“Misguidance from the path of God” (iḍlāl ‘an sabīl Allāh) is a well-known rationale frequently cited by those who argue for the prohibition or undesirability of an artistic work. However, numerous questions remain unanswered regarding this widely used rationale in the jurisprudence of art: Is misguidance a personal or categorical matter? Who determines its application? Does misguidance inherently lead to prohibition, or does it merely establish the undesirability of its subject? Perhaps one of the main reasons for the lack of clarity surrounding this rationale is its lack of independent analysis as a jurisprudential basis, coupled with its limited standalone discussion in the context of the jurisprudence of art. Dr. Alireza Salehi, a graduate of advanced jurisprudence and principles courses at the Qom Seminary and holder of a PhD in political sociology, seeks in this exclusive commentary to provide an overview of jurists’ approaches to using this rationale in arguments related to the jurisprudence of art.
“Misguidance” (iḍlāl) is a key term that, in religious teachings and consequently in jurisprudential texts, has been cited as one of the primary reasons for prohibiting certain artistic works. However, in contemporary jurisprudential research, given the proliferation of artistic domains and changes in their usage, the scope of applying the term iḍlāl has also undergone transformations.
The allure and enhanced role of art in human life, along with its widespread influence among people and its transformation from a mere luxury to a necessity of life, have prompted some jurisprudential researchers to emphasize the need for a shift in perspective toward art (Fazel Lankarani, 2017, p. 25) and to propose a new branch of jurisprudence called “the jurisprudence of art” (Alidoust & Dorri, 2021, p. 133). Consequently, examining the religious permissibility of art has become a significant concern, particularly for the religiously observant, though its rulings have not yet been comprehensively derived.
Religious teachings contain numerous statements about art (Alidoust, 2015, p. 42), but these are primarily negative, addressing specific instances such as poetry (Surah Ash-Shu‘arā’, 26:24; Harr Ameli, 1988, vol. 17, p. 315), sculpture and painting (Harr Ameli, 1988, vol. 17, p. 296), and singing and music (Surah Luqmān, 31:6; Surah Al-Hajj, 22:30; Kulayni, 1986, vol. 6, p. 431; Harr Ameli, 1988, vol. 17, p. 318; Kulayni, 1986, vol. 5, p. 119). Moreover, these issues have not been addressed cohesively in a single jurisprudential chapter.
Establishing a foundational principle and determining the primary ruling for art, independent of its external manifestations, is a topic that most contemporary jurists and religious researchers prioritize when examining art as a jurisprudential subject before delving into the rulings of its specific instances. According to Mohammad Javad Fazel Lankarani, a jurisprudential researcher, art and its subjects inherently lack a specific criterion; thus, they fall under the category of ibāḥa lā-iqtiḍā’ī (neutral permissibility), carrying neither a ruling of permissibility nor prohibition. Instead, if used legitimately, they may fall under permissibility, desirability, or even obligation, but if used illegitimately (i.e., causing misguidance from the path of God), they become prohibited (Fazel Lankarani, 2017, pp. 38-39). Similarly, Abolqasem Alidoust, a professor of advanced jurisprudence, citing Quranic verses (Surah Al-A‘rāf, 7:32) and narrations (Kulayni, 1986, vol. 6, p. 438), argues that the ruling for art, independent of its external manifestations, begins with desirability and may even reach the level of obligation (Alidoust, 2015, pp. 44-46; idem, 2021, Session 5).
After establishing a foundational principle and determining the primary ruling for art, jurists proceed to examine the religious rulings of its specific instances and external manifestations, relying on specific evidence, general jurisprudential principles, and secondary concepts. In jurisprudential texts, following religious narrations, among the instances of art, five—poetry, painting, sculpture, singing, and music—have been most extensively addressed. Earlier jurists, relying on the predominant negative view regarding these instances, particularly concerning painting and singing in religious teachings, leaned heavily toward prohibition, with their primary reason being the “misguidance” inherent in the ultimate intent of these arts (Imam Khomeini, 1994, vol. 1, p. 312; Meshkini, 2013, p. 419).
Iḍlāl, meaning leading astray or deviating from the truth (Dehkhoda, 1998, under the entry; Qurashi, vol. 4, p. 192), is a key term cited in the Quran and narrations as a rationale for prohibiting certain artistic activities. In Surah Luqmān, the phrase “to mislead from the path of God” is used to prohibit listening to “vain discourse” (lahw al-ḥadīth), which has been interpreted as referring to singing (Qummi, 1983, vol. 2, p. 161; Huwayzi, 1994, vol. 4, p. 193). Similarly, regarding the prohibition of sculpture, some verses (Surah Al-Anbiyā’, 21:52) and narrations (Noori, 1987, vol. 13, p. 210; Harr Ameli, 1988, vol. 17, p. 296) point to its use for purposes such as idolatry, ultimately leading to misguidance from the path of God. Regarding poetry, religious texts also indicate that poets and their followers are misguided (Surah Ash-Shu‘arā’, 26:224-225) and prohibit joining their ranks (Harr Ameli, 1988, vol. 17, p. 315).
The emphasis on the misleading nature of these arts in religious teachings has led some early and even contemporary jurists to adopt a negative view of such arts without distinguishing between those that cause misguidance and those that do not, deeming them prohibited. For instance, Sheikh Ansari not only considers sculpting living beings prohibited but also does not deem sculpting non-living beings entirely permissible (Sheikh Ansari, 1994, vol. 1, p. 188). Some contemporary authorities also consider the creation, buying, and selling of sculptures of living beings problematic (Safi Golpaygani, 1996, vol. 1, pp. 308-309; Makarem Shirazi, 2006, vol. 1, p. 159). Similarly, a strictly cautious approach persists regarding music, discouraging engagement in such fields (Safi, 1996, vol. 1, pp. 290-291).
Despite the stringent views on these five arts in earlier and some contemporary jurisprudential texts, recent jurisprudential research seeks to determine whether the prohibition is due to their artistic nature or other factors. Contemporary jurisprudential researchers, by compiling the available evidence on these arts—which includes not only prohibitive but also supportive narrations (Sheikh Saduq, 1992, vol. 4, p. 379; Barqi, 1992, vol. 2, p. 358; Harr Ameli, 1988, vol. 7, p. 403, and vol. 14, p. 579)—have concluded that reconciling conflicting evidence is possible without discarding any. According to them, the criterion for attaching a prohibition to artistic works is their misguidance of the audience from the path of God, and without verifying this criterion, a prohibition cannot be issued (Khamenei, 2019, p. 253). Thus, for arts like sculpture, which were once tools of corruption and misguidance but are no longer so, prohibition does not apply, as their characteristics have evolved over time, leading to a change in their ruling (Janati Shahrudi, 1996). It has also been stated that when elements cited in verses and narrations—such as “vain discourse,” “false speech,” or “taking it in jest”—which are relevant to the prohibition of melodious sounds, are absent, a prohibition cannot be applied to an artistic work. Only when these elements are present can an artistic work be deemed prohibited under the concept of iḍlāl (Alidoust, 2015, p. 56).