Reference: The issue of dignity and the term “right to dignity” have found their place in jurisprudential discussions in recent decades. The authorship of the book The Principle of Human Dignity as a Jurisprudential Rule was a significant step in theorizing this principle jurisprudentially. Hujjat al-Islam wal-Muslimeen Seyfollah Sarami is among the opponents of the right to dignity. He believes that the term “right to dignity” is fundamentally incorrect, and on the other hand, no divine ruling can be in conflict with the right to dignity. This professor of advanced lessons in jurisprudence and principles at the Qom Seminary, however, considers the conflict of the absolute affirmative application of some rulings with dignity to be unproblematic. The full text of the candid and exclusive interview of Contemporary Jurisprudence with the Director of the Institute of Jurisprudence and Law at the Research Institute of Islamic Sciences and Culture, on the topic of jurisprudential rulings conflicting with the right to dignity, is as follows:

Contemporary Jurisprudence: What is the human right to dignity mentioned in the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, and what are its dimensions?

Sarami: The term “right to dignity” is entirely incorrect; because the dignity mentioned at the outset of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, which is currently used as a basis for legal issues, has no connection whatsoever with the concept of the right to dignity. Rather, at the beginning of the Declaration, for the purpose of setting the stage, reference is made to the inherent dignity of humans as a foundation. In the noble verse “And We have certainly honored the children of Adam” (Qur’an, 17:70), humans are endowed with dignity. Discussions arise as to whether this dignity is inherent or what the dignity mentioned in the verse means. Does this dignity refer to respect, or does it point to specific attributes such as the particular intellect that humans possess? Some say this dignity refers to human characteristics, such as the distinctions in human creation compared to other creatures. In the noble verse “And We have certainly honored the children of Adam,” the preference and dignity mentioned in part of this verse mean that We created humans with special attributes. In any case, dignity, neither in Islamic culture nor in today’s human rights literature, is referred to as the right to dignity, and attributes such as tribe, lineage, color, or religion have no bearing on this matter. This attribute is an independent matter, not something separate, but rather an attribute pointing to qualities such as free will and intellect. In any case, the right to dignity is considered as an attribute, whether as an inherent attribute or as an attribute pointing to the aforementioned qualities.

This is what the right to dignity is. But as for its dimensions, perhaps you mean what status it has, in the sense of what position and importance this attribute has in anthropological discussions. What importance and status can it have in either of the meanings mentioned? In any case, regardless of the meaning, we must see what status it holds. In this matter, theological dimensions have no bearing on its jurisprudential discussion. Thus, the fundamental and correct question is: What is human dignity, and what is its status in Islamic law, Islam, and Islamic teachings?

This question is appropriate and correct, but in my opinion, the initial question you raised was not correct. As for its status, the question is whether it is a jurisprudential rule, a jurisprudential principle, a principle of legal theory, or a paradigm in the sense of a framework that influences every inference, understanding, or interpretation.

If I were to answer this, it seems to me that dignity is a theological principle. Like human intellect and free will, dignity is also considered a principle; that is, in all matters related to the rulings of Islamic law, it is unrelated to human rights or modern issues. It is a theological principle, and it seems to be a pervasive and operative principle. The statement that God makes about humans is based on this principle: “We have honored the children of Adam.” Humans have been honored by God, and in their creation, they have been honored. The question arises: What does it mean to be honored? Humans, as humans, have a particular respect. They have the right to guidance and the right to choose. It brings them free will. Other characteristics give humans preference and superiority due to these attributes. Thus, firstly, I corrected the question, and secondly, I answered the second part to the extent possible.

Contemporary Jurisprudence: In general, which divine rulings are considered to conflict with the human right to dignity and should be set aside?

Sarami: This question has a presupposition, namely that dignity, as a human attribute, conflicts with certain rulings, and because of this conflict, those rulings should be set aside. The dignity that God Almighty has bestowed upon humans is distinct from the rulings that He Himself has established; but the presupposition is problematic. Divine rulings, as divine rulings in their state of establishment, have no meaning that could conflict with dignity. How could it be that He has established something and, on the other hand, it is contradictory? Hence, this presupposition is flawed.

It might be said that divine rulings refer to what a jurist seeks to deduce, deriving an interpretation from a narration, verse, or consensus, and sees that this interpretation conflicts with human dignity. When this interpretation conflicts, it is as if the divine ruling being deduced has not yet reached the stage of validity. What you have deduced is in a stage prior to validity, but when you see that it conflicts with a human’s free will or rationality, you set it aside; hence, such a ruling is not called a divine ruling. The interpretations we have should not conflict with human dignity, and an interpretation that conflicts with human dignity does not reach the stage of a ruling and lacks validity. It makes no sense for a ruling to be a divine ruling and conflict with human dignity.

Now, if we examine it from the perspective of affirmative application, it is possible that the absolute application of a ruling in certain circumstances conflicts with matters such as human dignity. For example, consider the ruling requiring a wife to obtain her husband’s permission to leave the home. The principle of this ruling does not conflict with human dignity, and ultimately, the household must be managed, and this overarching management has been entrusted to the husband. However, it may conflict with human dignity in certain circumstances; hence, this may lead us to set aside only the absolute application of this ruling, not its principle. Or, for instance, if a woman is in a situation where the husband’s seeking intimacy conflicts with human dignity. Rulings that are in the stage of deduction and have not yet reached the stage of validity may conflict.

Contemporary Jurisprudence: Can the requirement of obedience in all circumstances, differences in blood money and inheritance, or any other issue be considered to conflict with human dignity?

Sarami: Divine rulings, as divine rulings, cannot conflict with divine establishment and cannot, in their established state, conflict with real benefits and harms. However, it is possible that some of these rulings, in certain affirmative circumstances, conflict with benefits and harms. It is necessary to distinguish between situational and obligatory rulings. For example, inheritance is a situational ruling and differs for men in certain circumstances, but it is the same for their children. The inheritance of a sister and brother differs. The principle of this difference may have been established by the law for achieving benefits and preventing harms, and this does not conflict with human dignity. However, it may appear to conflict in certain circumstances. The statement that a woman’s inheritance is half that of a man is not correct; rather, it is the sister’s inheritance that, compared to the brother, is half in specific circumstances. In any case, these situational rulings cannot conflict with human dignity because they express reality, and the Lawgiver is expressing it, so there cannot be a difference. However, some obligatory rulings may conflict with human dignity in certain circumstances, in which case we refrain from their absolute application.

Contemporary Jurisprudence: Can some criminal rulings be considered to conflict with dignity?

Sarami: The Sacred Lawgiver has established a system for humans, whom He Himself has honored, and it is possible that in specific circumstances, it may negate dignity, in which case we refrain from the absolute application of these rulings. However, this does not mean that the ruling, in general, conflicts. The reality is that the Lawgiver, on the one hand, establishes rulings and, on the other hand, seeks their intelligent execution. The intelligent execution of rulings is very important. Therefore, it is impossible for the human right to dignity to conflict with certain executions, and if there is a conflict, it may be delayed or set aside, which in this case does not conflict with divine rulings. Rulings are objective matters aimed at worldly and otherworldly felicity, and such rulings, in their established state, have no conflict with human dignity. In these cases, we must pay attention to the principle and absolute application of the ruling. For instance, in cases of retribution or punishment, because a crime has been committed—such as stoning or flogging—only the flogging should be carried out, but the rest of their human rights remain intact. For example, their greeting must be answered, or if they are thirsty, water must be given to them, or if they are hungry, food must be provided. To the extent that the rulings require, they must be executed, and the rest, which pertains to upholding human dignity, must be observed.