According to the Research Institute of Contemporary Jurisprudence, the scientific session “Ethics of Jurisprudential Belief: Approaches and Principles” was held by the Department of Jurisprudence of Society, Ethics, and Upbringing of this research institute on March 3, 2025; a session in which the relationship between “ethics” and “jurisprudential belief” was analyzed from a fresh perspective.
In this session, Hujjat al-Islam wal-Muslimeen Dr. Seyyed Mohammad-Baqer Mirsane’, Assistant Professor in the Department of Theoretical Ethics at the Quran and Hadith Research Institute, presenting the paper “Ethics of Jurisprudential Belief: Approaches and Principles,” sought to offer a theoretical framework for explaining the ethics of belief in the ijtihad process. Subsequently, Hujjat al-Islam wal-Muslimeen Dr. Hassan Bousaliki, member of the Scientific Council of the Department of Jurisprudence of Society, Ethics, and Upbringing at the Research Institute of Contemporary Jurisprudence, engaged in critiquing and reviewing the presented views.
Dr. Mirsane’, at the opening of his speech, considered the main idea of the paper the result of years of study in jurisprudence and principles of jurisprudence (Usul), stating: “Many of the discussions pursued today coherently and independently in other sciences also exist in jurisprudence and principles of jurisprudence, but were raised fragmentarily amidst various discussions. If these discussions are gathered and organized, one can utilize the capacity of both disciplines to enrich one another.”
Pointing out that the “ethics of belief” is one of the emerging branches of applied ethics, he explained that this domain speaks of human moral responsibility in forming one’s beliefs, raising the question of whether any belief can be accepted without investigation and sufficient evidence or not. In his belief, this very issue is applicable in the ijtihad process, and principles of jurisprudence possess the capacity to produce a form of “ethics of jurisprudential belief.”
The session’s presenter, pointing to the views of the late Vahid Behbahani, spoke of the existence of a set of moral criteria for deduction, specifying: “Not being authoritarian in opinion (mustabidd bi-l-ra’y), lacking mental obsessions, avoiding stubbornness, and enjoying a spirit of fairness are not merely moral recommendations; rather, they are influential in the quality of the jurist’s understanding of proofs.” The Assistant Professor in the Department of Theoretical Ethics at the Quran and Hadith Research Institute, emphasizing that the “professional ethics of jurisprudence” has not yet been codified independently, added: “Just as professional ethics is spoken of for other professions, such a discipline must take shape regarding jurisprudence as well.”
Hujjat al-Islam wal-Muslimeen Mirsane’ then proceeded to express the most important questions of the ethics of jurisprudential belief: “When is it morally correct to accept a jurisprudential belief? Is the jurist obligated to place any result he deduces from texts at society’s disposal without any reservation? Can a doubtful matter be conveyed to the public as the practical Sunnah of the Infallibles (a), or even a truth whose expression is not in the interest of society or religion be published without reflection?”
He further explained his theory based on three approaches: “virtue-based,” “deontological,” and “teleological.” In his belief, in the virtue-based approach, accepting a jurisprudential belief is morally justified when originating from virtues such as justice, piety (wara’), and a sacred faculty (malakah qudsiyyah). In the deontological approach, the main criterion is obedience to divine command and traversing the correct path of discovering the ruling, without permitting the practical results of the ruling to intervene in its validity. However, in the teleological approach, the consequences and interests arising from a jurisprudential belief also play a role in its acceptance, and the jurist cannot ignore the social and religious effects of his belief.
Dr. Mirsane’, emphasizing the necessity of foundational coherence in ijtihad, stated: “If we have accepted the virtue-based approach, we must accept all its implications; if we are teleological, we must likewise remain committed to that same foundation throughout the deduction process. One cannot be consequentialist in one part of jurisprudence and purely deontological in another part without clarifying the basis of this difference.” He also considered the experience of governance jurisprudence a grounds for rethinking this issue, adding: “This domain must become rule-based; a coherent ethics of jurisprudential belief must take shape to clarify on what logic the jurist arrives at a jurisprudential belief in each domain.”
In the critique section, first, Hujjat al-Islam wal-Muslimeen Mousavikia, welcoming the presentation of this discussion, regarded his most important question as pertaining to the relationship of these three approaches with the jurists’ method, asking: “Have jurists utilized all three approaches simultaneously, or has each remained committed to a specific approach? If these three approaches cannot be reconciled, must the jurist select only one of them from the beginning?”
The member of the Scientific Council of the Department of Jurisprudence of Society, Ethics, and Upbringing at the Research Institute of Contemporary Jurisprudence also emphasized that jurisprudence, like other sciences, seeks to discover reality, and “excusability” (ma’zuriyyah) should not be considered its primary goal. According to him, being excusable in case of error is a requirement of the discovery process, not its end (ghayah); hence it should not be conveyed that the jurist merely seeks a way to be excusable before God.
Continuing the session, Hujjat al-Islam wal-Muslimeen Dr. Hassan Bousaliki, raising questions regarding the nature of the “ethics of jurisprudential belief,” stated that many raised discussions in truth pertain to defining jurisprudence itself and the ijtihad process, rather than a matter external to it; hence it must be clarified whether ethics of belief is an extra-jurisprudential discipline (danish-e borun-fiqhi) or part of the internal structure of jurisprudence. He also emphasized the necessity of distinguishing between “ethics of jurisprudential practice (ehtilaq-e faqahat)”, “ethics of imitation (ehtilaq-e taqlid)”, and “ethics of practicing jurisprudence (ehtilaq-e ‘amal bi-fiqh)”.
In conclusion, Dr. Mirsane’, welcoming the presented critiques, considered his paper the beginning of a path for further scientific dialogues, specifying: “This paper is not the end of the discussion, but the beginning of a research trajectory. Many of the questions raised in this meeting require independent examinations and deeper dialogues.” He added that organizing discussions on the ethics of jurisprudential belief can contribute to clarifying the foundations of ijtihad and explaining more precisely the relationship between ethics and jurisprudence in emerging issues.