Note: The right to human equality, while appearing self-evident at first glance, proves to be deceptively simple upon closer examination. The critical question is whether, given the diverse aptitudes and capacities of human beings across different ages and genders, equality is a genuine right and beneficial for them, or if it can sometimes lead to injustice. This very issue has prompted many jurists to propose the theory of justice in place of equality. In any event, the right to equality has posed numerous challenges to Islamic jurisprudence. In this regard, we spoke with Hujjat al-Islam wal-Muslimeen Mohammad Jalili Shahmansouri, a professor of advanced studies at the Qom Seminary. He identifies the traditional structure of the discipline of jurisprudence, which he argues does not permit the discussion of such topics, as a primary reason for the lack of a serious and independent treatment of this right in Shi’i jurisprudence. The full transcript of the exclusive interview between Contemporary Jurisprudence and this professor and researcher from the Qom Seminary follows:
Contemporary Jurisprudence: What is the right to human equality, and what are its dimensions?
Jalili: Within our framework of jurisprudential thought and the fundamental laws of the Islamic Republic of Iran, the right to human equality is a foundational principle. It emphasizes the equality of all individuals in intrinsic dignity, fundamental rights, and fair access to opportunities, and it repudiates any undue discrimination or privileges that lack a valid religious (Shar’i) and rational justification. This right has, on one hand, an intrinsic-ontological basis, whereby the Holy Lawgiver has ordained an ontological dignity for “the human being qua human being.” As the Holy Qur’an affirms, “And We have certainly honored the children of Adam” (17:70), and Imam Ali (a.s.) states in his letter to Malik al-Ashtar, “For they are of two kinds: either a brother to you in faith or an equal to you in creation.” This serves as a jurisprudential and ethical maxim indicating the negation of any privilege based on race, gender, or social class. On the other hand, this right has a posited-conventional aspect, manifested in positive laws and regulations designed to govern citizen relations and ensure social justice. In the Iranian Constitution, Articles 3 (clause 9), 19, and 20 emphasize the elimination of undue discrimination, the equality of people’s rights, and the equality of men and women under the protection of the law (in accordance with Islamic standards), all of which are rooted in Qur’anic and jurisprudential foundations and the established practice of rational people (sira al-‘uqala’).
The dimensions of the right to human equality can be analyzed along four distinct axes: First, dignity-based equality, an inalienable quality articulated in jurisprudence through concepts like the sanctity of a protected life and the prohibition against insulting the life and honor of individuals. Second, legal equality, meaning the equality of all before the law and the judiciary, in line with the maxim “People are as equal as the teeth of a comb” (al-nasu sawa’un ka-asnan al-musht) and the principles of Islamic due process. Third, equality of opportunity, which implies creating equitable conditions for access to social, economic, and educational resources, inspired by the verse, “so that it will not be a perpetual circulation among the rich among you” (59:7). Fourth, protective equality, signifying the equal entitlement of all individuals to the protection of the state and society in safeguarding life, property, and honor, derived from the principle of denying domination (nafy sabil) and the obligation to defend every protected life. Nonetheless, Islamic jurisprudence differentiates between equality in dignity, which is absolute and universal, and differences in certain religious rulings that are based on legislative wisdom and exigency (such as regulations concerning inheritance or blood money). Therefore, in our jurisprudential-legal system, the right to human equality is a multidimensional and complex concept whose scope must be redefined in light of authentic Islamic sources and contemporary social realities, and whose implementation must be guaranteed.
Contemporary Jurisprudence: Does the right to human equality, as a civic or natural right, possess its own positive scriptural proofs? Given the modern character of the rational consensus (sira al-‘uqala’) in accepting this right, how can the Lawgiver’s endorsement and non-repudiation be established?
Jalili: The right to human equality, both as a natural and a civic right, is supported by significant scriptural evidence within our jurisprudential system. This evidence includes verses from the Qur’an, the Sunnah of the Infallibles, and the practical conduct (sira) of the Imams (a.s.), all of which point to the principle of equality in dignity and fundamental rights. The verse “And We have certainly honored the children of Adam” (17:70) establishes the ontological foundation of this right—a dignity not exclusive to any particular group but encompassing all of humanity. Similarly, Imam Ali’s (a.s.) statement in his letter to Malik al-Ashtar, categorizing people as either a “brother in faith” or an “equal in creation,” demonstrates an acceptance of dignity-based equality and the necessity of just conduct toward all people. Narrations conveying the theme “People are as equal as the teeth of a comb” also clearly indicate legal equality.
Despite this, the practice of rational people (sira al-‘uqala’), as a modern development and rational custom, holds a special place in the recognition of this right within Imami jurisprudence. According to our principles of jurisprudence (usul), if a general and reasonable rational practice emerges in human societies, is contiguous with the era of an Infallible, and is either endorsed or not repudiated (rad’) by the Lawgiver, that practice is considered valid and authoritative. In the case of the right to equality, there is evidence of the Lawgiver’s non-repudiation. During the era of legislation, egalitarian practices existed to a limited extent among Muslims, and religious texts not only did not abrogate them but reinforced their trajectory through general principles of justice and the prohibition of oppression.
Therefore, the link between scriptural proofs and the rational consensus is fortified by the principle of the “Lawgiver’s endorsement” (imda’ al-shari’). In the terminology of usul, a globally accepted practice that entails a general benefit (maslaha) and is free from corruption (mafsada) falls under the general scope of verses on justice, benevolence, and human dignity. The Lawgiver, by not repudiating it, has thereby legitimized it. Hence, human equality is not merely a product of modern thought but a concept that is documented and justified within the textual domain of Islam.
Contemporary Jurisprudence: If human equality is considered revelation-dependent (tawqifi), requiring its definition to be provided by the Holy Lawgiver, would accepting this right fundamentally alter any religious rulings?
Jalili: If we classify the right to human equality as a revelation-dependent (tawqifi) matter—meaning its definition, scope, and conditions for realization are determined exclusively by the Holy Lawgiver—then its acceptance is valid only within the framework delineated by religious texts and authoritative jurisprudential sources. In a tawqifi framework, concepts like “dignity,” “equality,” and “justice” are not subject to purely customary or international interpretations but must be understood based on specific and general religious evidence. Qur’anic verses such as “And We have certainly honored the children of Adam” (17:70) and “Indeed, the most noble of you in the sight of Allah is the most righteous of you” (49:13), along with the Sunnah and the conduct of the Infallibles, affirm an intrinsic dignity and equality in that dignity. However, this equality does not imply absolute uniformity in prescriptive and declarative rulings.
Within jurisprudence, the distinction between equality in dignity and fundamental rights, on the one hand, and differences in religious rulings based on overarching benefits and harms, on the other, is well-established. For instance, variations in the rulings on inheritance, blood money, or certain devotional duties do not negate human equality. Rather, they are the outcome of a legislative system that considers the welfare of the family, society, and distributive justice. Based on the maxim, “The ruling revolves with its cause, in presence and absence” (al-hukm yadur ma’a ‘illatihi wujudan wa ‘adaman), the variation in rulings in these cases is contingent upon a difference in the subject-matter or the objective intended by the Lawgiver, not a difference in the inherent value of human beings.
Therefore, from a tawqifi perspective, accepting the right to human equality does not alter the fundamental architecture of religious rulings. It merely organizes the interpretation and implementation of this right within the framework of definitive religious texts and principles. This means that any approach to equality that seeks to disregard or alter the established rulings of the Sharia would lack legitimacy within a tawqifi jurisprudential framework. However, within the scope of human dignity and shared rights, this right is fully affirmed and enforceable.
Contemporary Jurisprudence: If human equality is considered custom-based (‘urfi), with its definition and instances determined by custom, would accepting this right not lead to the secularization of religion and render the Sharia obsolete?
Jalili: If the right to human equality is deemed custom-based (‘urfi), its definition and the identification of its instances are delegated to rational custom (‘urf al-‘uqala’). This approach has precedent in Islamic jurisprudence, as many subject matters—such as determining the criteria for “monetary value” (maliyyah), “local custom” in transactions, or “harm” (darar) in the rule of la darar—are referred to custom. However, this delegation does not equate to the secularization of religion or obviate the need for the Sharia, because the validity of custom is conditional upon its non-contradiction with definitive texts and the objectives of the Sharia (maqasid al-shari’ah). Thus, custom plays an explanatory and executive role in the domain of variables, while the Sharia remains the ultimate arbiter of legitimacy and the authority that delineates the boundaries of this right.
Contemporary Jurisprudence: What is the reason for the lack of formulation and acceptance of this right by pre-modern and many contemporary jurists?
Jalili: A primary reason for the absence of “the right to human equality” as an independent concept in the works of pre-modern jurists is the traditional structure of jurisprudential discourse. This discourse was typically organized around chapters on worship and transactions, adopting a subject-based rather than a rights-based classification. Within this framework, equality as a “general legal principle” was rarely treated as an independent topic and was instead examined within specific maxims, such as “People are as equal as the teeth of a comb,” or in discussions on the necessity of a judge’s impartiality between litigants. Another factor is the dominance of a duty-centric (taklif-mehvar) perspective in traditional jurisprudence, where the primary focus was on discovering specific duties and rulings, not on extrapolating universal human rights in their contemporary sense. Furthermore, many jurists adopted a cautious or critical stance toward new concepts influenced by Western legal systems, refraining from their acceptance without first establishing their roots in religious texts. Among some contemporary jurists, hesitation in accepting this right stems from two factors: ambiguity regarding the boundary between equality and the wise distinctions within the Sharia (such as differences in inheritance or blood money), and concerns over a customary or secular interpretation that could conflict with established rulings. Consequently, although instances of equality are frequently cited in various chapters of jurisprudence, its transformation into a “universal fundamental right” with a comprehensive definition has found little precedent in traditional jurisprudence.