Epistemological disconnection has methods and methods and is different from psychological disconnection. All our resources are aimed at reaching an epistemological break; But psychological disconnection is of discovery and intuition; Therefore, there is no method and intuition is a proof for a person; But there is no justification for others. The method of understanding religion in appearances must be documented in order to reach epistemology, but the psychological disconnection is not methodable at all and cannot be transferred to others.
Note: One of the most important proofs in jurisprudential inference operations is reason. Although this point is repeatedly emphasized in the knowledge of principles, but it is rare to find a jurisprudential issue whose reason is only in the intellect. To solve emerging issues of jurisprudence that there are less explicit texts about them; However, one of the suggestions is to refer to the judgment of reason. We discussed this matter with Hojjatul Islam, Dr. Ali Shafiei, a professor at Mashhad University. He believes that there is no difference between a conclusion and a suspicion caused by the judgment of reason, and therefore, just as a conclusion is a proof, a suspicion will also be a proof. In this conversation, he expressed new points that have not been discussed so far. The details of the conversation with this Khorasan practice professor are as follows:
Doesn’t the validity of the decision caused by the reason of reason lead to indiscipline in jurisprudence?
Shafi’i: It seems that lowering the value of reason in jurisprudential inferences has caused a lack of serious attention to it. In other words, we value narration so much that reason has gone astray. But regarding this question, my answer is positive; But this does not mean the descent of reason and narrativeism. Since in the modern era, like the late Sheikh, he raised this issue in a serious manner and talked about cutting off, a serious challenge has been created in our jurisprudence system. Some thought that cutting off can be proof; But what is placed in the circle of suspicion is not proof, in the event that there is no distinction between certainty and suspicion, and both must be managed, saying that certainty and suspicion are not different and have two divisions:
Psychological disconnection or suspicion
Epistemological suspicion
Psychological disconnection has major problems and it is unruly because it is personal. This decision that every person finds and is taken from his psyche is personal and not proof. Perhaps the reason why reason is certain and brings knowledge is that its product was a psychological act and a personal thing, and therefore it is not regulated. From the perspective of the knowledge of the principles of jurisprudence, anyone who reaches a conclusion is a proof for himself and is not a proof for others, while it must be defensible for others. For his followers, the jurist cannot make this cut as the source of his fatwa, and if he wants to have a fatwa based on the cut, he will be of the second category.
In my opinion, what is proof is the second part; It means epistemological disconnection. It is certain that it is a proof for a person and others like his followers.
Who distinguishes between these two types? Decisive considers himself to be miserable; But who recognizes what the interruption is derived from?
Shafi’i: The distinction between the two is clear and self-defining and others can understand which type it is. Epistemological disconnection has methods and methods and is different from psychological disconnection. All our resources are aimed at reaching an epistemological break; But psychological disconnection is of discovery and intuition; Therefore, there is no method and intuition is a proof for a person; But there is no justification for others. The method of understanding religion in appearances must be documented in order to reach epistemology, but the psychological disconnection is not methodable at all and cannot be transferred to others.
Can’t psychological disconnection be medicated?
Shafi’i: There are differences between these two types of disconnection:
The first difference: psychological disconnection is the product of causes, and from them it leads to psychological disconnection, which is personal and cannot be managed. Of course, they can be common causes and occur for several people and cause personal authority for each of these people; But the epistemological disconnection is the product of reason, not the cause.
The second difference: epistemological deduction, because it is a product of proof, is typically not personal, and since it is so, there is no difference between deduction and suspicion; Because there are non-cognizable matters in suspicion.
The third difference: epistemological disconnection, because it is documented, can be a proof for the imitators.
With this division and the point that a person cannot swear, this state of certainty is only based on reason and no feelings, emotions, or mental state are involved in it, there is no difference between suspicion and certainty. This problem causes problems for our jurisprudence system and the suspicion should be taken into consideration as much as the suspension is taken into account. Because even the epistemological disconnection is not without feelings and emotions and mental states, although it has a reason; But it is not 100% its product and it is definitely derived from psychological matters; But it has been documented.
It seems that the difference between the jurists is sometimes manageable; Such as scientific, academic and cognitive affairs, where one person knows the rules, another person has the vocabulary, another has the history of the development of jurisprudence, and the other has very strong principles. These are manageable; But there are things in the jurisprudence that cannot be managed, which can be effective in cutting. In terms of magnanimity, a jurist who is a risk-taker is less careful than a jurist who is not a risk-taker. A jurist for whom ethics is important, this affects his fatwas, and the output of his jurisprudence is more a guarantee of ethics than a jurist who does not consider ethics to be much involved.
Therefore, the epistemological disconnection also has ambiguities because it can be unmanaged and non-reasonable; Therefore, the separation between rational suspicion and transferable suspicion will be indefensible. If we include rational thought in the device, it will solve many challenges.
The late Shamsuddin has an article in his book on women’s rights stating that we have two types of axioms: Shari’i axioms and jurisprudential axioms. Some have seen the weight of these two as the same; But this is a mistake. Obviously, it is so clear that it does not need proof. He believes that jurisprudential axioms should also be examined, as opposed to Sharia axioms, which have authority and do not need to be examined.
For example, the lack of guardianship of women in jurisprudence has been discussed so much that it is taken for granted; But I checked and saw that all the evidences can be undermined and there is no improvisation.
Therefore, we must provide a method that manages both. Intellectual suspicion should not be abandoned from the beginning. It can be said that reasonable suspicion is a proof under these conditions and should not be dismissed as suspicion.
This article is part of the file “New Evidence in Contemporary Jurisprudence” and will be prepared and published in collaboration with Ijtihad Network.