For two years, people wore masks to avoid the disease, and wearing this mask exacerbated the disease and in the long run it will show its undesirable effects. The rational understands that this must be done for the time being; but it is not clear whether this ruling is permanent and always desirable. For example, the rational act quickly and use the corona vaccine; but in the long run, we cannot predict the lasting effects and the effects that this vaccine will have in the future. It takes years to understand it rationally and to understand all its dimensions and to be able to give a not complete but reliable ruling. This emphasizes that the structure of reason and the ruling of reason are different.

Note: Research into contemporary jurisprudence and the emerging issues raised in these newly emerging jurisprudential chapters have raised new questions. One of these questions is whether the traditional evidence of the knowledge of the principles of jurisprudence can be used to achieve effective results in deducing contemporary jurisprudence issues or whether, in order to answer these questions appropriately and efficiently, we need to add new evidence such as the newly developed rational conduct? The validity of the newly developed rational conduct has been seriously raised among jurisprudential scholars for several decades and has also found supporters. In this regard, we spoke with Ayatullah Muh. Qa’eni Najafi, a prominent teacher of jurisprudence and principles at the Qum Seminary. Although he has been focusing his lessons and writings on contemporary jurisprudence for years, he does not accept the authority of rationally invented sierahs. In his opinion, since it is not possible to discover the consent of the lawgiver in these seerahs, their authority is also not possible. The following is a detailed discussion with this prominent teacher of Qum Seminary, from your perspective:

– The late Allamah Tabataba’i and the late Imam consider the lack of inherent authority of seirah to require a disruption of the system. What is your opinion on this argument?

Mr. Qa’eni: Lifestyle are generally used as evidence because of the signature of the Holy Lawgiver. The meaning of the signature of the Lawgiver is that there is a possibility of refutation, otherwise, if the Lawgiver is tied in this position, this is contrary to the well-known principle that the consent of the Lawgiver is with his signature. Consequently, there is a clear difference between the ruling of reason and the construction of rationality. What the Lawgiver agrees with is the ruling of reason; But the moral code of the rational person is valid only when it is accepted by the Lawgiver. The Lawgiver certainly does not accept the disruption of the system in any way; but it is not the case that opposing the moral code of the rational person requires the disruption of the system.

– If the rational person, for example, commits an injustice; for example, they have a system called slavery and the Lawgiver wants to stop it, preventing it will inevitably lead to the disruption of the system. Isn’t that so?

Qa’eni: No. The fact that the Legislator wants to prevent something that is based on rationality does not mean that He agrees with rationality, but it will not be a disorder of the system either. A disorder of the system that the Legislator does not agree with is a disorder that endangers public safety and causes distress and chaos; in such a way that people are unable to secure their livelihood, let alone their livelihood; but the fact that the Legislator’s procedure differs from the procedure and structure of rationality in some cases is not a disorder of the system.

– Is the claim to the authenticity of rationally invented siras associated with the claim to the inherent authenticity of the sira, or can it be made conditional on agreement with the definitive mandates of the Lawgiver, or at least not opposing the definitive intentions of the Shari’ah, despite the claim to the authenticity of the lifestyle?

Mr. Qaeni: As stated, the validity of the sirah is based on the signature of the sirah, not the inherent authenticity of the sirah; therefore, if someone can discover the signature and consent of the Lawgiver with any statement, then it will be an argument, otherwise it is not an argument.

– Signature is a positive aspect; but non-deterrence can be established more easily. With this explanation, can’t adherence to the theory of non-deterrence be more explanatory in the case of invented siras?

Mr. Qa’eni: No, the only way to the authenticity of the sirah is to sign it, and non-deterrence is merely a way to establish the signature and consent of the Lawgiver; Therefore, wherever non-repulsion is a signifier, it is valid for that reason, not because it is itself objective. Based on this point, since we cannot obtain the signature of the Lawgiver with respect to the newly invented path, these paths are not valid.

– How can non-repulsion, which is a non-existent matter, be a signifier of the signature, which is an existential matter?

Mr. Qa’eni: Non-repulsion in what is infallible in the visible and audible, and that too in a normal way, not in the knowledge of the unseen, is a signifier of the agreement and conformity of the lawgiver’s opinion; but in newly invented paths, since we cannot discover this, we do not consider them valid. The newly invented path does not have the possibility of signature and repulsion, and we do not have any reason to necessarily consider something as evidence. The criterion and standard for evidence is clear, and that is the signature of the lawgiver, and other than that, nothing can be attributed to the Lawgiver.

– Can the promise of the return of the rules of practical reason to rational ways be considered to be associated with the promise of the inherent authority of the new ways?

Mr. Qa’eni: No, it is never like that. These two have different criteria. Even the rational people themselves differentiate between their ways and their rational rules. Yes, they are based on the recognition of wisdoms that the intellect understands; but it is not guaranteed and valid.

– The reason they have put forward for this return is that if the rational people of the whole world agree on a rule and act on it, this consensus must indicate something common among them all. On the other hand, the only thing that is rationally common among all is simply their reason; because religion, customs, traditions, habits, national and geographical requirements, etc. are not all the same in all rationally; therefore, the return of rational ways to the rule of reason is.

Mr. Qa’eni: Other than the infallible, if it has a basis, it is based on the recognition of the benefits it provides. On the other hand, in its recognition, it may not encompass all aspects. Considering this, it is possible that the Lawgiver, who is the universal intellect, may encompass a point that rational people may neglect. An example of this is the same analogy and istihsan, which are not unlikely to be rational practices among some people, but are not proofs in Islamic law.

– It is clear that a tradition exists only among a few people, and it is definitely not based on the ruling of reason; because if it were based on the ruling of reason, it would be necessary for everyone to agree on it rationally, not just some of them. However, the dispute is where everyone agrees on something rationally; for example, their tradition is based on the fact that beating an orphan for the purpose of discipline is ugly. In this case, does this tradition have any other evidence besides the ruling of reason?

Mr. Qa’eni: These cases are cases of the ruling of reason, not tradition. Certainly, in cases where the tradition is based on the ruling of reason, there is no doubt about its validity; but this has nothing to do with the foundation of reason, rather it is a ruling of reason that reason has followed. There is no doubt about the validity of this ruling, and there is no need to refrain from these matters. The discussion is about tradition that is a place of error and mistake, such as the foundation of reason on the validity of a legal entity or the validity of a single piece of news.

– There are cases that all rational people accept and act accordingly. On the other hand, no point comes to mind that would cause the Lawgiver to refrain from the Sirah. The return of such Sirah is in accordance with the dictates of reason; such as wearing masks during the Corona period, which was the Sirah, and its point was the dictates of reason on the necessity of protecting the body from diseases. In such cases, can one rationally rule on the inherent validity of the Seerah?

Mr. Qa’eni: For two years, people wore masks to avoid the disease, and the disease was exacerbated in this mask, and in the long run, it will also show its undesirable effects. Rationally, people realize that this must be done for the time being; but it is not clear whether this ruling is permanent and always desirable. For example, rational people act quickly and use the Corona vaccine; but in the long run, we cannot predict the lasting effects and the effects that this vaccine will have in the future. It takes years to understand it rationally and to understand all its dimensions and to be able to give a not complete but reliable ruling. This emphasizes that the structure of reason and the ruling of reason are different; because in relation to the ruling of reason, there are no such revisions, but even if thousands of years pass, justice is still obligatory and oppression is ugly and forbidden.

– In matters such as non-ritual matters that the Lawgiver has not provided a structure and has limited himself to stating generalities or partial statements and has accepted the procedure of reason, if we want to seek signature and refutation, will it not be an infringement of narrations such as “Be silent about what Allah has kept silent”?

Mr. Qa’eni: We do not have any case in the Lawgiver who has been silent, but He has the ruling everywhere. The silence of the Lawgiver in some cases is a proof of acceptance of it, not of following it; what it means is that this matter has the signature of the Lawgiver, not of following him. In other words, the acceptance of some rational procedures by the Lawgiver is not because he wanted to “follow” the custom; rather, it is to express the fact that in these cases, one must act according to the opinion of the custom, and the opinion of the custom is in accordance with the opinion of the Lawgiver.

– Are arguements such as “Keep silent about what Allah has kept silent” or “Do not ask about things” mean that non-restraint sufficient to prove the validity of the sirah?

Qa’eni: These narrations were issued against those who came and questioned them despite having a reason such as absoluteness or innocence. It is said in the narrations that if they had not questioned and had not been harsh on themselves, the absolute ruling would have been sufficient; therefore, it has nothing to do with the sufficiency of not being deterred to obtain the signature of a seerah.

– Considering this narration that “It is upon us to introduce the principles and upon you is the sub-division” in addition to the Imam’s knowledge of the unseen, who knew that a development had appeared in human life and that new issues would arise in society, can we conclude that the sub-division is authoritative?

Qa’eni: Sub-division has been entrusted to us; but legislation has not been entrusted to us. Sub-division does not mean legislation. For example, in the noble verse it is stated: “If you strike on the earth, there is no blame on you for failing to pray.” Now, the tools of the sirah have changed; But this did not change the ruling, and traveling with advanced means that did not occur to the minds of those times is also subject to that ruling. Substitution means that we do not derive a ruling from ourselves!

– Tafri’ can also be legislation. For example, a lawgiver orders the taking of medicine in order to maintain the health of the body. On the other hand, a person sees that drinking alcohol helps his health and solves his kidney problem. Is this substitution or tafri’?

Qa’eni: This is legislation; because drinking alcohol is included in the prohibitions.

This article is part of the file “New Evidence in Contemporary Jurisprudence” prepared and will be published in cooperation with the Ijtihad Network