Faculty Member of the Women and Family Research Institute, in an Exclusive Interview with Contemporary Fiqh:

Examination of the Jurisprudential Dimensions of Spousal Violence/4

Referring to international literature, it appears that the concept of violence against men has Western origins, emerging as an inevitable consequence of new family forms, the proliferation of gender theory, and propositions stemming from the sexual revolution, such as sexual and gender fluidity. Accordingly, reports and studies indicate that violence against men or domestic violence against men by their spouses is more prevalent in families with same-sex partners or spouses than in opposite-sex relationships. Men are still more likely to experience violence from other men than from women.

Note: Violence against wives has long been a topic in the discourse of women’s jurisprudence and law, with concepts such as spousal rape and the categorization of various forms of violence against women emerging from this dialogue. However, another form of violence, termed violence against husbands, is also conceivable, though it has received less attention in jurisprudential and legal literature. We discussed this issue with Dr. Nahid Salimi, a faculty member of the Women and Family Research Institute. This author and women’s studies scholar believes that violence against husbands has been examined in our jurisprudential literature, but the term itself was coined by societies that permit homosexuality and sexual relationships between men. The full text of Contemporary Fiqh’s exclusive interview with this faculty member of the Women and Family Research Institute is presented below:

Contemporary Fiqh: Is violence in marital relationships only perpetrated against wives, or is violence by wives against husbands also conceivable?

Salimi: Violence, in its literal and practical sense, refers to a type of harsh and aggressive behavior as opposed to gentle conduct and reconciliation, which takes on different manifestations and meanings depending on the cultural and environmental context. In Islamic jurisprudence, violence is considered in both positive and negative senses. In its positive sense, it denotes firmness and refusal to compromise with enemies or lawbreakers, while in its negative sense, it refers to a Muslim’s transgression against the rights of others or the law. One of the prominent aspects of Islamic jurisprudence in regulating marital relationships is the concept of nushūz (rebellion or disobedience) and specifically nushūz of the wife, which pertains to transgression against the husband’s rights and can be interpreted as violence against the husband. Given that the discussion of nushūz by the wife has been addressed with greater precision and frequency in jurisprudence, it could even be argued that addressing violence against husbands and prohibiting such violence holds a more significant place in Islamic culture and jurisprudence. This prohibition is explicitly supported by narrations, where transgression against the husband’s rights by the wife is condemned. The Prophet (peace be upon him and his progeny) stated in this regard: “Any woman who harms her husband, God will not accept her prayers or good deeds, even if she fasts her entire life, performs prayers, frees many slaves, or spends abundant wealth in the way of God, unless she gains her husband’s satisfaction. If she passes away without her husband’s approval, she will be the first to enter Hell.”

Contemporary Fiqh: Can behaviors such as coldness in sexual relations, using vulgar language by the wife during sexual intercourse, or forcing the husband into certain sexual positions be considered instances of sexual violence against the husband? What is the jurisprudential ruling on this?

Salimi: If we consider the examples of violence mentioned in light of the broader perspective outlined at the beginning of the discussion, we see that many behaviors by the wife that deviate from societal norms or involve excess or negligence, which have extended from jurisprudence to law, align with the concept of negative violence in the context of marriage—violence that exceeds legal boundaries. Specifically, coldness in sexual relations, if there is no legitimate impediment, has been strongly prohibited in jurisprudence and is considered an instance of negligence that results in the violation of the husband’s rights.

Therefore, in the Islamic approach, although specific rights and obligations between spouses are automatically established upon marriage, and spouses are required to fulfill their duties and maintain good conduct with one another, the behavioral and non-financial aspects, particularly the husband’s rights over the wife and the wife’s obligations, have received greater attention through the expanded conceptual and practical scope of tamkīn (submission) and nushūz. Thus, if a wife neglects her duties and is indifferent toward her husband, she is considered in jurisprudence and law to have committed nushūz and spousal harm. This harm includes anything related to specific tamkīn that affects the husband’s sexual enjoyment from the wife. Therefore, behaviors such as insulting the husband or insisting on specific forms of sexual pleasure that lead to the husband’s dissatisfaction or lack of enjoyment in sexual relations are considered forms of the wife’s nushūz and harm to the husband.

Contemporary Fiqh: Can humiliating the husband, comparing him to other men, threatening divorce, being aggressive, or using abusive language against him be considered instances of verbal violence against the husband? What is the jurisprudential ruling on this?

Salimi: The First Martyr (Shahīd Awwal) considered frowning or being sullen toward the husband as a precursor to nushūz, and the Second Martyr (Shahīd Thānī) regarded harsh speech as a form of verbal violence and a precursor to nushūz. This applies to changes in speech from gentleness and calmness to harshness and aggression, which pertains to both husband and wife. However, what has been extended to legal and ethical norms primarily concerns the wife’s behavior. In fact, the husband’s nushūz and harm are generally limited to failing to provide maintenance (nafaqa) to the wife and fulfilling obligatory cohabitation within a specified and extended period, with fewer qualitative stipulations compared to those for women.

Contemporary Fiqh: Given that instances of violence (physical and verbal) against men by women are not uncommon, why is violence in marital relationships often interpreted solely as violence by men against women?

Salimi: As discussed earlier, combined with Islam’s general approach to the family, the concept and stance on violence against men in the family context are limited to two main aspects:

First, in Islamic rationality, the regulation of societal relationships, particularly within the family, relies not only on rights and obligations outlined in jurisprudence and law but also heavily on ethical considerations and the role of conscience. Islam fundamentally does not incline toward excessive legislation or judicialization of the family, prioritizing the collective interests of the family based on sacrifice and forbearance over an extreme focus on individual rights and pure legal individualism.

Second, the rights of the husband and the wife’s obligations toward him have been addressed extensively and comprehensively in Islamic jurisprudence and laws. It is rare for a negative behavioral instance by the wife in the marital relationship not to fall within the conceptual and practical framework of the wife’s nushūz and harm to the husband. Therefore, addressing the concept of violence against men in the marital relationship is neither a novel nor overlooked matter in the Islamic and jurisprudential approach, unlike the case for women. While violence and transgression against women’s rights are visibly widespread in the context of social transformations, instances of violence against men, due to natural and legal gender-specific characteristics, have not been widespread historically or presently.

The expansion of this concept, like many social and legal family-related concepts, may be a function of the inevitable developments in international discourse and policies due to globalization. It should be noted that Western discourse on the family, along with emerging deviations in the structure and essence of the family and its forms, has led to the family losing its foundational role as a cohesive fundamental community with interconnected interests. The dominance of individualism over family-centered collectivism has increasingly highlighted individual domains and rights. In this context, the primary audience of legal systems and legislation consists of individuals whose interests must constantly be safeguarded in relation to one another, rather than a family unit where individuals are secondary in resolving issues to preserve the family.

Referring to international literature, it appears that the concept of violence against men has Western origins, emerging as an inevitable consequence of new family forms, the proliferation of gender theory, and propositions stemming from the sexual revolution, such as sexual and gender fluidity. Accordingly, reports and studies indicate that violence against men or domestic violence against men by their spouses is more prevalent in families with same-sex partners or spouses than in opposite-sex relationships. Men are still more likely to experience violence from other men than from women. In these documents, a man’s sexual orientation and the humiliation or attacks related to it from a partner or spouse are recurring themes in the conceptual framework of violence against men. Therefore, even in the Western model, where family structure and content are increasingly judicialized, and violence is expanding, the prevalence of domestic violence against women is not comparable to that against men. Statistics show that approximately one in four women experiences violence from an intimate partner or spouse from the age of fifteen, compared to one in thirteen men.

Thus, in religious and jurisprudential literature, the concepts of tamkīn and nushūz, which disrupt family tranquility as forms of excess or negligence with legal implications, have been sufficiently addressed. Adding newer dimensions or intensifying this discourse requires specific underlying causes, which are not always present in Iranian and Islamic culture.

Contemporary Fiqh: In Islamic jurisprudence and law, what protections are provided for a man who is a victim of violence by his wife?

Salimi: It appears that Islam does not intend for maximum intervention in the family and its individual domains, allowing family issues to be resolved through ethical mechanisms. Therefore, an Islamic government only has the authority to exercise power in cases of violence classified as the wife’s nushūz or extreme or negligent actions leading to harm, and it does not have the right to intervene in matters considered precursors to violence. In other words, this is where Islamic thought differs from Western perspectives, as the latter, for reasons discussed, believe in and need to legally intervene in all types of behaviors deemed violent in the modern world.

Nevertheless, referring to Islamic jurisprudence, law, and legislation, greater emphasis has been placed on protecting the husband’s rights against the wife’s transgressions, with numerous instances of the wife’s excesses or negligence identified through the mechanism of nushūz. Most behaviors considered violence against men fall within this framework and can be pursued accordingly.

In general and applicable to both spouses, Article 1103 of the Civil Code states: “Husband and wife are obligated to maintain good conduct with one another.” This good conduct generally includes forgiving each other’s mistakes, respecting one another, behaving ethically toward each other, refraining from speaking ill of or revealing each other’s flaws in front of others, fulfilling sexual enjoyment rights, and cooperating and consulting in life matters. Additionally, insults and disrespect in social and family interactions are actionable in a gender-neutral manner. According to Article 608 of the Islamic Penal Code, which pertains to discretionary punishments (ta‘zīr) for crimes against individuals’ dignity (where no specific punishment is prescribed by Sharia), such actions are considered violations of personal rights and are punishable under the law. This article explicitly states that insulting, including using vulgar language, is considered an offense, and any other behavior falling within this scope is deemed violence. The article specifies that insulting individuals, such as through abusive language or vulgar expressions, unless it constitutes qadhf (false accusation of adultery or sodomy), is punishable by up to 74 lashes or a fine of 50,000 to 1,000,000 rials. Furthermore, if the insult involves improper accusations (such as adultery or sodomy) and the perpetrator cannot prove their validity in court, they will be punished with 80 lashes under Article 250 of the Islamic Penal Code.

Regarding the husband’s rights and the wife’s obligations, the legislator has established enforcement mechanisms for the wife’s harmful behaviors through the expanded conceptual framework of nushūz and tamkīn (general and specific).

The direct consequence of a wife’s failure to fulfill tamkīn in Islamic jurisprudence and law is the forfeiture of her right to maintenance (nafaqa), a matter agreed upon by both Shi‘i and Sunni jurists. This ruling is explicitly stated in Article 1108 of the Civil Code, where the negative effect of a wife’s poor conduct is the loss of her maintenance. If a wife refuses to reside in the home provided by her husband, leaves the home without his permission or consent, maintains inappropriate relationships or friendships, or fails to satisfy her husband sexually, she is considered nāshiza (disobedient). Additionally, under Article 1117 of the Civil Code, a husband may prohibit his wife from engaging in a profession that is contrary to the family’s interests.

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