Introduction: The apparent conflict between certain jurisprudential rulings and the right to human equality is not a modern issue; however, the creation of discourse around it and the media-driven efforts to popularize it are novel phenomena. At times, discussions focus on the lack of equality in rulings concerning women and men, at other times on the differences between rulings for Muslims and non-Muslims, and so forth. The dimensions of these conflicts or apparent conflicts, their categorization, the perspectives surrounding them, and the proposed solutions to address them are topics explored in this exclusive article by Hujjat al-Islam Mohammad Javad Ahmadkhani, a professor of advanced levels at the Qom Seminary and a researcher at the Institute for Contemporary Jurisprudential Studies.
One of the most significant intellectual and legal challenges facing Islamic thought in the modern era is how to address modern concepts and values, particularly the “right to human equality.” While authentic Islamic sources, especially the Holy Quran, emphasize the inherent dignity and fundamental equality of all human beings (Al-Isra: 70; Al-Hujurat: 13), certain jurisprudential rulings within the Islamic tradition appear to establish distinctions among individuals based on gender or religion, either in form or in practice. Notable examples include differences in blood money (diyah), inheritance, testimony, and certain social roles between men and women, as well as between Muslims and non-Muslims.
This duality raises fundamental questions: Is Islam inherently in conflict with complete legal equality among human beings? Do these distinctions negate the “principle of human equality,” or are they merely functional differences based on specific rationales? Finally, does Islamic jurisprudence possess the capacity to revisit these rulings through renewed ijtihad (jurisprudential reasoning), relying on concepts such as “public interest” (maslahah) and the “objectives of Sharia” (maqasid al-shari’ah)?
The Right to Human Equality: Ethical, Legal, and Islamic Foundations
The concept of the “right to human equality” implies that all human beings, regardless of characteristics such as race, gender, language, religion, or social status, possess inherent dignity and equal rights. This principle can be elucidated at three primary levels:
- Ethical Dimension
According to this dimension, every human being, by virtue of being human, possesses inherent dignity. This dignity serves as the fundamental source of individual and social rights and emphasizes equal respect and status for all human beings. - Legal Dimension
In this dimension, the necessity of recognizing equal rights for all individuals in civil and criminal laws, as well as ensuring equal treatment before judicial and executive institutions, is underscored. Discrimination in law or its implementation constitutes a clear violation of this principle. - Social Dimension
From a social perspective, the principle of equality requires providing equal opportunities for growth, progress, and participation in society. Educational, economic, and cultural institutions must be designed to foster the equitable development of talents for all citizens.
Islamic Foundations of the Principle of Human Equality
Although some discourses portray the principle of equality as conflicting with religion, particularly Islamic jurisprudence, an examination of primary Islamic sources reveals that this principle is not only compatible with Islamic thought but is one of its foundational elements.
A. The Holy Quran
In verse 13 of Surah Al-Hujurat, piety (taqwa) is established as the criterion for superiority among individuals:
“Indeed, the most noble of you in the sight of Allah is the most righteous of you.”
This verse was revealed in a context where tribal and racial superiority was prevalent, thus effecting a profound conceptual transformation in the social outlook of the pre-Islamic era.
Similarly, verse 70 of Surah Al-Isra states:
“And We have certainly honored the children of Adam.”
In this verse, dignity is attributed to all human beings—as descendants of Adam—without distinction based on race, ethnicity, or gender. This dignity is considered inherent and universal.
B. Prophetic Tradition
One of the most significant pieces of evidence supporting the principle of equality in the Prophet’s tradition is his Farewell Sermon (Khutbat al-Wida’). In this sermon, he explicitly declared:
“O people, know that your Lord is one, and your father is one. No Arab has superiority over a non-Arab, nor does a white person have superiority over a black person, except by piety.”
This statement serves as a historic declaration against ethnic and racial discrimination and holds a lofty position in Islamic tradition.
C. Contemporary Islamic Documents
At the contemporary level, the “Islamic Declaration of Human Rights,” adopted by the Organization of Islamic Cooperation (Cairo, 1990), states in its first article:
“Humankind forms a single family united by submission to God and descent from Adam. All people are equal in their inherent human dignity, responsibilities, and obligations, with no distinction or privilege based on race, color, language, gender, or religious belief.”
Thus, the principle of human equality in dignity and intrinsic value is not only a universal ethical and legal foundation but is also firmly supported by Islamic religious texts. However, the primary challenge arises when this general principle appears to conflict with certain specific jurisprudential rulings, such as those concerning blood money, inheritance, or testimony. Analyzing this conflict and elucidating possible mechanisms for its resolution or reinterpretation are among the critical tasks of contemporary Islamic scholars.
Distinguishing Rulings: Examples and Analysis of Perspectives
Certain jurisprudential rulings in Islamic jurisprudence, due to their differential treatment of individuals based on gender or religion, are perceived as potentially or actually conflicting with the “right to human equality.” These rulings can be examined under two main categories:
A. Distinctions Based on Gender (Between Men and Women)
The most prominent examples in this category include:
- Blood Money (Diyah)
According to the prevailing opinion among jurists, the blood money for a woman in cases of homicide or bodily injury is half that of a man. - Inheritance
In most cases, a woman’s share of inheritance (e.g., as a daughter or sister) is half that of a man in the same inheritance class (e.g., a son or brother). - Testimony
In certain financial disputes, the testimony of two women is considered equivalent to that of one man, based on verse 282 of Surah Al-Baqarah. - Judiciary and Public Leadership
Many early jurists deemed it impermissible for women to hold positions such as judgeship or supreme leadership (e.g., head of an Islamic state), arguing that such roles require qualities they believed were more prevalent in men.
B. Distinctions Based on Religion (Between Muslims and Non-Muslims)
Certain jurisprudential rulings also establish differences between the rights of Muslims and non-Muslims, including:
- Blood Money and Retribution (Qisas)
According to the prevailing jurisprudential view, if a Muslim kills a non-Muslim, retribution (qisas) is not applicable, and the blood money for a non-Muslim is generally less than that for a Muslim. - Testimony
The testimony of a non-Muslim against a Muslim is not accepted in most Islamic courts, except in specific or non-judicial matters. - Inheritance
Based on the prevailing opinion, a non-Muslim does not inherit from a Muslim, a ruling rooted in the difference in religion.
Perspectives on Resolving Distinctions
How are these distinctions justified, and do they negate the principle of human equality? Two primary perspectives exist on this matter:
First Perspective: Differences Do Not Negate Equality (Traditional Analysis)
Some traditional jurists and defenders of the existing jurisprudential framework argue that the legal distinctions among different groups, particularly regarding women’s rights and those of religious minorities, do not negate the principle of inherent dignity or equality. They view these differences as based on functional considerations, distinct social roles, and collective interests. The rationale for this approach can be outlined as follows:
- Inheritance
In the Islamic legal system, the responsibility for providing for the family is primarily placed on men (Al-Nisa: 34). Therefore, allocating a larger share of inheritance to men is seen as an attempt to balance the financial burdens of the family. From this perspective, this is rooted in the principle of “distributive justice” rather than “absolute numerical equality.” In other words, since duties and responsibilities differ, resource allocation is adjusted accordingly. - Blood Money (Diyah)
In the traditional argument, blood money is not a measure of the value of a human life but a form of financial compensation for the family of the deceased. Given that, in traditional family structures, men were often the primary breadwinners, their death imposed a greater financial burden on the family. Thus, a higher blood money for men is justified as compensating for a greater economic loss, not as an indication of the superior intrinsic value of a man’s life over a woman’s. - Testimony
Verse 282 of Surah Al-Baqarah, which addresses the testimony of two women being equivalent to one man in financial transactions, is interpreted by traditional scholars as specific to the historical context of the Quran’s revelation. At that time, women were generally less involved in economic and formal transactional spaces, and their domestic responsibilities limited their focus and expertise in financial matters. Thus, requiring two women’s testimony was seen as a precautionary measure to protect financial rights, not as an indication of intellectual deficiency or lack of trust in women. - Differences Between Muslims and Non-Muslims
The distinctions in certain rulings between Muslims and non-Muslims, from the perspective of traditional jurisprudence, are meaningful within the political and legal framework of an Islamic society. These rulings are based on the principle of differing obligations and commitments between Muslim citizens and those under the covenant of protection (dhimma), not on a difference in inherent human dignity. In essence, these distinctions are defined by the legal relationship with the Islamic state, not by a negation of the humanity or intrinsic value of non-Muslims.
Second Perspective: The Need for Re-examination of Distinguishing Rulings (Critical Analysis)
Some reformist scholars and jurists, while respecting the jurisprudential heritage, believe that certain distinguishing rulings require re-examination and reinterpretation due to social changes and historical transformations. This perspective emphasizes the inherent capacity of Islamic jurisprudence to evolve and adapt to new circumstances. The main reasons for this approach can be categorized as follows:
- Changing Social Conditions
In contemporary societies, economic responsibilities are no longer solely borne by men. Many women are either heads of households or contribute equally to family sustenance. Consequently, traditional arguments for differences in inheritance or blood money, which were based on men’s financial responsibilities, have largely lost their relevance. - Conflict with Fundamental Sharia Principles
Rulings that, in practice, lead to inequality or discrimination are seen as incompatible with the overarching and ethical principles of Sharia, such as justice (“Indeed, Allah commands justice” – Al-Nahl: 90) and human dignity (“And We have certainly honored the children of Adam” – Al-Isra: 70). These principles, which fall under the “objectives of Sharia” (maqasid al-shari’ah), should serve as a criterion for evaluating and revising specific rulings. - Negative Social Consequences
The continued enforcement of distinguishing rulings in today’s society may portray Islam as unjust, weakening its standing in public opinion and challenging social cohesion in Muslim communities. This could lead to cultural and ideological divergence. - Possibility of Alternative Interpretations of Religious Texts
Some scholars argue that religious texts have the capacity for diverse interpretations. For instance, verses such as the one addressing the testimony of two women in place of one man may pertain to specific historical conditions or the level of judicial literacy and experience among women at the time of revelation, rather than being an eternal ruling. From this perspective, such verses can be seen as precautionary or advisory measures, not immutable mandates.
Jurisprudential Capacities for Re-examination and Renewed Ijtihad
1. Interest-Based Jurisprudence and the Objectives of Sharia
This approach, with a long history in Islamic jurisprudence and articulated by scholars like Al-Shatibi, posits that Sharia rulings serve overarching objectives such as preserving religion, life, intellect, lineage, and property. Justice and human dignity are also among the key objectives of Sharia. Thus, if a ruling in the modern era conflicts with these objectives, its revision based on “public interest” (maslahah) is justified.
2. Governmental Jurisprudence and the Role of the Islamic State
A perspective emphasized in the contemporary era, particularly after the Islamic Revolution in Iran by Imam Khomeini, highlights the role of the Islamic state in issuing secondary rulings. According to this theory, the supreme jurist (wali faqih) can temporarily or permanently amend or suspend certain primary rulings to preserve the public interest. The law establishing equality in blood money for men and women in Iran, implemented through the Bodily Injury Compensation Fund, is a practical example of this approach.
3. Ijtihad Based on Time and Place
This principle, emphasized in the evolution of Shia jurisprudence, particularly by scholars like Martyr Sadr and Imam Khomeini, underscores that the understanding of religious rulings must adapt to changing temporal and spatial conditions. Distinguishing rulings were often shaped by the customs and social structures of the era of revelation, and with the transformation of these structures, the subject matter of the rulings has also changed, necessitating renewed ijtihad.
4. Distinction Between Ritual and Socio-Legal Rulings
Some jurisprudential scholars distinguish fundamentally between ritual rulings (e.g., prayer and fasting), which are fixed and divinely ordained, and socio-legal rulings (e.g., blood money, inheritance, and testimony), which are tied to social justice and public order. The latter, therefore, are more amenable to transformation and revision based on contemporary conditions.
Conclusion
In conclusion, there exists a conceptual and practical tension between the “principle of human equality,” rooted in foundational Islamic sources such as the Quran and Prophetic tradition, and certain jurisprudential rulings shaped in specific historical and social contexts. The traditional perspective, relying on functional rationales and the circumstances of the rulings’ issuance, deems these differences justified and necessary. In contrast, critical and reformist perspectives, citing changes in social and historical conditions and emphasizing the higher principles of Sharia—such as justice, rationality, and human dignity—advocate for the re-examination of certain jurisprudential rulings.