Introduction: Dr. Abdulwahab Forati has consistently explored new domains and concepts in jurisprudence. He was among the first to emphasize the notion of schools and traditions in jurisprudential knowledge and has written extensively for years on the requirements of schools such as those of Najaf and Qom. However, as a faculty member of the Research Institute for Islamic Culture and Thought, he has grown weary of concepts like Dar al-Islam, Dar al-Harb, and even the more recent Dar al-‘Ahd. He believes that the demands of the contemporary world can no longer accommodate these ancient concepts. He proposes a new concept that he considers closer to the essence of the Prophetic call. The full text of this engaging and exclusive commentary by a member of the Academic Council of the Department of Political Jurisprudence and International Relations at the Research Institute for Contemporary Jurisprudential Studies follows:
Islamic jurisprudence not only addresses internal matters but also encompasses the external relations of the Islamic state with other states within its scope of inquiry, providing guiding principles, rules, and specific rulings for the foreign conduct of the Islamic state. However, what is significant for us today is that jurisprudence traditionally examines the nature of the Islamic state’s external relations based on past cultural and political frameworks.
In traditional jurisprudence, two longstanding concepts, Dar al-Islam and Dar al-Harb, are prevalent, and our jurists typically discuss the external relations of the Islamic state under these categories, regardless of the form of governance. Researching these concepts reveals that they are neither found in the Quran nor in the Sunnah.[1] These concepts entered jurisprudential discourse from the third century of the Islamic calendar onward and became the basis for dividing the world. Without delving into specific instances of these domains, it is clear what these terms denote and to what cases the esteemed jurists refer. At times, peace was established between these two domains, and at other times, war, with each situation governed by specific jurisprudential rulings. Occasionally, treaties were made with states in Dar al-Harb, leading to their designation as Dar al-‘Ahd, and interactions were based on the terms of the treaty, such as the agreement the Prophet (PBUH) made with the Christians of Najran, committing to protect their lives and property against any aggression, even from Muslims. Perhaps due to such commitments, some jurists include Dar al-‘Ahd or Dar al-Muwada‘a within the broader scope of Dar al-Islam and interpret it as an extension of it. However, others, such as Shafi‘i and Shaybani, do not consider it part of Dar al-Islam. Nevertheless, as Abu Zuhra writes, today all states adhere to specific laws and order at the international level, and the Islamic state must remain faithful to such international arrangements. Consequently, it is likely that no country in the contemporary world can be classified as part of Dar al-Harb, and all fall under Dar al-‘Ahd.[2] This suggests that the traditional division of the world by jurists into Dar al-Islam and Dar al-Harb has shifted in favor of a contemporary division into Dar al-Islam and Dar al-‘Ahd, signaling the end of Dar al-Harb.
Nevertheless, it must be stated that applying the old concepts of Dar al-Islam, Dar al-Harb, and even Dar al-‘Ahd to our contemporary reality, as scholars of ten centuries ago conceived them, constitutes a methodological error. In today’s world, where people are in constant movement and we participate in an increasingly complex process involving economic, financial, and political power zones, diverse strategic alliances, and spheres of influence, on the one hand, and the multicultural nature of most Western states, which does not inherently obstruct the promotion and invitation to Islam—allowing individuals and institutions to easily use modern technologies like the internet to invite others to Islam across borders—on the other hand, adhering to a simplistic, binary perspective of reality seems untenable. Although Dar al-‘Ahd is more practical than the other two domains and could serve as a good basis for the Islamic state’s relations with other states, a precise analysis reveals that this concept also fails to provide a comprehensive view of the current state of international relations. This is because the term Dar al-‘Ahd derives its meaning and identity only in the context of Dar al-Islam and Dar al-Harb. For this reason, it appears that Dar al-‘Ahd primarily describes a state of non-war rather than a complete definition of regions like Europe or America, where many Muslims live and, as Abu Hanifa described, practice their religious duties in complete security and freedom. Consequently, describing the world through the concept of Dar al-‘Ahd is interesting and useful but inadequate for at least two reasons. First, using this concept cautiously, given its basis in traditional jurisprudential divisions, is no longer feasible. Today, Dar al-Islam and Dar al-Harb have reached a mutual understanding, and Dar al-Islam can invite everyone to Islam without formal restrictions, establishing mosques or religious institutions in any part of Dar al-Harb as desired. Second, when Muslims residing in Dar al-Harb, who have agreements with non-Islamic states, feel on the one hand that they are not in their own society and, on the other hand, have come to terms with that reality and are considered citizens of that society, this issue, which is reflected in Rousseau’s social contract theory, is not captured by the concept of Dar al-‘Ahd.
This indicates a genuine gap between the old jurisprudential concepts and current conditions, necessitating the replacement of these concepts with new ones. The proposal is to henceforth use the concept of Dar al-Da‘wa (Abode of Invitation) instead of Dar al-‘Ahd. Just as Mecca was neither Dar al-Islam nor Dar al-Harb but Dar al-Da‘wa for the Prophet (PBUH) and Muslims before the migration, Dar al-Da‘wa is a space for inviting others to the worship of the One God, introducing Islam, and conveying its message. Therefore, globalizing the Prophet’s (PBUH) call, as he himself stated that the entire world is a mosque, requires Muslims, wherever they are in the world, to promote spirituality, religious values, and human commitment, expanding the community of believers. In the West, where religion and spirituality have been marginalized, efforts must be made to invite others to Islam, and Islamic states should not regard those regions as Dar al-Harb. Perhaps these reflections will convince our jurists to cease translating dar as a limited “abode” and instead apply the concept of dar to the entire world, thereby demonstrating their aspiration to understand the world in its entirety. In the past, we could draw a binary distinction between Muslims and non-Muslims and define Dar al-Islam and Dar al-Harb based on the type of state. Today, we must speak more of relations between individuals belonging to different civilizations, cultures, religions, and ethical systems, and their compatibility, rather than reducing the interactions of Muslims dispersed across the globe with non-Muslims to a confrontation between two domains. Interpreting dar as encompassing the entire world and detaching it from the meaning of a limited “abode” will clarify that Muslims are settled worldwide, living in both central and peripheral regions of the Western world. The entire world is for them a “land of testimony,” where they must bear witness to the oneness of God and divine values in all places and serve as witnesses to the actions of others.[3]
[1] Kalantari, Dar al-Islam and Dar al-Kufr and Their Specific Implications, Journal of Jurisprudence, Issue 10, Winter 1375 [1996], p. 36.
[2] Abu Zuhra, International Relations in Islam, Cairo, Dar al-Fikr al-Arabi, 1995, pp. 59–60.
[3] Tariq Ramadan, Western Muslims and the Future of Islam, translated by Amir Rezaei, Tehran, Research Institute for Cultural and Social Studies, pp. 113–114.