Introduction: In terms of existing writings in Shia and Sunni jurisprudence, economic jurisprudence is ahead of many other chapters of fiqh. This very fact makes its entry into the international arena easier and more accessible than other jurisprudential domains. Here, the question arises: does Islamic economic jurisprudence fundamentally possess a significant and serious advantage over other economic schools of thought, enabling it to be considered an important economic school or body of economic law in the international arena? Hujjat al-Islam wal-Muslimin Mohammad Javad Qasemi Asl Estahbanati considers the greatest competitive advantage of Islamic economic jurisprudence to be its treasure trove of usuli maxims, jurisprudential maxims, and jurisprudential rulings, which emanate from the inexhaustible source of revelation. This professor and researcher of economic jurisprudence, however, believes that the internationalization of Islamic economic jurisprudence depends on taking certain steps, which he has detailed in this interview. The full text of the exclusive interview by Fiqh-e Mo’aser with this faculty member of the Economics Department at the Imam Khomeini Education and Research Institute follows for your review:
Fiqh-e Mo’aser: What competitive advantages, understandable to the contemporary world, does Islamic economic jurisprudence and Islamic economics possess for a presence in the international arena?
Qasemi: We have three modes of presence. One is a passive presence, meaning we assimilate into the thought, mindset, and practices that currently dominate the world and try to fit ourselves into them by any means necessary.
A second mode is an interactive presence. This means we are one party, and they are another. Here, it is necessary for us to become at least as significant as them and to gain international power. This mode of presence has its own requirements, and it seems this is the mode currently being considered.
There is also a declarative presence: “that He may make it prevail over all other religions” (Quran 9:33). This means we proclaim the religion and make our own Islamic economic jurisprudence triumphant over the whole world and turn it into the common currency. This is an ideal that is not too far-fetched, but it has many conditions, obstacles, and regulations.
Another issue is, what does “international” mean? “International” has several meanings. One is the Islamic international sphere. If we want to introduce our Islamic economic jurisprudence into the international arena, we must first introduce it into the Islamic environment, which constitutes about a quarter of the world’s population. In other words, if we can form a single economy with countries that ostensibly accept Islam and in which Sharia is established, they take priority over other countries.
Also, in Islamic economics, we have a special and specific domain called the discussion of resistance. The countries of the resistance sphere can have an international economy among themselves. In addition, we have a trans-Islamic economy called the economy of the oppressed (mustaz’afin), which is something similar to the Non-Aligned Movement; these countries also have the potential to create an independent economy. After implementing the economy in these countries, we can then turn to other nations.
But the competitive advantages of Islamic economic jurisprudence are, in fact, its vast treasure trove of usuli maxims, jurisprudential maxims, and legal-jurisprudential rulings related to economics, which has a history and legacy of over 1000 years and is supported by the inexhaustible and definitive source of revelation. From a social, historical, and cultural perspective, it is very fascinating to the world that such a rich collection of jurisprudential and legal works exists in one place. This itself can create a significant foundation for a presence in international forums, even if there are differences in the details of jurisprudential views among Islamic schools of thought. In this regard, two examples are noteworthy:
One is the maxim of binding (qā’idat al-ilzām), which in essence means that whoever interacts with adherents of other schools of thought must accept the jurisprudential laws of that school; that is, one must interact with the people of other schools according to their own school. The second is the discussion of fixed and variable rulings (aḥkām thābitah wa mutaghayyirah), which creates a high capacity within jurisprudence for modernization and interaction with the world.
Fiqh-e Mo’aser: What are the specific characteristics of Islamic economic jurisprudence compared to other religions and schools of thought?
Qasemi: I cannot give a definitive answer to this question because my knowledge of other religions and schools of thought is very limited. However, I will state what I understand of the differences, which at least warrant consideration and for which there may be some evidence. The differences between Islamic economic jurisprudence and other religions and schools of thought are as follows:
One is the Divine Traditions (sunan), which are presented as a jurisprudential source in the Holy Quran—both the social traditions and the economic traditions, which are frequently mentioned in the Holy Quran and form the foundations for religious and scientific theories in economics. These traditions consist of the realities that govern society and its economy; realities about how human beings are in the socio-economic sphere, as social beings, as economic beings. What regulations does society have? What laws govern economic history?
The second point is the fixed legislative guidance (hidāyah tashrī’iyyah thābitah) expressed in the form of fiqh. Those sunan were creational guidance (hidāyah takwīnīyyah), but this guidance is legislative and fixed. This guidance, presented in a vast and massive package, has the potential to answer all of society’s problems. Another issue alongside this fixed legislative guidance is our principles of jurisprudence (uṣūl al-fiqh) and jurisprudential maxims (qawā’id fiqhiyyah): a treasure trove that must be examined, evaluated, and compared with the principles and maxims of other economic schools of thought, although it is unlikely that the principles and maxims of other schools possess this degree of richness and breadth.
The third point is the variable legislative guidance (hidāyah tashrī’iyyah mutaghayyirah) established in Islam in the form of Imamate and later in the form of Guardianship (wilāyah). Whether we accept the Guardianship of the Jurist (Wilāyat al-Faqīh) or accept it from the perspective of public good (ḥisbah), in any case, we have this variable, ever-renewing, and up-to-date legislative guidance in the Sharia, for which a formal organization and structure has been established under the title of Imamate and Guardianship. Imamate and Guardianship, based on the fixed principles of the Sharia and the circumstances on the ground, decide how to guide the path of society so that it does not deviate from those accepted general principles.
Fiqh-e Mo’aser: Does the current economic jurisprudence have the necessary capacity for a presence in the international arena, or do we need changes in the methodology of derivation, maxims, evidence, etc., to make such a presence possible?
Qasemi: The answer to this question is both yes and no! Yes, in the sense that economic jurisprudence, even with its current capacity, can accomplish things. And no, in the sense that if it is to become ideal, transformations must occur within it. To explain:
Our jurisprudence, unlike Quranic exegesis (tafsīr), was problem-oriented from the very beginning, but this problem-oriented nature has stalled in the face of new issues. To put it more accurately, our problems used to be our own or were eventually localized. But now, the problems are imported, and the volume and speed of the influx of new issues, plans, maxims, contracts, and new mechanisms have increased, and we do not have the opportunity to digest them. When we are whip-lashed with an issue, we can no longer respond to it as it deserves.
The third issue is that the influx of subjects for jurisprudential matters has both intensified and is coming from unreliable, impure, and filthy sources. Currently, the dominant legal power in the world, which is designing regulations for social, legal, political, and contractual issues, consists of filthy and impure people who are doing this work with impure hands and from impure materials. It is as if a dog is making us kebabs with pork, has monopolized the market, and is rapidly serving us this pork kebab cooked and processed by a dog, whose analytical components are blood, filth, and impurities. A similar event is currently happening with contracts.
To counter this challenge, we must use the principles of jurisprudence (usuli maxims) common to both the present and the past, when the influx of jurisprudential issues was not of this magnitude and did not come from such unreliable, filthy, and impure sources. Examples include the maxim of apparent meaning (qā’idat al-istiẓhār), or jurisprudential maxims such as the maxim of no harm (lā ḍarar), the presumption of validity (aṣālat al-ṣiḥḥah), the Muslim market (sūq al-muslimīn), and binding (ilzām). Or religious theories such as the analysis that the source of entitlement is useful labor, or the theory of equity/profit-sharing versus wage-labor.
In sum, it must be said that changes in the maxims and principles are necessary. To make these changes, certain steps must be taken.
The first step is that we must eliminate those passive maxims, like acting according to the sira al-‘uqala’ (the practice of rational people), and utilize active maxims. Currently, the sira al-‘uqala’ has become a passive maxim. Who are these “rational people”? Are they anti-Islam Jewish rationalists, anti-Islam Zionists, irreligious rationalists, or faithful and devout rationalists? This is a very important issue. This is while reason is merely a computational device, not a source, whereas it seems some believe that reason is a source in itself.
The second step is to break the isolationist maxims. Isolationist maxims are those that saw the legally responsible person (mukallaf) as confined to the individual and had an individualistic outlook. However, if we consider the legally responsible entity to be the general public or the government, the result will likely change. If we adopt a civilizational approach—that is, a jurisprudence that wants to be influential in the world; or a governmental approach, meaning we specify the duties of the government; or a social approach, meaning jurisprudence wants to see what effect this fatwa can have on society—in that case, the jurisprudential outcomes will probably change.
The third step is a serious engagement with the discussion of subject-matter identification (mawḍū’-shināsī) and moving away from abstract discussions. Martyr al-Sadr says: we have a mathematical rationality that governs in some parts of our principles, which dictates that everything must be neat, clean, and two-plus-two-equals-four… But we also have a social rationality. Confronting society cannot be addressed with mathematical rationality; rather, it requires intuition, observation, and consultation.
In conclusion, civilization passes through the heart of society, society needs a state, the state needs jurisprudence, and jurisprudence is based on principles; therefore, to achieve an Islamic civilization, we must develop the principles.
Fiqh-e Mo’aser: To establish a presence for Islamic economic jurisprudence in the international arena, what actions and policies should be implemented?
Qasemi: It seems that, first, we must engage in self-knowledge and understand ourselves. That is, we must see if we can be a reliable and sound alternative to the existing front that is imposing its own jurisprudence—or as some great figures call it, Western jurisprudence—on the world, and if we can take a step on the path of worldly happiness for all of humanity. Because, in reality, it is these legal frameworks that shape and direct economic, social, and political dynamics.
After self-knowledge, we must achieve self-belief. The prerequisite for this is to hold meetings and gatherings and to examine the various dimensions of what we possess, including both our strengths and weaknesses.
The third step is recruiting allies and forming a front; this is the very internationalization of Islamic jurisprudence. Let us come together and form a common international front for economic jurisprudence and then move towards creating a common international front of the oppressed (mustaz’afin). This work, of course, is gradual and will not be achieved overnight.
Once these international social foundations are formed, it will be time for us to request a seat in international legal institutions so that our voice can be heard and respected. For our voice to be respected, we must have a seat there ourselves and move from interaction to proclamation. That is, to move from interacting with the world’s status quo towards the declarative goal and vision that the Quran states: “that He may make it prevail over all other religions, even if the polytheists dislike it” and “…even if the disbelievers dislike it.” This vision is not distant: “Indeed, they see it as distant, but We see it as near” (Quran 70:6-7).