Introduction: A scholarly-promotional session on the topic of “The Definition and Method of the Economic Madhhab (School of Thought) of Islam” was held virtually on Saturday, November 27, 2021, by the Economics Department of the Research Center for Islamic Systems at the Islamic Culture and Thought Research Institute. In this session, which was moderated by Hujjat al-Islam wal-Muslimin Ahmad Ali Yousefi, Hujjat al-Islam wal-Muslimin Dr. Sayyed Hossein Mirmoezzi presented the discussion. The critics of this session were Hujjat al-Islam wal-Muslimin Dr. Gholamreza Mesbahi Moghaddam and Hujjat al-Islam wal-Muslimin Dr. Majid Rezaei Davani. A detailed report of this session follows for your review:
Hujjat al-Islam Dr. Ahmad Ali Yousefi (Scientific Moderator): Mr. Mirmoezzi has been engaged in research, writing, and lecturing on the philosophy of economics for many years and is one of the experts in this field. One of the discussions in the philosophy of economics is the very existence of an Islamic economic madhhab, its nature, and its method of discovery. Today, he will present the discussion on the definition and method of discovering the economic madhhab of Islam with a look at the theories of Martyr al-Sadr.
Hujjat al-Islam Dr. Sayyed Hossein Mirmoezzi (Presenter): Regarding the concept, definition, and method of discovering the madhhab, I have presented points in two parts: one part on definition and the other on method.
Definition of the Economic Madhhab of Islam
First, in the definition from the great martyr, the late Sadr, I gathered his expressions of madhhab from various places in his books and arrived at a final definition. My understanding of the said definition is that the economic madhhab of Islam consists of the principles of the method for regulating economic life to solve economic problems from an Islamic perspective, which must be in relation to the concept of social justice from an Islamic perspective, is discovered from Islamic sources, and has two parts: fixed and variable.
I critiqued the said definition and presented four objections. That the principles of the madhhab must be in relation to social justice and they did not consider other goals, and of course, his definition of an economic madhhab is general and does not define the economic madhhab of Islam.
The main objection is that you confine the principles only to social justice, which is a point of discussion and objection. Economic security and growth, which are discussed alongside social justice, also exist, and the principles that are in line with solving problems, meaning achieving goals, and the principles that are relevant for achieving goals must be mentioned in the madhhab and not be confined to social justice. Of course, here I have anticipated the refutation of the objection, that someone might say Martyr al-Sadr’s meaning of social justice is a broad meaning that also includes security and growth. I referred to his own statements that the social justice he has in mind is that same distributive justice which he explained in the two parts of conflict (tazāḥum) and social solidarity (takāful), and therefore if we see this meaning and all the principles he has in the structure of his economic books, distribution before, during, after, and redistribution after production are organized, and this objection is not valid.
Another discussion is that he specifies that the principles of the madhhab are for solving economic problems, and he says that our problems are of two types: injustice (ẓulm) and ingratitude for blessings (kufrān ni’mah), which he defines injustice as maldistribution and ingratitude for blessings as laxity in exploiting nature. I surmise that he was neglectful of the sphere of consumption and his focus was more on the sphere of production and distribution, because interpreting ingratitude for blessings as laxity in exploiting nature is more related to production, and the consumption part is not seen in it, whereas one of the instances of ingratitude for blessings is the discussion of not consuming correctly, and our most important problems, especially in economics, wastefulness, etc., for which many rulings have been stated in Islam, and as a rule, we must extract general principles for this issue. Therefore, the definition must be in light of all spheres. Hence, he indicated that the madhhab has two fixed and variable parts, and this is a point of discussion, that if the madhhab states the principles of the method of discovery, then it is not divisible into fixed and variable. And he himself did not say in the madhhab what the variable principles are, and only stated the fixed principles. So this is also one of the problems.
The next discussion, which is also important in a way in system-building, is that he saw the discussion of the economic madhhab as the foundation of economic and financial law and, in reality, the legal rulings that are related to the financial relationships between individuals, people, and the government, and vice versa, he saw it as its foundation. And the principles he extracts are also related to this part, and this discussion arises: does ethics not have a role in solving the problems of the country and societies? Meaning, do we not have ethical methodological principles for solving economic problems, and how did he only take jurisprudential rulings as the criterion and extract the principles of the madhhab from the heart of jurisprudential rulings?
It is clear that in any case, if ethics is not more important than jurisprudence in solving problems, it is not less. Someone might say jurisprudence includes obligatory, recommended, discouraged, and other rulings, and ethics is seen in the recommended rulings and such. This statement, first, is different in the definition of ethics, and second, he has seen the recommended rulings within the “zone of permissibility” (minṭaqat al-farāgh) and has extracted the economic madhhab from declaratory and obligatory rulings. It might be said that from his words, this is understood, that he divides all Islamic data into ethics, concepts, and feelings and emotions, and then says that feelings and emotions, which are close to ethics, are in a way the foundation of jurisprudential rulings and through them are effective in solving problems. Whereas this is questionable, that it is not so, and organizing the motivations, emotions, traits, and faculties of man, based on which he regulates his actions and relationships with himself, God, and others, this is directly effective in organizing and solving the problems of the system. These were the problems I mentioned in the chapter on definition.
Of course, I also examined the definitions after Martyr al-Sadr, and in the end, I myself arrived at this definition: “The economic madhhab of Islam consists of the general and fixed rules that are derived from the sources of derivation and are the foundation of the economic jurisprudence and ethics of Islam, and have been established for regulating economic relations in the three spheres of production, distribution, and consumption in order to solve problems and achieve economic goals.”
Method of Discovering the Economic Madhhab of Islam
On the method of discovering the economic madhhab of Islam, Martyr al-Sadr has a detailed discussion on method, which I have explained in detail in the article. In 5 axes: the relationship between the madhhab, civil law, and the financial system, which he sees as a base-superstructure relationship between them; the discussion of the operation between discovery and codification, that the difference between us and others is that we must discover, and others codify. The discussion of the ways of discovering the principles of the madhhab, for which he states two ways: one is texts, meaning a text that explicitly states a principle of the school, and the other is through rulings, which are the superstructure. He has another axis, that our main path is moving from the superstructure to the base and moving from rulings to principles. That they say we do not have texts, so we cannot enter this discussion through this path, and then when they intend to reach principles through rulings, the discussion of ijtihad comes up, and he explains ijtihad and mentions the danger of the interference of the jurist’s inherent characteristics in the method of derivation, which of course I have explained. The discussion of mixing theoretical and applied descriptive texts, and he has said that we must extract the principles of the madhhab through the theoretical descriptive way, so that the applied does not mislead us. What I am focused on is that he says because ijtihad is fallible, it is possible that different jurists, when they refer to the verses and narrations for deriving religious rulings—let’s assume we have two types of derivation: one is the derivation of religious rulings and the next is the derivation of principles from rulings—and he says in the first derivation, because the jurist has error and the possibility of error exists, therefore different jurists have different derivations. Therefore, the collection of rulings that each jurist arrives at differs from a similar case, so the principles of the madhhab in the second ijtihad differ from the principles of the madhhab of another jurist. And therefore, at the stage of thubūt (reality), although we do not have more than one madhhab, at the stage of discovery, derivation, and proof, we may face multiple madhhabs by multiple jurists. Of course, he says that this is not a problem, and he who wants to implement this madhhab, his hands are open, because the reality is spread among these ijtihads, and all of them, because the method of ijtihad has been observed in them, are authoritative proofs. And therefore, they can implement the principles that they diagnose as more effective. We have no problem up to here.
The Possibility of Deriving the Principles of the Madhhab by a Jurist
He states a second point, and this is where I have an issue: a jurist, by citing his own fatwa, cannot derive a coherent set of principles of the madhhab. Why? Because all of the jurist’s fatwas are not in conformity with reality, due to the mentioned possibility of error. At the same time, Islam has said that jurists, if they observe the method of ijtihad, should derive in this way, and they have not committed a sin, and their error is also not considered a sin. Therefore, he certainly reaches a point where he extracts a principle from a number of rulings he has derived, and this extracted principle is not compatible with a number of rulings he has derived in the same chapter. He has a summary knowledge (‘ilm ijmālī), and it is that either these extracted principles (80%) are wrong, or the remaining principles (20%) that were extracted are wrong. This summary knowledge does not allow him to abandon the 20%, because he has derived it from the texts and has also observed the method of ijtihad, and therefore it is an authoritative proof. There is a probability, and therefore for this reason, he cannot abandon the rulings. Now what should he do? He takes the 20% and replaces it with another 20%. 20% from a jurist whose principles are similar and in conformity with his own 80%. Because he faced this problem, he was forced to say that we must extract the principle from different fatwas, and this very thing has led to the objection that this is not authoritative proof. And what kind of principle is this that you attribute to Islam, where is its authoritativeness? In the previous discussion, we were not looking for authoritativeness, because he who wanted to implement was in the process of choosing from among several economic madhhabs that several jurists had derived, which he can choose at the stage of implementation. But here the discussion is different, because he wants to [derive] a principle of the madhhab through 80% of my own fatwas and 20% of another’s fatwas that I might not accept at all, and therefore it is objected that this is not authoritative proof. Here we said that this matter has two problems: first, that you, by setting aside 20% and replacing it with another 20%, have corrected the form of the issue, otherwise the other 20% of fatwas had no involvement in the discovery of the principle, because this principle was derived from your own fatwa, and you replaced the other 20% that was not compatible with someone else’s. We should note that you did not go for this borrowing from the beginning, and therefore this is formal and had no effect on the derivation of the principle. So you derived the principle based on 80%.
The second point is that here there are not two probabilities but three probabilities: one, that these 20% of rulings that are contrary to the principle are wrong. The second probability is that this principle that was derived from 80%, and the second derivation, is wrong. And the third probability is that both are correct and valid, with this justification, that it is not so that all rulings in one chapter are written based on one principle (an affirmative justification), and it is possible there was another principle, and these 20% had preference in terms of conformity with the other principle, so they were written based on that principle. Meaning in the conflict of principles, that principle was more important, and the 20% was written based on it. And because in the derivation of the opposing 20%, you observed the method of ijtihad, and also for the principle extracted from 80%, therefore we consider the probability that both are correct. Because the probability of being contrary exists everywhere, and we do not have knowledge of the contrary, and we only have a probability. Therefore, the summary knowledge is broken based on the third probability, so the result is that a jurist can derive the principles of the madhhab based on his own fatwas.
The first case is that the majority of rulings are in conformity with his own principles, and that number of rulings that are not in conformity are so few that they are not worthy of attention, and in my opinion, there is no problem here. Another time is when the number of rulings from which the principle is derived is 80%, and 20% of the rulings are contrary, and here with the third probability, I say both were correct and this principle was correctly derived. One case remains, and that is that from 50%, one principle is extracted, and from 50%, another principle is extracted. It is here that we cannot trust this derivation, because they find a conflict with each other, and this conflict does not allow us to choose the correct and the invalid principle. And this brings two important innovations in this article: first, that the madhhab includes ethics, and ethical principles are seen as part of the principles of the madhhab, and system-building is done directly based on them to solve the country’s problems. Because if the principles of ethics go to the underlying layer of the principles of the madhhab, he who builds the system is the principles of the madhhab. If these are done alongside the legal and ethical principles of the madhhab, then system-building is built based on these principles, and therefore each of these finds its place in the discussions of system-building. The second innovation was in the method, where I said he presented the authoritativeness of the method with this proposed solution; I solved the problem of the authoritativeness of the method in the derivation of principles.
The Objection to Martyr al-Sadr Is Not Valid
Hujjat al-Islam Dr. Gholamreza Mesbahi Moghaddam (Critic of the Session): That Martyr al-Sadr has made justice the differentiator between the school of thought and the science of economics, and not the differentiator between the Islamic school of economics and the capitalist school of economics, and the reference that Mr. Mirmoezzi has made in the text of the report, that the capitalist madhhab is not committed to justice and justice is not a concern for them, this dispute is worthy of reflection. If Martyr al-Sadr speaks of justice as the differentiator between the school of thought and science, his intention is that normative and value-based discussions have a place in the madhhab and have no place in science, and scientific discussions have no relation to value-based and normative issues. And what I understand is not that justice can be one axis and alongside justice, security or growth be other axes. And of course, what I understand is that growth is the concern of the science of economics, not the economic school of thought. And if we consider Martyr al-Sadr’s statement, as is understood from the book Iqtisaduna, to be considering the madhhab as normative, this dispute is apparently not valid against him. A madhhab—whether capitalist or Islamic—these are in pursuit of concepts in the sphere of the economic school of thought that go back to norms, and he has made justice the symbol of these norms, and from this aspect, I do not think this dispute is valid. Of course, the explanation he gave, that the meaning of justice is distributive, before production, after production, and again.
The Role of Ethics in Economics
The subject of ethics, which he considered to be influential in economics: what I derive from Martyr al-Sadr is that in concepts, he brings in ethics under the title of the role of concepts, such as the concept of ownership, which he considers an insightful matter. This insight causes that if there is talk of ownership, it does not induce the pure and absolute capitalist view to us. Rather, it makes one understand that ownership is a type of responsibility for the division of resources for exploitation, use, and service to production, distribution, and consumption. If we see the role of ethics in the framework of the role of concepts, just as in exchange this is said, that exchange in Islam has a specific concept, and the meaning is that services and goods have been produced that must reach the consumer market, which itself is a type of production, and from this aspect, it justifies the share of profits that reaches the exchanger. And in this way, he explains the role of ethics under the title of concepts. Or the role that the verses of the Quran, like the prohibition of usury, present, he presents them in the framework of concepts. From this aspect, it is worthy of reflection whether he has ignored ethics or has pursued it in this framework. In the issue of the method of discovery, where Martyr al-Sadr discusses the relationship of the madhhab and financial rulings, and through this, Martyr al-Sadr considers several bases for his derivation, one of the bases is the legal rulings related to the economic system. Another is the financial system, which refers to khums and zakat. Another is concepts. And another is the issue of the “zone of permissibility.” So it is not so that we say Martyr al-Sadr purely wants to place the principles of the economic madhhab on the base-superstructure relationship of merely jurisprudential rulings on economic issues; it is not so. Rather, he has placed several foundational bases alongside this, and I have even presented this as a diagram, in this way: that we have a school of Islam, from which rulings, ethics, concepts, beliefs, and creeds… and from the collection of these, the Islamic school of economics is extracted. Therefore, the base-superstructure is the relationship of this entire collection with the principles of the economic school of thought.
Discovering the Economic Madhhab Does Not Need Authoritative Proof
Another point is the issue of the emergence of different madhhabs based on multiple fatwas, and that is also the issue of the authoritativeness of discovering the principles of the school from two series of derivations, one the jurist himself and one also others. Of course, I remember Martyr al-Sadr’s argument, that he says given that in the first derivation, we are compelled to derive based on our own method of ijtihad and rulings are obtained, but it is not so that we say these rulings that have been extracted are a representation of reality. No, this is the result of our effort. We tried to reach reality, but it is not known, perhaps we did not reach it. Because we are fallibilists (mukhṭi’ah) and not infallibilists (muṣawwibah). And since it is so, and the assumption is that the outcome of the ijtihad of all jurists has authoritativeness, and the assumption is that we intend to provide a prescription for the Islamic ruler, that jurist who is in the position of deriving the principles of the madhhab can, where he sees inconsistency and wants to extract a principle and is in the process of deriving, still sees a deficiency and a flaw, and therefore cannot say this is the principle that I have extracted. And therefore, with the help of 20% of the fatwas that others have given, he can complete his own derivation. That you said he first extracts the principle and then goes to others, and from this aspect it is of no use and has no role, no, this first a spark has struck the mind and a principle has come to mind, but he sees that no, this principle has a flaw, so he gets help from other fatwas to fix the flaw in his own theory and then reaches the conclusion that this principle is an accepted principle. If we accept such an issue, and in the end, Martyr al-Sadr’s statement at the stage of discovery becomes different in terms of authoritativeness from the stage of deriving primary rulings. Meaning he intends to discover the madhhab, and therefore in the derivation of primary rulings, authoritativeness was necessary because he wants to follow it in the stage of action and behavior. And at the stage of discovering the school of thought, the economic madhhab has no ruling at all that you would want to implement the ruling, to say on what basis of authoritativeness. Rather, it gives you a theory and a theoretical matter, not a practical matter, and this theoretical matter, the result it gives, is defensible from a theoretical perspective. Authoritativeness at the stage of following and obedience is different from authoritativeness at the stage of theorizing. And incidentally, in this issue, he has been completely successful, and from this aspect, it is worthy of reflection. And now, I myself, when I was reading this Iqtisaduna, it occurred to me that Martyr al-Sadr has troubled himself for nothing and has dealt with the difference of opinions of the jurists, because the subject of difference of opinions is not in the principles, it is in the branches. You look, in the capitalist economic theory, there are a few important principles, and these principles are a matter of consensus among the entire capitalist stream. For example, the principle of private ownership. Now, regarding its dimensions, there is a difference of opinion, so the centrality and primacy of the principle of private ownership is the principle. You see that in the Scandinavian countries, they have accepted these same capitalist principles, but in terms of function, they are very different from the capitalism of England or America. The capitalism of France is different from England’s, but none of them say that this is another school of thought that has become socialist, although regarding the Scandinavian countries, the suspicion of acting in a socialist manner has arisen, but in reality, the precise experts say exactly this, that it is capitalism, and capitalism has gone through an evolutionary process here and has followed a reformist process to reach this point without completely abandoning its own principles. In my opinion, we should not get so minute and detailed in the Islamic economic school of thought and go into the difference of fatwas and make them the basis. Even between Shia and Sunni, as the Islamic school of economics, we might suffice with a mutually agreed-upon school of thought and suffice with the broad outlines, not the [detailed] lines. If we make the broad outlines and the major lines the basis, these things are not there at all. This difference of opinions does not arise, and this general [view], Martyr al-Sadr and others can reach it by relying on their own derivation.
Reasons for the Need for an Economic School of Thought
Hujjat al-Islam Dr. Majid Rezaei (Critic): I remember before that we used to have such discussions, and we reached this point that Martyr al-Sadr has used the rulings and then has also benefited from the opinions of other jurists, and Mr. Makarem used to say that instead of this, you can use the jurisprudential maxims. This discussion is really important and fundamental; it has been dealt with little. First, we must solve this, why do we want to state the Islamic school of economics, and what need do we have when we benefit from jurisprudence, ethics, Quranic exegesis, hadith studies, etc., and in these 1400 years, Islam has carried out its function with these same tools? Our economic school of thought that Martyr al-Sadr organized from the perspective of Imami jurisprudence, what benefit does it have, other than that we generally state our overall economic views regarding capitalism or socialism? Does this have a practical outcome for us, that Mr. Mirmoezzi should maneuver on this issue, what really is the benefit of this work? Because as he himself said, what we have in religion, and the Holy Quran which has reached everyone through continuous transmission, and the Sunnah of the Prophet which has reached us in continuously transmitted sayings or continuously and non-continuously transmitted hadiths, and therefore from these sources and other sources that are used from them, in this period, jurisprudence and ethics have been used, and did we have something missing in the middle? And did we have a problem that this was supposed to solve for us, and now it itself has become a problem! And now we want to set about solving it.
In my opinion, because perhaps part of Martyr al-Sadr’s work goes back to this, that in front of an audience where one wants to talk about economic issues, one states a few principles. For example, the Marxist view that says I have a state economy and in all matters, there is one hundred percent state ownership and it is completely free, and on the other hand, capitalism emphasizes private ownership and freedom. This is one discussion that, in my opinion, without proposing a school of thought, except in this aspect that we want to generally present views, perhaps we do not need. Another issue Mr. Mirmoezzi raised regarding ethics and jurisprudence, I want to say that because we are entering economics, let’s not imagine that economics is purely a theoretical discussion. It is not a discussion that, for example, we only pay attention to historically or as a belief, but it must be operationalized. When Islam wants to be operationalized, it becomes jurisprudence. The ethical issues that Mr. Mirmoezzi pointed to, when they are operationalized, show themselves in jurisprudence. Of course, in jurisprudence, we have that lying is forbidden because it harms our soul and creates a problem for us from the perspective of spiritual transcendence. The view of ethics is different from the view of jurisprudence because one sees the rulings and the other sees what effect it has on the human soul. But when it wants to be operationalized, ethics takes the form of jurisprudence, meaning if you find an ethical issue that jurisprudence has nothing to say about it, it cannot be found. Every ethical issue like lying, backbiting, etc., sometimes the jurists have stated it clearly and explicitly, or they have referred it to the books of ethics, which suffices.
A person sees when a jurist wants to see an ethical discussion, how he expands it and pays attention to the details, it is not just in a general way that has an admonitory aspect. Therefore, I do not feel that if jurisprudence is paid full attention to, ethics will be lost in it, and it is not so. And what ethics pays attention to, it pays attention from an ethical perspective that it be operational. Another issue regarding social justice, in my opinion, from between the lines of Martyr al-Sadr’s words, social justice is seen as bigger than just income distribution. That he emphasizes income distribution is because the problem of that time was on this matter, and the main fight of Marxism with capitalist economics, which went back to ownership, the discussion was about this, that we should allocate something of this wealth that is in the world to the poor as well. That now one person consumes excessively was the second aspect of the issue. The book Iqtisaduna was written about 70 years ago, and at that time, economic discussions were different from today, and mostly production discussions were more fundamental. Another point Mr. Mirmoezzi made regarding fixed and variable: in Islam, we have more limited cases, meaning the fixed things and necessities in which there is no doubt from the beginning until now, and there is always agreement on them, and the rest he has called variable, meaning issues that are understood from the apparent meanings, and sometimes the interpretations are different.
Mr. Mirmoezzi’s book, which was written about the economic system, you have considered some cases to be fixed; it may be different from the perspective of another jurist. The fixed may be in the mind of one jurist, and in Islam, perhaps it is also among the matters of reinterpretation. An example, a statement has come from the noble Prophet that we assume all are among the fixed things, and it has reached this era that there were agricultural effects and there were no machines, so saying it is correct, but it has a few conditions. For example, the discussion of permission from the government, or that the Prophet himself, as a ruler, presented this matter, and now one must get permission from the ruler of the time. We have brought a series of conditions, and it seems these were also among the variables. The fixed thing is, for example, the interest of society, that based on the interest of society, but the society and the Imam of the society can have conditions and restrictions regarding the derivations of the society. A time passes, for example, a thousand years it has been fixed, and now it is changing. Therefore, what we call fixed and variable may change, but for example, drinking wine or the principle of private ownership will never change. Therefore, what we consider fixed may be limited. As much as we enter into jurisprudential discussions, these can be variable because the great jurists also have this foundation, that they should identify the subject with precision and prove that the subject has been fixed over time, so that then they come and announce its ruling, because over time, subjects are variable, and therefore the rulings can also be variable. I also did not understand another point regarding the action of the guardian-ruler (wali al-amr), because the guardian-ruler himself is a jurist, and which ruling does he act upon? His own opinion or the opinion of others? If the rulings he himself has derived do not fit in the framework and are not capable of being acted upon, for example, the late Imam, in some economic issues, did not act upon his own fatwa and would refer it. For example, this very late payment penalty, which he himself was explicitly against, but at the same time, he sufficed with the opinion of the Guardian Council and had accepted it, so it became current operationally. The guardian-ruler that you said there is a difference, there he is forced to act contrary to his own ijtihad.
Reasons for the Necessity of Discovering the Economic Madhhab
Hujjat al-Islam Dr. Hossein Mirmoezzi: While thanking the honorable professors, regarding why we went to the madhhab at all, this has a clear reason. System-building leads us in this direction. One of the points that Ayatollah Haeri used to say was that jurisprudence is sufficient and there is no need for principles. Martyr al-Sadr also has explicitly that the principles of the method for solving the country’s problems are not extracted from jurisprudence, and if you want to implement jurisprudence in this regard, then you need principles and a method.
Martyr al-Sadr Saw Ethics in the Hidden Layer of the Madhhab, Not its Prominent Layer
Regarding the discussions of ethics, it is not that Martyr al-Sadr did not see the discussion of ethics, but rather he saw it in the hidden layer of the madhhab and not in the surface layer. Martyr al-Sadr has it that beliefs, concepts, and emotions are influential on someone who derives rulings from the verses and narrations. Meaning, he wants to derive legal rulings or the financial relationship of the government and the people, and even the texts, beliefs, concepts, and emotions are involved in his derivation, and therefore he can derive correctly. But that ethics itself, alongside civil and financial rulings, ethical rulings themselves are also a reference for the derivation of principles, this he does not say, and our objection is this very point. Let’s suppose we extract fairness and moderation from ethical rulings, and these principles of fairness and moderation are extractable, and other systems that are needed regarding market-making, and these very things solve many problems.
If you have seen the leftist books, one of the discussions it has is this very point, that ethics is like a filter that a person who intends to enter the market must pass through this filter so as not to transgress, and the legal [filter] is the second filter. That we want to know what jurisprudence or ethics are, or that we do not need ethics and whatever we want exists in jurisprudence—which in my view is a mistake—therefore, ethics must be seen alongside jurisprudence, and that too not just financial law and economic discussions like the rulings of consumption and production, all must be seen. The reason Martyr al-Sadr went to financial and civil law was that his view was distributive, and he focused on the circle of law, not ethics. Of course, this discussion needs more reflection.
Regarding the second discussion, suppose that every jurist can reach coherent reference principles with the collection of his own fatwas; there is no problem with this. But because jurists are different from each other, and therefore the derivations are different from each other, therefore, various madhhabs can be derived on their own.
The guardian-ruler himself, let’s suppose he extracts a madhhab based on his own fatwas. But at the stage of deriving God’s ruling, no, but at the stage of implementation; now which one should he act upon, while he knows that some of his own fatwas may also not be correct? Therefore, the truth is spread among multiple ijtihads. Now the solution is to know which of these solves the problems in society better and to choose that one, which I also accept. But he has a second statement, and that is that a jurist cannot extract a coherent set of principles of the madhhab based on his own fatwas.
The friends said that the reason the jurist goes to the fatwas of others is so that he himself can find assurance in the same path that he himself has reached—for whatever reason. Now why does he go to the fatwas that he himself has found and confirms? Meaning he should go to other fatwas or even those contrary to his own fatwa. Therefore, my point is that when he is in the process of finding his own fatwa, he finds a principle in this regard, and a principle comes to mind for him, and incidentally, he reaches this point that the principle he has found is in conflict with some of the foundations of his own fatwas. You say in order to find assurance whether the principle he has derived is correct or not, instead of going to the opposing 20%, he goes to the 20% that is in agreement. Consequently, this is not the meaning of finding assurance, but rather for assurance, he must search and investigate, and he may even reach conflicts and oppositions to his own principle and abandon his own principle. In my opinion, this objection is valid, that if we are to go after the principle, considering the point you made, then all fatwas must be seen.
Source: Public Relations and Information Office of the Islamic Culture and Thought Research Institute.