A professor of advanced levels at the Qom Seminary, in an exclusive interview with the Institute of Contemporary Jurisprudential Studies:

Titles of sanctity in the jurisprudence of arts/4

It may be permissible, according to some jurists, for a small amount of hair to be visible or for a wig to be worn, and the people watching these films may be followers of those jurists. We must assume good faith. After all, living in today’s world has its own particular demands. In the art of the Islamic Republic system, we must consider certain exceptions; either we must entirely abandon film, theater, cinema, and music, or we must, in accordance with the demands of the era and the specific needs of society, set aside some past jurisprudential rulings, allow for exceptions, and state that partial lack of hijab, where it does not provoke viewers, may not be problematic.

It has long been known that there is a dispute between artists and jurists: artists who view jurists as rigid and jurists who regard artists as mere entertainers indifferent to religion. But is this truly the reality? Hujjat al-Islam Nasiruddin Ansari Qomi, who has studied under prominent religious authorities for years and has long been teaching advanced levels at the Qom Seminary, holds a different view. He believes it is not accurate to generally label jurists as opposed to art; rather, many jurists have engaged in calligraphy, poetry, portrait painting, and music. The conversation with a member of the fatwa council of the late Ayatollah Alavi Gorgani was filled with fascinating historical insights and novel analyses. The full text of the exclusive interview with this professor and author from the Qom Seminary is as follows:

Contemporary Jurisprudence: Given the fatwas of jurists regarding performing arts, sculpting, painting, dance, music, and similar fields, can we conclude that the general approach of jurists toward art is one of suspicion and negativity?

Ansari Qomi: Art is a broad and encompassing concept. Some of the matters you mentioned, such as painting, sculpting, music, and dance, are general concepts that, in our jurisprudence, are divided into specific subcategories, some of which jurists have deemed prohibited because they are associated with gatherings of diversion and play (lahw wa la‘b). For example, they have prohibited the creation of lifelike, complete statues with heads. However, if a statue lacks detailed limbs or a head, or even if it has a head but no detailed features, its creation is not considered prohibited. Dance also has exceptions; for instance, dancing by a wife for her husband, or, according to some jurists, dancing in women-only gatherings or at wedding celebrations, is considered permissible. Similarly, regarding music, it has been divided into diversionary (lahwi) and non-diversionary music. Diversionary music and ghinā (singing) associated with gatherings of corruption, indulgence, or ecstasy (tarab) are deemed prohibited, but non-ecstatic music, such as military or epic music and certain other types, is considered permissible. Therefore, it is not accurate to generally claim that jurists are opposed to art; rather, one must pay attention to specific cases, carefully consider exceptions, and distinguish between the subcategories of various arts.

Contemporary Jurisprudence: Why, despite jurists having a positive approach toward arts such as poetry, Quranic recitation, and passion plays (ta‘ziya), do they approach other arts with a negative perspective?

Ansari Qomi: We must clearly understand the intent and purpose of this question. Which arts have jurists opposed? Jurists themselves have been practitioners of art. Many of our jurists were skilled in calligraphy, poetry, and painting, and some have even left behind lifelike portraits. The late Ayatollah Najumi engaged in portrait painting. The late Ayatollah Sheikh Reza Tohidi also painted portraits. Even now, there are jurists in Qom who engage in portrait painting. Certainly, they are not engaging in prohibited acts; rather, their work is based on the fatwas of certain jurists. Therefore, it is not accurate to generally claim that jurists are opposed to art; rather, they support and advocate for it. Many of our jurists have been highly skilled and specialized in calligraphy, portrait painting, and musical techniques. As examples, one can mention the late Ayatollah Najumi and Ayatollah Tohidi in painting and calligraphy, and other scholars in the art of poetry, particularly mystical and romantic poetry.

Contemporary Jurisprudence: The fatwas of contemporary jurists regarding arts such as sculpting, performing arts, painting, and music appear to be less stringent than those of earlier jurists. Is this shift in approach due to a change in the subject matter, a change in the jurists’ perspective, or a change in social conditions and society’s rejection of certain fatwas?

Ansari Qomi: It seems that all the factors you mentioned contribute to the change in the fatwas of some jurists. We now see that sculpting is prevalent in cities and public squares; statues are no longer viewed with the same old perspective but are considered memorials that evoke and commemorate historical figures. Painting and theater are also regarded as artistic expressions. The same applies to music. Music is recognized as an art form, such as mystical or epic music. Some mystical poetry, when accompanied by music, impacts the body and soul. Many contemporary jurists do not hold the old views on music, sculpting, theater, and cinema; rather, they see them as tools for promoting religion.

Contemporary Jurisprudence: It appears that jurists and artists have reached an unwritten agreement whereby artists do not adhere to many fatwas, such as the prohibition of creating lifelike statues, the requirement of full hijab, or the prohibition of emotional interactions between non-mahram actors in performing arts, and so forth. On the other hand, jurists do not issue warnings about the non-observance of these matters and even refer to many artistic works that disregard these jurisprudential prohibitions as religious and revolutionary works (such as films by filmmakers like Hatamikia, Talebi, and others). Do you agree with this statement?

Ansari Qomi: The fatwas of jurists hold their own religious and legal standing, but their application in the realm of art is a different matter. We cannot expect all artists to fully adhere to the fatwas of jurists. After all, film and theater have their own specific demands. If we were to strip them of these demands, nothing would remain of film and theater. A jurist issues their fatwa, but is this fatwa practically applicable in society? Can it be followed to the letter? That is a separate issue. The jurist’s fatwa does not change. The prohibition of emotional interactions between non-mahram men and women remains in place. From the perspective of a jurist who considers lifelike statues or images prohibited, their fatwa remains unchanged, and the ruling stands. However, certain segments of society may not be able to adhere to these fatwas and may act otherwise. Not all people follow a jurist’s fatwa. The seventh art, namely cinema and theater, has its own demands and audience. Some people spend their leisure time with theater and cinema, and some artists, actors, and directors must create works that align with the preferences and tastes of their audience. Thus, we face a duality between fatwas and certain artistic expressions. Each person can act according to their own inclination and taste. For example, the devout may avoid these matters. On the other hand, those who are not strict followers of these jurists may follow jurists who consider these things permissible. It may be permissible, according to some jurists, for a small amount of hair to be visible or for a wig to be worn, and the people watching these films may be followers of those jurists. We must assume good faith. After all, living in today’s world has its own particular demands. In the art of the Islamic Republic system, we must consider certain exceptions; either we must entirely abandon film, theater, cinema, and music, or we must, in accordance with the demands of the era and the specific needs of society, set aside some past jurisprudential rulings, allow for exceptions, and state that partial lack of hijab, where it does not provoke viewers, may not be problematic.

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