Note: The jurisprudence of international relations, both in terms of its sensitivity and the breadth of its subject matter, and due to the novelty of this branch of jurisprudence, faces numerous challenges for its researchers. However, some of these challenges are pseudo-challenges, not real ones, and one should not fall into their trap. Amin Rezaei-Nejad, a researcher at the Pendar Think Tank, has extensive familiarity and studies both in the field of jurisprudence and in international relations. Regarding these challenges, he believes there is no need to revise our jurisprudential rulings as soon as a challenge arises. For example, to connect with the world, it is not necessary to revise our jurisprudential rulings that contradict some international conventions; rather, we must become so strong that the world does not interfere with the contradiction of our rulings and laws with these conventions, just as it is the case with powerful countries in the world. The full text of the engaging and readable interview of Contemporary Jurisprudence with this researcher in jurisprudence of international relations passes before your eyes:

Contemporary Jurisprudence: What are the most important challenges facing research in the jurisprudence of international relations?

Rezaei-Nejad: The jurisprudence of international relations, as an emerging branch in Islamic studies and the discipline of international relations, faces multiple challenges at the conceptual, methodological, and operational levels. These challenges, due to inherent complexities and the exigencies of the contemporary era, require serious reflection and innovative approaches. At the conceptual level, creating transformation in traditional concepts when confronting the new international system is of great importance. Many jurisprudential concepts related to international relations, such as dar al-Islam, dar al-kufr, jihad, and peace, have been formed in a different historical context.

The emergence of nation-states from the Treaty of Westphalia in 1648 and its consequence, which is the new international legal systems, the end of World War II and the formation of modern foundations in the international arena, the change in the nature and manner of exercising power, and even the change in the concept of governance at the global level, have led to the creation of a deep gap between traditional concepts that were formed in a historical and Hobbesian anarchic context and the new modern concepts of international law, which are often based on Kantian rationality rather than being historical. Redefining traditional concepts in a way that preserves their jurisprudential authenticity while having applicability in the new order is strongly felt. Also, the confrontation created between fixed principles and the variables of the time is one of the important concerns that must be addressed. Finding a balance between fixed religious rulings and socio-political changes in international relations is of great importance; for example, how can the principle of the prohibition of unjust contracts be harmonized with the mechanisms imposed on weak countries in today’s unjust global system?

One of the most important methodological challenges in this field is the issue of interaction between jurisprudence and new sciences. In my opinion, the lack of coherence in ijtihad methods is an important issue. Traditional ijtihad methods, which mainly focus on deduction from texts, face limitations when confronting multifaceted and complex issues in international relations such as human rights, terrorism, national interests, or cyber warfare; for this reason, using interdisciplinary methods and interacting with scholars in the fields of political science, international law, and global economy for a better understanding of the topics is essential, and perhaps even mujtahids who are specialized solely in this field should be trained. On the one hand, in classical jurisprudential texts, less attention has been paid to international relations in its modern sense. As a result, researchers often face a shortage of primary sources for ijtihad, and the need for producing new content is felt, in which case my recommendation is again the training of specialized mujtahids in this field. Also, one of the key issues in this regard is the ambiguity in the position of international custom in jurisprudential ijtihad; that is, how should one deal with international customs and accepted legal rules at the global level? Or can these customs, as the practice of rational people, be involved in deducing religious rulings or not?

On the other hand, there are two operational challenges in this field, the first of which is the difficulty of adapting theory to practice. More clearly, translating jurisprudential theories into practical policy-making has its own difficulties and complexities. For example, how can theories related to justice in international relations be applied in setting commercial contracts or foreign policies? The second challenge is the political and economic pressures exerted by great powers against Muslims. These pressures sometimes limit the possibility of implementing jurisprudential principles in international relations. This issue creates challenges such as observing justice or preserving independence in the foreign policy of Islamic countries. The third challenge is the lack of jurisprudential consensus among Islamic countries and also the secularity and laïcité prevailing in some Islamic countries. Differences among countries and various jurisprudential and even intellectual schools prevent the creation of a unified and effective Islamic discourse at the global level, through which the pressures of the modern order on Islamic jurisprudence can be reduced.

Contemporary Jurisprudence: With rules such as the “rule of negation of dominance” and rulings such as offensive jihad, permission for dishonoring, backbiting, and harassing the infidel, etc., which express the superiority of the Muslim over the infidel and the Shia over the Sunni, can one organize the jurisprudence of international relations that is based on the equal rights and interests of states and nations?

Rezaei-Nejad: This question is one of the fundamental and challenging issues in the field of jurisprudence of international relations, which relates to apparent conflicts between some jurisprudential rules and rulings with the foundations of contemporary international law. In responding to this question, a comprehensive approach must be adopted that is faithful to jurisprudential principles while considering the exigencies of the modern world.

In my opinion, the first issue is the nature and scope of the discussed jurisprudential rules and rulings; for example, the rule of negation of dominance, which is based on the verse “And Allah will never make a way for the disbelievers over the believers,” means negating any dominance of infidels over Muslims. In the individual and social dimension, this rule indicates preserving the dignity and independence of Muslims against enemies; but the way in this rule means unjust and coercive dominance, not any kind of relationship that may be beneficial to both parties; therefore, it does not seem that contracts and mutual interactions based on legitimate interests are necessarily in conflict with this rule. Although in case-specific evaluation, we face numerous theoretical differences, a prominent and very recent example of which can be stated in the case of JCPOA. On one side, the Supreme Leader was there who expressed heroic flexibility and viewed the JCPOA negotiations as a tactic to escape a temporary problem; but on the opposite side, Mr. Dr. Rouhani’s government believed that the nuclear JCPOA could be the starter of other levels of negotiations on regional, missile, etc. issues, so that by reducing Iran’s extension of hand in the international arena, we can reach de-escalation with the West.

Offensive jihad and rulings on the superiority of the Muslim over the infidel have also mostly been formed in a historical context and a specific social system of the era of revelation and we know that it requires the permission of the Infallible (peace be upon him); but this very offensive jihad was raised in a period when the international system did not exist in the form of current nation-states and political and religious legitimacy was usually defined within the framework of expanding the Islamic territory. For example, some Iranian kings like Nader Shah Afshar attacked India multiple times with this very ruling; but in today’s world, with the acceptance of the principle of national sovereignty and borders and the prohibition of aggressive war in international law, these rulings are applicable in more specific contexts, and one can apply this very ruling that is only related to the era of the appearance of the Infallible (peace be upon him). For example, preemptive war, which has been raised multiple times by the United States, and also Russia’s attack on Ukraine, which started with this very logic, can be considered as a basis for using the principle of offensive jihad.

I mentioned this example to justify the use of the ruling of offensive jihad in the modern era, and certainly I do not mean that the actions of Russia or the United States give us a jurisprudential basis. In general, I mentioned the example of offensive jihad to say that in fact, there is not much distance between jurisprudential rules and rulings that we are not even using them currently and today’s global realities. On the other hand, dishonoring, backbiting, and harassing the infidel also mostly mean confronting the enemies of Islam and those who are at war or conspiring against Muslims; therefore, these rulings cannot be generalized broadly to all issues in international relations.

Another raised issue is apparent conflicts and the possibility of reinterpretation. In this regard, one can point to the necessity of distinguishing between fixed principles and jurisprudential variables. One of the important principles in Shia jurisprudence is flexibility in confronting new issues. Rules such as negation of dominance or offensive jihad generally have general aspects, but their application depends on temporal and spatial conditions and exigencies. For example, in conditions where the international system is based on the equality of sovereignties, observing these principles means striving to preserve the dignity, independence, and interests of Muslims and is not recognized as a method for aggression or disregard for others. Also, alongside rules such as negation of dominance, the rule of justice is also one of the central principles of Shia jurisprudence that emphasizes observing rights and fairness in relations with others. This rule can be a basis for reviewing the application of traditional rulings to new conditions, which in fact will seem very beneficial and modern.
Another issue that is very important is some aspects of maqasid jurisprudence, which has been accepted by Shia and is oriented towards the result-oriented nature of Shia jurisprudence, resulting in the acceptance of parts of this jurisprudence. Shia jurisprudence, considering principles such as secondary rulings and repelling corruptions, has the capacity to reinterpret rulings; even those rulings that may seem in conflict with the grand goals of Islam, namely realizing justice and peaceful coexistence.

Finally, it should be pointed out that the new international system, although apparently but on paper, is formed based on legal equality among states; as a result, although some jurisprudential rulings apparently express the superiority of Muslims, the jurisprudence of international relations can interpret these rulings within the framework of Muslims’ duty to invite to justice and fight against oppression, not necessarily aggression or dominance over others. Also, the rule of negation of dominance can be considered as a framework to prevent unjust dominance and secure the independence and interests of Muslims in the global system and as a protective principle. This rule prevents the acceptance of colonial contracts or economic and political dependence on great powers, but at the same time, it has no conflict with participation in international institutions that are based on the common and accepted term of interdependence. In fact, in interdependence, we face a positive semantic load; because this dependence means friendship and cooperation. On the other hand, many rulings such as dishonoring and harassing the infidel, which may not even have a strong jurisprudential basis, relate to individual behaviors or war conditions and cannot be the basis for the foreign policy of the Islamic state. Foreign policy must be set based on the interests of the ummah and rational principles.

Contemporary Jurisprudence: Considering the non-acceptance of geographical borders in traditional jurisprudence and adherence to dar al-Islam and dar al-harb, can one fundamentally depict “international relations” in its current form in jurisprudential knowledge?

Rezaei-Nejad: It seems that to reach the answer to this question, first we must explain the traditional jurisprudential foundations regarding the division of the world and then address the feasibility of reviewing or adapting it to current structures. In traditional jurisprudence, the division of the world into dar al-Islam and dar al-harb acts as a legal-political system. Dar al-Islam are areas under the sovereignty of Islamic government where Islamic laws are implemented in that geographical area; and dar al-harb are territories outside the control of Islamic government and are considered as areas in confrontation with Islam.
Although this division has roots in specific historical conditions, today some groups like ISIS used these very concepts and declared Iran and Syria as dar al-harb, but this idea did not endure, and ultimately we saw that even supporters of ISIS like Turkey and some Arab League countries sought to reconnect with Damascus. In general, this idea relates to a time when the concept of nation-state and geographical borders in the modern sense did not exist. The global system at that time was more based on empires and religious or ethnic territories, and wars based on territorial conquests were an accepted rule. It must be accepted that this framework cannot fully harmonize with the realities of the modern international system, which is based on the principle of national sovereignty, defined geographical borders, and legal equality of states; because in my opinion, the concept of an Islamic country is also now raised as a challenge.

For example, is the country of Azerbaijan under the sovereignty of an anti-Shia government that even wages war against rituals, merely because Muslims live there, an Islamic country? This country is a member of the Organization of Islamic Conference and has the right to express opinions there; but it is one of the leading countries in the field of citizens becoming atheists. In confronting this country, which we know is an enemy of Iran, what name should we give it? Dar al-Islam? Dar al-harb? Islamic country? Or what… On the other hand, with the existence of multiple Islamic countries and the absence of a unified Islamic sovereignty, determining the instance of dar al-Islam in the current system has also become a serious challenge, which itself is a lengthy discussion.

Also, although traditional jurisprudence does not recognize geographical borders; but today, Islamic states practically operate based on nationally recognized borders in the international system; for example, countries like Iran, Turkey, or Saudi Arabia set their foreign relations based on the principle of national sovereignty, although in some cases, intellectual and ideological relations exist, which is also one of the masterpieces of Shia jurisprudence, such as the deep spiritual connection of Ansarullah Yemen, Hezbollah Lebanon, and Hamas Palestine with Iran’s sovereignty; but ultimately it must be said that in the modern system, it is these nation-states that are recognized as the main actors in international relations, and non-state actors do not have much formality.

The relations of these political units are also set based on principles of equality, respect for sovereignty, and international law, which requires reviewing jurisprudential concepts; for example, instead of emphasizing the division of the world into dar al-Islam and dar al-harb, one can raise the concept of the unified ummah. This view, instead of geography, emphasizes religious solidarity among Muslims and can be realized in the form of regional and international cooperations among Islamic countries; or in traditional jurisprudence, in addition to dar al-Islam and dar al-harb, there is a concept called dar al-mu’ahadah – meaning territories that have a peace treaty with Muslims. This concept can be expanded and used as a framework for mutual relations and cooperation with other states in the international system.
Also, the rule of expediency and repelling harm, meaning preserving national interests and repelling harm from the Islamic ummah, can be the basis for international relations and even a replacement for traditional divisions.

On the other hand, Shia jurisprudence has accepted valid custom in deducing rulings. International custom, which today is recognized as the basis of international law, can be considered by jurists in setting international relations.

Finally, it should be pointed out that Islamic jurisprudence can organize international relations based on the principle of justice and negation of oppression. This principle, which in fact has roots in the Quran and tradition, is a suitable replacement for old and inefficient divisions.

Contemporary Jurisprudence: To have an active presence in the international arena, one of the requirements of which is joining international conventions, to what extent can one disregard jurisprudential rulings?

Rezaei-Nejad: At the beginning, I would like to correct the assumption of your question. To have an active presence in the international arena, one must be strong, and joining international conventions is not necessarily important. The United States and the Zionist regime are not members of NPT. The United States easily withdraws from the Kyoto Protocol. George Bush, at the United Nations after September 11, issues the order to destroy Afghanistan and Iraq. If Iran were not strong in the missile industry, it could not attack the Zionist regime. The West condemned Iran; but since they do not have the power, they cannot do anything.

I answer your question from the logic of power and political realism. We must become so strong that there is no need to change our jurisprudential foundations with the principles and logic of the current international conventions, and we must even strive in the new world order, whose signs have become clear to everyone, to place ourselves in the international arena in a position where we are the order-giver and determiner of law and convention. The Supreme Leader rightly pointed this out regarding artificial intelligence. Although even in this current order, in international law, there is the rule of reservation. According to this rule, countries can, when joining a convention, exclude provisions that conflict with domestic or religious laws.

Of course, one can give another answer to this question. Suppose we can never achieve order-giving power. Then what should we do? It seems that rules like hardship and embarrassment, expediency, and important and more important can be the key to the field of jurisprudence of international relations. Also, secondary rulings can solve many problems in this field. Many jurisprudential rulings raised in the field of international relations depend on temporal and spatial conditions and exigencies, and in this field, there is more flexibility for joining conventions.

Contemporary Jurisprudence: Considering the minority status of Muslims and especially Shias in the global society, can one deduce the rulings of the jurisprudence of international relations based on taqiyyah conditions?

Rezaei-Nejad: Taqiyyah, one of the important principles of Shia jurisprudence, means concealment or flexibility in the face of serious threats and dangers to preserve life, property, religion, or other important interests. This principle is applied in conditions where there is either a real danger to Muslims or the Shia religion, or it is necessary to consider a greater interest. If Muslims or Shias are in a situation where, due to being a minority, it is not possible to fully implement jurisprudential rulings, one can use the principle of taqiyyah to set the rulings of international relations. This issue is especially important in cases where open opposition to the international system causes a threat to the vital interests of Muslims. For example, one can mention accepting membership in organizations some of whose provisions do not align with Islamic sharia, but membership in them is necessary for defending the interests of Muslims.

Of course, taqiyyah cannot be an excuse for overlooking the fundamental principles of religion, such as observing justice or negating oppression, and it should not be forgotten that it is always temporary and must be managed in such a way that ultimately, the possibility of returning to the full implementation of Islamic rulings is provided. Also, any action based on taqiyyah must be such that it does not damage the Islamic identity and its central principles.
In conditions where Muslims, especially Shias, are in the minority, jurisprudential rulings can be reviewed based on principles such as repelling harm and attracting benefit. In such conditions, it may even be possible to temporarily set aside some non-essential rulings so that the main and vital rulings are preserved. Also, taqiyyah can be a tool for advancing policies based on interaction and peaceful cooperation, of course, provided that the dignity of Muslims is also preserved.