Note: Although Islamic jurisprudence speaks of justice among human beings, this does not necessarily mean equality of their rights. Equality of human rights, which is considered an established matter in Western law, encounters challenges and opposition when it enters Shi’i and Islamic jurisprudence. We discussed these challenges with Hujjat al-Islam wal-Muslimeen Dr. Sajjad Omidi, a researcher at the Judiciary Research Center. He believes that even if the right to human equality is accepted, identifying its instances cannot be left to custom (‘urf); because in that case, we will face the secularization of religion. The detailed text of Contemporary Jurisprudence‘s exclusive interview with this researcher at the Judiciary Research Center follows:

Contemporary Jurisprudence: What is the right to human equality, and what dimensions does it possess?

Omidi: One of its dimensions is social equality, which refers to matters in which all individuals of a specific society or groups share an equal status in certain aspects. These dimensions can be discussed in terms of civil rights, freedom of speech, property rights, equal access to social goods and services, and equal opportunities and threats. For example, age, sex, race, sexual orientation, lineage, class, income or property, language, religion, beliefs, opinions, health, or disability should not lead to unequal treatment under the law or an unfair reduction of opportunities.

Discussions on health equity, economic equality in all dimensions, educational equality, etc., are also other dimensions of the right to human equality.

In general, equality among human beings is conceivable in the following dimensions:

• Equality in relation to the Creator (Ar-Rum: 40);

• Equality in the wisdom of creation (Az-Zariyat: 56);

• Equality of human beings in the merit of having the Divine Spirit breathed into them (As-Sajdah: 9);

• Equality in having the seed of cognition planted within them all (Al-Baqarah: 31);

• Equality in the factor of perfection (Al-Baqarah: 285 and Ash-Shura: 13);

• Equality in inherent dignity with primary dignity (Al-Isra: 70);

• Equality in the potential to acquire value-based and acquired dignity (Al-Hujurat: 13);

• Equality in overall objective;

• Equality in the origin of human creation (An-Nisa: 1);

• Equality in the primary material of creation (Al-Hijr: 26);

• Equality in essence and characteristics, including intellect and conscience (Al-Qiyamah: 2, 14, and 15);

• Equality before natural rights and the enactment of necessary laws (Al-Ma’idah: 8 and 135).

Contemporary Jurisprudence: Does the right to human equality, as a citizenship right or natural right, possess its own affirmative textual proofs (adillah naqliyyah)? Given the newly emerging nature of the conduct of rational beings (sirat al-‘uqala’) in accepting this right, how can the Sharia’s endorsement (imda’) and non-deterrence (adam-e rad’) regarding it be proven?

Omidi: In response to this question, there are various viewpoints, and each researcher has explained this discussion based on their expertise and its domain.

Some consider human equality to be a social necessity and a psychological need; for example, viewing injustice as causing psychological trauma and social harms, which means that striving to develop justice, in addition to being a psychological necessity and need, can also be considered in preventing social harms.

In the religion of Islam, the equality of all human beings in creation is emphasized. The Holy Quran states: “So when I have proportioned him [Adam: the first human] and breathed into him of My Spirit, fall down in prostration to him, all of you together.”

This view of human beings does not differ from one person to another; rather, all human beings share in possessing the Divine Spirit. Sharing in the Divine Spirit means the equality of all in creation.

In other verses, such as the verse “And We have certainly honored the Children of Adam…” (Al-Isra: 70), God also states: We have honored the children of Adam, meaning all human beings, by virtue of being human, are honored by God, and We have favored them over many of the creatures. All are honored and are equal in this respect.

Human beings are equal in citizenship and natural rights, and this point is indisputable; consequently, we do not have first, second, or third-class citizens.

Another point is intellect (‘aql) and free will (ikhtiyar). Almighty God has bestowed intellect and free will upon all human beings; that is, they do not differ from one another in terms of being human.

In terms of dignity, human beings also do not differ from one another. Man possesses dignity by virtue of his creation, and this dignity is both inherent (zati) and acquired (iktisabi). That is, he possesses a degree of inherent dignity and can also acquire another portion of it through his own effort and free will, thereby reaching exalted stations and degrees. Human beings are also equal in terms of this potential, because all possess the potential to reach the highest stations.

In summary, it can be stated: The proof of the inherent nature of human equality in rights is found in the verses of the Quran. Rationally, too, people have accepted this principle of equality, even if in some instances they have failed to observe it. The Lawgiver (Share’) considers this right inherent to humanity, while others view it as a natural right of human beings.

Contemporary Jurisprudence: In the event that human equality is divinely ordained (tawqifi) and requires definition by the Sacred Lawgiver, does accepting this right fundamentally cause any difference in Sharia rulings?

Omidi: As an introduction, let me state that the main purpose of revealing books and sending messengers is the moral cultivation of human beings, and human beings are equal in Islam.

One of the principles of Islam is the principle of human equality. By virtue of this principle, which stems from the inherent dignity of every human being, no human is created superior or inferior to others. For this reason, no one can exercise authority over another without proof. The principle of human equality brings along other principles, one of which is the principle of non-domination of one person over another. The equality of the ruler with the people in livelihood and action is a manifestation of individual equality in Islam. No privilege exists for the ruler, just as there is no immunity from the law for him. In Islam, hereditary government is not accepted; rather, only qualified individuals can attain governance and other public offices, such as the judiciary. The Holy Quran states regarding human equality: “O mankind, indeed We have created you from male and female and made you peoples and tribes that you may know one another. Indeed, the most noble of you in the sight of Allah is the most righteous of you.”

Human equality in Islam encompasses all aspects, including equality in fundamental rights in terms of equality before the law, equality before the judge, and equality in rights and duties. Obligations (wajibat) and prohibitions (muharramat) apply to everyone, just as no immunity exists for individuals, and just as no difference between litigating parties or privilege for any accused is considered in Islamic procedural law.

Naturally and logically, rights arise where human beings are assumed equal to one another. This equality is clearly reflected in the Quran. The Quran considers all humans to originate from a single root and views them as equal: “And it is He who produced you from one soul” (Al-An’am: 98).

The origin of all human beings is one; hence, no one possesses inherent superiority over another. The only superiority in the view of the Quran pertains to individual character, which is elevated through reflection and worship. Elsewhere, the Quran states that all human beings were created from one father and mother, which, in addition to indicating the inherent equality of all, shows that humans are brothers and must interact with one another in a spirit of brotherhood: “O mankind, indeed We have created you from male and female” (Al-Hujurat: 13).

In the perspective of the Quran, society is composed of individuals, and each person individually manifests the values that society possesses. The Quran considers attention to an individual human being as attention to all individuals, such that if someone kills one person, it is as if he killed all humanity, and if he brings about the revival and life of one person, it is as if he revived all humanity: “Whoever kills a soul unless for a soul or for corruption done in the land – it is as if he had slain mankind entirely. And whoever saves one – it is as if he had saved mankind entirely” (Al-Ma’idah: 32).

This right is inherent, and rulings are likewise equal for human beings in all places and times based on this premise. If human rights, actions, and free will differed from one another, their rulings would also differ.

Of course, in performing commands in exceptional cases, individuals differ from one another, such as rulings for travelers, the sick, and those under duress (mudtarr). However, fundamentally, all are equal before the law, and this stems from the right to equality.

Contemporary Jurisprudence: In the event that human equality is customary (‘urfi) and requires definition of its concept and identification of its instances by custom, does accepting this right lead to the secularization of religion and a lack of need for Sharia?

Omidi: Briefly stated, if all human rights, including Sharia rulings, were customary (‘urfi), it would cause whatever custom identifies to become a Sharia ruling, eliminating any need for divine rulings and the deduction of rulings by a jurist (faqih). To put it more clearly, people would no longer need divine Sharia rulings; rather, whatever custom identifies would determine the rulings required by the people. However, the role that Islamic jurists assign to custom is identifying instances and subject matters, not articulating Sharia rulings. Therefore, the secularization of rulings definitely results in people having no need for Sharia rulings, because it leads to custom itself specifying the rulings required by the duty-bound (mukallaf).

Indeed, secularizing religion and reducing it to the level of reason is the product of Western thought and the result of the specific context of Western civilization, its interaction with Christianity, and the specific developments of that culture. Of course, in Islamic societies as well, whispers of secularism, almaniyyah, and the secularization of laws and rulings have been raised. In this regard, analyzing the foundations of two opposing thoughts regarding the entrance of custom and its prohibition in the jurisprudential and legal system of Islam and Islamic society across three sections—the meaning of custom’s impact on the jurisprudential system, the domain of Sharia and religion, and the domain and field of custom’s operation—can clarify the correct place of custom’s entry and the manner of its influence in the jurisprudential and legal system, providing answers to certain doubts in this regard.

The secularization of religion means secularism; and secularism, in terms of its literal meaning, is opposition to teaching Sharia and religious matters, secularism, and belief in the primariness of worldly affairs. In English, the antonym of secular is sacred. In Persian, the secularization of religion is equivalent to the word secularization, which means desacralization and dedeification. It can be defined as follows: a process or trend through which the political, social, and moral aspects of society are dedeified or desacralized; or, in other words, a process based on which religious thought, religious acts, and religious institutions lose their social role and importance, resulting in religion—if it survives—taking the form of a private affair. In this process, religious manifestations in society are removed or diminished, and affairs are managed without the presence of religion.

Contemporary Jurisprudence: What is the reason for the lack of proposal and acceptance of this right by non-contemporary jurists and many contemporary jurists?

Omidi: The reason is that Shi’i scholars throughout history were distant from governance and, in the past, lacked social presence in the sense of connection with governance and academic centers.

Another reason is that scholars spent all their effort, striving, and time on devotional discussions (‘ibadat) in jurisprudence and were generally distant from these discussions.

Another point is that in Islamic seminaries, custom (‘urf) was considered the reference for identifying instances of rulings and determining the subject matter and linguistic meaning; for this reason, they considered their discussions sufficient and did not engage in further examination and inquiry.

Of course, among contemporary scholars, prominent individuals have entered these discussions, and we are witnessing insightful writings in these newly emerging topics.