Note: Although the objectives of Shari’ah have been discussed in the principles of Sunni jurisprudence for centuries, they do not have much precedent in Shi’i jurisprudence. The existence of evidence such as “Istislah” in Sunni jurisprudence has made its spread to Shi’i jurisprudence difficult and slanderous. Therefore, it seems that those who believe in the theory of “Istislah” and the objectives of Shari’ah are also trying to reveal their intentions with other phrases, phrases such as the taste of the legislator. Teacher Saifullah Sarami has been engaged in research in the field of new principles and jurisprudence for many years. We spoke with him about the requirements for reasoning on the objectives of Shari’ah. The Director of the Research Institute of Jurisprudence and Law of the Islamic Sciences and Culture Research Institute, however, does not consider the objectives of Shari’ah to be an argument except in governmental rulings. The detailed conversation with this teacher and researcher from the Qum Seminary, from your perspective:

What is the nature of the objectives of the Shari’ah and how does it differ from the objectives of the message and the interests of correction?

First, let me mention an introduction and two points to address the question. In my opinion, contemporary jurisprudence issues are not such that it is necessary to take the guard of changing the evidence of jurisprudence in the existing principles of jurisprudence from the beginning to solve them. At least, we must be impartial and approach the evidence and principles impartially and without presuppositions. It is not necessarily the case that because the issues are new, the evidence and principles must also be new. The nature of fundamental issues is to be general and must be applied to all chapters. Yes, a jurist may, for example, consider the religious and narration-based istishab specific to a specific chapter.

It may be said that just as the issues have changed, the means of inferring them must also change. The problem is new and cannot be solved with generalities and applications. These propositions did not exist at the time of the lawgiver. They give an example that in the past, the means of transport was a cart, but today new vehicles have come up that are different in their use and repair from carts.

This is a fallacy. This analogy is not correct; because in jurisprudence we are talking about human behavior, which is not outside the five rulings. Of course, there are also situational rulings, so they have the same type. The principles of jurisprudence also pursue this and want to be accountable. A cart and a car are two different things and do not have the same type; but the subject of jurisprudence is human behavior, which has not always been outside these five rulings. The principles of jurisprudence want to infer these rulings, whether it is on the Internet or riding a donkey or an electric car; this ruling is the same. Yes, in the approximately 270 years of the presence of the Infallible, we have had new issues and new rulings; whether in the form of announcements or new legislation. Even if, for example, we had the presence of the Infallible for 50 years, the principles of jurisprudence would not have changed. Certainly, the principles of jurisprudence evolve in the form of jurisprudence, but this does not mean that the evidence in the principles or the solution of the problem at a specific time or a specific problem is useless. It is neither bound by time nor bound by a specific problem. The principles of jurisprudence evolve, but this does not mean that it changes. “Al-Khabar al-Wahid” and “Istishab” are not bound by a specific time or problem and they should not necessarily change. Therefore, the principle is that we should assume the basis of principles and then enter into jurisprudence; then if it does not solve the problem, we should think about it.

Let us discuss the purposes of the Shari’ah.

First point: The purposes of the Shari’ah can be used in two places:

A: In the position of deducing the Shari’ah rulings that want to be attributed to the lawgiver as evidence.

B: In the position of issuing a government decree by the jurist of the comprehensive conditions or the legitimate Islamic government that is used in the capacity of governance, and this includes legislation. All decisions and behaviors of the Islamic government as a whole are a subset of the government decree. In all three branches of government, the executive, legislative, and judicial, and even dismissals and appointments, are all issued according to the purposes and demands of Islamic Shari’ah.

We do not consider the purposes of the Shari’ah to be evidence for the first case; but in the second case, the purposes of the Supreme Leader and the Islamic government as a whole, in the capacity of management and government, can have evidence for them.

Second point: Evidence has several meanings. Sometimes it is specific to the principles, which is about arguments and evidence, and sometimes it has a logical, minor and major meaning that may be conclusive, suspicious, illusory, or even fallacious. The two should not be confused. In the discussion of “qaṭ”, its authority is different from the authority of a al-khabar al-wahid. In the case of “qaṭ”, it reaches one of the aforementioned states based on premises or causes. The correct interpretation of the inherent authority for qaṭ is also the same, which is not given by the Shari’ah.

But regarding your first question, it must be said: Basically, the objectives of the Shari’ah have no place as a criterion and reason for deducing rulings in the principles of Imami jurisprudence, and are not considered at all; because they are suspicious and are within the general lack of authority for suspicion. Yes, if the objectives are definite and the jurist, in the position of deducing a ruling, finds a conclusion based on it, it becomes the authority of “qaṭ”, which is not a new point and was mentioned in the second point. Here, the objectives are definite and can be found in any way, and the objectives are not relevant in it. For example, a jurist is certain that justice is one of the purposes of the Shari’ah or that the existence of copyright is one of the definitive examples of justice, so it must be observed. This is due to certainty.

However, the scientific aspect of the purpose of the intended purpose in the principles of Sunni jurisprudence is rooted in the discussions of “qiyas”, which extend the ruling from the principle to the branch. The same is true of istislah and maslah. Scientifically and in terms of terminology, we extend the causality that is obtained from qiyas or there is evidence for its validity to other subjects in which the cause exists. Sometimes there is evidence for its invalidity and sometimes it is free and there is no evidence for its validity or non-existence. The validity of istislah and the purpose of the intended purpose depends on whether the cause you are considering has evidence for its validity or not. Not all Sunnis accept this and it is not accepted by all of them. The reason they put forward is that if we consider the suspiciousness of that interest that has no evidence for its validity as evidence for a ruling, this is an act of suspicion and not evidence.

Among the Shi’is, no one has issued a fatwa based on the Shari’ah rulings to put several issues together and say that these issues all have a single purpose and that this issue is ruled according to those purposes. Of course, in governance, all jurists raise interests; because the issue of guardianship is related to expediency. In all small and large guardianships, for example, in the issue of a guardian, he must take possession based on expediency, and since the purpose is to protect property and expediency is such, in its transactions, it is necessary to act based on its expediency. It is not necessary to observe the expediency for sure, but something may happen and the property may be lost, but the goal is to observe the expediency and it does not necessarily have to be profitable; it is enough that it is in the interest of the interest and that there is a presumption of expediency.

Do you consider the terms objectives and interests to be synonymous?

Objectives cover interests. The first criterion for issuing a government decree based on interests is that interests must be within the general objectives of the Shari’ah. The general objectives are matters such as expanding social justice, the general welfare of the people, social order, public security, expanding and deepening the religiosity of the people, expanding the culture of martyrdom, etc. The Islamic government must first outline and consider the general objectives and then address the government. First, objectives must be outlined and placed at the forefront of the laws, and officials must rule based on them. Today, this is interpreted as the general policies of the system.

What is the evidence for the validity of objectives?

Supposedly, if the Holy Lawgiver, in order to derive his own Shari’ah rulings, somewhere relied on objectives, it would be as stated in the introduction. However, we do not have such a case where, like al-Khabar al-Wahid, the Lawgiver ruled with authority and validity. I have not found such a case; but for government and issuing government rulings, we have evidence for authority. The best reason is that when the lawgiver gives the authority to someone and states his goals for the government (all of which are assumed in the case of the guardianship of the jurist and the Islamic government), then an interest is an interest when it serves those goals and objectives. In this case, if interests are not included in the category of objectives, it is not an interest at all from the lawgiver’s point of view. On the other hand, governing based on the goals and objectives of the lawgiver and based on interest is nothing more than observing the category of objectives in interests.

We have cases in the narrations where the Imam states a ruling based on objectives. Can’t these cases be evidence for the validity of the objectives?

If these cases are there and are not definitive, and if we consider the Imam to be the expounder of the Shari’ah and not the lawgiver and other ifs, they can be evidence, but such cases that have been raised have so many ifs and buts that they are invalidated. Some do not accept these as criteria in the operation of inferring rulings and only raise the issue of preference between two reasons or say that in the jurist’s approach to inference, it must be considered, such as the justice-centered approach that must be considered in inferring a jurisprudential ruling. If it is based on certainty, only the expediency of certainty is not enough, but both the purpose must be certain and it must be certain that the complete cause is for the ruling. That is, be certain that the cause of the ruling is only this purpose; for example! In the case of copyright, it is established that justice-centered only based on the purpose. If it is so certain, no one has any argument. The argument is about the validity of the principles that the jurist’s suspicion in cases of purposes is evidence and that is sufficient.

It can be said that jurists used to obstruct in cases of encountering technology and this obstruction was based on the purposes, for example, they opposed television and radio or considered microphones to be the trumpet of the devil or issued fatwas on the prohibition of using high-speed internet. It seems that all of this was done with the intention that the lawgiver is not satisfied with this matter.

I am not saying that no one has ruled based on the interests of inference, but rather that it is not authoritative. These examples have flaws. For example, I have not seen a real case of a jurist who has opposed these cases. Yes, a pulpit may start on the pulpit and some people may follow him, but we have not seen in the history of the seminaries and the practice of the scholars of Najaf and Qum that they consider the shower as a problem. We have not seen a case where scholars have opposed technology and have not driven in cars or used spoons and forks. Of course, it is said in the Sunnah, but it is not certain. If there was a case, it would definitely be Laban and Ashtar.

Therefore, I do not see any evidence for the validity of the Shariah’s purposes as evidence in deducing a Shari’ah ruling.

According to your statement that there is an overlap between purposes and interests, interests also go back to the judgment of reason and its basis is good and bad, justice and injustice. Maintaining the social order and social justice all goes back to good and bad and the judgment of reason. Given this, why are these matters not taken as evidence for the purposes of Shari’ah?

If the judgment of reason is a conjecture, it is not evidence and is only evidence if it is certain. Of course, we accepted your statement about governance. If we accept the reason for obstruction and arrive at a stronger suspicion with the expert’s opinion, your statement is correct; but generally, the experts’ opinion is based on suspicion and is not certain. In the field of governance, the judgment of reason is a conjecture of evidence and its conjectural interests are also evidence. The reason for that is the reason for obstruction.

But regarding the status of deducing rulings, when the purposes are not evidence, talking about the challenge and criterion that you asked about does not make sense either. Of course, in the case of governance, we have proposed several criteria for determining interests in the book on the sources of legislation, such as that it should be under the general headings of the Shari’ah and that it should be the most important.

Considering the authority of the taste of the lawmaker in the eyes of Shi’i jurists and its identity with the objectives of the Shari’ah, can this be a proof of the validity of the objectives of the Shari’ah?

First, this question is fundamentally wrong. No jurist has said anywhere that the taste of the lawmaker is an argument like the authority of a single news. The fact that they adhere to the taste of the lawmaker is due to the achievement of certainty. For example, the late Mr. Ayatullah al-Khu’i raises the condition of being a man in the condition of imitation or taqlid and says that there is no evidence for it, but when I follow the narrations, considering the existing narrations and jurisprudence, in my opinion (this means certainty) the Shariamaker is not satisfied that the reference for imitation should be a woman. He has called this the taste of the lawmaker. This is giving a title to certainty. The taste of the lawmaker means from the collection of studies and accumulations that I have of the Shari’ah. Considering them, for example, I conclude that a woman should not be a reference for imitation/taqlid, even if there is no evidence to prohibit it. This is an example of a contradiction, otherwise, like al-Khabar al-Wahid, they have not addressed the taste of the lawmaker, which is evidence for its validity from the Book and the Sunnah. This is the state that a jurist reaches after spending a lifetime in jurisprudence.

Secondly, there is no identity between the taste of the Shari’ah and the objectives of the Shari’ah. Even if he believes that, it is not correct. In some cases, there may be overlap and interference, and some tastes can be understood from the objectives, but this identity is not the case. Sometimes the taste of the Shari’ah is obtained from tracing the detailed rulings and from their entirety. When this identity is not there, the validity of the objectives cannot be attributed to them.

This article is part of the file “New Evidence in Contemporary Jurisprudence” prepared and will be published in cooperation with the Ijtihad Network.