Note: Hujjat al-lslam wal Muslimin Bastani has been teaching at the Qum Seminary for many years, and his course on the principles of jurisprudence and theology is currently held in this seminary. For many years, he has also been interested in emerging issues and teaches and researches in these areas. We discussed with him the ruling on the broadcast of naked or semi-naked men’s bodies in the media. He had previously discussed the issue of covering in his non-jurisprudence course. According to this teacher of jurisprudence and principles at the Qum Seminary, effective rulings in the field of covering cannot be issued by relying solely on religious credentials, but rather, in addition to religious credentials, attention should also be paid to the purposes and wisdom of the rulings. The following is a detailed account of an exclusive conversation with this veteran teacher at the Qum Seminary, from your perspective:

What is the ruling on obligatory body covering for men?

Teacher Bastani: Before I answer this and your subsequent questions, I consider it necessary to mention two introductions:

First Introduction: When we set out to discover the religious duty regarding an issue, several steps must be taken: The first step is to extract the legal validity of the inherent title of that action or the titles associated with that title – whether titles equal to it or more general titles that include our title. For example, when the ruling on consulting a non-mahram doctor is discussed, in addition to the title “consulting a non-mahram doctor,” which is the essential title of the subject, the ruling on consulting a non-mahram should also be clarified, because usually the doctor’s treatment is accompanied by his consulting a patient.

The second step is to examine the legislated credits on other titles that are related to the above essential title and have a reasonable general and specific relationship with it – that is, they are not permanently associated with it. For example, when the ruling on obeying parents is discussed, the ruling on hurting them and insulting them should also be sought; because it often happens that abandoning obedience to parents causes hurt or is considered an insult to them. Or, for example, if we are trying to discover the ruling on singing, we cannot ignore the ruling on music; because the accompaniment of music with singing is not unexpected. Of course, some of these secondary titles, rarely and occasionally, coincide with the essential subject of our problem, which is usually beyond the researcher’s ability to address.

Second Introduction: The popular opinion among jurists is that the ruling of the Shari’ah is specifically the credentials of the Lawgiver, which are addressed to the obligated ones. In contrast to this opinion, there is another significant opinion that believes that credentials are not an essential element in the formation of the Shari’ah ruling, but the discovery of the love and hatred, will and dislike of the Lawgiver is also sufficient to establish the ruling of the Shari’ah, even if no credentials are legislated based on it. In clearer terms, the teachings of the Shari’ah have been communicated to the obligated servants of God in various forms. One of these forms is the Shari’ah credentials, but in addition to credentials, one should not be unaware of the love and hatred, will and dislike, intentions and wisdom of the Lawgiver in discovering the Shari’ah duty and God-pleasing action. The religious credentials are the addresses of the Lawgiver to the obligated ones, which have been communicated to us in the form of a specific message, in an apparent word, or through rational implications. But wisdom is the likes and dislikes of the sacred Lawgiver, which we understand in a reliable way. A jurist who holds this opinion may consider only wisdom that has been expressed by the elders of the law and in religious texts as ruling-making, and on the other hand, perhaps in addition to that, he may consider wisdom that the intellect understands, even if it has not been discovered through religious texts, to be sufficient.

Despite the differences of opinion that exist in explaining and limiting the obligation to wisdom, which should be addressed in its place, in my opinion, it cannot be denied that the obligated one, just as he sees himself responsible for the message and writing of the lawgiver, is also responsible for the love and hatred, will and aversion of his inherent master – the sacred lawgiver. According to this opinion, the wisdoms outline the scope of the Shari’ah rulings in a scope beyond the credits for the obligated (mukallafin).

There is an important difference between credits and wisdoms, and that is that the scope of the credit is solely dependent on its reason and is defined, so to speak, independently of its wisdoms, but the scope of the obligation arising from wisdom is, first, dependent on the existence of wisdom, and second, dependent on the absence of an obstacle in the situation in which the obligated (mukallaf) person is. Jurists who consider credit to be an essential element in the formation of a Shari’ah ruling consider wisdoms to be merely moral recommendations that are good to follow; but they do not entail a jurisprudential duty.

At the end of this introduction, it should be noted that sometimes it is difficult to distinguish between credits and divine wisdoms. It is possible that a matter, for one jurist, is subject to the credits of the Shari’ah, but for another jurist, it is considered wisdom. Pursuing these matters requires a detailed space that is beyond the scope of this article.

In any case, if we believe in the latter opinion, in addition to the two steps that were taken in the first introduction to discover the ruling of the Lawgiver, another step or steps must be taken; and that is, an attempt to discover the wisdom and criteria that sometimes apply to the subject we are studying in some way. We will follow the example of this case while applying it to the issue in question – namely, the covering of men.

Now, after stating the two introductions above, we can answer the question that was raised as follows: The famous jurists believe that the obligatory amount for a man is the covering of his private parts. Apparently, their main reason for the necessity of covering the private parts is the noble verse of Surah An-Nur: “Tell the believers to lower their gaze and guard their private parts. That is purer for them. Indeed, Allah is Aware of what they do.” In this verse, the meaning of guarding private parts is covering the private parts, along with caution. The evidence that no more covering is necessary for a man than that is also the originality of the acquittal. This is a simple and elementary statement and report of what is stated in the jurisprudential treatises. But to explain this fatwa, it is necessary to take help from what was mentioned in the introduction and state: It is common and customary in jurisprudential books, in the position of stating the ruling on a subject, that the jurist only seeks the validity that has been assigned in the Shari’ah, especially the inherent title of that subject or the implications of that title. In other words, the validity regarding other titles that are related to the subject in a general and specific way, are usually not considered in this position. This feature is also present to a greater or lesser extent in practical treatises.

Perhaps the existence of this matter in today’s practical treatises can be criticized, but at least in the current situation, someone who refers to the practical treatise of his or her reference should know that unless he or she also searches for the ruling on related topics, he or she cannot reach the complete fatwa of his or her reference jurist and fully understand his or her duty in relation to a subject.

In short, if it is said in scientific and practical treatises of jurisprudence that covering the private parts is obligatory, this does not mean that sometimes covering more than that is not obligatory in the form of other topics. The same is true of the principle of exoneration in covering beyond the private parts, because the meaning of its current meaning is only exoneration with respect to the specific validity of the title of covering and does not consider the ruling on other topics that sometimes apply to covering. Therefore, the fatwa on the necessity of covering the private parts, and the implementation of the bara’ah otherwise, does not mean that the obligated (mukallaf) person is not required to pay attention to other legal bases – and also to the divine wisdom – related to this issue. Rather, it is possible that, while the principle of exemption from obligation regarding the title of covering applies, other titles may sometimes be obligatory. The other titles are those that, based on the legal basis – and in our opinion, the divine wisdom – impose duties on the obligated (mukallaf) person.

Is the fatwa of many jurists, including Muhaqqiq al-Khu’i, who consider covering the private parts obligatory only for men, effective in today’s society?

Mr. Bastani: In discussing the obligatory covering of men in front of non-mahrams, we are faced with several titles: One is the title of “covering men”, which is the inherent title of the issue. The other title is “preserving the sanctity of the believer” in social relations, which is given religious validity to its necessity in Islamic law. Some coverings in some environments are considered disrespectful to the respected observer. It may be said that in general, observing the minimum norms of social custom is an example of preserving the sanctity of society, and in certain situations, these minimums can change.

Here, there is also a third topic that there is disagreement about the wisdom or validity of the ruling, and that is the topic of “helping others to sin.” Perhaps, relying on the primary validity of the Shari’ah regarding the topic of covering, in a certain environment, will cause someone else to commit sin, so due to the need to avoid helping others to sin, at least in some situations, more covering should be observed. This topic is especially important when we know that the ruling on the extent of covering and the ruling on the extent of looking are not the same; that is, if we believe that covering more than the private parts is not obligatory on a man, it does not mean that a non-mahram can look at a man’s body other than the private parts.

The fourth topic, which seems to be an example of wisdom, is the issue of modesty. Modesty and the nature of the covering are usually associated with each other, and of course the requirements for its quality also vary according to the circumstances. A covering may not be an example of immodesty in one environment, but it may be in another. In such an environment, a covering must be observed more than the direct validity of the covering is attributed to it.

Perhaps there are other credentials and wisdoms in this regard that we can reach with further reflection, and it is not unlikely that by analogy with the priority of the ruling on women, we can consider the specifics of a man’s face and shroud to be outside the necessity of covering. The result of what we have said is that first: the private parts must be covered absolutely, although depending on the case, we must see what other credentials and wisdoms require. Second, attributing this opinion to the late Ayatullah Khu’i, who considers the covering of private parts to be the only requirement for men, is an incorrect attribution.

Considering the fatwas of jurists, what is the ruling on displaying naked or semi-naked men’s bodies in the media?

Mr. Bastani: In response to the question of the ruling on displaying men’s bodies in social media, it is good to address the issue in three stages:

The first stage is the ruling on looking at a non-mahram man, beyond the image or media tool. Most jurists consider the validity of looking at a non-mahram to be exclusive of looking at a picture, but despite this, they distinguish between obscene and other images and consider obscene images to be absolutely forbidden, whether it is done with the intention of lust, or to arouse lust, or accompanied by usury or not. The reason for this fatwa is perhaps the truth of the customary prohibition against looking at obscene images, even if it is beyond the picture. They consider it forbidden in non-obscene images, especially looking with lust or usury, as well as intentionally looking.

I believe that the rulings on looking are nourished by three wisdoms: one is avoiding lust and its attendants, the other is respecting the believer who is being looked at, and the third is modesty. Respect for the believer and modesty, just as they are directly related to covering, are inversely related to looking at a non-mahram; that is, when we want to respect another, we do not look at him except to the extent that is normal; Just as when we are modest, we will not intentionally look at another. I believe that based on these three wisdoms, one should think about looking at a non-mahram – whether it is the gaze of the one who is intimate or through images and media – and its limits and limitations.

In other words, even if we accept that the validity of the sanctity in looking at a non-mahram is dependent on the gaze of the one who is intimate, in terms of the issue of avoiding lust and preserving the sanctity of the believer and modesty, looking at a non-mahram through images cannot be free and liberated. Even if this does not establish validity, the mere proof of the existence of wisdom – that is, love and hatred, the will and aversion of the lawgiver – is enough to impose a duty on the one who is obligated.

It is not a bad idea to make a passing reference to the evidence of these three wisdoms regarding looking at a lowly person. In the detailed discussion I have had in this regard, I have shown that, based on numerous evidences, the verse “Tell the believing men to lower their gazes… and tell the believing women to lower their gazes…” refers to the wisdom of modesty in looking at non-mahrams. Also, my evidence on the issue of the sanctity of a believer is, such as the narration “It is not forbidden for women of the Ahl al-Thimmah to look at their senses and hands.” Regarding the issue of inciting lust, the narration “Looking is a poisoned piece of the devil’s spear, for leaving it for Allah alone and for no one else. Allah will reward it with faith, finding a prey” is sufficient to prove it. These are wisdoms related to looking at non-mahrams and apparently are not specific to a man’s gaze on a woman. As mentioned in the second introduction, wisdoms rule alongside credentials. What I have presented here is a clear analysis of the fatwas of jurists, which of course explains the duty of those who are obligated in a clearer way.

The second stage is the ruling on men’s covering behind images and the media. When, based on what was discussed in the first section, we know that it is obligatory for the obligated person to cover his private parts absolutely and the rest of his body occasionally – wherever one of the wisdoms exists – from non-mahrams, the question arises as to whether this ruling is against the private part of the attendant or whether the covering of the attendant also includes the image? The eminent jurists consider the validity of the ruling on covering to be limited to covering from the attendant, but the wisdoms cannot be assigned to it. This is a revelation of the Islamic ruling for a jurist who does not consider validity to be an essential element in the formation of a religious ruling.

The third stage is the ruling on the media display of a man’s body to non-mahrams. The difference between this issue and the issue raised in the previous stage is that there, the issue was to what extent a person should observe the covering of his body behind the image, but here, the meaning is an image that the owner of the media puts on public display of the bodies of others. Now that the ruling on looking at a non-mahram man from behind a picture and the ruling on the obligatory covering for men behind a picture have been clarified, it seems that the ruling on the visual media is clear. The central headings in this issue are “cooperation in committing sin” and “aiding in committing sin” and also “spreading sin.”

Where an actor, for example, acts in a film to be shown and does not observe the obligatory covering, the media that publishes it has participated in a cooperation in committing sin. It has also contributed to the sin of the observer who sees it. Where a film or picture is published in which a person appears in an unlawful covering, but has not intended to show his body to others, the publishing media has committed a sin in terms of spreading sin and has aided in committing sin in terms of looking at the forbidden thing that happens.

Regarding the topic of spreading indecency and also cooperating in sin, the opinion of the jurists is clear that, according to the example of “And do not cooperate in sin” and “Indeed, those who love that indecency should be spread among those who believe, for them will be a painful punishment in this world and the Hereafter, and Allah knows, while you do not know,” those two topics are considered forbidden in terms of Shari’ah; however, as mentioned, the topic of aiding in sin is controversial: some consider it to be included in the category of prohibition, and some consider it to be part of wisdom.

Is there a difference in the rulings on the display of men’s bodies between live and non-live exposure? If the answer is yes, what is the reason for this difference?

Mr. Bastani: It seems that there is no difference between live and non-live broadcasting; because they have no substantive difference and both will be subject to forbidden titles. Explanation: In the example of the ruling on cooperation or donation against sin, when we are talking about the media and the audience of the media is a statistical community with people with different morals and beliefs and in different conditions, how can we distinguish the limits of the ruling? When an action is considered sin and forbidden according to the Shari’ah, since its limits depend on the truth of the title mentioned in the argument, applying the ruling to the instance is not difficult; because in the position of application, it is taken by the application of the title; but where the sanctity of an action is derived from a wisdom, since its application in the position of compliance is a function of the existence of wisdom on the one hand and the absence of an obstacle on the other, the task of applying it to a statistical community is difficult, especially in our case where the media usually has defensible motives in broadcasting an image or film. The problem is that the combination of necessary existence and absence of hindrance occurs in the case of one person and not in the case of another; and sometimes it is found in some conditions and in other conditions, not. Now, should the media shut down its work just because the subject and conditions of the ruling are fulfilled in the case of one person?

Let me give a more concrete example. If the display of a men’s wrestling or football match in the media has benefits in line with the mission of the media and, for example, causes excitement in society, in what case can it be considered an example of aiding in stimulating the lust of non-mahrams and be considered forbidden? These are more than jurisprudential questions, they are thematic questions that seem to be the responsibility of a group of experts in social psychology, sociologists, moral philosophers, and theologians to determine.

This note is part of the electronic journal “Principles of the Jurisprudence of Performance,” which was produced in collaboration with the School of Jurisprudence of Art and the Ijtihad Network website.