Note: In this scientific session, the presenter, relying on the foundations of absolute wilayat al-faqih, sought to provide a methodical framework for evaluating Islamic legislation based on secondary rulings and social expedients. The session critics, while appreciating the theoretical innovation, raised questions about the boundaries of the legislator’s intervention in primary and secondary rulings, the nature of the obligation to observe rulings, and the criterion for the baseline fatwa in legislation. According to the scientific secretary of the session, the goal of this series of programs is to elucidate the methodology of legislative governance and achieve an efficient model of Sharia-compliant legislation in the Islamic Republic system.
The 64th session of the “Method on Sundays” series, titled “The Process and Methods of Evaluating Law Compliance with Secondary Rulings,” was held on Tuesday, 6 Aban 1404 (October 28, 2025), organized by the Research Institute for Contemporary Jurisprudence Studies, with support from the Development and Empowerment Desk for Islamic Sciences at the Islamic Propagation Office of Qom Seminary, and in collaboration with the Jurisprudence and Law Group of the Islamic Research Center of the Parliament.
According to the news portal of the Research Institute for Contemporary Jurisprudence Studies, in this session aimed at elucidating the foundations and methodology for evaluating laws based on secondary jurisprudential rulings, Hujjat al-Islam wal-Muslimeen Hasan Ali Ali-Akbarian, professor of advanced legislative jurisprudence, as the presenter, expressed his views on the necessity and manner of assessing law compliance with secondary Sharia rulings. Subsequently, Ayatollah Muhammad Andelib Hamadani and Ayatollah Ja‘far Najafi Bustan, prominent professors of advanced jurisprudence and principles at Qom Seminary, as critics, examined and scientifically critiqued the raised discussions.
The scientific secretariat of this session was handled by Hujjat al-Islam wal-Muslimeen Muhammad Kazem Haqqani Fazl, director of the Contemporary Jurisprudence Encyclopedia. At the beginning of the session, while explaining the objectives of the autumn “Method on Sundays” period, he emphasized the importance of methodology in the relationship between jurisprudence, law, and legislation, stating: “The series of sessions on ‘Methodology of Legislative Governance Based on Sharia Standards’ is part of the autumn programs of Methodology Sundays at the Research Institute for Contemporary Jurisprudence Studies, held to elucidate theoretical foundations and methodical approaches in Islamic legislation.”
He further added: “One of the main concerns of religious governments is how to align laws with Sharia. But the fundamental question is what is meant by Sharia in this alignment, and which layer of rulings—whether primary or secondary—should serve as the criterion for legislation.”
The director of the Contemporary Jurisprudence Encyclopedia, referring to the theme of the autumn series sessions, noted: “The practical challenges of religious governments in dealing with secondary titles, especially in legislation, require theorizing and precise methodology to achieve coherent and implementable solutions at the legislative level.”
Hujjat al-Islam wal-Muslimeen Hasan Ali Ali-Akbarian, professor of advanced legislative jurisprudence, began by outlining the discussion axis, identifying his speech topic as “Criteria for Legislation Based on Secondary Titles.” Referring to the legislative process in the Islamic Republic system, he said: When the Guardian Council deems a law contrary to Sharia and the Parliament insists on it, the final decision is delegated to the Expediency Discernment Council; but the fundamental question is what the basis for discerning expediency in such cases is and with what criteria this evaluation is conducted?
The professor of advanced legislative jurisprudence, emphasizing that his presentation is based on the theory of absolute wilayat al-faqih, stated: The legitimacy of law in the Islamic system is formed based on wilayat al-faqih, and the evaluation of laws must also be conducted within this framework.
Reviewing existing views on the scope of the legislator’s authority, he added: “According to some theories, the legislator’s intervention is limited to the domain of permissible acts, and in case of conflict between expediency and a permissible ruling, the law can prohibit or obligate it; but the main criterion in this view is the expediency of the Islamic society.”
This researcher, critiquing these views, clarified that each faces issues, and to address this gap, a more precise look at the legislator’s duty from a Sharia perspective is needed. In this regard, he explained: “The Islamic legislator is obligated in cases to enact laws for implementing Sharia rulings, and this duty can be a preliminary obligation. However, this obligation is conditional on observing Sharia rulings and their overarching purposes; meaning observing rulings, justice, and Sharia expedients in the ruling become conditional for legislation.”
In another part of his speech, referring to the necessity of simultaneity between justice and Sharia in the legislative process, he said: “Implementing some rulings in specific temporal or social conditions may be considered oppressive due to the lack of proper implementation grounds—not from a Western or liberal perspective, but from the view of a Muslim jurist. In such cases, the legislator is obligated to consider gradual implementation or moderation in executive rulings to preserve the spirit of justice in society.”
Hujjat al-Islam wal-Muslimeen Ali-Akbarian, in conclusion, while emphasizing the necessity of methodically elucidating criteria for evaluating legislative approvals, added: “By considering multiple conditional obligations , conflicts between them can serve as the basis for assessing the religious compliance of laws. Accordingly, the Expediency Discernment Council must also operate based on these precise and clear criteria so that its decisions are defensible within the framework of Sharia rulings and purposes.”
In the scientific critique section, Ayatollah Muhammad Andelib Hamadani, while appreciating the scholarly effort of Hujjat al-Islam wal-Muslimeen Ali-Akbarian, considered his discussions to have valuable theoretical capacity but raised several fundamental questions and points about the theory’s implications.
He expressed his first question as follows: Does the presented theory distinguish between preserving permissible acts, obligations, prohibitions, and Sharia purposes, or not?
According to him, if the legislator views conflicts between these levels equally, “there is a possibility that the scope of legislation extends even to prohibitions and obligations; whereas this is incompatible with the ruler’s duty to implement ‹what God has revealed› and preserve definitive Sharia rulings.”
Ayatollah Andelib then, referring to the distinction between two types of conflict—“conflict between more important and important” and “conflict of averting greater corruption with lesser corruption”—emphasized that Ali-Akbarian’s theory requires more precision in explaining these two areas, as, in his words, “generalizing the rule of more important and important to all legislative cases is not compatible with jurisprudential foundations.”
He further identified the “baseline fatwa” issue as an overlooked point in the theory, stating: “When there is disagreement among jurists on a subject, such as banking transactions or economic issues, it must be specified based on which mujtahid’s fatwa the legislator acts. If the criterion is the ruler’s fatwa, it should be clarified that ‹in the ruler’s view› is the standard for detecting contradiction with Sharia, not based on existing jurisprudential disagreements.”
The professor of advanced jurisprudence and principles at Qom Seminary, in summarizing his remarks, proposed that to prevent conflict between law and Sharia, “a red line for legislation in definitive rulings agreed upon by all jurists” should be determined.
Ayatollah Andelib, in conclusion, while appreciating the presenter’s scholarly effort, considered the raised discussions a valuable ground for deepening the methodology of Islamic legislation and emphasized the necessity of pursuing and completing this theory in future sessions.
Continuing the session, Ayatollah Ja‘far Najafi Bustan, as the second critic, while commending the presenter’s scholarly effort, analyzed the theoretical basis of “The Obligation of the Ruler to Observe Religious Rulings” and raised two fundamental objections.
He initially, referring to the structure of Ali-Akbarian’s theory, said that the basis of his speech is that conflict occurs not between the rulings themselves but between the obligations of the ruler to observe rulings. Explaining this part, he said: “You stated that conflict is not between the rulings themselves but between two obligations of observance; meaning the ruler is obligated on one hand to observe one ruling and on the other to observe another ruling. This depiction is novel and precise, but it must be specified what type this obligation is; is it prescriptive Sharia, advisory, or rational?”
Ayatollah Bustan then, raising a question about the Sharia origin of this obligation, noted: “If the intended obligation is prescriptive Sharia, a devotional reason must be provided for it. However, such a reason does not exist in Sharia evidence in this form; unless from enjoining good or as a corollary of faith, both of which face issues.”
He then explained that even if we accept this obligation, it means nothing more than guidance to rational ruling: “Ultimately, if we accept that the ruler must observe rulings, this obligation will not be prescriptive but advisory; meaning if you want to reach a healthy society aligned with the Legislator’s purpose, you must implement rulings as they are. This recommendation pertains to rational ruling, not a new Sharia enactment.”
The professor of advanced jurisprudence and principles at Qom Seminary, citing the rational rule of obedience, added: “Reason says that to be safe from divine punishment, one must act according to rulings. Therefore, the obligation of observance here is guidance to this rational ruling and cannot be prescriptive.”
Ayatollah Bustan, in summarizing his critique, clarified that if the obligation of observance is advisory, the conflict intended by the presenter does not materialize, as no new binding ruling forms for the ruler, and the discussion returns to the original conflict between rulings.
He emphasized: “If we consider the obligation of observance advisory, the result is that no conflict forms between permissible acts and obligations or prohibitions, as the permissible is acted upon according to its requirement, with no obligation in it. Thus, this depiction cannot resolve the theory’s problem.”
In conclusion, he stated that Ali-Akbarian’s discussions possess theoretical precision but require further explanation in elucidating the nature of “obligation of observance,” expressing hope that this theory will be completed in subsequent sessions and strengthened from a principles perspective.
In the final section of the session, dedicated to questions and answers, Mr. Salehi, one of the participants, raising a question about the position of the theory presented by Hujjat al-Islam wal-Muslimeen Ali-Akbarian, referring to the possibility of differing views in governmental and non-governmental jurisprudence, asked: “The theory you presented—is it in the paradigm of governmental jurisprudence or non-governmental? If in the non-governmental paradigm, its position is clear, but if raised in governmental jurisprudence, in my opinion, no contradiction arises, as legislation is based on governmental needs, and topical conflict will automatically be resolved.”
The professor of advanced legislative jurisprudence, in his response, first referred to the distinction between rulings and their different weights, saying: “All rulings are not of equal weight; the common tool is conflict, but there are differences between obligations, prohibitions, and permissible acts, and some dispositive rulings have broader impact. Therefore, when the issue of the ruler’s obligation to observe rulings arises, these differences must be considered.”
He then, referring to the importance of the baseline fatwa in legislation, explained: “The baseline fatwa is the one applied in legislation exercising wilayat, and the ruler or wali al-faqih, if delegating the legislative duty, must entrust it to a jurist or assembly of jurists. If existing fatwas create conflict, the conflict remains unresolved, and solutions for addressing it are necessary.”
Hujjat al-Islam wal-Muslimeen Ali-Akbarian also referred to the implementation of prohibitions and permissible acts in law, citing examples such as hijab and consumption of food in emergency conditions, clarifying: “Implementing a Sharia ruling in society requires considering potential corruptions. Sometimes the legislator may, due to greater corruption, refrain from criminalizing certain behaviors, even if Sharia-prohibited, to avoid systemic disorder.”
In summarizing the discussion, he referred to the distinction between individual duties and the ruler’s duties: “An individual’s duty regarding the prohibition of usury differs from the ruler’s duty as a legal personality. The individual must neither give nor take usury, but the ruler’s duty is legislation to eliminate usury in society and impose legal sanctions. This obligation of the ruler is realized through legislation and the tool of wilayat al-faqih, not merely based on individual Sharia obligation.”
The presenter, in conclusion, explained that the obligation of the ruler to observe rulings, in addition to individual obligation, has a preliminary obligation related to implementing Sharia rulings at the societal level. He emphasized: “This obligation, like rational obligations for saving a drowning person or other advisory obligations, obligates the Islamic ruler to implement Sharia rulings in society using law and wilayat tools, and this obligation is separate from his individual duties.”