Note: The right to human equality, at first glance, appears clear, self-evident, and in accord with human nature (fitrah). However, when we look deeper into it, we face the question of whether human beings who differ in talent, age, gender, and other matters ought to possess identical rights. At least in the science of jurisprudence, the identity of all rights among all human beings has not been accepted. Hujjat al-Islam Mohammad-Javad Ahmadkhani, a researcher at the Research Institute of Contemporary Jurisprudence Studies, discusses the jurisprudential challenges of accepting the right to human equality in this exclusive note.

In recent decades, the discourse of human rights and concepts arising from it have become one of the most serious and complex areas of contact—and at times confrontation—between the Islamic jurisprudential tradition and modern thought. At the core of this discourse lies the principle of “human equality”; a principle according to which all human beings, irrespective of any racial, gender, religious, or ideological distinction, are equal in dignity and fundamental rights. This principle, crystallized in international human rights documents and become the prevailing conduct of rational beings (sirat al-‘uqala’) in the contemporary era, confronts the Islamic legal system with fundamental questions.

Islamic jurisprudence, as a comprehensive system for regulating individual and social relations based on revelatory sources, has set forth legal differences among its various chapters, particularly in the realms of family law, inheritance, adjudication, testimonies, and political rights, between men and women as well as between Muslims and non-Muslims. These differences, established on the basis of explicit Quranic texts, traditions (hadiths), and juristic consensus (ijma’), appear at first glance to conflict with the modern concept of “absolute equality.”

This apparent conflict, which has been addressed in its proper place, has served as the origin of deep jurisprudential and theological challenges, impelling Muslim thinkers—both traditional jurists and religious reformists—to reflect and respond. The central question is: How can and should contemporary jurisprudence encounter this “newly emerging” (mustahdas) concept? Do internal religious capacities exist to accept and adapt this principle, or is the divergence of foundations such that any effort at harmonization is rendered impossible? Can one rely on generalities such as “justice” and “dignity” emphasized in religious texts to revise specific rulings that appear discriminatory?

What Is “the Right to Human Equality” and Its Dimensions

Prior to entering the analysis of jurisprudential challenges, it is necessary to precisely define the concept of “the right to human equality” as posited in contemporary discourse and delineate its dimensions. The failure to separate these dimensions often leads to confusion of topics and inaccurate assessments. Based on existing legal literature, this right can be analyzed across four main layers:

1. Inherent Equality and Human Dignity: This dimension represents the most fundamental layer of equality, meaning that all human beings share in the primary essence of “being human” and inherent value. This equality serves as the origin and source of other rights, and differences in color, race, gender, or creed do not tarnish this inherent value. This concept shares a very close semantic affinity with the Islamic doctrine of “inherent human dignity” crystallized in Verse 70 of Surah Al-Isra (Wa laqad karramna bani Adama), serving as the primary point of commonality between jurisprudential discourse and modern law.

2. Equality Before the Law: This dimension points to the executive and judicial aspect of rights, meaning that laws must be applied equally and impartially to all. No individual or group should be deprived of the protection of the law or placed above it due to identity characteristics. This principle is a requirement for realizing judicial justice and appears compatible with jurisprudential generalities such as “equity” (qist) and “justice” (‘adl), although its specific application to certain specific rulings remains a matter for reflection.

3. Equality of Opportunity: This dimension pertains to the social, economic, and political domains, emphasizing that all individuals must possess equal opportunities for growth, talent fulfillment, and achieving various positions. The objective here is the removal of discriminatory and structural barriers that block the path of progress for certain groups. It must be noted that equality of opportunity does not mean the negation of natural differences or the equalization of outcomes, but rather establishing a fair environment for competition and effort.

4. Equality in Fundamental Rights: This dimension is the most controversial layer in the encounter with jurisprudence. By it is meant equality and non-distinction in fundamental citizenship rights, such as the right to life, freedom of expression and belief, the right to political participation (such as the right to be elected for all offices), and family rights (such as inheritance, divorce, and child custody). The primary challenge emerges precisely at this point; because Islamic jurisprudence, based on specific interests in certain areas, has not assigned identical rights and obligations to all groups (particularly between men and women, and Muslims and non-Muslims). Therefore, the main dispute of jurisprudence is not with “inherent equality,” but with extending this equality to “equality in all fundamental rights,” which in modern discourse is viewed as its logical requirement.

The Challenge of Textual Proofs and Endorsement of Rational Conduct

One of the most central discussions in this field pertains to how textual proofs (verses and traditions) are reasoned and the validity of the “contemporary conduct of rational beings” (sirat-e ‘uqala-ye mu’asir).

Proponents of harmonizing jurisprudence with modern equality cite a collection of religious texts that emphasize human equality in the origin of creation and negate discrimination based on color and race. Verse 13 of Surah Al-Hujurat: “O mankind, indeed We have created you from male and female and made you peoples and tribes that you may know one another. Indeed, the most noble of you in the sight of Allah is the most righteous of you,” and the famous Prophetic tradition “All people are equal like the teeth of a comb” (Al-nasu kulluhum sawa’un ka-asnan al-misht), are among the most famous of these proofs. From the perspective of this group, these texts manifest the governing spirit of the Sharia, which is the negation of superficial privileges and emphasis on human dignity, and must be considered governing principles over other specific rulings.

The primary problem begins where “the right to equality” in its modern, expansive dimensions (the fourth dimension mentioned in the previous section) constitutes a newly emerging concept and conduct (sirah-e mustahdasah) that lacked precedent during the time of the Lawgiver (Share’) and early jurists. In Usul al-Fiqh, according to the prevailing opinion, the “conduct of rational beings” (sirat al-‘uqala’) can serve as valid religious proof only if it was continuous, connected to the era of the Infallible (a), and the “endorsement of the Lawgiver” (imda’-e Share’) can be established through his non-deterrence (adam-e rad’).

If we wish to resort to the conduct of rational beings regarding equality, a fundamental obstacle exists: the presence of explicit and specific texts (nusus-e sarīh va khass) that have enacted different rulings for different groups. For example, verses regarding inheritance (For the male, what is equal to the share of two females), blood money (diyah), and narrations regarding conditions for adjudication, testimony, or guardianship explicitly articulate differences between men and women or Muslims and non-Muslims. From the perspective of these jurists, these specific texts themselves serve as “deterrence” (rad’) and prohibition by the Lawgiver from accepting absolute equality. Under such conditions, the silence of the Lawgiver regarding a hypothetical future conduct, in the face of a specific and explicit text, lacks foundational validity. In other words, the Lawgiver has declared His contrary opinion in advance regarding equality in these specified domains.

Some religious reformists, proposing the theory of “the objectives of Sharia” (Maqasid al-Shari’ah) and distinguishing between fixed and variable rulings, argue that the aforementioned differing rulings addressed the historical-social interests and conditions during the era of revelation. From this perspective, the ultimate goal of Sharia is the realization of justice; and if the definitive conduct of rational beings in an era considers “equality” a clear and necessary instance of justice, this conduct can be deemed endorsed by the Lawgiver based on the overall spirit of Sharia and its objectives. This approach, while opening the way for broad changes, faces the challenge of precisely defining objectives and establishing the boundary between foundational (ta’sisi) and confirmatory (imda’i) rulings.

The Dispute Between Divinely Ordained and Customary Views of Equality

The debate over accepting or rejecting modern right to equality can be formulated as a confrontation between two macro-foundations in jurisprudential epistemology: Is the concept of “just equality” a divinely ordained (tawqifi) matter or a customary (‘urfi) one?

Based on the divinely ordained (tawqifi) perspective, defining justice and equality and establishing their boundaries is exclusive to the Sacred Lawgiver, and human intellect alone is incapable of comprehending all its aspects and interests. From this viewpoint, accepting the principle of equality in inherent dignity does not necessarily mean identity and uniformity in all rights and obligations. The Wise Lawgiver, based on ontological differences and differences in roles and responsibilities, has enacted different rights and duties. Existing legal differences in jurisprudence (such as differences in inheritance or blood money), from the perspective of this viewpoint, are not “discrimination” in its tyrannical and negative sense, but rather “difference” grounded in wisdom and interest that our intellect may not fully grasp. These differences, within a macro and harmonious legal system, ultimately benefit the individual, family, and society.

The logical requirement of this view is the impossibility of revising explicit and fixed Sharia rulings based on modern and variable concepts. Accepting the right to equality merely emphasizes Islamic value principles in negating illusory racial and tribal superiorities, without altering jurisprudential structures.

Conversely, the second view holds that concepts such as justice and equality are customary (‘urfi) matters (in its rational sense), and comprehending and identifying their instances is entrusted to the custom of rational beings (‘urf-e ‘uqala’) in every era. From this perspective, many social rulings in Islam are not purely foundational (ta’sisi), but “confirmatory” (imda’i); meaning they endorsed the rational custom of their time. With changes in that custom and transformations in human understanding of the instances of justice, these rulings can also change proportionate to the demands of time and with the goal of preserving the primary objectives of Sharia (such as justice, dignity, and public interest). The most significant challenge facing this view is the risk of “secularization of religion” and losing the authority of texts. If in every era, the rational understanding of justice is to serve as the basis for changing rulings, the question arises: Where is the standing of fixed religious texts, and how is the boundary between fixed and variable rulings determined? This could lead to relativism in justice and ultimately weaken the standing of Sharia as an independent, trans-historical source for human guidance.

Proponents of this view respond that the custom relied upon is not “idle custom” (‘urf-e laghv) or “caprice,” but “definitive rational conduct” (sirat-e qat’iyyah-e ‘uqala’iyyah) that reveals the definitive judgment of reason, and Islam never conflicts with the definitive judgment of reason. Nevertheless, the dispute over identifying the definitive judgment of reason and how to deduce new rulings based on objectives remains a serious and unresolved debate in contemporary Usul al-Fiqh.

The Challenge of Conflict with the “Spirit of Devotional Submission”

One of the deepest and most fundamental challenges created by accepting “the right to complete equality” for Islamic jurisprudence is its conflict with the “spirit of devotional submission” (ruh-e ta’abbud). Devotional submission (ta’abbud), meaning surrender and servitude before divine command even in instances where human intellect is incapable of fully grasping its wisdom, is considered one of the pillars of religious faith. From this perspective, many Sharia rulings, particularly those whose details cannot be deduced by intellect, possess a devotional aspect, and their rationale is testing the degree of the servant’s submission and faith before the Creator. Trust in infinite divine knowledge and submission before His command is itself a rational matter and a requirement of servitude. According to this view, when a jurist encounters explicit texts that differentiate between the rights of men and women (such as inheritance or retaliation), he considers it his duty to follow this divine command. Attempting to alter these rulings based on extra-religious criteria such as “modern equality” is a form of prioritizing limited human intellect over complete divine revelation, thereby tarnishing the spirit of devotional submission.

At the opposite pole, “the right to complete equality” is a modern and thoroughly intellect-centered principle. This principle is built on the premise that justice requires all human beings to be equal in all fundamental rights, and any law violating this principle is inherently unjust and requires reform. This approach places “human rationality” as the ultimate judge for evaluating the justice of social laws.

When this intellectual paradigm encounters differing jurisprudential rulings, instead of devotional acceptance, it turns to questioning and challenge. For example, it asks: “Why should a woman’s blood money be half that of a man?” or “Why must excess blood money (fazil-e diyah) be paid to retaliate against a man for a woman?” From the perspective of this view, the answer “because the Lawgiver has so specified” is insufficient and unconvincing. This approach seeks to find a rational and just logic (based on contemporary understanding of justice) for every ruling, and upon failing to find it, questions the ruling.

Precisely here lies the point of crisis. Traditional jurisprudence does not view legal differences as tyrannical “discrimination,” but as wise “difference” based on differing structures and roles, accepting which requires a degree of devotional submission and trust in the Lawgiver. However, full acceptance of the principle of equality does not tolerate this justification and considers these differences inherently discriminatory.

The challenge of “conflict with the spirit of devotional submission” demonstrates that accepting the right to equality is not merely a change in a few subsidiary rulings, but requires a paradigm revolution in religious epistemology. This challenge compels the contemporary Muslim to reflect on the fundamental question: Where lies the boundary between “pure devotional submission” (ta’abbud-e mahz) and “critical rationality”? Must social rulings in Islam, like acts of worship (‘ibadat), be accepted devotionally, or are these types of rulings built upon rational principles such as “justice,” requiring revision upon conflicting with the definitive understanding of rational beings regarding justice? The answer to this question will determine the future path of jurisprudence and its relationship with the modern world.

In light of the foregoing, contemporary jurisprudence’s encounter with “the right to human equality” is not a one-dimensional challenge, but a multi-layered phenomenon possessing theological, foundational (usuli), jurisprudential, and epistemological dimensions. The main dispute is not over “inherent human dignity”—which is agreed upon—but over extending this dignity to “identity in all rights.” The traditional system of ijtihad, relying on “commitment to texts” and the “divinely ordained (tawqifi) view of rulings,” does not consider legal differences to be contrary to divine justice. Conversely, reformist currents, relying on the “objectives of Sharia (maqasid al-shari’ah)” and “viewing justice as customary (‘urfi),” pave the way for revising variable rulings, yet face the risk of relativism and weakening the authority of text. It appears that any comprehensive and sustainable response to this challenge depends upon deep re-thinkings in the foundations of the science of Usul al-Fiqh, particularly in discussions such as “the authority of the newly emerging conduct of rational beings,” “the relationship between fixed and variable rulings,” “the domain of confirmatory rulings,” and “criteria for deduction from the objectives of Sharia.” This topic will remain one of the most vibrant and serious research arenas for mujtahids and scholars of contemporary jurisprudence. It is obvious that the set of challenges facing contemporary jurisprudence in encountering the principle of equality and other modern concepts is not restricted to the items raised in this note. Nevertheless, in this space, an effort was made through selecting and analyzing the central challenges of “texts,” “devotional submission,” and “objectives” to present a coherent and interconnected picture of the dimensions of this epistemological crisis and lay the groundwork for future reflections and research.