vice and seeks to eliminate it in their child. This effort to eliminate self-conceit as a moral vice in another person is an educational act. Some matters are shared between the two fields, such as shunning a child. From the perspective that it is an action of a person, it is an ethical matter, and from the perspective that it is an educational method, it is an educational matter. Therefore, in terms of subject matter, these two sciences have a general and specific correlation from a certain perspective (‘umum wa khusus min wajh). However, the perspective of discussion differs: in one, the focus is on the action as a human act, and in the other, as an educational act.
Footnotes:
[1] This depends on whether the opinion of the educational expert is considered authoritative by the jurist, whether it is deemed credible due to expertise, or whether it merely raises a rational concern. With these varying degrees in mind, the jurist utilizes the opinions of educational experts in the process of deriving and interpreting rulings. (Statement by the Professor)
[2] It is not entirely clear whether the distinction between the Jurisprudence of Education and the science of education lies in assessing efficacy. Does the jurist, when deriving primary or secondary rulings, consider the external effects of a method and weigh its benefits against its harms? Is evaluating the impact of an educational method in relation to the objectives of the Sharia the responsibility of the jurist? In some cases, jurists issue fatwas by considering and comparing the benefits and harms of an action. How does this differ from assessing efficacy?