The Martyred Leader Fundamentally Did Not Consider Documentary Consensus (Ijma’ Madraki) Part of the Science of Usul al-Fiqh

Note: Fame does not always highlight the full scope of a person’s qualities and characteristics; at times, it can overshadow certain attributes, leaving them unaddressed. The scholarly dimensions of the Martyred Leader of the Revolution’s personality—much like those of his righteous successor—fall into this category. The dominance of his political and social persona has meant that his scholarly and academic qualities have rarely been examined in a scholarly, non-promotional manner. On the occasion of the martyrdom of this great commander, we spoke with Ayatollah Mohammad Mohammadi-Qaeini, one of the professors of advanced-level fiqh and usul al-fiqh at the Qom Seminary who attended the Martyred Leader’s classes for many years, about the distinguishing features of his teaching. He believes that the Martyred Leader introduced innovations in the sciences of Usul al-Fiqh, Fiqh, Rijal (biographical evaluation of hadith narrators), and Qur’anic exegesis, which he would address during his fiqh lessons. He considers one of the most significant of these innovations to be the exclusion of documentary consensus from the science of Usul al-Fiqh, along with his position that the invalidity of a stipulated condition does not necessarily entail the invalidity of the contract itself. The detailed interview with this member of the Scientific Council of the Health and Medical Jurisprudence Group at the Institute for Contemporary Fiqh Studies follows below:

Why Did the Martyred Ayatollah Khamenei Never Teach Advanced-Level Usul al-Fiqh?

Contemporary Fiqh: Why did the Martyred Ayatollah Khamenei never teach an advanced-level course in Usul al-Fiqh? Was this due to a lack of time for teaching it, or a lesser degree of conviction regarding the discipline of Usul al-Fiqh?

Mohammadi-Qaeini: Regarding why he did not teach the science of Usul al-Istinbat (the methodology of juristic derivation), the main issue was that his time was limited. Managing the affairs of the Islamic Ummah, particularly in connection with the Islamic Revolution, is an extremely demanding undertaking. This was not unique to him; it applied to the great senior maraji’ (sources of emulation) as well. Imam Khomeini himself, after the Revolution, taught neither fiqh nor usul. The late Ayatollah Borujerdi, after some time had passed in his marja’iyyat during which he taught both usul and fiqh, eventually discontinued teaching usul entirely. Other prominent scholars followed a similar pattern. Marja’iyyat, and beyond that, the leadership (za’amat) of the Shia community—and indeed of the wider Islamic Ummah—especially in the context of this Islamic Revolution, demands an enormous amount of time. However, this did not mean that his conviction regarding Usul al-Fiqh was weak. Like many other great scholars, he held the view that the science of Usul al-Fiqh, as a key methodology for juristic derivation (istinbat) in fiqh, ought to have a clear, organized, structured, and non-lengthy framework. Our discipline of Usul al-Fiqh contains a great deal of superfluous material and lengthy digressions that could be trimmed—whether in terms of classification, presentation, or the discussion of useful issues with greater practical application—yet this refinement has not yet been carried out within our tradition of Usul al-Fiqh. Therefore, he certainly held firm convictions regarding Usul al-Fiqh; in his own fiqh discussions, whenever he engaged in juristic argumentation, he demonstrated thorough familiarity with and mastery of the principles and foundations of Usul al-Fiqh. The reason he did not begin formally teaching it, however, was twofold: first, he observed that many others were already teaching this discipline; and second, what is essential for fiqh is possessing sound usuli foundations, which he himself possessed. Consequently, since teaching Usul al-Fiqh according to the newer methodology was highly time-consuming, he did not undertake it, and instead simply established the relevant usuli foundations within the course of his fiqh lessons in order to substantiate his positions, without deeming it necessary to devote extensive time to a detailed, standalone treatment of usuli discussions.

His Distinctive Methodology in Addressing Fiqh Topics

Contemporary Fiqh: What was his approach to addressing fiqh topics? Did he employ a methodology distinct from that of the jurists of Qom?

Mohammadi-Qaeini: Yes. Regarding methodology in fiqh discussions, it is now common to speak of the “Samarra school,” the “Najaf school,” and the “Qom school”—these schools of thought, each named after one of these cities, possess their own distinguishing characteristics. We have addressed these in a separate, detailed discussion elsewhere. However, regarding his particular methodology in addressing fiqh topics, the key point is that his fiqh was Jawahiri fiqh—that is, he adhered to the same methodology employed by the author of Jawahir al-Kalam, a methodology esteemed and followed by all scholars of both Najaf and Qom. This is clearly evident and was thoroughly implemented throughout his fiqh curriculum. Jawahiri fiqh possessed the following distinguishing characteristics: first, it was grounded in demonstrative reasoning (burhan) and argumentation; second, it was attentive to the views of jurists; third, it involved thorough investigation of all juristic opinions on any given issue; and fourth, it involved deepening and expanding the discussion and argumentation while avoiding oversimplification. This was the methodology practically implemented by the author of Jawahir, and it was fully and clearly evident in the Supreme Leader’s teaching curriculum—whether in the discussion of music and singing (ghina), in the “Three Treatises” (al-Rasa’il al-Thalath) concerning the chapter on jihad, or in Al-Makasib al-Muharramah (Forbidden Transactions). Accordingly, what stood out prominently in his fiqh discussions was his subject-recognition (mawdu’-shenasi) and particular attention to the subject matter itself. It often happens that an issue may appear self-evident from a common perspective (‘urf) yet remain unclear to specialists, and vice versa; likewise, a subject matter that jurists and specialists might consider well-established could, through his critical scrutiny and meticulous examination, be reframed in a different light, leading to a corresponding change in the ruling itself. It can therefore be said—and we observe this to a considerable degree in the late Imam Khomeini as well—that he devoted great care to understanding the subject matter, relying on it and clarifying it according to time and place; whether in discussions of music and singing, instruments of frivolity and play (alat-e lahw wa la’b), backbiting (ghibah) and involvement in political affairs, or in other topics and subjects.

The general principle is that unless we precisely understand the subject matter, we cannot issue a ruling. According to the scholars, the relationship between subject matter and ruling is analogous to that between cause and effect; without a proper understanding of the subject matter, applying a ruling to it becomes essentially meaningless. Therefore, in matters of fiqh, we must exercise precision regarding time and place—or even regarding the meaning a given term held at the time it was issued by the Infallible (Ma’sum)—to determine what that word actually meant and what the Infallible intended by it, rather than relying solely on present-day common usage. He made a special effort in this regard, and this is entirely evident throughout his discussions and in his treatment of every issue; it can be clearly observed.

Contemporary Fiqh: How were the topics for his advanced-level fiqh lessons selected? Did he insist on addressing contemporary issues, or did he also discuss longstanding, traditional topics?

Mohammadi-Qaeini: Yes. Regarding the selection of lesson topics, he certainly prioritized contemporary issues, since we have now established a system of governance; we face matters of jihad, politics, administration, education, and many other issues. We have numerous unresolved complexities and ambiguities that remain incompletely clarified—issues such as inflation, and price discrepancies that create disputes in value between buyer and seller, for instance. These matters must be addressed, and Islamic fiqh, based on the standards handed down to us by the Infallible Imams (peace be upon them), is capable of responding to all of them. Therefore, even though he framed these topics as contemporary issues, this did not mean he neglected longstanding, traditional topics; rather, he presented those same traditional topics with a new dimension and a contemporary approach—such as the perspective on women and women’s position in society, the perspective on youth and their place in the community, the relationship between religion and politics, the role of religion within governance, and similar matters. In short, it can be said that he sought to resolve contemporary problems, much as Martyr Motahhari, Martyr Sadr, and many other prominent scholars—though not large in number—prioritized the pressing issues of the age that had been neglected, insufficiently addressed, or not examined with sufficient depth. Through resolving contemporary fiqh issues, he addressed these problems and paved a clear path for the governance system and officials who required rulings on these matters.

Contemporary Fiqh: Given the tremendous importance he placed on the Qur’an throughout his life, was this evident in his advanced-level fiqh lessons as well? In other words, was his argumentation based on Qur’anic verses merely a matter of seeking blessing (tabarruk) and formality, or did he seriously engage with them, considering them the primary source among all sources of evidence (umm al-adillah)?

Mohammadi-Qaeini: As it happens, what is entirely certain is that at the beginning of every discussion he undertook, he would first address the relevant Qur’anic verses, followed by the hadiths. Furthermore, in the course of the discussion, or after concluding the treatment of hadiths, he would also address consensus (ijma’) and prevailing scholarly opinion (shuhrah fatwa’iyyah), examining these as well. In his argumentation on fiqh issues meant to be substantiated through Qur’anic verses—that is, where rulings were to be established on the basis of a verse—he exercised thorough and necessary precision. He would examine a verse in terms of its linguistic meaning, sentence structure, the various types of textual implication (dalalah), and the range of interpretations offered by our great exegetes who had engaged with that verse, and he would establish or refute these interpretations through rigorous argumentation, at times even offering a nuanced distinction (tafsil). Therefore, it is not the case that his attention to the Qur’an was limited to mere recitation, or citing a couple of verses for the sake of blessing and showing reverence to the Qur’an—not at all. He would examine the verses in genuine detail; for instance, regarding the verse “Awfu bil-‘uqud” (“Fulfill your contracts”), he would ask: What does “’aqd” (contract) mean? How many meanings does it carry? What does “’ahd” (covenant) mean? What is the difference between “Awfu bil-‘uqud” and “Awfu bil-‘uhud”? Can both terms indicate the fundamental principle of validity in commercial transactions (bay’), or not? He offered extensive discussion on such questions. Notably, in these lines of argumentation, he would begin with the views of earlier exegetes, theologians, and jurists, and would even, at times, thoroughly present the views of contemporary scholars on that verse—how they interpreted it—subjecting these interpretations to critical examination. His critiques were genuinely rigorous; that is, based on his own principles and independent derivation, while maintaining respect for these great scholars, he would critique and, where necessary, reject their views, occasionally offering an entirely new interpretation of his own. It is therefore entirely clear that he gave special attention to the Qur’an as the authentic and primary source for argumentation regarding religious rulings and teachings. This offers a lesson for all of us: that we must not merely invoke the Qur’an for the sake of confirmation, relegating Qur’anic verses to a secondary or tertiary position. The first stage of argumentation must be grounded in the Book of God, followed by the hadiths and other sources of evidence.

Contemporary Fiqh: What were the Martyred Ayatollah’s innovations in the field of fiqh?

Mohammadi-Qaeini: From a fiqh perspective, one of the innovations that can be attributed to him relates to the matter of Wilayat al-Faqih (Guardianship of the Jurist). Like Imam Khomeini, the late author of Jawahir, the late Naraqi, and even earlier scholars such as Shaykh al-Mufid—who had articulated the fundamental principle of Wilayat al-Faqih—he attached great importance to this doctrine. In his view, the legitimacy (hujjiyyat) of all actions and behaviors carried out within society—whether by rulers or ordinary people—derives entirely from the authority of Wilayat al-Faqih and the establishment of the Wali al-Faqih’s approval regarding any given action; without this, no action possesses religious legitimacy. Even if a person prays, fasts, gives charity, or performs good deeds, if in a particular matter he knows that the position of his Wali-Amr (guardian ruler) differs from his own and the guardian holds a different view, he considered undertaking that action to be entirely impermissible and illegitimate.

Regarding other matters—for instance, whether we may deviate from primary principles for the sake of managing societal affairs, and whether, by determining relative priorities (al-ahamm fa’l-ahamm), certain Islamic rulings may be postponed or temporarily suspended in order to implement another, more critical fiqh ruling—this parallels the argument that the Prophet Harun (Aaron) made to his brother when Prophet Musa (Moses) asked why he had not prevented the people from worshipping the calf. Harun responded that he feared Musa would return and accuse him of causing division among the people, saying “lam tarqub qawli” (“You did not heed my word”)—meaning: “I said, preserve all of this in accordance with Islam, and you may then come and address me directly.” Thus, Harun was prepared to accept the people’s adherence to the fundamental principle of monotheism (tawhid), even though some of them had, in the context of worship, turned to calf-worship, rather than risk division before Musa’s return to resolve the matter.

This represents an important issue: our need to discern what is of greater versus lesser priority within society. Sometimes this becomes necessary—for example, the matter of hijab is among the essential requirements of Islam; however, if our approach and method risk endangering the very foundation of the system, or destroying the Revolution itself, then this matter must certainly be postponed, or at least not treated as an immediate priority relative to matters concerning the system’s survival. The same applies to economic and financial matters, banking issues, and even political matters, including the question of political parties and partisanship. People are free to express their own views and to form organizations; however, they must understand that while forming a political party poses no problem in terms of managing affairs and organizing action, when it comes to the fundamental principles of religion and allegiance to the governing system, individuals must not subordinate themselves to a political party. A party, functioning merely as an organizational body that articulates certain professional or organizational guidelines, operates only within that limited scope; however, individuals shaping their beliefs and conduct according to party directives holds no religious legitimacy. Legitimacy belongs to Islam, which, during the Occultation, must be implemented through just and comprehensively qualified jurists (fuqaha). Therefore, yes, forming political parties poses no inherent problem, and political activity is indeed necessary; but all of this must operate under the umbrella of Wilayat (Guardianship)—that is, it must take shape in accordance with the principles of Islam and the establishment of Islamic rulings within society, and such activities remain permissible only insofar as they do not undermine adherence to Islamic rulings.

Contemporary Fiqh: Did he also have innovations or distinctive, less commonly articulated principles in the science of Usul al-Fiqh?

Mohammadi-Qaeini: Broadly speaking, yes, within discussions of Usul al-Fiqh, he held positions that diverged from the prevailing scholarly view. For instance, he did not accept the presumption of eternal non-existence (istishab al-‘adam al-azali), which is one of the categories of istishab (presumption of continuity).

Or, for example, regarding whether the invalidity of a stipulated condition (shart) entails the invalidity of the entire contract (‘aqd): the prevailing view holds that it does, but he maintained otherwise. He held that if a contract is concluded and made contingent upon a certain condition, and that condition proves invalid, then the condition itself has no effect and is rendered void; however, the contract itself—having been established and enacted through genuine intent—remains intact and valid; the contract is not invalidated.

Or, regarding documentary consensus (ijma’ madraki), he offered a clear position: he stated that when our scholars sometimes cite instances of consensus—for example, where a verse exists, a hadith exists, and other evidences exist, and consensus is invoked alongside them—the consensus mentioned in such contexts is meant to indicate that the position derived from the Qur’an and Sunnah also enjoys scholarly support, with little or no dissent among jurists. Therefore, what is meant here is not the technical sense of consensus as one of the four recognized sources of Islamic law (al-adillah al-arba’ah); accordingly, documentary consensus does not, in fact, constitute part of the technical concept of consensus within the science of Usul al-Fiqh—its purpose is merely to corroborate the position. Similarly, with respect to other principles, he held views, on certain occasions, that diverged from the prevailing scholarly consensus and are essentially regarded as principles distinctly his own.

Contemporary Fiqh: What was his principle regarding the evaluation of the reliability of hadiths?

Mohammadi-Qaeini: Yes. Regarding reliance on hadiths, while he accepted the prevailing scholarly view that a report from a trustworthy narrator (khabar al-thiqah) constitutes valid evidence—that a hadith whose narrators are trustworthy is authoritative, whether classified technically as sahih (authentic), hasan (good), or muwaththaq (corroborated)—he nonetheless held that the authority (hujjiyyat) of a report is not confined solely to reports from trustworthy narrators. What is truly authoritative, in his view, is a report whose issuance is assured (khabar mawthuq al-sudur)—that is, a hadith whose content is such that we have confidence it was indeed issued by the Infallible (Ma’sum), even if one or more of the narrators mentioned in its chain of transmission have not been proven to be trustworthy; this poses no problem, and such a hadith remains authoritative. This may be established through corroborating indicators—for example, that the content is confirmed by the Qur’an, or corroborated by other reliable hadiths; or that although the hadith is technically weak, it appears in the Four Books (al-Kutub al-Arba’ah); or that our great jurists, who represent the pillars of fiqh, have practically incorporated this hadith into their works or acted upon it, or have at least explicitly affirmed its reliability—even if the chain of transmission that has reached us contains deficiencies, weaknesses, or narrators whose trustworthiness has not been established. In such cases, it becomes evident that, in the view of these earlier scholars, since the chain reached them through a reliable route, they possessed some basis for confidence in the trustworthiness of all individuals involved. Accordingly, he held this broader, more expansive view regarding hadith authentication.

Contemporary Fiqh: Did he have innovations or less commonly articulated principles in the science of Rijal as well?

Mohammadi-Qaeini: Yes. As it happens, even before the Revolution, he had written an article and treatise comparing the four well-known Shia works of Rijal: al-Fihrist by Shaykh al-Tusi, Rijal al-Tusi, Rijal al-Najashi, and another Rijal work also compiled by Shaykh al-Tusi. He conducted a comparative analysis of these works, examining their reliability and the various chains through which hadiths are transmitted via these four categories of narrators, according to their differing principles. Regarding great contemporary scholars—including the late Ayatollah Khoei and the late Ayatollah Borujerdi, who had also engaged with the science of Rijal, authored works on the subject, and each held distinctive positions of their own (particularly Grand Ayatollah Borujerdi, who had introduced innovations of his own in the field of Rijal)—he offered critical assessments. He addressed Rijal-related matters both at the level of specific instances (sughrawi) and at the level of general principles (kubrawi); for example, questions such as whether the books that have reached us are genuinely attributable to their claimed authors, and whether the intermediary narrators cited in these hadiths as validating a given narrator’s trustworthiness are all themselves reliable—and if some are not reliable, whether their reliability can nonetheless be established through some alternative means. Consequently, in cases where our great scholars deemed a hadith unreliable because those who had vouched for a narrator’s trustworthiness had not themselves had their own trustworthiness established, he would establish the hadith’s reliability through alternative means—whether by identifying a variant chain of transmission, or by locating an intermediary figure intended to vouch for the original narrator; for instance, he might find that the narrator’s trustworthiness had been established in some other work. On this basis, he would challenge these eminent scholars, arguing that, contrary to their assessment, the hadith they considered unreliable was in fact reliable, since those who had vouched for the narrator’s trustworthiness were themselves all reliable, supported by evidence and chains of transmission. Therefore, as a jurist, he was indeed regarded as holding distinctive positions within the science of Rijal as well; in both his usuli discussions and his analyses of Rijal, he offered critiques of the views of eminent scholars and introduced innovations of his own, through which a given hadith’s reliability would either be invalidated or established—consequently affecting the fiqh ruling on the matter and yielding new conclusions.