Contemporary Jurisprudence

Examined in a Debate between Ayatollah Alavi Boroujerdi and Dr. Khosropanah:

Principles of Economic Jurisprudence/25

Regarding Mr. Sadr, Mr. Rouhani believed, from a scholarly perspective, that he was a very learned man. But there is no issue; these questions that we raise, if Mr. Sadr were here, he was a fair man. At that time, we were fervent, and these questions did not cross our minds. Now, we have these questions. Meaning, those foundations and characteristics that he states for Islamic economics as a science—although he does not consider Islamic economics a science either—even as an independent economic school of thought that is completely separate from capitalism [are also not acceptable].

Introduction: Ayatollah Alavi Boroujerdi, a professor of advanced jurisprudence (fiqh) and its principles (usul) at the Qom Seminary, had made some statements regarding Islamic economics in an interview, which prompted reactions in the seminary. Among these reactions were the words of Hujjat al-Islam wal-Muslimin Khosropanah, a professor at the Qom Seminary, who refuted Professor Alavi Boroujerdi’s statements and requested a scholarly dialogue and debate with him. In March 2021, this scholarly dialogue was held between the two professors, the full text of which you will read below:

Moderator: Today, we are in the presence of the honorable Ayatollah Alavi Boroujerdi, and also in the presence of the honorable and great professor, Haj Agha Khosropanah.

Alavi Boroujerdi: Well said. May God reward you. We also extend our greetings and respects to the honorable Mr. Khosropanah, to you, and to all the dear ones. We hope that, God willing, as we have said, dialogue is a foundation for us in the seminary. Apart from the word of God, revelation, and that whose authoritativeness has been established from the Infallibles, we do not consider anything else to be among the constants, and it is open to discussion and debate. Any kind of discussion and debate in these matters helps the scholarly perfection of the seminary. This has been our way in the seminary, and this way should never be compromised.

Khosropanah: I seek refuge in God from the accursed Satan. In the name of God, the Most Gracious, the Most Merciful. Praise be to God, Lord of the worlds, and peace and blessings be upon the Messenger of God and his good, pure, and infallible progeny, especially Hujjat ibn al-Hasan al-Askari, may our souls be sacrificed for the dust of his arrival. I also extend my greetings and respects to all the dear ones present in the session, especially Haj Agha Alavi Boroujerdi. God has granted us the success to be in this sacred place during these blessed days, where the Grand Ayatollah Haeri Yazdi and the Grand Ayatollah Boroujerdi were once present, and where holy souls have communed with God. Today was also the birthday of Imam Javad al-A’immah, according to the precise calendar, and we are also on the eve of the 13th of Rajab. I congratulate you on the blessed birth of the Commander of the Faithful, the Master of Monotheists, and I am grateful to God for the success of participating in this session, and I hope we have a scholarly and cordial dialogue.

Moderator: The topic that the honorable gentlemen have given us time to be in their service for is Islamic economics. In October of this year (2020), a conversation and statements from the honorable Ayatollah Alavi Boroujerdi were published regarding the discussion of Islamic economics. Various reactions took place, and different views were put forth, especially by Haj Agha Khosropanah, who emphasized that this is an important topic and it is necessary to have a dialogue about it. Given that this topic was raised by Haj Agha Boroujerdi, we will first ask him to once again review his views that he had expressed, which perhaps may not have been fully presented, or to state his supplementary points, so that after that, we may benefit from the presence of Professor Khosropanah.

What is Sharia?

Alavi Boroujerdi: In the name of God, the Most Gracious, the Most Merciful. That which we call Sharia and religion is a collection of beliefs, jurisprudence (fiqh), rulings, and ethics. We have this collection. In the discussion of beliefs, we have theological discussions. What we are dealing with now is jurisprudence. Our jurisprudence is a collection of rulings, and Shia has one of the richest jurisprudences, because we benefit from a very rich narrative heritage. In the narrations we have—because we know the subject of jurisprudence is the action of the legally responsible person (mukallaf), the “do’s” and “don’ts”—and in jurisprudential narrations, the Imams have stated matters concerning these “do’s” and “don’ts.” And let us be aware that a ruling always applies to a subject; the subject must be actualized for the ruling to apply to it.

Types of Jurisprudential Subjects

Our subjects are of two types: we have religious subjects, and others, subjects that the Sharia has not determined. We are told that prayer is obligatory. Prayer is a “constituted essence” (māhiyyat mukhtara’ah) in our terminology; the Sharia itself has created it, and it does not have a creational form. The Hajj is also a constituted essence. The Sharia has said prayer is this, and Hajj is this. But we have subjects that the Sharia has not determined. In these subjects, we must always clarify the subject, so that the ruling may be based upon it, meaning the ruling applies to it. Where must we find this subject? It has been said that you should refer to custom (‘urf). We have exceptional cases where these subjects have been determined in the Sharia, according to some. For example, in backbiting (ghībah); what is backbiting? We have a narration that says, “Your mentioning of your brother in a way that he dislikes,” or “Your mentioning of your brother in a way that God has concealed about him.” But—let’s suppose—in singing (ghinā), we do not have a religious subject. What is singing? We do not have a religious subject [for it], and for many other cases. We have been told to refer to custom. Custom means what is in their practice, and this custom may not be a general custom but a specific custom. We have medical issues, in medical matters; therefore, the subject must be taken from the custom of medical experts. Today, new issues are found; for example, genetic issues and issues of transplantation and the like, that with the emergence of the subject, we state its ruling in the Sharia.

Instructive and Inquisitive Narrations

One of these cases is economic issues. We have a collection of narrations; people ask the Imams questions, and they answer. Be aware that narrations are of two types: instructive narrations (riwāyāt ta’līmī) and inquisitive narrations (riwāyāt istiftā’ī). Our instructive narrations are limited, where Imam Baqir and Imam Sadiq (AS) speak and teach a topic. The majority of our narrations are inquisitive; meaning the narrator asks the Imam about a problem he is facing, and therefore the Imam’s answer is in light of that question. Mr. Boroujerdi had an insight that in inquisitive narrations, we must pay attention to the context in which the question is posed.

The Beginning of Inquiry from the Ahl al-Bayt (AS)

I will present this introduction, although it takes time, that during the time of Imam Ali, Imam Hasan, and Sayyid al-Shuhada (AS), the understanding of rulings that existed in the time of the Prophet (PBUH) was still in people’s minds. Questions are few, the companions are present, and disagreement is little, except for cases that have a political dimension, otherwise disagreement is typically little. From the time of Imam Sajjad (AS) onwards, when the era of the Successors (tābi’īn) begins, or the end of the era of the Companions, the perceived subjects fade and are forgotten, and judges and muftis are questioned. At this time, the answers are different, and this difference begins from this time; the discussion of fallibility (takhṭi’ah) and correctness (taṣwīb), which is a theological discussion, also begins here. Due to the different answers that were presented from different people, because the answers became multiple, they said we do not have a single divine ruling, and whatever anyone says is the divine ruling: [meaning] taṣwīb. This became established in the discourse of the Sunni gentlemen which, according to Mr. Boroujerdi, is a theological discussion, and therefore he objects that “al-taṣwīb al-mujma’ ‘alā buṭlānih” (correctness, the invalidity of which is subject to consensus) is not at all a matter of consensus; a theological issue is not a place for consensus at all.

But from the end of the period of Imam Sajjad (AS), they come and ask questions. There were questions, but they increase at this time. Why? Because the Sunni rulers gave different answers. That former understanding also existed to some extent, and they would ask. In the period of Imam Baqir (AS), it increases, and in the time of Imam Sadiq (AS), it peaks. Therefore, Mr. Boroujerdi says that in these questions, one must see what the place and city of the narrative question’s context was. Who was the major jurist there whose opinion might have reached the ear of this narrator and been influential? The Imam’s answer is in light of that question, and therefore in many cases, we have contextual limitation (inṣirāf) in the narration. As soon as we see the text of the narration, like in technical jurisprudence, we should not quickly resort to its generality (iṭlāq) and universality (‘umūm) and consider the matter finished. No, [one must see] does this generality hold? Because contextual limitation prevents the formation of generality. Does it have contextual limitation or not?

These people ask, and the Imam answers. What is asked of the Imam is something that has happened and that they are afflicted with, and it is a subject; whether economic or non-economic. Our narrations are these. This transaction, this action, and this exchange existed, and the Imam says it is valid, it is not valid, or this part of it is not valid. Therefore, the jurisprudence of commerce (fiqh al-matājir), the jurisprudence of earnings (fiqh al-makāsib), the jurisprudence of lease, sharecropping (muzāra’ah), crop-sharing (musāqāt), and all of these emerged. These subjects that we have in these narrations, where did they come from? Sale (God has permitted sale and forbidden usury) was among the people, and Islam did not create and establish it. I have said before that the Messenger of God, before his mission, went on a [trade] journey for Khadijah (SA), a trade to Syria. On what basis did they transact? Later, when they migrated to Medina (let alone Mecca), did that entire commercial practice they had change and get overturned, and a new subject emerge? Lease and sale were the same. The late Sheikh Ansari in some cases specifies that these subjects are all subjects that rational people have. When we say the practice of rational people (sīrah al-‘uqalā’), [it is because] rational people have a system of livelihood (niẓām ma’āyish); meaning when a population gathers and a society is formed… When we say rational people, we mean those who are people of reason; their society is formed, and they establish a foundation for the continuation of their life’s system, like our law-making now, to preserve their rational order. In this rational order, rational people have had exchanges. They had [exchanges] before Islam and after Islam. These exchanges existed, and when Islam came, in the questions that are asked of the Imams, we observe that the Imam’s words are in light of this very thing that was commonly current among rational people and in their system. They emphasize cases where it is not correct, [like] munābadhah and muṣāfaḥah [types of pre-Islamic sales]. But mostly, lease was among rational people, sale was among rational people, even “God has permitted sale and forbidden usury,” or “trade by mutual consent“; Sheikh himself says all these are in light of the practice of rational people.

And this being in light of, which I have termed as guidance (irshād), be aware that some gentlemen have objected that these are approbatory (imḍā’ī). Our approbatory rulings are also guidance. We sometimes have guidance to a rational judgment and sometimes guidance to the established practice of rational people. Here, where it is an approbation, the Lawgiver guides us that this is an established practice of rational people, and I have approved it. In order to be precise in this subject and to weigh its pros and cons, we must go to the foundation of that subject among rational people, just as Sheikh in Makasib, or our great scholars in Matajir, do this very thing.

Islamic Economics: An Approbation of Rational Economics

Therefore, our point is that we have the same systems that rational people had regarding sales at that time. The science of economics did not exist in this form among rational people. At that time, [those systems] existed, and the Lawgiver came and considered these foundations. We understand this from the questions asked of the Imams, and therefore in most of these cases, we do not have a constitutive ruling where the Imam has stated a constitutive economic foundation; rather, it is guidance to that which existed among rational people.

As time passed from the era of the Sharia to today, transactions are found today that did not exist in the time of the Sharia, like the very fatwa of the late author of ‘Urwah, that transactions are found among people that did not exist in the time of the Sharia. How should we rule on these? The job of jurisprudence is to rule on a subject, and these are also subjects. He says we look, [we see that] these are rational established practices found among people, we measure them against the generalities and universal statements of the Sharia; if they are not in opposition, we say they are approved. Because there too, we do not need approbation; non-repudiation (‘adam al-rad’) is what we need. The mere fact that repudiation is not established is sufficient. We also said in our discussion that the late author of ‘Urwah says this regarding transactions, and we say it regarding rights; for example, the right of invention, discovery, and authorship did not exist in the time of the Lawgiver and has emerged now. This is a rational right, for which money is exchanged. We measure this too with the same standard, and therefore the fatwa that was narrated from the Imam, that he had negated the right of authorship, we did not accept. The right of authorship is a rational right like rational transactions; we measure rational rights with the same criterion that the author of ‘Urwah stated.

Economics as Subject, Not Ruling

Therefore, from the perspective of the nature of the story, pay attention to this meaning: that which we today call economics is a discussion of subjects, not rulings. We must pursue the clarification and diagnosis of the subject; the ruling exists. Another point on which I insist is that the capacity for applying a ruling to subjects in our jurisprudence is so strong that we believe if we are precise in the issues, we will not be at a loss. There is a very high capacity in all issues, including economic issues. Economic subjects that are found today and did not exist yesterday, today we can apply a ruling to them as a primary ruling (ḥukm awwalī). In addition, we have a vast resource called secondary injunctions (‘anāwīn thānawiyyah) and the discussion of conflicts (tazāḥum) that arise, which here are based on expediencies and that is another story, and it comes to our aid in times of necessity, and not absolutely. But absolutely, we are discussing primary rulings, and therefore I conclude this: what we have among rational people and rational systems has been current and continues to be current, and just as the Sharia at that time stated these rulings for those subjects, we too today can diagnose them with the help of those generalities and universal statements.

The Emergence of the “Islamic Economics” Discourse

This was a point I intended to make, which of course has a continuation. Another issue we have here is, why did the discussion of Islamic economics arise? In the 1960s—I came to Qom in 1968, and before that, I went to high school in Tehran. We were familiar with the late Mr. Motahhari and with Engineer Bazargan. I am not concerned with the political aspects. They were religious men. We were in high school and we had societies and a magazine, and we did things in those days. We were familiar with these gentlemen and we had an issue: a leftist thinking was dominant among our intellectuals and academics. This discussion is present in Islam. You are aware that we have two fundamental economic schools of thought: one is Communism, and one is Capitalism. Their characteristic is that in Capitalism, owning capital and property is officially recognized, and in Communism, it is not officially recognized. This is the main characteristic. At that time, when we were young and in university, we would enter the discussion and it would be asked what Islam’s view on economics is: capitalist or communist? Because leftist thought was so strong, it was a flaw to say capitalist; and capitalism, not that American-style capitalism. When we say capitalist ownership, we are talking about the principle of the school of thought, meaning the official recognition of ownership. This was bad. [In that context,] a capitalist was a blood-sucking leech. At that time, we ourselves were inclined to separate Islamic economics, to present something separate. Therefore, when Sayyid Muhammad Baqir al-Sadr wrote his book Iqtisaduna, we scrutinized it and gave lectures about it. Now some say we haven’t seen it. We used to boast a lot about his book. Of course, we were not acquainted with him and I never saw him, but later his teacher, Sayyid Muhammad Rouhani, when he came to Qom, I studied under him for twelve years. Regarding Mr. Sadr, Mr. Rouhani believed, from a scholarly perspective, that he was a very learned man. But there is no issue; these questions that we raise, if Mr. Sadr were here, he was a fair man. At that time, we were fervent, and these questions did not cross our minds. Now, we have these questions. Meaning, those foundations and characteristics that he states for Islamic economics as a science—although he does not consider Islamic economics a science either—even as an independent economic school of thought that is completely separate from capitalism. Again I say that [regarding the concept of] capitalism, I am emphasizing the principle of ownership, not in the sense of… We don’t have another word to say in opposition to socialism. We ourselves wanted to have an independent title. It’s the same now. They accuse us of [saying] that Islam is a supporter of capitalism. Now we answer differently, but at that time, we were fervent. Pay attention. Sometimes we wanted to move faster than the socialists, so we gave harsher slogans. Narrations appeared among us like, “I have not seen abundant blessings except that alongside them is a violated right,” and we had no chain of transmission or basis. We used to say these things. But [today] is a time when we must enter into matters precisely and with depth and not lose our way, because our losing the way leads to the general public losing their way. This is my initial statement.

Moderator: Thank you. Mr. Khosropanah, you too, please initially state the theoretical framework you have in this field and your macro-level view, so that we may continue the discussion.

Economics: An Instance of Practical Wisdom

Khosropanah: I thank the dear masters again for holding this scholarly and wise session. If you permit, in this first part, I will not say anything in light of the statements of the honorable Professor Alavi Boroujerdi and will leave it for the next stage. Although I agree with a significant portion of the statements and there is no difference of opinion, and under his statements, there are observations and questions that, God willing, we will benefit from and the discussion will be completed.

In this part, I will raise an independent discussion. Since the topic of discussion is economics and Islamic economics, let me say that economics was one of the اقسام (divisions) of practical wisdom. When household management (tadbīr al-manzil) was mentioned, it meant economics, and mainly microeconomics. This does not mean that macroeconomics did not exist in the past; [because] macroeconomics was part of the politics of cities (siyāsat al-mudun), and microeconomics was discussed as household management. Our meaning of economics is today’s economics, meaning from the 19th century onwards, because the human sciences in the world, and especially in the Western world, have gone through four stages: one stage from Greece to the Middle Ages, one stage from the Middle Ages to the Renaissance, the third stage from the Renaissance to the 19th century, meaning in the era of Dilthey and the era of Auguste Comte, and the fourth stage begins from the 19th century. Our discussion is in light of economics and the human sciences in the fourth stage.

Science of Economics or Economic Sciences?

Today, if we talk about economics, what is meant is the economic sciences, meaning it is not just one science. I will briefly mention that today the term “philosophy of economics” exists; economic worldview also fits under this philosophy of economics. Another term is “economic ideology,” and the term “school of economics” or maktab that Shahid al-Sadr used in Iqtisaduna is in light of this second term. And another term is the “jurisprudence and law of economics,” which in the context of our Islamic sciences becomes the jurisprudence and law of economics. And the fourth term is the “science of economics.” To avoid the fallacy of “lumping multiple issues into one,” each of these must be seen independently. For example, when it is said philosophy of economics, the ontological and worldview foundations that govern the human sciences, and among them economics, must be considered.

Foundations of Western Economics

From the Renaissance onwards, three foundations were accepted, and these three foundations are dominant in the 19th century: one is Humanism, one is Subjectivism, and one is Secularism; meaning the primacy of man, the primacy of self-founding reason, and the primacy of the world. Each has a precise meaning. So precise that if one is not careful… for example, they say “Islamic humanism,” which in my opinion is like an eight-sided triangle. This doesn’t mean Islam doesn’t value man; human dignity, human vicegerency, etc., are in their proper place, but we do not have Islamic humanism, Islamic secularism, Islamic subjectivism, because subjectivism means the primacy of self-founding reason. Self-founding reason means revelation is not a knowing agent, revelation is not a source of knowledge. These three principles permeated modern economics, meaning from the 19th century onwards, and therefore two other foundations were formed from them: one is Deism in capitalist economics, one is Materialism in communist and Marxist economics. Therefore, Marxists and communists accepted the foundation of materialism and the primacy of matter, and the capitalist system [accepted] Deism, [meaning] Natural Theology. That is, theology must be discussed with reason-sufficiency, and even for proving God and about God, one should not turn to revelation. This is what is meant. There is another foundation in modern economics that is present in both capitalism and in Marxism and socialism, called Nominalism, [meaning] the primacy of the name and the negation of universals. Meaning the negation of the logic that we accept, and the foundation of our intellectual discussions is these discussions of logic.

These foundations have created the economic worldview; meaning if someone wants to precisely understand the capitalist system or the socialist system [they must pay attention to these things]. Just as Haj Agha Boroujerdi correctly stated, when a ruling is to be applied, it must be applied to a subject. Here too, we intend to apply a ruling to the subject of capitalism or the subject of socialism, whether it is permissible or forbidden, and whether it has religious authority or not. Does the Sharia have a repudiation for this practice of rational people, who are Marxist or socialist or liberal rational people, or not? Therefore, first, the subject must be well clarified.

Philosophy, a Prerequisite for Understanding Economics

In my opinion, with all due respect, neither before the revolution and at the time when socialist discussions were prevalent, was socialism understood precisely, because the background of the philosophical foundations governing socialism… because socialism is an ideology, Marxism is an ideology, liberalism is an ideology; ideologies have philosophical backgrounds. Shahid Motahhari, who was a professor of philosophy, and Shahid al-Sadr, who was familiar with philosophical discussions, were both jurists and had studied under great scholars and had scholarly weight; they understood this connection between philosophical discussions and ideological discussions very well. Therefore, Shahid al-Sadr writes Falsafatuna (Our Philosophy) before Iqtisaduna. Why? In Falsafatuna, he has two discussions: the discussion of worldview and the discussion of epistemology or theory of knowledge. Shahid al-Sadr first explains Falsafatuna and the worldview and epistemology of Kant and the Neo-Kantians and before Kant, and presents his philosophical critique, and then comes to Iqtisaduna. Iqtisaduna deals with economic ideology, and a precise understanding of it is contingent on first precisely understanding Shahid al-Sadr’s Falsafatuna.

Someone who wants to understand Shahid Motahhari’s critique of Marxism must first see Shahid Motahhari’s philosophical discussions, to [understand] his foundation as an explicator and clarifier of the Transcendent Theosophy who was attuned to the issues of the time. Therefore, one of the important philosophical foundations of this discussion is monotheism in creational and legislative lordship (Tawḥīd fī al-Rubūbiyyah al-Takwīniyyah wa al-Tashrī’iyyah). It is a paradox for us to accept monotheism in legislative lordship on one hand, and to accept a weighty position for the noble verses of the Quran and the narrations of the noble Prophet of Islam and the Ahl al-Bayt of infallibility and purity, and to reach authoritativeness by going through the process of hadith sciences… this acceptance means we have accepted monotheism in legislative lordship. If we have accepted this, we cannot speak of and accept the economic ideologies of the world that are based on Deism. We can speak of them, but we cannot accept them, neither their system nor their school of thought. Because I said that after the Philosophy of Economics, economic ideologies and the economic school of thought are born. Economic schools of thought are not just socialism and capitalism; socialism, from socialism Marxism, from Marxism Communism, from Communism Leninism and Mao in China, each have had their specific interpretations. Or for example, now there is feminist economics, but it did not exist in Shahid al-Sadr’s time for him to address it, but today an ideology called feminist economics is being discussed. And it is interesting that all these economic schools of thought, whether socialist, Marxist, and communist, or fascist, or Nazi, these are all ideologies. Some think Nazism or fascism in Germany and Italy were parties, whereas the party was a product of that ideology; and likewise feminism and other “isms.” Some “isms” are philosophical isms, like empiricism and positivism, and some “isms” are ideological isms, like the ones I named. All social ideologies, under which are economic ideologies, all of them accept humanism, subjectivism, and secularism. They either accept Deism, which is rational theology and does not accept monotheism in creational and especially legislative lordship, or they are materialists who do not accept God at all, [and believe that] existence is equivalent to matter. All these foundations permeate all these ideologies.

Differences between the Islamic School of Economics and Other Economic Schools

So if we wanted the system… of course, a system is different from a school of thought, because a system is a collection of philosophical foundations, a school of thought, a science, and economic law. When it is said the capitalist school of thought or ideology, “capitalism” is an “ism.” When you say Marxist or socialist ideology, this is an “ism,” it is a school of thought. A school of thought is a package and has principles. I will say very quickly: in every economic school of thought, the discussion of economic goals is present, the discussion of economic freedom, the discussion of justice, the discussion of ownership, the discussion of wealth distribution and production, distribution, and consumption, is present. These are present in every school of thought. Therefore, when we say capitalist ideology or school of thought, we should not just look at wealth and capital. Capital and capitalism are two different categories. Capitalism is an “ism” that accepts private ownership but has limitations on its view of public or state ownership, because it accepts a minimal state. When we say the capitalist system or the economic school of thought or capitalist ideology, it is only because they believe in economic freedom and private ownership. This cannot be a point of similarity with Islamic economics.

My question is this: does Islam accept public ownership or not? Does it accept private ownership or not? State ownership or the Imam’s ownership? It accepts these three. Shahid al-Sadr has explained it well, and all the jurists have said so. Shahid al-Sadr, according to his method, which is thematic exegesis, takes questions from new discussions, presents them to the texts, and gets answers without eclecticism, and, so to speak, interrogates the religious text and provides modern categorizations.

The economic freedom that Shahid al-Sadr or Shahid Motahhari discuss has limits. I am reviewing for the great masters; indeed, the Makasib of the late Sheikh Ansari is a precise foundation for economic jurisprudence, and from economic jurisprudence, one can derive the school of economics, because it has both forbidden earnings (makāsib muḥarramah), where it mentions the types of forbidden earnings, and it has sales, where it mentions the reality of sale and its types, kinds, and rulings, and also options (khiyārāt), where it discusses what they are and their types and kinds, and various maxims. The late Sayyid [Yazdi] has a commentary here, that after Sheikh mentions some hadiths, including a hadith that is in Tuhaf al-‘Uqul, is in Fiqh al-Rida, a hadith of Imam Sadiq (AS), where he was asked how many ways and means and causes of livelihood and subsistence for the servants of God are there? The Imam says there are four ways and not a fifth: one, through guardianship and sovereignty; two, through trade and exchange; three, through leasing and being hired; four, through crafts. This is truly one of the miracles. According to my research, the chain of transmission of the narration also has no problem. Its indication also has no problem. Now, the discussion of the problem with Tuhaf al-‘Uqul is another discussion.

Moderator: Excuse me, if you could please summarize… and also please state the question you intended to ask, because you shied away from the question.

Foundations of Islamic Economics: The Implicit Meaning of Religious Sources

Khosropanah: In my remarks, I made this point that in reality, the key question is this: when you say “capitalist system,” do you see this capitalist system or school of thought as separate from its philosophical background? If so, you have not understood the subject correctly. And it is interesting that… I intended to refer to the commentary of the late Sayyid. He says: “Al-Fā’idah al-Thāniyah” (The Second Benefit). I want to use this point from this point of Sayyid: “Lā yakhfā ishtimāl hādhā al-ḥadīth al-sharīf ‘alā jumlah min al-qawā’id al-kulliyyah” (It is not hidden that this noble hadith contains a number of general maxims). He derives maxims. The very difference between a jurist of principles (uṣūlī) and a literalist (akhbārī) is this, that from one noble hadith, they extract multiple maxims, nearly ten maxims: “Minhā ḥurmat al-dukhūl fī a’māl al-sulṭān al-jā’ir wa ḥurmat al-takassub bi-hādhihi al-jihah wa minhā ḥurmat al-i’ānah ‘alā al-ithm, etc…” (Among them is the prohibition of entering into the works of an unjust ruler and the prohibition of earning through this means, and among them is the prohibition of assisting in sin, etc…).

The summary of my remarks is in two sentences: one, if we want to accept the capitalist school of thought or system, we should not only pay attention to capital; it is capitalism, meaning the primacy of capital. This primacy has meaning and has a philosophical background. Meaning if you say we have accepted capitalism, it means we have accepted Deism, just as if you say you have accepted Marxism, it means you have accepted materialism. These cannot be a case of “we believe in some and disbelieve in others.” The second point, it is true that many of these discussions may not be in the direct denotation of the verses or narrations, but according to the method of jurisprudential principles that we have learned from great scholars like Ayatollah Boroujerdi and Haeri Yazdi and Akhund Khorasani, Khoei, and Imam Khomeini, there are clear implicit denotations that provide us with maxims, and we can, from these maxims, explain the Islamic school of economics, which corresponds neither with the capitalist school of economics nor with the socialist school of economics, nor communism, nor feminism, nor any other ideology.

Moderator: Thank you. From my understanding, Mr. Boroujerdi, as he stated, his view is based on economic jurisprudence and he spoke from a jurisprudential perspective, and Mr. Khosropanah presented a history of economic thought from the perspective of different ideas and different schools of thought. It seems that here, that very discussion of referring to rational people is the point of discussion and challenge, that who, in reality, are these rational people. The honorable Mr. Khosropanah stated that it is based on different ideas, and if you see fit, perhaps if we continue the discussion from this perspective or from any other discussion you state, we are at your service.

The Difference Between Partial Agreement with a School and Accepting all its Foundations

Alavi Boroujerdi: The point I have for the honorable Mr. Khosropanah is that if we have a commonality in one aspect with a school of thought, it does not mean adherence to everything they say. In capitalism and the capitalist system itself, there are different schools of thought, and not all of them are theistic, and some are anti-God, and it has degrees. About the fact that all our economic actions and interactions and those of mankind are based on a philosophy behind them and based on a system, it may be so in many schools of thought; meaning they depict a comprehensive view and see it this way, but the general public who move through history do not think this way. One of the movements that emerged in Islam was the Muslim Brotherhood movement, the movement of Hassan al-Banna. At that time, we were also supporters of the Muslim Brotherhood and were influenced. They too have socialist tendencies that ripple through their words. They even told us at a time when the October Revolution had not yet occurred… the October Revolution is not the beginning of socialism; socialism existed before these. When that Communist Manifesto was written, the October Revolution had not yet happened, between Engels and Marx.

What is of concern to us here is that we are faced with a collection of external movements and external actions in the field of interactions and exchanges that have existed throughout history. Here we have a point of commonality, now with capitalism. We are not looking at the school of thought. Islam believes in ownership. We are in common with them, and Islam does not negate ownership. Rational people have also existed from the beginning. This talk of primitive communism or so-and-so, this is not established. The primary nature of man is that he felt ownership even over his hunting tool, and if someone else took it, he would argue with him or they would fight. Therefore, socialist thought itself was formed as a result of the onslaught of capitalism and labor problems, and especially in the industrial world, not in the peasant world. Later, Mao wanted to derive this from the peasant movement, but it was generally formed from industrial production. The worker’s right was being consumed, and these issues were created. [It was said that] on what basis should someone have facilities at his disposal, and this side only works. Therefore, these issues were created, and a school of thought emerged on its own, and even in socialism itself, we do not have just one school of thought. Look at European socialism, who are Christians. These are Christians and are theistic in thought, yet they also accept ownership in a way, but they also have socialist thoughts. In the Soviet Union itself too, after a while, they came to believe in ownership to some extent, that everyone can have, for example, a piece of land of a few hundred meters and provide for their life’s needs. They too developed such tendencies.

Islamic Philosophy Does Not Have Islamic Roots!

Therefore, to [say] that everything that is discussed as economics in the world, which we see as a subject in our jurisprudence, has a philosophy behind it, and then to even attribute this philosophy to Islam, this is the very point of contention. Now, we are not concerned with the science of economics; philosophy itself is not ours and came from Greece, and there are many stories about why it was brought into the Islamic world. They brought it in to close the door of the Ahl al-Bayt. But we see that we had great philosophers who, after entering philosophy, worked in such a way that, in my words, the branch exceeded the root. But it does not have Islamic roots, and therefore, even though we look at it with a divine view and philosophy reached divine perfection with us, it did not become Islamic philosophy. Yes, it is the philosophy of our great scholars, but it is not an Islamic philosophy that we can attribute to Islam. The Islam that we speak of needs attribution. May God have mercy on the late Mr. Khoei; he has a view on leniency in the evidence for recommended acts (tasāmuḥ fī adillat al-sunan), which I thought at first was first stated by the late Mr. Khoei himself. He, in the narrations of “man balaghah” (whoever receives [news of]…): “Whoever receives news of a reward for an act of goodness and performs it, will have that reward“… we have ten or twelve narrations like this. Sheikh Ansari, in his treatise on leniency in the evidence for recommended acts, believes that these narrations correct the weakness of the chain of transmission. Sheikh Ansari is committed to this even in historical narrations, and therefore [believes that] we can attribute to the Sharia; [this narration] creates a recommendation, creates a discouragement. The late Mr. Khoei had a foundation, and it was that these narrations do not create an attribution to the Sharia. Recommendation is an attribution to the Sharia, discouragement is an attribution to the Sharia, and this narration does not do this. These narrations are a bestowal of grace. Someone has heard that a reward is given for that act, he did that act, and the reward is given to him. It is nothing more than this. Attribution is meaningless. Later I looked closely and saw that this foundation was first put forth by the late author of al-Hadā’iq. It is a strong foundation.

Many Jurisprudential Maxims Have Rational Roots

When we want to attribute to Islam, we must be precise. We have jurisprudential maxims. We have other maxims too, but many of our maxims have rational roots. Many of our jurisprudential maxims have rational roots. Here I am making a jurisprudential point; we have the maxim of the presumption of validity (aṣālat al-ṣiḥḥah). This maxim exists in practice; I buy this house from you, then I doubt whether you were the owner of this house or bought it correctly and did not take someone’s property by force. Here, the presumption of validity is applied to the action of another. The presumption of validity in action means that when a person does a fundamental act, he does not do something wrong; we are not concerned that a Muslim must be devout.

The late Haj Agha Reza Hamadani says that this maxim has a rational root; meaning rational people in their interactions with each other, when they intend to buy a house, do not have the doubt of whether he is a thief or the owner. And then he extends this maxim to the actions of the person himself. He says the maxim of completion (farāgh) and passing (tajāwuz) are also aspects of this same maxim of the presumption of validity, that when I pray, [I presume that] I have performed it correctly. This has a rational root. It is a jurisprudential maxim, and we derive it from narrations, but it has a rational root. The late Mr. Sadr himself, when he discusses the characteristics of Islamic economics—state economy, public economy, public and private ownership—we [must] look to see if these have a precedent among rational people or not. Did rational people not have state ownership? Every government everywhere had possessions within its own circle, and what we in Islam know as public resources (anfāl), anfāl is not exclusive to Islam that Islam established it. Anfāl or public wealth existed among people before Islam too, even African tribes. These tribes had huts and personal hunting equipment, but the forest that was around them and where they went to hunt, they considered this public property. The peaks of mountains or the bellies of valleys, which we express in anfāl, these are public wealths and have always existed.

Ownership Has Rational Roots

Later, a school of thought in capitalism, due to necessities that arose, for example, the discovery of America, caused people to migrate from Europe, Germany, and Ireland. There, it was said that you can go and just register these lands, as much as you want. Give the dimensions and just register it. Take it for yourself. Therefore, large lands emerged that even included mountains. Some capitalist thoughts elevated ownership very high. Here, what existed among rational people? Among rational people, all lands that had no owner, lands that were unowned, whoever revived it, became the owner. Whoever went and discovered a mine, became the owner among rational people. Islam also brought this revival of dead lands (iḥyā’ al-mawāt). We have narrations about the revival of dead lands. It is an Islamic ruling and has a rational root. This ownership has a rational root. Here we see that both state ownership and public ownership in anfāl, and private ownership, have rational roots. We see all of these in Islam as well. It is not a characteristic of Islam that we say here that Islam established this. No; therefore, in the revival of dead lands, we go to rational people.

The Practice of Rational People Does Not Mean the Agreement of All Rational People

But that you say all rational people are [included], at that time too there were different societies. When we say rational people, why do we say rational people? Because reason is the inner proof (ḥujjah bāṭinī). A gentleman insisted in a discussion that all sciences were created by the prophets; the prophets came, and all human sciences were created by the hands of the prophets. This is not a problem. “Fa-dharrah fī buq’at al-imkān” (A mote in the realm of possibility), we do not deny it. But this needs proof; for example, what science did the prophet Moses create? We have no affirmative proof, but it is possible. But I said why go that far? Reason itself is also an inner proof, and God has placed it in the existence of man, and this reason of man has given man the thought to build foundations. We are in the matter of the system of livelihood. This is the practice of rational people. Do you imagine that among the communists, after Lenin gained power and the communist economy became dominant, all the people and the rational people of the populace subscribed to that practice? There was a slaughter to take their lands. There was conflict and turmoil. They imposed this matter. The practice of rational people that we speak of means what rational people, based on their freedom of action, sit down and think of ways. It is possible that in some places, this rational practice and foundations may be different, like traffic rules. If you go to England, instead of the right side, they go on the left side; these are rational laws. They have made regulations and live based on them. We too, if we go there, even from a jurisprudential perspective, must follow that practice. It is meaningless to violate it. They are also a group of rational people. On this side is France, which is different. Rational people may have differences in foundation-building. We are not talking about a specific custom of specific rational people; we are talking about the aspects that are common among rational people. Islam itself in some cases had specific characteristics, but are these characteristics that I mentioned in such a way that we can make an attribution? Meaning these very narrations that you mentioned, and of course it is correct. I have seen them too. These narrations that give a maxim, before them, is there no practice among rational people? Among rational people, it is also the same: it is either through the sovereign, or through production, or through leases. This is and has been.

The Infallibles (AS) Did Not Seek to Islamize the Sciences

The Messenger of God (PBUH) migrated to Medina, and in a gathering of youths where there were questions and answers, he asked, “Where do you get these shields and swords and equipment you have?” They said these Banu Qurayza and Banu Nadir—two Jewish tribes in Medina—are skilled weapon-smiths and have very large workshops. The Prophet asked if their work was good. They said it’s excellent. The Prophet said, “If a dispute arises between you and them and they are not willing to sell you weapons, what will you do?” They said, “They are good people and we have dealings with them, why a dispute?” The Prophet said, “What is the problem if you and the children and the youths go to their workshops and learn and learn the tricks of the trade and come and set up workshops?” In short, he encouraged and followed up, and this was done. After a gap of five or six years, the Battle of the Trench occurred. In the Battle of the Trench, these same Jews of Medina allied with the polytheists of Mecca against the Prophet, and they did not have a weapon problem. Here, why does the Prophet say go and learn from the Jews? Could the Prophet himself not teach them? This image that the Sharia is obliged to bring all sciences for the people, and those practices that rational people have in preserving their systems, how can we discuss this? Did the Sharia come to teach medicine? Did the Prophet and Moses not consult a physician? Did they not bring a physician for the Commander of the Faithful? Why? For example, did he say, “Why a physician? I am a physician myself.” But they did not say that.

We had industries then too. Yes, in the consultation for minting coins, they came to Imam Hadi and said that they are promoting Christianity on their coins, and the Imam said mint your own coins. Therefore, we have guidance, but that Islam should come and teach the sciences one by one, this is the very point of contention. My point is that separate from the schools of thought and the philosophical and ideological backing that has now emerged behind all aspects in everything… because one of the issues we have in philosophy is that philosophy with us is limited. May God have mercy, we had this discussion with the late Motahhari too. Philosophy, when it came to us, in the same limits that we discussed—potency and act, motion, cause and effect—and it has become a little broader than that. This is a reality. We have reached this far. This Greek philosophy went to the West, especially to the post-Renaissance West. Because before the Renaissance, no value was given to science. The Renaissance caused them to separate from the church, and the dominion of the gentlemen cardinals and popes and gentlemen was removed, and freedom of action and thought came into being, and therefore we see philosophical thoughts from this origin. Its root is also Greek philosophy, Indian philosophy, ancient Iranian philosophy, “al-fahlawiyyūn al-wujūd ‘indahum” (the Pahlavis, for whom existence is…) is also there.

But Greek philosophy was very strong and stronger than all that went to Europe. This philosophy there found different branches; therefore, philosophy of economics, political philosophy, and philosophy of mathematics also emerged. For every science that exists, there is also a philosophy behind it that was created later. There is no problem that we categorize this movement that is in the direction of economics and that there is an ideology behind it, but what we deal with in a jurisprudential subject is [that] I see exchange here. I see this process and this method here that is common among the general rational people today. In various economic formulas, inflation, growth is a reality, and they have programs. These programs are also not something like revealed writ; it is experience.

We are dealing with these subjects. Those subjects that we have seen among them to be more successful, as a foundation that they have in their society, and they themselves are seeking to find the best way. If there is a better way somewhere [they will follow it]; for example, the Chicago school or the Friedman school in Chile, after they removed Pinochet, they took this Mr. Friedman and he organized the economy, and it worked up to a point. Meaning it came out of the previous situation, but it had other side effects that they are still struggling with. We are not saying everything the capitalist or capitalist school of thought says is correct, no, we [say we must pay attention to] that which is the result of people’s experience, and sciences are also created as a result of need. We must have a comprehensive view of the sciences. How was physics created? How chemistry? They also have an old history. Chemistry is the same as alchemy. We also have the narrations of Imam Sadiq (AS) and we have Jabir ibn Hayyan. These are needs that we have; the science of physics, the science of chemistry, and geography… have existed, but later they became organized. Mankind creates these sciences according to its needs. It is not an invention that happens by sitting and inventing. The needs of individuals create this. Ophthalmology is a field that… for example, in our Malayer—may God have mercy on him—Dr. Rastan was a heart surgeon whose father was an ophthalmologist. In Borujerd, they would even bring him for Mr. Boroujerdi; he would perform both hernia and eye surgery. These specializations were not separate. Now, just in the specialty of the eye, you have dozens of fields. Why? Experience has developed mankind and the work of man. We have the same in economics.

The Revelatory Backing of a School of Thought Does Not Mean It Is Irrational

My point is that instead of saying we have this specific economic school of thought in Islam, [we should say] the school of thought that we have has divine and revelatory backing, we believe in the text, and we do not believe that the Imam must tell us all the subjects. We have a power in jurisprudence. We have a dynamic power that all these subjects that exist, with criteria, according to his statement, are with us, the jurists of principles; because the literalists here cannot move much this way or that. We who are jurists of principles, with those criteria with which we derive, we can find a ruling for these subjects and be responsive.

Moderator: Thank you. My understanding of your remarks was that the connection with or benefit from a science does not mean the endorsement of the ideology that lies behind it, and you do not deny this ideology, and I think the point you made about referring to rational people, that ideological backing that exists among rational people is what you have in mind. Please, you may speak.

Khosropanah: Allow me not to enter the discussion of the justification of the Islamicity of Islamic philosophy, which requires another discussion. In the history of philosophy, we have had al-Farabi, who in any case had a political philosophy, and Khwaja Nasir and others. It was pursued until Mulla Sadra in Shawāhid al-Rubūbiyyah, in the fifth witness, on divine manifestations, discusses the matter of politics and sharia at length, and it is precisely a critique of secularism in the modern sense of the word. But Mulla Sadra’s concern, as he has in his commentary on the metaphysics of al-Shifā’, is, he says: “Kitābunā al-kabīr al-musammā bi-al-asfār wa huwa arba’at mujalladāt kulluhā fī al-ilāhiyyāt” (Our great book called al-Asfār, which is four volumes, all of them on metaphysics). These discussions must be left for another opportunity so we may benefit from your presence.

Islamic Economics Does Not Mean Text-Centrism

That we said we have an Islamic school of economics does not mean we do not accept rational people and reason, or that we are text-centric. Just as we do not accept reason-sufficiency, meaning subjectivism, we also do not accept text-sufficiency. Therefore, you correctly stated that reason is the inner proof. Therefore, the words of some individuals that everything must be derived from the texts, and even Islamic medicine and experience are suspended and reason is suspended, does not fit with our disposition, and certainly does not fit with the disposition of authentic scholars and even the Ahl al-Bayt, because they too recommend referring to the experience of rational people. These are outside our discussion, and in my opinion, we should not bring them in now. Twenty years ago, a draft of mine was printed called “Mankind’s Expectations of Religion.” There I explained it in detail. At the beginning of this discussion, I also explained that the science of economics is not currently under discussion, but the school of economics is. Another important point is that before the revolution, the elites were influenced by Marxist-socialist thoughts; for example, the late Shariati was influenced by socialism.

Alavi Boroujerdi: He was a follower of the late Nakhshab; the Socialist God-Worshippers. Many great figures were too.

Khosropanah: In his youth, he was initially a supporter of Nakhshab and later was very influenced by the Frankfurt School. At that time, Marcuse was prominent. If you pay attention to his works, he was severely critical of Marxism, but he was a supporter of socialism. My intention is to emphasize this point, that the same situation is not repeated in our time; meaning before the revolution, a group of elites were influenced by Marxism or socialism because it was prevalent. Now that the capitalist system has dominance in the world, let’s be careful not to be influenced and not to have the same wrong experience of before the revolution in another way.

Islam Is Not Opposed to Capitalism

My discussion was not that Islam is opposed to capital and investment. When we accept economic freedom in Islam, it means we also accept investment. But capitalism and capitalism, no. You cannot say I accept capitalism but I do not accept its philosophical background. Is it in my hands and yours to be able to say I accept this and I don’t accept that? Like someone who says I accept Mulla Sadra’s substantial motion, but I do not accept the primacy of existence. Or for example, I accept the narration of Imam Sadiq (AS) but I do not accept his Imamate. When you say the narration of Imam Sadiq (AS), it means you have accepted his Imamate. Therefore, capitalism and this “ism” are different from capital. Yes, Islam permits economic work and freedom of economy and private ownership. It is possible that Haj Agha’s emphasis is on this, that we must give value to private ownership in our own society, which is another discussion and is related to the economic sociology of Iran and is separate. But from a jurisprudential perspective, what we understand from jurisprudence, especially from Sheikh Ansari and other great scholars, is that Islam accepts both private ownership and public ownership, and also state ownership. And in the causes of private ownership, as you are aware and we are just reviewing: some are primary causes, like acquisition (ḥiyāzah) and labor; some are transferential with voluntary causes, like contracts and unilateral acts; and some are transferential with coercive causes, like inheritance, apostasy, and the threshold for khums and zakat. In state ownership, which is the Imamate and sovereignty, we have fay’ and anfāl. In public and shared ownership, we have conquered lands (arāḍī maftūḥah ‘anwatan).

Being Islamic Does Not Mean Being Constitutive

Your honor says these also had rational roots; the question is, did the sacred Lawgiver not correct them in places? Did he not repudiate them in places? In any case, there were transactions like for wine and… which he forbade. In one place, there is non-repudiation, and in one place, there is approbation. Here there are several principles of jurisprudence (usuli) branches; because the discussion of the practice of rational people is an usuli discussion, but unfortunately, our scholars of principles have not discussed it much. They have discussed it sporadically. The practice of rational people as rational people has many numerous branches. One branch is that the rational practice that exists in the era of the Infallible and the Infallible has explicitly endorsed it, this is known and has an Islamic attribution and is without issue. Meaning there is no obstacle for us to consider the discussion of acquisition as Islamic, even if it has a rational root, even if it is an approbation of the Lawgiver. Meaning the Islamicity of a ruling is not in the ruling being constitutive; it is also in the ruling being approbatory. Unless someone defines Islamicity by constitutiveness [and says] that which is non-constitutive and approbatory, I do not consider it Islamic at all; I don’t say anti-Islamic, but it is not Islamic either. I do not accept this. I believe that which is the established practice of rational people, the Lawgiver has either explicitly endorsed with a narration or with a question and answer, or has endorsed it absolutely or with correction and amendment; because sometimes over time, rational people have also found deviations, and the Imam corrects them. All of these are Islamic.

Sometimes in the era of the Infallible, there is a rational practice that the Lawgiver has not approved and has not repudiated either. Here, some scholars of principles believe that non-repudiation is sufficient, and this suffices for Islamicity. The next branch is if it is a rational practice after the Infallible—which is termed as a newly-arisen rational practice (sīrah ‘uqalā’iyyah mustaḥdathah)—this is a very serious discussion. This practice, now that we are in the era of the occultation of the Infallible and do not have the success of being in his presence, can we discover non-repudiation—if we consider it sufficient? My belief is this: in the advanced discussion of the principles of jurisprudence of the guardianship system that I have, I reached this conclusion that we must go to the maxims. If we can, based on a maxim, confirm an approbation or non-repudiation, this newly-arisen rational practice is acceptable, otherwise no. Even sometimes, we understand non-repudiation or non-approbation from the maxims.

For example, now among the rational people of the world, shaking hands between a non-mahram man and woman exists, and rational people have accepted it. We, when we travel abroad and meet with elites, we do not shake hands and respectfully put our hand on our chest. As soon as they realize we are Muslims, they immediately use the expression “I’m sorry.” They apologize that they were not aware. Meaning not only do they not get upset, but they are completely understanding. But this rational practice exists there, which is not endorsed by the Lawgiver, and he repudiates it. Now someone [might] say no, because now rational people bring alcoholic drinks to gatherings and so on… for example, we have been to the Vatican many times, or some other countries…

Alavi Boroujerdi: These are behaviors, not established practices (banā).

The Difference Between Reason, Rational People, and Rationality

Khosropanah: The practice of rational people is different from the ingrained dispositions of rational people (irtikāzāt al-‘uqalā’). I apologize. The ingrained dispositions of rational people are a mental matter, and it is a practice (sīrah) when it finds behavioral objectivity. If it does not find behavioral objectivity, it is not the practice of rational people; it becomes the ingrained dispositions of rational people. The origin of the practice of rational people may be the ingrained dispositions of rational people, or it may not be ingrained dispositions but habits, the order of a ruler, or laws. Now in France recently they have permitted marriage with maharim or homosexuality.

My point is that one must distinguish between reason, rational people, and rationality. These equivalents may not be precise in our language. Westerners call reason “Reason” and when they use rationality, they say “Rationality.” These are different. The inner proof is reason, not rationality. Yes, rational people as they are rational, if it is a rational practice that has appeared in behavior and its origin is reason as it is reason, it is certainly an authoritative proof. But discovering this matter, this is the point of contention. For example, you say rational people in the discussion of transactions… you know that now northern Europe is socialist, not Marxist. Meaning Sweden, Denmark, Finland, and Norway, the very type of their economic governance is different from the model of England, America, and Canada. Now my question is this, if here, as a jurist, you want to say that it is the practice of rational people, and then you add non-repudiation to it and give a ruling, [which one do you take as the basis?]. My point is that in these economic spheres, it is not rational people as they are rational; rational people as they are socialists have one practice, they have one set of rational ingrained dispositions, and the origin of many rational practices is habits and ideologies. In America, England, and Canada, it is another way. Which one should we take as the subject for the ruling of permissibility? It is here that I say when discussing the practice of rational people, let’s not quickly say the practice of rational people as they are rational. Yes, in the major premise of the discussion, we have no disagreement; rational people as they are rational, whose origin is reason as it is reason, is not at all a matter of discussion. Rational people as they are rational, whose origin is habit or anything else, is a matter of discussion. I even say that if the origin of rational people as they are rational is reason as it is reason, the approbation of the Lawgiver is not even necessary, and it is a religious proof. Why? Based on the rational entailment, because the rational entailment makes its authoritativeness correct, and we do not need approbation or non-repudiation at all. But if the origin of rational people as they are rational is not reason as it is reason, here approbation or non-repudiation is needed. And in our time, when we have newly-arisen rational practices, we must see if it is rational people as they are socialists, as they are capitalists, and it should be examined. There is no problem at all. It is possible that after examining the correspondence of jurisprudential maxims, in one place we endorse the words of the socialists and in one place we endorse the words of the capitalists in that part, and its meaning, in your words, is not that we have accepted capitalism with its philosophical foundations. Because here we have endorsed its permissibility with a jurisprudential criterion, but when we have endorsed its permissibility with a jurisprudential criterion, we have accepted its Islamicity, even if it has a rational origin. Like many of the practices that existed in the era of the Prophet and the Infallible, and the Lawgiver also approved them, and the approbation or non-repudiation explains its Islamicity.

Dimensions of the Islamic School of Economics

In this sense, we say the Islamic school of economics, and really, [it would be good] if there is an opportunity and we enter the discussion in more detail; meaning both in the discussion of economic freedom, and in the discussion of economic justice, and in the discussion of economic ownership, and in the discussion of the economic state, and in the discussion of economic production, distribution, and consumption. This same Friedman you mentioned has a consumption function theory. Sometimes the consumption function theory goes to the science of economics, and in the science of economics, it is based on the discovery of an empirical relationship like supply and demand, which is not our point of discussion. But sometimes a “should” and “should not” comes out of the consumption function and becomes a result; there, we must measure it with the criterion of the Sharia, which you certainly also endorse.

Therefore, with the foundation of the practice of rational people that is endorsed by the principles of jurisprudence, with the explanations I presented to you, with these foundations, Islamicity is also endorsed, and we can, in another opportunity, discuss economic freedom, the economic state, economic production, distribution, and consumption, economic justice, and economic ownership, each separately. It needs an independent discussion to make it clear that economic ownership in Islam is different from economic ownership in socialism and capitalism and other ideologies. [Also] freedom and the state and so on, which are all the same.

My last point; because I have a great devotion to the late Ayatollah Boroujerdi and have really benefited from his jurisprudential method, and in my opinion, one of the best methods of ijtihad for social jurisprudence is his method. I have his picture in my library alongside the pictures of my teachers, and I am always mindful of him and have benefited from his works. In this very book, Al-Badr al-Zāhir, which is one of the best transcriptions of his discussions on prayer, he has a phrase: “Al-Rābi’: qad talakhkhaṣa mimmā dhakarnāh: 1. an-nā lanā ḥawā’ij ijtimā’iyyah takūn min waẓā’if sā’is al-ijtimā’ wa qā’idih. 2. wa an-nā al-diyānah al-muqaddasah al-islāmiyyah ayḍan lam yuhmil hādhihi al-umūr bal ihtamma bihā ashadd al-ihtimām...” (Fourth: It has been summarized from what we mentioned: 1. That we have social needs which are from the functions of the administrator of society and its leader. 2. And that the sacred Islamic religion also did not neglect these matters but paid the utmost attention to them…). My point of evidence is this: “…wa sharra’at (ya’nī al-diyyānah al-muqaddasah al-islāmiyyah) bi-liḥāẓihā aḥkāmahā kathīrah wa fawwaḍat ijrā’ahā ilā sā’is al-muslimīn” (…and it legislated (meaning the sacred Islamic religion) in consideration of them many of its rulings and delegated their implementation to the administrator of the Muslims). Meaning it has legislated, now legislation is either by way of being constitutive or legislation is by way of being approbatory; legislation should not only be taken as a constitutive discussion. Therefore, describing the economic school of thought as Islamic has a completely principled and jurisprudential basis.

Moderator: Thank you. I think the discussion is still about this, that rational people as they are rational… Yes, please go ahead.

The Practice of Rational People Means a Foundation with a Rational Root

Alavi Boroujerdi: We are not at all concerned with the issue of capitalism. What we are talking about is [that] there may be commonalities in some aspects between us and some schools of thought. This is no reason for devotion to those schools of thought; however, this is not my point. Regarding the practice (sīrah) that you said is the ingrained disposition of rational people (irtikāz ‘uqalā’), this itself is an independent story. We consider the ingrained dispositions of rational people to be an authoritative proof, but practice, we say, is a practical foundation. A practical foundation means the work they do, and they do it based on their reason as well. Now, the difference between reason and rationality; because in our view, rationality means the application of that reason. Now, another conception of this rationality is another story. The rationality that we discuss in principles means that by applying reason, they make foundations, and the foundations are for their system of livelihood, meaning here the customs and traditions of different nations are not the practice of rational people. The main methods, meaning the rational foundation, is that man must interact with others, have relations with others, and collective life is not possible without interaction. Now, this interaction and warmth is with shaking hands, or in France with kissing, among Indians the hands make a special movement; these are customs and traditions and not a practice. Rational people have this practice that in interactions, one must give value to individuals. We are social beings and must interact with individuals. Many customs and traditions have no relation to the practice, because they are not in the system of livelihood. The system of livelihood means the practical principles that guarantee the durability of society. This is a practice and a foundation; otherwise, customs are different, and for example, in food customs, clothing customs, and then sometimes unseemly practices and customs, like the people of Lot, this is no longer a practice, it is an unseemly habit. Homosexuality, which we equate with homosexual acts, of course, is another story. In general, this issue of homosexuality, whether it really has a rational root, is the very point of contention. Meaning in the foundation-building of society, those who come to lay the practical practice in society, does the marriage of two men have a place? They themselves, and even the church that has accepted it, have had and have a disaster. In societies too, it has problems, and even in America, it has not been accepted in that way.

Therefore, the practice that we are talking about is that rational foundation in the realm of action that must have a rational root, which is the inner proof, and is for the durability of the rational system, which is the system of their society. In our view, this is the practice. The practice of rational people is this. Now, sometimes we may face different practices; for example, northern Europe that you mentioned, here we have no problem that with respect to two economic methods in two practices, according to our own method, we use non-repudiation for both from our maxims.

Khosropanah: Meaning both of them? That is a conjunction of opposites!

Alavi Boroujerdi: Of course, not in opposites, in a place where they can be combined. Because these are methods. When they negate each other, of course, it is not possible. But suppose there is a method that fixes this inflation with a formula…

Khosropanah: Haj Agha, this is the science of economics…

The Challenge of Subject-Matter Identification

Alavi Boroujerdi: Yes, we consider the science of economics to be rational too, because rational people have made it. Here there is one or two methods, but the issue is that we also refer to our own intellects. A jurist in the chapter of identifying the subject… because one of the calamities we have in jurisprudence and are now struggling with is subject-matter identification, where we have a fundamental problem; in political matters, and in social matters. This very sentence you quoted from Mr. Boroujerdi, yes, the Sharia legislates, but the Sharia legislates the ruling, not the subject. We are stuck in the subject, for example, in medical subjects. For example, I myself was stuck in the discussion of menopause (yā’isah). In the words of all our scholars, it is mentioned between fifty and sixty, and we have a narration. Here, is this statement the criterion, or is it a reality that existed among these women in that race? The science of medicine has another story and says menopause is when this ovarian cell does not secrete, and if it does not, menopause occurs, and if it continues for seven or eight months, it is over. This may happen at forty or forty-five years of age; races are different, nutrition is different, climate is different. What we see between fifty and sixty was common in the Arabian Peninsula, and even Sayyidah women are an exception here, the Quraysh for example. It may be different in different races.

Here, what should we do with the subject of menopause? With pure submission to narrations, or should we also place our own understanding alongside it and say this is a specialized opinion? Although the Lawgiver’s opinion is also correct, the Lawgiver has said what people asked him, and he has spoken about that region. Therefore, this subject is an issue. It is the same in economics. Here, rational people follow different methods. It is the same now. We must diagnose these methods in the aspect where we want the subject. We must have a measurement among these. Therefore, our problem is that our jurist today must know those economic rules. We now give rulings about banks and interest… [without] knowing what interest is, or knowing that interest is different from usury (riba). I, as a jurist, if I want to bring the ruling of the Sharia, the subject must be clarified. In this aspect, we are stuck in many cases.

I see no problem that whatever has passed through the Sharia is approbatory or constitutive, but our discussion is that what the Sharia itself has brought… because a science or a school of thought means it has brought something that others had not brought. This is, so to speak, the apparent meaning of the matter.

Khosropanah: No, this is not the apparent meaning of the matter, and it is not so anywhere in the world. Maktab is a translation of “School.”

Alavi Boroujerdi: Now, allow me! Maktab is “School,” here it is a specific method. In any case, this socialist school of thought and the capitalist school of thought are two methods. Here, socialism itself was brought by individuals who, previously, the capitalists had not said these things. They had not said them.

Khosropanah: But many other schools of thought said it; for example, Plato said it.

The Difference Between Approbatory and Constitutive Rulings

Alavi Boroujerdi: We have a theory of primitive communism. We even have it among ourselves. Let’s consider those specific cases. Yes, this thought emerged that we should make this ownership broad and public. We are not concerned with these. We are [concerned with] those main schools of thought that were present. This school of thought has brought something itself. If a matter here has a rational root, it is approved, and its Islamicity is by way of approbation, there is no problem with it, and therefore we, as a jurist in jurisprudence, apply our ruling to this subject; this rational subject, which has no problem at all. In this sense, economic jurisprudence emerges, and economic rulings are created. But that here we have a school of thought in opposition to other schools of thought and an independent school of thought, of course, in speaking there is no problem, and we also used to boast and say the Islamic school of economics. Observe that its consequence is that if we say a school of thought, for all the actions and interactions and problems that arise, we must foresee a way. We must have a way. Based on these approbations or non-repudiations, can these ways be foreseen in problems or not? As Islamic economics, even as a school of thought, can we present it? In that case, that discussion of today’s external reality arises, and that economy that we have today, like today’s banks.

If we say about the school of thought that approbation is also accepted and has been accepted by the Sharia and therefore is accepted, we also understand it. And therefore, its difference is that in the ruling of the Sharia in constitutive rulings, for the limits of the ruling, we refer to the Lawgiver himself, but in approbatory rulings, to understand the ruling, we must refer to those limits that are among rational people, and therefore, its ups and downs are not in the hands of the Sharia, they are in the hands of rational people. The Sharia has accepted it. To what extent was this acceptance of the Sharia? It requires that same derivation that we must diagnose with maxims and means. Therefore, if we present it as a school of thought, we must have something to say in all fields. Meaning we must enter into economic schools of thought and we too, according to the foundation of faith, present a plan. As you said, it has a philosophical background and an ideological and creedal background that we ourselves have; based on faith, we present a plan. Like us, who have a divine ideology, they exist among the economists of the world, and we speak, and we present this plan of ours among them; there is no problem. It becomes like philosophy. In philosophy, we presented the foundations to the world. Henri Corbin did not come here and to Allamah Tabataba’i and Sayyid Abulhasan Rafi’i for Greek philosophy. They themselves had things to say in philosophy. They had given this philosophy a perfection that they felt themselves in need of coming here and studying. Or that you say we have worked, but it is not as vast as theirs; the European form of philosophy today is not like our philosophy and is completely different. The basis there has become different. The form is preserved with us, and we have entered into some works; for example, we have entered into these limited social philosophies: the philosophy of cities and the management of cities, but we have not entered very strongly. Sometimes our great scholars have entered, which is good, but philosophy in Europe has expanded in another way and has been according to different sciences. Meaning they saw that for every science that exists, we must see the philosophy behind it, and in this way, a philosophy is formed. Philosophy of mathematics was not something among us, but it was formed there.

Our point is this: when attributing, is it the duty of the Sharia to present all the sciences that the people and followers need to them? Is this work necessary? Is this the work of the Sharia? Meaning the Messenger of God, who was sent in Medina, was there an economic problem that the Prophet came to solve? Or did the economy of Medina find a fundamental difference from the economy that was in Mecca? It was the same trade journeys that they went on, and later when they came to Medina too, we have it that Abd al-Rahman ibn Awf, whom the Prophet recommended to one of the Ansar, came to help; he said, “Show me the way to the market, and I don’t want any help.” He was naked, and they had taken his clothes in Mecca. He fell into the work of the market. In Surah al-Jumu’ah, it also comes that “and they left you standing“; that at the time of the Friday prayer, the caravan arrived, and all the people left the Prophet (PBUH) and went.

This happened. Did this method have a difference from that method? The principles were one. Yes, the Sharia guides more towards fairness. The Sharia guides towards being considerate of the other party: aqālahu Allāh (may God cancel his [bad deal]). We have many of these guidance-based rulings. But do these create a school of thought? You say a system or a method; in the end, we have a method, but in those fundamental principles, meaning competition, Islam accepts the principle of competition. It accepts the principle that we do not have price-setting. It accepts those narrations of the Prophet and other narrations. That if someone had capital, has paid khums and zakat, and has a lot of money, can we, as a primary ruling, take his money? The same story of “no harm and no causing of harm.” The Prophet tries so hard, “I will give you a hundred trees in paradise, and I will give them here.” The Prophet says these things. Therefore, we have an issue here that the existing and common methods in the world also have a problem with this issue and act more harshly than Islam. In America, for capital and income, when it goes above a certain level, they put a seventy or eighty percent tax. We do not have this tax. As a primary ruling, we do not have such a thing in Islam. There, they say that this income you had from production, if you invested it and did not put it in the bank to consume, the investment is exempt from tax, and therefore they have created another method where they practically make the capitalist their own worker and wage-earner; so that he does not pay tax, as long as he lives, he must create employment and create production, which is also to the benefit of the country. They have these meanings, whereas we do not have them and we cannot necessarily have them.

If we want to moderate this wealth, we must use secondary injunctions. There is no problem that we impose a tax on gatherings, but what does the principle of the Sharia have to say here? Therefore, we see that in Islam, this meaning exists, that he who has a lot of capital, if he wants to have a shade over his head on the Day of Resurrection, he must pay attention to endowments (awqāf) and do good works. Therefore, the Sharia, based on another foundation, is influential in these cases. The method of the Sharia is different from their method. But this is no longer economics; it is ethics. This goes back to that guidance aspect that the Sharia has.

Moderator: In continuation of the honorable professor’s remarks and the final part of his talk, this independent discussion was raised, whether Islam should have all these things at all, which itself needs an independent discussion. If you see fit, let’s pursue that same discussion of rational people, and given that it has been 95 minutes since we started the session, please provide a summary in two or three five-minute intervals.

Khosropanah: I wish we had used a method at the beginning of the discussion and first specified our own conception of school of thought, science, and other terms. Based on my understanding of Haj Agha’s words, it seems a school of thought in his view means the science of what was and what will be, and the solution to all economic problems must be in the school of thought. Meaning wherever there is a problem…

Alavi Boroujerdi: It should answer the main necessary principles.

Economic School of Thought, in Contrast to Philosophy of Economics, Jurisprudence of Economics, and Law of Economics

Khosropanah: An economic school of thought has a specific definition that is neither philosophy of economics, nor jurisprudence of economics, nor law of economics, nor science, nor ethics of economics; it is none of these, because each of these has its own specific methodology. If a few principles and goals are determined, it becomes an economic school of thought. For example, does Islam accept the primacy of economic freedom or not? Does it accept ownership or not? What is Islam’s view on production, distribution, and consumption? What is Islam’s view on economic justice and the goals of the economy? These very explanations of yours, that Islam permits this and does not permit that, in reality, this is the school of thought.

These discussions are new discussions, and there is no problem with it; at one time there was no science of theology, then it was formed. At one time the science of jurisprudence had a limitation, and then the late Muhaqqiq came and from Purity to Blood Money, he expanded jurisprudence. The very art of Shi’ism is that it constantly, with the method of ijtihad, develops these sciences and creates dynamism. Therefore, the school of thought that Shahid al-Sadr speaks of is extracted from jurisprudence. Exactly the school of thought that is in Shahid al-Sadr’s Iqtisaduna, which has the title of Islamic economics and is in opposition to capitalism and Marxism and communism, is extracted from jurisprudence. Meaning if someone accepts the jurisprudence of economics, which here is not a point of contention, we certainly accept the school of thought, because the school of thought is extracted from jurisprudence. But many of the discussions and challenges are about the science of economics, and I also accept that one of our great weaknesses is in the science of economics. And the science of economics, as far as I have studied in the human sciences, is not such that it is one science; meaning it is one science whose paradigms are different. The positivist paradigm has one sociology, and the interpretive paradigm has one sociology, and the combined paradigm also has another sociology. Therefore, the sociology of Giddens and Weber and Auguste Comte is different. Meaning we do not have a discipline called sociology and economics. These are other discussions. Now we were talking in the economic school of thought, that with the explanations provided, it seems your honor accepts this much, that Islam has something to say about economic freedom; now approbatory, non-repudiation, or constitutive. About economic justice, consumption, permissible and forbidden [it has something to say], which shows Islam’s specific view.

Alavi Boroujerdi: [About] the sale of impure things, it has specific rulings. We accept. It makes the explanation correct; in the sense of a thought whose consequences are that it is also responsive in some other places, can we [have it]?

Khosropanah: Responsive in what? In the questions of science? We do not intend to enter into the economy of Iran now, but one of the causes of Iran’s backwardness in economics is that the economics of Chicago and Friedman and classical and neoclassical is not responsive to Iran. This does not mean not using their experiences.

Alavi Boroujerdi: We must act according to our own characteristics and needs. Yes, that’s correct. Some things are not implementable here.

Khosropanah: The Iranian people themselves have characteristics in production, consumption, and work that are not applicable, and we have not worked on this. Meaning the weakness of our universities is that they teach the same economic sciences and different economic paradigms of the world. For example, at Sharif University, neoclassical economics is taught; at the University of Tehran, classical. Then the trained student and professor cannot handle the existing problem, and cannot predict inflation and the stock market, because the research is not in light of the Iranian human being, and science is in light of fact, and not in light of values. Science is in light of external realities, and the external reality of Iran must be known so that it can diagnose economic relationships. This has no relation to the school of economics. It is related to the science of economics. I completely accept your statements that we have a serious deficiency here.

Alavi Boroujerdi: I have a point, I have a request for all viewers and listeners; when we say something and a three-minute clip is made of it, it is not necessary to judge that same three minutes. We, of course, have no problem with insults and harshness; if it is from the seminary, they are our own children, which is no problem at all. But our request is that the entire matter be heard and then judged. Another point is that Islam has a richness. We have an extraordinary foundation and a huge heritage in our narrations and great scholars who have preserved this heritage for us. Even for preserving these narrations, from a rijali perspective and for correcting these narrations, we have many differences with the late Mr. Khoei. We have a huge narrative heritage, and in the discussion of economics too. In our opinion, this makes us self-sufficient so that we can [extract] the subjects needed and compatible with society. That point you made is very important; the formula that has created growth in Europe does not necessarily create growth for us here. The characteristics here must be known. Our own rational people, with these methods and these characteristics that are in Iranian consumption and production, must be considered. We can apply these approbatory or constitutive rulings. Our hands are open, but as I said, we have a serious problem in diagnosing the subject in jurisprudence. We have a fundamental problem.

Khosropanah: It has its own method; meaning the method of deriving a ruling is different from the method of identifying a subject.

Alavi Boroujerdi: Excellent. Like inheritance, where until we know mathematics and division by proportion, it is not at all possible to enter. It is the same in other places. We, regarding women’s issues, [like] menstruation and postpartum bleeding, have a strange calamity. Sometimes they curse us and say you in the seminaries only work on the rulings of menstruation and postpartum bleeding, but even this has not been solved for us. The subject is important for us; therefore, in the seminary, we need subject-matter identification; in the jurisprudential chapters, in identifying the subject, and identifying the things that lead us to the subject. It is a skill in itself that makes jurisprudence [difficult] for us; in our era, which is an era of multiple and different views and which is progressing. For example, this same science of economics grows and progresses daily. Unfortunately, we are behind the caravan, because it grows very quickly and they do research. We must be up-to-date. Our jurisprudence needs this.

Khosropanah: A supplement to your statement: the subject is not only the actions of the legally responsible person that jurisprudence deals with; it is also entities, as you know. The third case has been formed in this modern world, and that is structures; meaning for example the structure of a bank, insurance, social security, which are neither entities nor actions. The works related to it are actions, but this structure itself is a jurisprudential subject. Therefore, the discussion of subject-matter identification that you correctly stated requires its own specific method; both subjects that are of the type of action, and subjects that are of the type of entity, and also subjects that are of the type of structure, all three must be examined.

Alavi Boroujerdi: Sometimes in this very subject of banks, we encounter strange and bizarre fatwas.

Moderator: Let me also summarize; two points were instructive for me, that God willing, this dialogue will be a new opening, because the subject is very extensive and has different angles. God willing, the scholars of the seminary and the academics, after this dialogue, will each take the points raised as a basis for discussion and dialogue. Of course, considering all the statements of the professors, and God willing, future dialogues will take place based on this very discussion. The next point was an ethical lesson for me from both of the great figures who participated in this session.

Alavi Boroujerdi: It is never too late to learn, and man is exposed to error and may make a mistake. When he understands this, he must go back on his word, and criticism is a necessity of discussion. In the West, it is more established. If a book is not critiqued, it means it was not successful and no attention was paid to it. A film needs critique. Critique is a sign of attention, and a correct critique is also pleasing, because it raises our own understanding.

Source: Rasa News Agency.

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