Note: When speaking of the equality of human rights, some regard it as synonymous with the meaning of justice. This is despite the fact that justice does not always mean equality. We interviewed Ustadh Sayyid Mohammad-Ali Ayazi regarding the relationship between justice and the right to human equality. He believes that although the citizenship rights of human beings—whether they are Muslims, Jews, or Baha’is—are equal to one another, this does not mean that the amenities provided to them must be identical. According to this seminary and university professor and author, sometimes even discrimination, if positive, constitutes an instance of justice. The detailed text of Contemporary Jurisprudence‘s exclusive interview with this scholar and researcher of the Qom Seminary follows:
Contemporary Jurisprudence: What does the right to enjoy justice mean, and does it refer to God’s justice toward His servants, the just governance of the sovereign toward the people, or the just conduct of citizens toward one another?
Ayazi: Firstly, when we speak of justice—especially with an eye toward the Quran, on which I have authored a work titled The Quran and Social Justice—we must know that justice does not possess a single meaning. Justice is sometimes used in the sense of ontological justice (‘adalat-e takwini), which pertains to how Almighty God created existence in the order of being. Sometimes it means legislative justice (‘adalat-e tashri’i); meaning whether the laws and rulings enacted by God as the sole Lawgiver are just or not. In my book, I have enumerated 11 types of justice, whereas some of our scholars have presented only a single meaning of it. For instance, the martyred professor Morteza Mutahhari addressed divine justice (‘adl-e ilahi) and raised extensive discussions on it, which occasionally relate to legislative justice, but mostly pertain to ontological justice. I myself have primarily addressed the issue of social justice, which is the primary principle of justice.
Thus, when we speak of justice, our meaning should not merely be the justice discussed regarding God, unless we wish to discuss God’s laws, in which case we can debate whether the laws established by God are just or not, alongside other issues we might address as the discussion progresses.
However, that justice which you likely have in mind and serves as the focus of this conversation is justice among the people, which is social justice. When the meaning of justice becomes social justice, naturally the discussion of people’s rights also arises. In this regard, our primary premise is that all human beings are human, there is no inherent virtue in humanity itself over others, and all humans are created from one essence. Therefore, there is no difference among them from any aspect regarding rights—neither in terms of gender, nor race, nor language, nor geographical region, nor skin color. Consequently, all human beings equally possess common rights.
Contemporary Jurisprudence: What are the differences between justice as a citizenship right, justice as a jurisprudential rule (qa’idah fiqhiyyah), or justice as an Islamic theory?
Ayazi: When we speak of justice as an Islamic theory, we are speaking of the theological theory of the ‘Adliyyah (Justice-oriented rationalists), who believe that justice precedes the Sharia; in contrast to the Ash’arites, who view justice as post-Sharia. In the view of the ‘Adliyyah, justice is a pre-religious matter against which rulings must be measured, rather than divine rulings defining the instances of justice. But when we raise justice as a citizenship right or a jurisprudential rule, the matter changes.
When we consider justice as a jurisprudential rule, it means that when a jurist (faqih) seeks to deduce a ruling, he must arrive at a ruling that does not conflict with justice. This is while some jurists, merely based on the existence of a single verse or narration, sometimes deduce rulings that run contrary to justice, and this point holds no importance for them. This is the very school of the Ash’arites. According to the school of the ‘Adliyyah, if a ruling conflicts with justice, one must reflect upon it and alter or reinterpret (ta’wil) it. In theological discussions, when the apparent meaning of certain proofs, such as some Quranic verses, suggests a concept like God having a physical body—which contradicts our theological principles, such as “The Hand of Allah is over their hands” or “The Most Merciful rose over the Throne”—we immediately reinterpret that proof; likewise, here, when the apparent meaning of a proof conflicts with justice, it must be reinterpreted. For example, if the apparent meaning of a narration suggests that one may slander and revile opponents, this proof must be reinterpreted, because it conflicts with justice. One cannot accuse someone of theft who has not stolen, merely because in our view he is an innovator (ahl-e bid’at); rather, this narration must be reinterpreted to mean something else. Another way of dealing with such narrations is to evaluate them against the Quran according to the narrations requiring evaluation against the Quran; and since justice is one of the primary principles of the Quran, and this narration conflicts with this principle, we set it aside.
Therefore, justice as a rule has two effects: one is that it influences our understanding of traditions (hadiths), and the other is that it serves as a proof in the process of jurisprudential deduction (istinbat). For instance, if we have two narrations, one conforming to justice and the other conflicting with justice, the contextual preference rules of equilibrium and preference (ta’adul va tarajih) dictate that you prefer the narration conforming to justice over the other and act upon it. For example, regarding Verse 29 of Surah At-Tawbah, which states: “Until they pay the jizyah willingly while they are subdued (saghirun),” one meaning of saghirun is “they are compliant” (hum multazimun), meaning the People of the Book pay the jizyah in the sense that they are good citizens paying their taxes, as Sheikh Tusi interpreted in Al-Tibyan and others have similarly explained. Another meaning is that you should humiliate them, strike them on the head, and abase them. Well, this second meaning conflicts with justice. Here, the rule of justice dictates that you select the meaning conforming to justice, not the meaning conflicting with it.
However, justice regarding citizenship rights means that the enactment of laws and their execution must be conducted in a manner that is disciplined and rule-based among citizens. Similarly, regarding adjudication, one must act according to justice.
Contemporary Jurisprudence: Does the right to human equality merely seek the equality of human beings in rights, even if this equality exists in oppression? Or does it also encompass the justness of behaviors?
Ayazi: In my view, this question is somewhat complex. If you wish to say that equality of rights is sometimes not proportionate to justice, this statement contains a technical flaw. The flaw is that equality in rights is distinct from equality in amenities/resources. If the government provides special amenities for the blind—for instance, designing specific vehicles and sidewalks for them or establishing special schools for them—this apparent inequality does not fall under rights that form the subject of this discussion. The right to human equality pertains to rights; for example, that someone residing in the affluent part of town should have the exact same rights as someone residing in the underprivileged part of town. From this angle—that is, looking at the right to human equality from the perspective of rights—we must say that equality here is synonymous with justice.
Of course, we sometimes refer to certain matters as positive discrimination; for example, because in underdeveloped regions there is lag and fewer amenities compared to privileged regions, the government allocates a larger budget to these regions during budget distribution. This is positive discrimination and is not contrary to justice; rather, it is because the government wants all regions to enjoy a uniform level of welfare. However, it should be noted that the discussion of “positive discrimination” fundamentally has no bearing on citizenship rights; hence, accepting positive discrimination in the allocation of resources does not conflict with the necessity of observing equality in citizenship rights.
Contemporary Jurisprudence: Do you say the same regarding oppression, considering strictly oppression in rights to be improper?
Ayazi: Yes. Of course, custom (‘urf) may sometimes perceive something as oppression when in reality it is not oppression, such as the positive discrimination we raised, which is actually a form of equality. Allow me to give an example. As you know, going out at night is easier for men than for women. For instance, men can easily leave the house at night and go to a library to study, but this action may entail difficulties and dangers for women. Now, if the government provides special facilities for women so that they can study at night without insecurity just like men, such a thing is not oppression; rather, it is a form of positive discrimination. In Europe, I observed that special facilities, such as designated pathways, were provided for the disabled or the blind so that they could travel as easily as ordinary people. These special facilities are not oppression against others; rather, they are positive discrimination.
Contemporary Jurisprudence: Is the right to human equality different from justice? In what matters does this difference lie?
Ayazi: Yes, it is sometimes different. For example, the law provides for pregnant women to have a 9-month maternity leave. But such leave is not provided for men. Therefore, equality is not observed in this matter; nevertheless, everyone considers it just. Or if a man says, “My wife has an emergency right now and I must leave,” all his colleagues will say that he must be granted leave, and they consider this a just matter. Therefore, the principle of the necessity of equality of rights is correct; however, in certain instances it is improper and considered contrary to justice.
Contemporary Jurisprudence: So, in reality, the right to equality differs from justice?
Ayazi: Yes, it differs. Of course, one must also pay attention to the context and location of the right. For example, the compensation of a specialist physician who has studied for years and acquired specialization is not identical to that of an unskilled laborer who lacks literacy, nor should it be; but regarding citizenship rights, they must possess equal rights; hence, if they go to court, there should be no discrimination between them. From the perspective of citizenship rights, the Imam (a) and a Jew share the exact same ruling and are equal before the judge. In a narration, when the Commander of the Faithful (a) and a Jew went before Shurayh the Judge for adjudication, Shurayh said: “Peace be upon you, O Commander of the Faithful!” The Imam (a) said to him: “Here I am equal with this Jew, and it is outside of here that I am the Commander of the Faithful.” In another narration, when the Imam (a) had a dispute with someone and wished to refer to the judge, he said Malik should go in his stead; because “If I go, I fear the judge will accommodate my status and fail to observe justice.” From the perspective of citizenship rights, a Jew, a Muslim, and a Baha’i possess no difference whatsoever from one another.