The use of “corruption” (ifsād) is not exclusive to the jurisprudence of art but is also employed in other jurisprudential domains to indicate the prohibition or undesirability of an act. However, it is undoubtedly one of the most frequently applied concepts in the jurisprudence of art. Hojjat al-Islam wal-Muslemin Ali Rahmani, in this commentary, has sought to explore the various dimensions of this lesser-addressed jurisprudential concept and discuss its application to the jurisprudence of art. According to this professor at the Mashhad Seminary, prior to examining this concept jurisprudentially, it is essential to consider terms such as “removal” (raf‘), “prevention” (daf‘), “eradication” (qal‘), and “suppression” (ḥasm), which are often associated with it. He further considers it a strategic error to study the use of this term in narrational and Quranic heritage without regard to the nature of the art contemporary to the issuance of the text. The full text of this insightful and scholarly commentary by a faculty member of the Akhund Khorasani Center and deputy of education at the Office of Islamic Propagation in Khorasan is presented below:
The methods and tools used to bring about corruption (ifsād) can be divided into two categories. Some are inherently categorized as prohibited. For instance, misguidance (iḍlāl) is a prohibited concept, and thus, it is covered by evidence of prohibition without requiring the application of the concept of corruption. Writing, buying, or selling deviant books, immorality, murder, and many other concepts prohibited by specific evidence fall under this category. Therefore, the question arises: if these concepts serve as tools or means to achieve corruption, are they, in addition to their primary prohibition, also subject to the prohibition of corruption? If the methods or tools used in corruption are not inherently prohibited, such as the use of a weapon, or if their prohibition is uncertain, does corruption render them prohibited?
Art and artistic works, due to their potential to influence audiences, may serve as tools or means to bring about corruption. This raises several questions: What is the primary ruling for such matters? If they fulfill the criterion of corruption, will they be deemed prohibited? If they are already subject to a primary prohibition and, under this assumption, bring about corruption, will their prohibition and associated penalties be intensified? In the initial encounter with artistic works and subjects, there is a perception that jurisprudence views them negatively.
Given that in traditional jurisprudence, the chapters related to art are included under prohibited transactions (makāsib muḥarrama), one might ask whether the predominant cautious approach among some jurists—particularly regarding ambiguous or newly emerged matters—or the interpretation of narrations detached from the contextual requirements of their issuance, or the failure to distinguish prohibited concepts from artistic ones in their general sense, has reinforced a negative perception of the domain of art. The application of concepts such as lahw (frivolity), lahw al-ḥadīth (vain discourse), bearing false witness, futility (laghw), play (la‘b), and the like to artistic genres and works has further strengthened this perception, evoking notions of corruption and sin in the minds of the religious community. To clarify this issue, it is first necessary to examine the relationship between the concept of corruption in the context of acts and artistic works and then determine the ruling of corruption and its impact on artistic works.
Corruption (fasād) is defined as the opposite of rectitude (ṣalāḥ) and is understood as something deviating from moderation. From a jurisprudential perspective, every crime or sin committed by a person brings about corruption in some aspect of their life. The nature of corruption depends on its context: if the transgression or sin pertains to personal matters, it results in personal corruption; however, if it affects the life, property, or rights of others, the corruption becomes broader and fulfills the criterion of ifsād (causing corruption).
Given the prohibition of corruption, its degrees and nature have led to various approaches in jurisprudence. Terms such as “removal” (raf‘), “prevention” (daf‘), “eradication” (qal‘), and “suppression” (ḥasm) of the source of corruption determine the nature of this engagement.
The term “removal of corruption” (raf‘-e fasād), synonymous with “enjoining good and forbidding evil” (amr bi al-ma‘rūf wa nahy ‘an al-munkar), is used when an evil or corruption has occurred but must be prevented from continuing. The obligation to remove corruption follows the evidence for forbidding evil.
“Prevention” (daf‘) is another term associated with corruption, used when an evil or corruption has not yet occurred and must be prevented. Among jurists, there is disagreement regarding the obligation or non-obligation of preventing evil, with each group relying on narrational evidence, and the determination of responsibility depends on resolving the conflict among these sources.
“Eradication” (qal‘), the third term related to corruption, is used for uprooting its source when it has the potential to take root, spread, and expand.
The final term associated with corruption is “suppression” (ḥasm), which jurists equate with cutting off or eradicating. Suppression or eradication of the source of corruption is a jurisprudential principle used to prevent or hinder the growth of corruption. Art or artistic works alone are not subject to the concept of corruption or concepts indicative of it. To understand this issue more accurately, it is necessary to revisit the concept of art.
Regarding the nature of art, numerous views and theories have been proposed. To date, no universally agreed-upon definition of such categories has been reached among scholars. Undoubtedly, elements such as extraordinariness, beauty, creativity, and reliance on imagination are constitutive components of art, even if its essence cannot be defined through logical limits and descriptions.
Art is a concept that, on its own, cannot bear a prescriptive or situational ruling, as it falls under the category of qualities, which inherently are not subject to jurisprudential rulings. A ruling applies only when art is associated with an act or the result of an act. To clarify, if art is defined as something extraordinary, beautiful, and creative, it merely indicates a quality that gives rise to a behavior or the realization of an effect in the external world. In this case, it becomes subject to a prescriptive ruling through acts such as teaching, learning, creating, promoting, preserving, and the like associated with it, such as teaching or learning art. Nevertheless, in Islamic jurisprudence, artistic acts and works have not been discussed as inherently artistic; rather, their impact, semantic implications, and the context of their origin have been prioritized over form and structure. Accordingly, the existing chapters in jurisprudence addressing art-related matters should not be regarded as the Shari‘a’s stance on the domain of art, nor should these matters be interpreted in isolation from their contextual elements.
Regardless of the fact that many artistic forms—such as eloquence, calligraphy, illumination, architecture, and the like—emerged or flourished with the support of the Holy Quran and Islamic narrations, many other artistic genres were intertwined with specific and unique contextual environments at the time of the revelation of Quranic verses and the issuance of narrations. Detaching an artistic act or form from its contextual meaning undermines a true understanding, especially since the cultural context of that environment influenced its familiar audience. Applying the evidence related to that context to a different environment with a distinct audience and culture leads to a divergence from the intended meaning of the Lawgiver and Legislator. It is not unlikely that revisiting the evidence related to artistic matters and works would suggest that only specific instances or forms compatible with the cultural, ideological, social, or political environment were subject to concepts such as lahw, lahw al-ḥadīth, bearing false witness, futility, play, and the like, and were deemed sinful and corrupt, and thus prohibited, with specific qualifications.
In this regard, an artistic work is not exempt from this equation. An artistic work is distinct from art itself. In fact, a work is a manifestation or expression of the constitutive elements of art created by the artist. Thus, it embodies beauty, creativity, and reliance on imagination, reflecting the emotions of its creator. These characteristics may manifest in literary forms (poetry or prose), performative forms (theater or film), visual forms (painting or sculpture), or other forms, creating an engaging and remarkable phenomenon.
Due to its narrative and meaning-conveying capacity, an artistic work can carry a specific message or concept. The context and environment in which the work is produced imbue it with this meaning. If the context and origin of the work’s creation are political, social, national, global, religious, or anti-religious, realistic or abstract, the artist, influenced by it, is driven toward specific thoughts and orientations, conveying a message aligned with that context. Thus, in every artistic work, beyond its dependence on the context of its creation, the meaning it carries must also be considered. Accordingly, a work may fall under condemned and prohibited concepts such as lahw, la‘b, misguidance (ḍalāl), causing misguidance (iḍlāl), corruption (fasād), causing corruption (ifsād), assisting in oppression or sin, or promoting immorality, just as it may align with concepts such as transcendence, reform, strengthening religion, promoting good, healing, and the like. Given that these concepts carry different rulings, a ruling compatible with each subject can be found in Shari‘a for the artistic work, such that some may be obligatory, some desirable, and some prohibited.
Thus, if an artistic act or work falls under a concept that is inherently prohibited, it becomes forbidden, and to the extent that it leads to personal corruption, it will also be subject to secondary evidence of corruption. For example, melodious sounds (ghinā) compatible with a frivolous environment are prohibited, and since they can, in terms of content, undermine moral virtues, the concept of corruption applies to them, making them subject to the evidence of prohibition. It is possible that an act or artistic work is not inherently sinful or corrupt but provides the grounds for it. Such cases, due to their role in facilitating or paving the way for prohibition, are deemed forbidden by the Lawgiver. If the creation of such a work is intended to promote and expand corruption, ifsād is realized, and its prohibition extends to these works as well. To clarify, ifsād, as the opposite of reform, pertains to property, actions, or aspects of human life and society that lead to ruin. In the Holy Quran and Islamic narrations, corruption (fasād) and causing corruption (ifsād) are deemed deserving of punishment. Verses such as “And they strive throughout the land [causing] corruption, and Allah does not love corrupters” (Quran, Al-Mā’ida 5:64) and “And do not cause corruption upon the earth” (Quran, Al-A‘rāf 7:74) clearly present corruption and wrongdoing as detestable to God, and He does not accept their occurrence.
The difference between fasād and ifsād is that an individual or work may be corrupt without leading to the ruin of others or society. Ifsād is realized when, beyond personal corruption, its expansion is aimed at causing deviation in an individual or society. In this case, if an artistic form or work is corruptive or contains corruption and is used to bring about ruin in other individuals or human society, it is undoubtedly subject to prohibition based on both its primary ruling and the evidence of ifsād.