In 2015, Ayatollah Alidoust’s hidden and unspoken insight was revealed! This innovative yet traditionally grounded jurist, who for years had regarded art in itself as a noble and commendable matter, spoke at the First Conference on the Jurisprudence of Art about the desirability and obligation of artistic acts, stating that the ruling on art begins with desirability. Since that year, there has hardly been a gathering or forum discussing the jurisprudence of art where Ayatollah Alidoust’s enduring words have not been a topic of discussion. He stands between tradition and innovation. At one moment, he becomes indignant at the baseless ruling on the purity of dogs under the guise of innovation, and at another, he criticizes jurists for their permissive or prohibitive approach to art. According to him, he is not solely seeking the “dynamism” of jurisprudence but considers “stability” an essential pillar of jurisprudential propositions. Given the supportive and opposing views expressed over the years, including in this magazine, regarding Ayatollah Alidoust’s statement, we review the text of his remarks at the First Conference on the Jurisprudence of Art, published in the collection of articles from that conference, to further clarify his main claim. The full text of the remarks by the member of the Board of Trustees of the Institute of Contemporary Jurisprudential Studies at the First Conference on the Jurisprudence of Art is as follows:
The Primary Ruling on Artistic Acts
The discussion is whether art, as a concept, irrespective of the form it takes, has a ruling, and if so, what is that ruling? Is it permissibility (ibāha), undesirability (karāha), or desirability (istихbāb)?
Throughout history, it is possible that jurisprudential opinions on a phenomenon may differ from reality; that is, jurisprudence may say one thing, while people and artists act differently. In discussions of the jurisprudence of art, sometimes we consider art as an abstract reality, independent of its external manifestations, seeking to determine the stance of jurisprudence toward such art. At other times, we focus on the specific manifestations of art, such as architecture, painting, sculpting, ghinā (singing), and music.
It is appropriate to distinguish between these two approaches. Some esteemed scholars have also pointed to this matter, and it is a valid observation. Accordingly, my first discussion pertains to a reality independent of specific instances, while the second involves addressing certain instances.
It is crucial to establish a principle in this regard, as we may not reach a prohibition or permission through a single piece of evidence or validity in some cases. If a principle exists, we act upon it. Therefore, establishing a principle is akin to scholarly discussions in the jurisprudence of art.
From a jurisprudential perspective, art as a reality begins with desirability (istихbāb) or, at the very least, permissibility (ibāha). However, if we define art narrowly as pertaining to unconventional or corrupt phenomena, it may reach the threshold of prohibition (hurma). It should be noted that in the realms of obligation (wujūb) and prohibition (hurma), art often acquires secondary titles. Secondary titles in art, based on logic, are either instrumental in the application of art or instrumental in its establishment. This is because the possibility of obligation or prohibition due to secondary titles pertains to the essence of art itself, in which case the secondary title becomes instrumental in its establishment. However, if we say that this is not always the case—for example, when art becomes obligatory for the creation of a grand Islamic civilization—in such a scenario, we may only believe in the obligation of propagating belief. In this case, creating a civilization becomes obligatory, not art itself; thus, the secondary title becomes instrumental in its application.
Narrational Evidence for the Principle of Desirability in Artistic Acts
The existence of numerous narrations supports the notion that the ruling on art begins with desirability. We have many narrations from the Prophet (peace be upon him), Amir al-Mu’minin, Imam Reza, and Imam Sadiq (peace be upon them) with the theme: “Indeed, Allah, the Exalted, is beautiful, loves beauty, and loves to see the effects of His blessings on His servant.” From the phrase “He loves” (yuḥibb) in this narration, the desirability of artistic acts is inferred, and it is incorrect for anyone to dispute its desirability. The baseline ruling for artistic acts begins with desirability.
George Jurdak, a Christian, was captivated by Nahj al-Balagha due to its extraordinary eloquence in expressing the words of Imam Ali (peace be upon him), dedicating his life to this work. This reflects the concept of the beauty of art in expression, which humbles even a non-Muslim, prompting them to change their perspective and produce an unparalleled work titled Imam Ali: The Voice of Human Justice. A person may appreciate the beauty of a natural phenomenon or admire a beautiful face, but the Prophet’s statement in this narration refers to the manifestation of this beauty in people—that is, to express it so that the creation, as described, becomes evident. In essence, if someone has a talent for poetry, they should express it, or if they have a beautiful voice, they should perform it.
Several narrations on this matter are attributed to Imam Sadiq (peace be upon him) alone. Therefore, we believe that desirability is base jurisprudential ruling for art. On one hand, the ruling on art must begin with desirability and may extend to obligation; on the other hand, if art is interpreted as unpleasant, ugly, or corrupt phenomena, it may fall into the realm of prohibition.
Islam Begins with Art
Islam begins with art. Many scholars discuss art solely from the perspective of the Quran. This approach is not problematic but is incomplete, as the ethics of the Prophet constitute art. How do we wish to define art? The Prophet’s ethics are an extraordinary character trait; because they transcend the ordinary, they become beautiful and desirable. In this sense, an exceptional behavior is considered art.
The Quran is a tangible embodiment of art. The ethics of the Ahl al-Bayt, Nahj al-Balagha, and Sahifa Sajjadiyya are also art. The supplication of Kumayl, the Munajat Sha‘baniyya, and the Fifteen Supplications, in terms of their eloquent prose and profound content, are works of art. Therefore, these works are phenomena “from Islam” but “for humanity.” Islam’s perspective on these arts cannot be neutral and is, at the very least, one of desirability. In other words, regarding the creation of Nahj al-Balagha, if secondary titles do not render it obligatory, the ruling is certainly desirability. The creation of Nahj al-Balagha and the supplication of Kumayl would also be deemed desirable.
Once specific manifestations are determined, establishing the stance of jurisprudence toward art is not difficult; it begins with desirability, may extend to obligation, and in regressive phenomena, may reach prohibition.
Determining the Jurisprudential Stance on Art
If art pertains solely to execution and skill, it becomes desirable. In other words, the jurisprudential ruling on art, in relation to its content, revolves around prohibition, obligation, or desirability. Is this conclusion correct? Content must be included in the discussion, as it has an impact whether we are discussing specific behaviors or not. In a comprehensive view of art, we should not focus on specific instances. For this reason, to determine the ruling on art, we should not refer to narrations about ghinā or music.
A Quranic Verse Indicating the Desirability of Artistic Acts
The desirability of artistic acts can also be derived from this verse: “Say, ‘Who has forbidden the adornment of Allah which He has produced for His servants and the good things of His provision?’ Say, ‘They are for those who believe during the worldly life, exclusively on the Day of Resurrection.’ Thus, We detail the verses for a people who know” (Quran 7:32).
Permissive and Prohibitive Approaches to Art
Typically, in jurisprudential discussions, the approach of the Najaf school of jurisprudence emphasizes establishing a principle. If we wish to establish a principle in an artistic ruling or in this discussion, the principle is permissibility (ibāha). Those who believe caution (ihtiyāt) is necessary in ambiguous cases—referred to as aṣālat al-ḥaẓr (the principle of prohibition) or aṣālat al-waqf (the principle of suspension)—adopt a cautious approach. However, according to the principles of Imami jurisprudence, the principle is acquittal (barā’a), permissibility (jawāz), and allowance (ibāha). Yet, in the jurisprudence of art, we observe that jurists’ permissive and prohibitive approaches are more pronounced than their approach of permissibility.