Excerpt: The first question that comes to mind is: Is dignity of the nature of a right? In the preamble to the Charter on Citizenship Rights, dignity is mentioned as a principle, which appears to be a more accurate expression.
The law professor at Shahid Beheshti University stated: “We must pay attention to the fact that intrinsic dignity functions as a normative matter; that is, the proposition we deal with in framing human rights and citizenship rights is that human beings must possess dignity and behavior must be conducted with dignity.”
According to Contemporary Jurisprudence citing ATNA, continuing the series of specialized roundtables rereading the Charter on Citizenship Rights organized by the Secretariat of the International Congress, the fourth roundtable was held in the Archives Building of the National Library and Archives Organization.
In this roundtable, Hujjat al-Islam wal-Muslimeen Rahim Nobahar, faculty member at Shahid Beheshti University, stating that applying the expression “right” to human dignity is improper, stated: “The first question that comes to mind is: Is dignity of the nature of a right? In the preamble to the Charter on Citizenship Rights, dignity is mentioned as a principle, which appears to be a more accurate expression.”
He added: “In the past, obligation and responsibility constituted the dominant discourse, and in state-nation relations and social relations, human responsibility and duty were spoken of; however, in the modern era, the rights of citizens are spoken of.”
Nobahar, emphasizing that it is clear the language of rights is potent because behind the expression of right—and especially the violation of a right—lies a moral concept, noted: “When we clothe something in the attire of a right, its violation becomes problematic. There is a tendency within us to clothe even interests, benefits, and values in the attire of rights because we can better relate to them; yet simultaneously we must pay attention to the fact that this can have undesirable consequences.”
The law professor at Shahid Beheshti University, stating that we currently face an inflation of rights, said: “Legal scholars regard this inflation as a warning, considering it a form of harm that can afflict human rights—meaning we might face rights inflation such that on one hand we can categorize rights, while on the other hand the importance of rights is eroded.”
Nobahar, stating that given the definition of a right, human dignity is a pre-legal matter—meaning a principle and foundation—stated: “If you read the opening sentences of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights as well, nowhere does it state that human dignity is a right; rather, the opening sentences of the Charter state that peace, equality, and freedom form the foundation of human dignity.”
Referring to the fact that dignity accompanies the essence and core of the human being, he recalled: “When we accept intrinsic dignity, it means we recognize the human being as such, not merely Muslims or the community of believers. A criminal human being does not lose his dignity. We can punish a criminal human within a framework mentioned in subsequent chapters of the Charter.”
He added: “Punishment is important; it must not assume the title of torture, nor can punishment be humiliating to a degree that nullifies the humanity of a person.”
Without Dignity, Human Rights and Citizenship Rights are Meaningless
The law professor at Shahid Beheshti University, emphasizing that if you strip human dignity from human rights and citizenship rights, it is like a tree whose roots you have dried up, specified: “When from an anthropological perspective we say that we consider man a sacred creature or created in the image of God, these concepts are all descriptive. These propositions are not normative (‘ought-assuming’), but descriptive (‘is-assuming’).”
Nobahar added: “We must pay attention to the fact that intrinsic dignity functions as a normative matter; that is, the proposition we deal with in framing human rights and citizenship rights is that human beings must possess dignity and behavior must be conducted with dignity.”
Continuing, he stated: “Law is a conventional matter (amr i’tibari), yet many of these matters trace their lineage to realities. Why do we posit the credit of ownership (i’tibar-e malikiyyah) for a worker over the fruits of his labor? This postulation is constructive (masdari), yet rooted in reality. If I accredit the fruits of your labor as ownership to someone else, society will not accept it; therefore, a connection exists between the realm of existing entities and the realm of legal conventions.”
The faculty member at Shahid Beheshti University, stating that dignity belongs to humanity, even a criminal human, noted: “We must be careful that if someone speaks of dignity in the name of religion—citing, for example, that angels prostrated before God, etc.—these anthropological descriptions cannot be utilized at the level of legal matters until they put on the attire of normativity.”
Dignity Accompanies Equality
Posing the question of whether human intrinsic dignity is identical with the issue of equality, he continued: “From lexicological and conceptual perspectives, these two are distinct; however, we must remember that human dignity cannot be distant from equality. If you discriminate between individuals based on gender or race, you are forgetting the human principle; human rights commentators state that we should interpret the principle of human dignity in the climate of equality.”
We Have No “Islamic Human Rights”
Nobahar, stating that it is a wrong path to differentiate humans under the label of human rights and place the crown of dignity on their heads based on beliefs, specified: “If today, citing verses and sacred texts, we establish the dignity of believers and exclude others from the circle of humanity, I request that discussions in this area not be brought into the domain of human rights at all—meaning they should not put the name ‘Islamic human rights’ on these at all. Because human rights means recognizing the human being as such and striving to create peace and concord among humanity.”
He added: “If we grant a legal status to human dignity, we do not necessarily reduce its validity; rather, in a sense, it means we have assigned it a status elevated above legal matters, a point that applies to freedom as well.”
Nobahar pointed to the abstract nature of the concepts of freedom and dignity, stating: “Sometimes the ambiguity of abstract concepts becomes their ruin; some make their ambiguity a pretext for rejecting them, which can stand as a challenge to dignity or freedom. However, we must pay attention to the fact that certain concepts in their intrinsic essence are abstract and non-determinable. For example, does consensus exist even regarding the most fundamental concept of moral philosophy, namely good and evil?”
The law professor at Shahid Beheshti University, stating that human dignity functions as a filter, said: “In my view, the jurist must pass his rulings through this filter; that is, if a ruling fails to pass through this filter, it cannot be the Lawgiver’s ruling, because a duality arises here. How could God grant dignity to all humans and then proceed, in the form of a jurisprudential proposition, to strip this dignity away?”
Government and Freedom
Referring next to negative and positive freedom in society, he stated: “The duty of one committed to respecting our freedom is inaction (‘adam al-fi’l); meaning that for you as a citizen to be able to exercise your freedoms, the state and society have no duty other than non-interference. However, in positive rights, the state and society must take action. For example, if a group wishes to stage a civil protest, a citizen-oriented state must secure their safety.”
The law professor at Shahid Beheshti University, stating that bringing freedom and security together taking into account Iranian society was a positive initiative, noted: “Unfortunately, the perception that exists regarding the concept of security is social rather than individual; that is, when we say security, the discussion concerns societal security. What then of individual security? In the Quran, it is emphasized to look at how much tranquility and assurance human beings in society possess.”
Self-Determination is Self-Evident
Pointing out that it would have been better for the right of participation in self-determination to come after the right to dignity, he noted: “According to the prevalent interpretation of the principle of human dignity in its normative sense, man is a creature who can decide regarding himself and his society, and that man can determine his destiny is self-evident. Man is God’s servant, yet God has entrusted self-determination to ourselves.”
Continuing, Nobahar asked: What legal relationship do human beings born in a land possess with that land? “Why can we not revoke the citizenship of an Armenian person today? Because people born in a land possess a form of undivided ownership (malikiyyah musha’ah) over it. A person who committed a crime in this land and was executed might be buried in this very land; however, if you do not accept ownership, we use the literature of rights.”
He added: “The late Sheikh Ansari stated that a right is a weaker degree of ownership. In certain instances, a right may be controversial, but if you do not accept ownership, accept the right. The right of exclusivity (haqq al-ikhtisas) means that I, as a person born in the land of Iran, possess a greater exclusivity to this soil compared to someone born in another country.”
Nobahar, stating that God gave us the duty to develop the land in which we were born, said: “If you say this land belongs to God and after that to God’s Wali (guardian), and God’s Wali may dispose of the land however he wishes? First of all, not all affairs and management are of the religious type. This is the right to self-determination; that is, either we are owners regarding this land or we hold a right in an undivided manner (nahw al-isha’) and are obligated to develop here.”
He added: “When I do not intervene in developing this land, in citizenship rights literature I am passive; however, in religious literature, not only have I abandoned my right, but I am falling short in my duty.”
The law professor at Shahid Beheshti University, emphasizing that worthy administration and good governance are fully interpreted as rights, said: “However, articles appearing under the third clause of the Charter reveal that the right to governance has tilted heavily toward the public sphere and concentrated on elections. Emphasizing elections as a hallmark of democracy holds its importance, but we must not forget that when we speak of the right to participate in self-determination, it means human beings can also organize the private sphere of their lives.”
Raising the question of what requirements are needed to hold a fair election, he said: “One of these needs is the presence of a public sphere free from state interventions—a sphere where citizens and civil society gather and converse regarding the common good. The product of these conversations is public opinion. The more conversations there are, the resulting public opinion becomes rational, justified, supported by argument, and further removed from an emotional atmosphere.”
Regarding Article 11 of the Charter on Citizenship Rights, which refers to women’s presence in various arenas, he said: “If we speak of dignity, ownership rights, and the right to self-determination, these are rights that know no gender, and if we maintain a gendered view, they lose their nature. Many differences existing in religious texts regarding men’s and women’s rights are social differences; that is, they are not intrinsic differences, but possess a historical and social dimension.”
Concluding his remarks, Nobahar added: “The principle (al-asl) is that man qua man possesses equal rights and duties, and it is the claimant of discrimination who must produce solid proof to sever us from the requirement of the principle, namely equality. In many of these differences, solid jurisprudential proofs do not exist; rather, in past eras, these differences were socially acceptable.”